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The ability to transition technology developments to operational systems is of 
great importance to the Department of the Navy (DoN).  One way to achieve increased 
transitions is to operate more efficiently – more “like a business.” 
Over the years significant programmatic and policy changes have been introduced 
in the DoN.  One of these changes was the initiation of a new science and technology 
(S&T) transition process for delivering new capabilities in a more focused manner -- the 
Future Naval Capability (FNC) process. 
This thesis examines the FNC technology transition process from a business 
process perspective.  A number of common business parameters are researched and used 
for comparison to the FNC Process.  The goals and objectives of the FNC Process are 
documented and feedback is obtained from the stakeholder community.   
Although the FNC Process is new, and remains a work-in-progress, the results of 
this thesis reveal frustration and concern from all stakeholder communities regarding 
continued difficulties with the process for delivering new capabilities to the warfighter.  
In comparing FNC Process parameters to those in the commercial sector this research 
identifies areas where the FNC operations differ from the private sector.  In those areas 
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Due to limited financial resources a number of agencies within the government 
have been exploring ways to operate more efficiently for many years.  The Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)1 
and the U.S. Postal Service are examples of three such government agencies which have 
pursued, in a very public and visible manner, efficiency reforms in the way they conduct 
their business operations.   
The Department of Defense (DoD) has also been aggressively pursuing 
fundamental changes to the way it conducts its business operations.  The recent Defense 
Transformation Act for the 21st Century is possibly the most sweeping reform of the 
Defense Department since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.  Business reform 
initiatives, in accordance with the Secretary of Defense’s (SECDEF) transformation 
mandate, are being implemented within the military services.  As SECDEF Donald H. 
Rumsfeld commented in an editorial column, “the fact is that the transformation of our 
military capabilities depends on the transformation of the way the Defense Department 
operates.”2  The driving force behind the continued desire to operate more efficiently, 
beyond the obligation of being judicious stewards of taxpayer dollars, was the realization 
that such actions free up limited resources needed for other desired uses.   
To realize increased business operating efficiencies the government has sought to 
model some of the methods of the commercial sector.  If such commercial practices were 
translated to government business operations it seemed reasonable to expect to free-up 
additional resources through increased operating efficiencies realized by taking 
                                                 
1 NASA, in particular, has been in the public spotlight regarding efforts in changing how they do 
business in their struggle to keep a national space program alive.  For additional material on initiatives to 
make the government more “businesslike” under President Clinton refer to Chapter 9 of Butrica, A. J. 
(2003). Single Stage to Orbit: Politics, Space Technology, and the Quest for Reusable Rocketry.  
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  See also McCurdy, H. E. (2003).  Faster, Better, Cheaper: 
Low-Cost Innovation in the U.S. Space Program.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press and 
McCurdy, H. E. (1994).  Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational Change in the U.S. Space 
Program.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press .  These efforts, which focused on doing more 
with less, cutting waste and bureaucratic red tape, are considered by many to have been failures. 
2 Rumsfeld, D. H. (2003, May 22).  Defense for the 21st Century.  The Washington Post, p. A35. 
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advantage of lessons learned from the commercial sector.  One of the areas where there is 
a desire recapitalize investments is in the transitioning of advanced technology to the 
military operational community. 
 
1. Department of the Navy Initiatives 
The ability to transition new technology developments successfully into 
operational systems in a reasonable timeframe has been, and continues to be, of critical 
importance to the Department of the Navy (DoN).  As mentioned above, the SECDEF 
has articulated a mandate to transform our military services into a more responsive, 
mobile and expeditionary force to defend our citizens.  This guidance is being 
aggressively implemented within the DoN.  The realization of the transformational 
changes desired will likely require the transition of new Science and Technology (S&T) 
developments to the operational community in a more efficient and rapid manner.   
Over the last few years significant programmatic and policy changes have been 
implemented in the DoN's S&T program.  These changes are attempts to change the way 
the Navy conducts the “business” of scientific research, the development of new 
technologies and the transitioning of those technologies from a laboratory environment 
into an operational military system.  One of the changes implemented was the initiation 
of a new S&T process – the Future Naval Capability process – for delivering technology 
to the operational community in a more focused and accelerated manner.   
 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research was to examine the effect that attempting to operate 
“like a business” has had on the implementation of the Future Naval Capability process.  
This thesis examines business concepts, such as the use of business models and group 
decision dynamics, to determine if the FNC Process accurately approximates the business 
processes from the commercial sector.  A focus on the “business environment” of the 
FNC Process will focus the analysis of issues encountered when attempting to transition 
products to the operational community.   
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The objectives of the various participants in the process will be analyzed, and the 
difficulties they report of the transition process will be discussed.  Finally, an assessment 
will be made regarding whether or not the process metrics were sufficient to facilitate the 
transition of technology to the operational community in a more accelerated manner (as 
desired).  The goal of this research was to provide a greater understanding of the issues 
involved, and suggest changes that might benefit future technology transition efforts. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this thesis was: 
To what extent is the Future Naval Capability S&T business environment 
conducive to an acceleration of technology transition? 
In order to answer this question it was necessary to obtain background 
information on business methods, the Navy’s S&T Program, the Navy’s new FNC 
technology transition process and an understanding of the environment within which the 
FNC Process operated.  To obtain this exploratory background information it was 
necessary to first answer the following questions: 
• What triggered these changes to the execution of the DoN S&T Program? 
• What is the history of the FNC Process? 
• What FNC technology transition metrics exist? 
• To which areas is the technology being transitioned? 
• How do the FNC Integrated Product Teams operate? 
• What changes to the FNC technology transition process have occurred? 
• What transition issues have arisen from the FNC Process? 
• How do other DoD/DoN transition processes relate to the FNC Process? 
• To what extent are current transition efforts an improvement over past efforts? 
 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study contributes to a greater awareness of the issues encountered when 
attempting to transition science and technology projects from the laboratory to an 
operational system in an accelerated manner.  Lessons learned will be captured from the 
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Navy's FNC technology transition process and the defense business environment that 
surrounds that transition process.  These lessons represent very real obstacles to the 
Navy’s ability to transition technology in a rapid manner and arise from conflicting 
priorities of the various participating organizations.  A clear understanding of the difficult 
and critically important issues encountered when attempting to transition new technology 
projects to the fleet in an accelerated manner is essential if resolution of those transition 
problems is to be achieved.  This thesis provides practical information and useful 
feedback regarding the implementation of the FNC technology transition process for 
future researchers and those involved in DoN policy decisions.   
In addition to DoD guidance, commercial business processes and performance 
models, DoN S&T and FNC literature, the analysis provided here was based on other 
relevant sources, including a number of senior DoD, DoN and commercial personnel as 
well as individuals who participated in the FNC Process and so were intimately aware of 
the process mechanics, advantages and shortfalls.  The results of this research are 
intended to provide positive tangible benefit to the DoN’s S&T program as a reference to 
be consulted when exploring lessons learned and when planning further changes to the 
Navy’s technology transition processes. 
 
E. SCOPE 
This thesis covers the FNC subcomponent of the DoN S&T Program only.  This 
thesis makes no attempt to assess the success or failure of specific FNC’s nor of 
individual projects funded through an FNC Integrated Product Team.  The period of 
relevance for this thesis covers what I refer to as the “first implementation phase” of the 
FNC Process which formally started3 with FY02 funding.  Data collected spanned the 
approximate period of November 1998 through September 2003.  Those FNC Process 
changes which occurred in late 2003 were considered to be part of the “second 
implementation phase” of the FNC Process and were not addressed in the analysis4. 
                                                 
3 This happened when funding resources were provided. 
4 One change, for example, was the separation of two FNC’s, Capable Manpower and Warfighter 
Protection, from the rest. 
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 F. METHODOLGY 
An extensive literature review of relevant information was conducted.  Examples 
of such information includes; DoD guidance, directives, instructions, books, magazine 
and newspaper articles, and other relevant library information resources regarding 
military transformation efforts, business reform processes and the current DoD 
“business” operating environment.  A review of previous research on technology transfer 
experiences was also undertaken.  This review included the use and effectiveness of 
business models, group theory and decision-making dynamics, and the use of teaming 
arrangements in the technology transition process.   
A series of questions, designed to provide insight into the FNC technology 
transition process, were prepared.  To answer the questions raised data were collected 
from a number of independent sources.  Personal interviews of high level civilian 
(government and commercial) and military leaders, DoN community stakeholders and 
FNC technology transition process participants were conducted.  In addition, an 
electronic survey was electronically mailed to FNC participants from each of the four 
major S&T stakeholder communities.  This data was analyzed to evaluate the extent to 
which the FNC Process approximated industry business methods as well as to determine 
if the DoN S&T “business environment” was conducive to promoting technology 
transitions at an accelerated pace. 
 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The research presented in this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II (Literature Review) provides background information on the events 
that have led to our current business environment within the DoN.  A number of 
important business concepts such as business models, group decision-making and 
collective action behavior dynamics are presented in detail.  Also presented are a 
summary of transition experiences found in the literature. 
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Chapter III (DoN Science and Technology Program) is an extension of the 
literature review and provides the reader with an overview of the DoN’s Science and 
Technology (S&T) Program.  This chapter, compiled essentially from public DoN 
“marketing” material, describes the Navy’s S&T leadership reporting structure, the DoN 
S&T Program and its subcomponents. 
Chapter IV (Future Naval Capabilities) is a further extension of the literature 
review but focuses on a major subcomponent of the DoN S&T Program, the Future Naval 
Capability process.  This chapter presents a detailed description and chronology of the 
Future Naval Capability technology transition process and documents its implementation. 
Chapter V (Data Collection and Analysis) presents and analyzes the data collected 
to assess whether the DoN has been able to operate more “like a business” and whether 
our DoN business environment has facilitated the acceleration of technology transition to 
the warfighter.  The analysis of this chapter is based on feedback provided by DoN S&T 
“stakeholder” representatives who participated in the Future Naval Capability process 
and returned an electronic survey on the Future Naval Capability process.  The analysis 
also draws from personal interviews of high level representatives from representatives 
within the government (military and civilian) and industry responsible for technology 
development and the transitioning of technology to operational systems. 
Chapter VI (Conclusions and Recommendations) presents a series of conclusions 
and recommendations based on the analysis and experiences of the stakeholder 
communities directly involved with the FNC Process.  A number of the important 
technology transition issues are summarized and the recommendations made to stimulate 
debate and suggest alternate approaches to achieving the technology transition results 
desired. 
Appendix A (FNC Survey Responses) provides the raw data used for the analysis 
in Chapter V.  These are the S&T community5 stakeholder responses to the electronic 
survey on the FNC Process. 
                                                 
5 The four S&T stakeholder communities are 1) S&T, 2) OPNAV, 3) Acquisition and 4) Fleet/Force. 
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Appendix B (Business Models) provides information on the revenue generation 
schemes of many common business models used by the commercial sector.  This 
appendix shows the variety of revenue-generation options possible. 
Appendix C (Acquisition Transition Issues) provides one specific example of a 
program that has experienced, and continues to experience, many of the technology 
transition issues examined by this thesis.  Resolution of the difficult issues span will 
require collaboration across the spectrum of DoN stakeholder community’s. 
Appendix D (Measures of Effectiveness) provides a summary of metrics used to 
measure the effectiveness of a defense “business” operation that were uncovered during 
the literature search portion of this research. 
Appendix E (Congress) provides a very brief overview of the role that Congress 
plays in appropriating the operating revenue for government organizations.  The 
Congress plays an increasingly important role in the technology transition process and 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides background information on a number of subject areas in 
order to lay the foundation for topics raised throughout the remainder of this thesis.  With 
respect to the broad issue of technology transition, the issue regarding whether the 
government can – or even if it should – operate in a more business-like manner was 
researched in the open literature and shown to be a highly complex matter.  As this topic 
was explored it was found to be a highly convoluted mix of issues and concepts that 
require careful examination in order to resolve the relevance and interdependencies 
among many of the important topics explored.   
This chapter starts out by presenting some examples of guidance provided by the 
government for operating more efficiently and more effectively – more “like a business.”  
The guidance cited spans a substantial period and concludes with relatively recent 
“transformational” objectives provided by the Secretary of Defense.   
The concept of a “business environment” is introduced next and a number of 
typical business measures are presented.  These measures are used as fundamental 
metrics through which comparisons will be made between the commercial and defense 
business “market” sectors.   
An overview of business models is also presented.  “Models” of business 
operations were found to be in use throughout the commercial sector.  The use and 
development of accurate models of business operations are considered critical to 
successful business operations.  This section explains what business models are and how 
they are used by the business community.  Because of their importance to understanding 
business operations an appendix to this thesis provides additional information on the 
revenue schemes used by various business models. 
A comparison of the civilian and military business “markets” is then explored in 
order to illustrate a few key differences between the two types of business markets.  
Some very important comparisons between government and business operating principles 
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are explored in order understand what principles have been used in the past and to assess 
better whether or not the government can be reasonably compared to a business operation 
or, as an example will show, under what conditions have successful operations been 
demonstrated in the past.   
Because of its fundamental importance to basic business operational principles 
and a number of the issues uncovered later during the research of this thesis, there is a 
section which explores group dynamics and group decision-making in depth.  Many of 
the issues explored in both the commercial and military sectors were fundamentally based 
on principles of group dynamics.  Accordingly, any resolution of these issues will also 
require a understanding of the group dynamics involved. 
A section which summarizes the technology transition experiences of others is 
also included in this chapter.  The experiences of corporate attempts to transition 
technology is directly relevant to the “businesslike” core of this thesis.  A number of 
innovative approaches which have been used are described. 
This chapter concludes with a brief summary of the major points of the chapter 
before moving on to providing a description of the Department of the Navy’s Science and 
Technology Program, in Chapter III. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
The desire for the federal government to operate more efficiently has been a 
consistent goal for a large number of years.  This objective is not simply a recent 
emphasis but has been a remarkably consistent theme articulated by both the executive 
and legislative branches of our government.  Over the past fifty years there have been 
numerous “experiments” in ways to transform government agencies and department 
operations into more efficient, more effective organizations. 
The premise behind this thesis is that the government is deliberately attempting to 
mimic business practices because those in policy-making positions believe it makes 
perfect sense to do so.  There will be, in effect, a sufficient return on investment in doing 
do.  Part of the rationale is that businesses are presumed to operate in a more efficient 
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manner, and are thought to be more responsive to customer needs,6 two attributes 
universally desired within the government.   
This desire to operate “like a business” has not been limited to the larger 
departments of the government, such as the Department of Defense, but has been equally 
pursued across the many diverse components of federal, state and local governments.  
The underlying goal is to respond to a perceived need for an increasing amount of 
financial resources to respond to taxpayer demands.  Raising taxes is one method to 
secure these increased resources.  Wringing more out of our current operations (“doing 
more with less”), through increased efficiencies, is clearly another method to obtain 
additional needed resources.  Along this line of reasoning the fundamental assumption is 
that the implementation of new, more efficient, more effective, transitional organizational 
administrative processes will provide a means for these departments and agencies to 
break from the shackles of the traditional, highly bureaucratic, and financially wasteful, 
administrative processes and thereby free-up taxpayer monies for use in more urgent and 
needed programs.  As would be expected some of these experiments have been regarded 
as more successful than others but all have explored varying approaches to operate our 
government agencies in a more judicious manner.  
The premise behind the reform initiatives is that requiring our government 
agencies to operate more “like a business” will cause them to be more competitive7 and 
more responsive to changing market conditions.  Such behavior would make them more 
efficient, more effective, and save taxpayer money.8 
 
C. GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE 
An awareness of the government’s ability to operate effectively came about as a 
consequence of this country’s response to WWII.  From this national emergency came a 
                                                 
6 If they did not, the logic goes, they would soon be out of business.  There is validity behind this 
based on this sentiment being expressed just this way by the President of a small manufacturing company 
who was interviewed.  His interview comments are included later in this chapter. 
7 For the Navy, the “competition” might realistically be considered to be the other Defense Agencies 
and Services – for example, DAPRA, the Air Force and Army.  It is these agencies that compete against the 
Navy for financial resource allocations, ultimately decided upon by the Congress. 
8 In this case a fundamental business tenet of “making a profit” is equated with that of organizational 
efficiency and “saving money.”  However, making money and saving money are not equivalent. 
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large number of scientific and manufacturing innovations, industry partnerships and 
experimental alliances forged in support of the high priority civilian and military 
activities which were being conducted in the defense of this nation.  The level of 
manufacturing productivity attained, as well as the technological advancements achieved, 
were truly extraordinary and provided this nation with first-hand evidence of the 
possibilities. 
Following WWII – indeed up to current times – there is substantial evidence of 
continued attempts to operate government agencies and organizations in a more effective, 
more efficient, manner.  Examples of such attempts are found at all levels of U.S. 
government operation (local, state and federal) as well as internationally. 
The Clinton Administration placed a heavy emphasis on “reinventing” the 
government.  The National Performance Review’s (NPR) goals were about 
“fundamentally changing the way government does business.”9  The four primary tenets 
outlined by the NPR were: 
• Put customers first by regularly asking them how they view government 
services, what problems they encounter and how they would like services 
improved. 
• Make agencies compete for customer business. 
• Turn government monopolies into more business like enterprises. 
• Shift some federal functions from old-style bureaucracies to market 
mechanisms. 
With respect to the Defense Department, the “market-focus” of the National 
Performance Review had very little substance to it.  The “market mechanisms” refer to 
the issue of “governance” but the specific market mechanisms discussed were not 
germane to defense.  They addressed more general social problems such as 
environmental protection, worker safety, health and public housing.   
One of the observations the NPR made referred to the difficulties the government 
organizations were having in dealing with Congress.  Although no solutions were 
suggested as a result of the NPR, the final report observed: 
                                                 
9 Report of the National Performance Review.  (1993).  p. 43. 
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Many agencies will be unable to set clear measurable goals until Congress 
simplifies their responsibilities.  Programs are bound by multiple, often 
conflicting, legislative objectives.  The complex politics of passing 
enabling legislation and then negotiating annual appropriations forces 
some programs to be all things to all people.10  
An economist observed the drive to operate the government more like a business 
was based on the competitive forces of the private markets: 
The intention is to force public bureaucracies to be governed by the same 
competitive forces that make private markets socially beneficial.11 
In various forums William Perry12 has expressed his opinion that the defense 
business environment has fundamentally changed and that “the Defense Department must 
ride on the shoulders of our commercial industry” and “give up our unique buying 
practices and employ best commercial practices.”13  In essence, although Defense R&D 
might remain in government control for critical defense needs the military’s “buying 
practices” should be based on private sector models. 
Much of the history behind the military and business changes implemented by 
William Perry are discussed in a book published after his service as SECDEF ended.14  A 
reading of his book provides surprisingly little insight into the reasoning behind the 
changes implemented during his service as SECDEF.  With respect to a discussion of 
business concepts and the goals and objectives he desired through his acquisition reform 
initiatives, Mr. Perry’s book falls short in providing amplifying information beyond 
linking much of what had to be done to a need for acquisition reform.  In his book Mr. 
Perry (1999) provides only brief background information regarding the long time it took 
to implement the acquisition reform changes.  The changes which were eventually 
implemented are actually attributed to the recommendations of the Packard Commission 
                                                 
10 Ibid. p 74. 
11 Sclar (2000), p. 3. 
12 William Perry served as Secretary of Defense from January, 1994 to January, 1997.  Many of the 
significant acquisition reform changes were implemented by the Department of Defense while William 
Perry served as Secretary of Defense. 
13 Perry, W. J. (1998, February 23). Defense Must Open the Commercial Door, LA Times. 
14 Carter, A. B. and Perry, W. J. (1999) 
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report, A Quest for Excellence, released in April, 198615.  The Packard Commission’s 
final report called for a number of changes, including a revolution in defense 
management.  The revolution in defense management consisted of three distinct parts: 
1. RMA – A Revolution in Military Affairs.  The focus of this was on an 
Army simulation emphasis and their “Force 21” concept. 
2. RBA – A Revolution in Business Affairs. 
3. RPM – A Revolution in Personnel Management. 
Mr. Perry states the revolution in business affairs was inspired “by the marked 
increase in managerial efficiency of US industry over the last two decades.”16  The use of 
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) teams was one of the new DoD 
procedures introduced under RBA.17  As Mr. Perry describes them, these [IPPD] teams: 
… have been used by industry for about a decade with great effectiveness.  
They bring together the various members of the design and production 
team at an early stage of the design process to consider simultaneously 
what is to be made and how it is to be made, allowing for cost-effective 
tradeoffs in design specification and production techniques. 
These business reform initiatives are fundamentally about cost.  The high cost of 
supporting the current force structure, the long acquisition cycles and the continued 
mismatch between fiscal resource realities and operational force structure requirements 
are the driving forces behind these changes and emphasize the need for transformation.  
When doing a survey of the government’s defense acquisition and procurement systems, 
plenty of examples of cost problems can be found.18  As just one example, in 2000 the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) had estimated the Navy would require roughly $17 
billion more each year for fiscal years 2001 through 2005 than was being planned19. 
 
                                                 
15 Information on President Ronald Reagan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense (1986), also 
known as the Packard Commission, can be found at the National Defense University (NDU) library 
website, URL = http://www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc/pbrc.html, retrieved June 2004. 
16 Carter, A. B. and Perry, W. J. (1999). p. 210. 
17 Integrated Product Teams are discussed in more detail, as an implementation of a group theory 
construct, later in this chapter. 
18 The problem, of course, is wider than the Defense Department.  Any number of sources—such as 
the GAO, the CRC, and others—can provide reports and studies that identify cost problems. 
19 Budgeting for Naval Forces: Structuring Tomorrow's Navy at Today's Funding Level, 
Congressional Budget Office, October 2000 
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1. Transformation Planning Guidance 
Throughout the current administration a very clear case has been made in the 
open press, by the President and the Secretary of Defense, for the need to ‘transform’ our 
defense organizations.  The urgency of these changes has been emphasized by the 
terrorist attacks launched in September 2001 against U.S. citizens.  The Transformation 
Planning Guidance,20 signed by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, states a need 
to transform existing practices to sound business practices as one of three areas of the 
DOD transformational efforts.  This document mentions initiatives are already under way 
as a result of Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).  The objectives of the DPG are 
incorporated within the Defense Transformation Act, congressional legislation designed 
to provide the Defense Department increased flexibility to manage its personnel better. 
In an editorial outlining some of the reasons for transforming the Defense 
Department the SECDEF describes a number of management problems plaguing the 
DoD.  He describes personnel problems that have resulted in a large number (in excess of 
300,000) of on-duty military personnel and contractors filling positions that should be 
filled by civilian personnel.  The transformation initiatives are aimed at actions needed to 
manage a civilian workforce that is responsive and adaptable and mentions they are 
addressing most of the problems they have the power to fix, such as “implementing a new 
business management structure”21 and calls upon Congress to acknowledge its 
responsibility in the transformation process and take the legislative actions that are 
needed to reach these goals  
One of the priorities is a reform of the acquisition process in order to reduce the 
acquisition cycle time and align acquisition with a new capabilities-based resource 
allocation process built around joint operating concepts.  
 
2. Technology Assessment 
Because the issues are so complex, the investment costs are so high, and the 
development timeframes so long, there is a critical need within the government for an 
                                                 
20 DOD, Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003. 
21 Rumsfeld, D. H. (2003, July  18). Why Defense Must Change, Washington Post, p. A19. 
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unbiased technical advisory function.  Congress needs such a service, for the legislative 
decisions it is called upon to decide, as does the DoN for the highly technical tradeoffs 
which are absolutely critical for cost effective operations.  Incredibly, such a service is 
not provided today to either organization which leaves both vulnerable to poor and costly 
decisions as a result of a confusing tangle of special-interest analysis.  This deficiency 
has been raised in the past.  In a study of the weapons development and acquisition 
process, Fox (1974) concluded “Congress needs substantially more analytical support 
than it is now receiving.”22 
The literature provides evidence that the role of scientific technical advisor has 
traditionally been a controversial, difficult and often unappreciated one.  Politically, the 
advisory science role has been tolerated, and only reluctantly.  Dr. Vannevar Bush’s23 
influential report24 on the need for a civilian scientific agency to address urgent needs 
was accepted by President Harry Truman but not implemented in the manner and with the 
urgency recommended.  Although the importance of the issues was too important to 
overlook the recommendations were implemented in a different manner and Vannevar 
Bush’s influence in Washington declined. 
In 1976 President Nixon, “furious with advice he didn’t want, unceremoniously 
fired his science advisor,” which, in turn, caused Congress to create the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy (OSTP) by law.25  The elimination of the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) in 1995 left Congress without an organizational tool to tap into for the 
expert scientific and technological advice needed for effective legislative decision-
making.  This deficiency has become increasingly critical, as more and more of the 
decisions faced by Congress and society require judgments based on highly specialized 
technical information.  The negative ramifications of this action are increasingly more 
evident as Congress debates serious policy decisions on highly technical matters ranging 
from anthrax and stem cell research to weapons inspection criteria. 
                                                 
22 Fox (1974). p. 457. 
23 Dr. Vannevar Bush was Head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during WW II. 
24 Bush, V. (1946). Science – the Endless Frontier. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
25 Kelly, H. (2003, August 12). No Substitute for Sound Science.  Washington Post. p. A13. 
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The Navy, too, has historically resisted any independent scientific advisory role.  
William McBride describes the difficulties the Navy has encountered in its struggles with 
technological change, one small aspect of which was the early formation of an 
“ineffective and peripheral Navy Consulting Board.”26   
The technical assessment function continues to be a issue for the Navy.  In much 
more recent independent reviews of portions the Navy’s S&T investment portfolio, the 
need for system analysis to support the program goals and provide a reliable assessment 
of technology options was found to be an often repeated finding of the Naval Studies 
Board (NSB).27 
Like the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service, the 
National Academy of Sciences is an organization which does play an important role in 
providing Congress and the DoN, through the Naval Studies Board, with independent 
assessments of technical issues and programs.  Like all of the outside assessment 
organizations, their role is necessarily limited and their reviews are not typically 
conducted in an urgent and timely manner.  The DoN needs a more vibrant, proactive 
system analysis and technical assessment advisory capability in order to make the policy 
and resource decisions that are needed. 
 
D. BUSINESS MEASURES 
In conducting this research a number of factors that influence how an organization 
conducts their business operations were found.  Those that appear to play a significant 
role for government business operations are included in this section. 
                                                 
26 McBride (2000). p. 93. 
27 The lack of quantitative system analysis is a continued repeat finding by the Naval Studies Board.  
Some of the reports which cite this shortfall include (1) Naval Studies Board. (1999). 1999 Assessment of 
the Office of Naval Research’s Air and Surface Weapons Technology Program.  Washington D.C.: 
National Academy Press.; (2) Naval Studies Board. (2000). 2000 Assessment of the Office of Naval 
Research’s Marine Corps Science and Technology Program.  Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.;  
(3) Naval Studies Board. (2000). An Assessment of Undersea Weapons Science and Technology Program.  
Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.;  (4) Naval Studies Board. (2000).  Network-Centric Naval 
Forces: A Transition Strategy for Enhancing Operational Capabilities.  Washington D.C.: National 
Academy Press.;  (5) Naval Studies Board. (2001). 2001 Assessment of the Office of Naval Research’s 
Aircraft Technology Program.  Washington D.C.: National Academy Press.  This continued lack of system 
analysis can drastically limit the DoN’s ability to make informed investment and technical decisions.   
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1. The Business Environment 
The business environment is typically reflected through a number of indicators 
which provide potential investors a glimpse into the state of the health of the market of 
interest.  Specific environmental indicators will vary by market, but examples of typical 
generic environmental indicators would include; the strength of the market economy, the 
degree of political stability, the legal and regulatory environment, taxation laws and 
policies, competition policies, the availability and quality of the labor market, the quality 
of infrastructure, and the markets openness to investment. 
 
2. Market Performance Indicators 
For the commercial sector there are a large number and variety of performance 
metrics and economic indicators to guide investment decisions.  For example, it is very 
common for individuals and businesses to refer to a number of Wall Street stock market 





NYSE-listed co                                                
The Dow Jones stock indexes.  The Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) index serves as a broad measure of the entire U.S. market.  The 
DJIA includes such diverse industries as financial services, technology, 
retail, entertainment and consumer goods.  The Dow Jones Transportation 
(DJTA) and Utilities (DJUA) Averages include only transportation and 
utilities stocks.28 
NASDAQ.  NASDAQ lists a large number of “category-defining” 
companies including technology, retail, communications, financial 
services, transportation, media and biotechnology companies.29 
S&P 500.  The Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) is an index made up 
of five hundred stocks, each of which is selected for liquidity, size, and 
industry.  The S&P 500 is a common benchmark for the overall market, 
and is frequently used as the standard of comparison for investment 
performance. 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Composite Index.  The NYSE 
Composite Index measures the performance of all common stocks listed 
on the NYSE.  This index consists of more than 2,000 U.S. and non-U.S. 
stocks and is a measure of the changes in aggregate market value of all 
mmon stocks.30  
28 The Dow Jones Indexes website. http://www.djindexes.com/, retrieved June 2004. 
29 The NASDAQ website. http://www.nasdaq.com/about/overview.stm, retrieved June 2004. 
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30 The NYSE website, http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/composite_desc.shtml, retrieved June 2004. 
• 
• 
                                                
American Stock Exchange composite index.  The American Stock 
Exchange (Amex) Composite Index is made up of all listed equities on the 
exchange.31 
Russell 2000 index.  This index measures the performance of 2,000 small-
cap (small companies just starting to grow) stocks.32 
As a subset to any of these market indices there will be more specific market 
indicators including, for example, declining issues, advancing issues, and trading volume.  
At the individual company level, where stock certificates are sold to individual investors, 
the sale price of a share of stock is another metric indicator. 
 
3. Revenue 
Revenue is the heart and soul of all business operations.  For commercial business 
operations the source of revenue is the customer.  For government business operations the 
revenue flow is more complicated because of the number of organizations that become 
involved – the revenue stream is not supplied through a simple business-customer 
relationship.  For government operations, although all revenue ultimately comes from the 
taxpayer, the actual financial appropriations for any government organization will come 
from the Congress and not directly from the taxpayer.  As such, congressional 
representatives function as a proxy on behalf of their constituents, a subset of the total 
population of U.S. taxpayers.  As a consequence, the taxpayer is not necessarily – or even 
typically – considered to be the “customer” in all cases, which greatly complicates the 
actions and accountability of government ‘business’ operations. 
Within DoD the Navy portion of President’s Budget (PRESBUD) Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds33 flow from the Under Secretary of 
Defense (USD) for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) to the DoD 
Comptroller.  The DoD Comptroller provides a Program Budget Accounting System 
(PBAS) allocation Navy-wide.  The responsible office for Navy-wide RDT&E is ONR.  
 
31 American Stock Exchange, http://www.amex.com/?href=/atamex/news/press/sn_XAX_010504.htm, 
retrieved June 2004. 
32 Ameritrade On-line, http://www.ameritrade.com/educationv2/fhtml/stockmarket/russell.fhtml, 
retrieved June 2004. 
33 For the Defense Department, the Science and Technology (S&T) account is a subset of the 
governments Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) account. 
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The DoN PBAS allocations are disbursed to the Navy claimants who then initiate funding 
requests and documents such as project directives, military interdepartmental 
procurement requests, procurements, contracts and grants.  In addition, Congress 
typically makes other changes to the appropriated defense accounts as well.  For 
example, there can be congressional “plus-ups” which would be considered separate from 
the PRESBUD as well as “undistributed reductions”34 and “rescissions.”35 
 
4. Customer 
The most important aspect of any business venture is a clear understanding of the 
customer.  Business models will make assumptions based on an understanding of 
customer needs and buying behavior.  Without a clear understanding of who the customer 
is a business will not be able to make accurate assumptions of behavior and the model 
will not be a reliable approximation of the consumer-business dynamics.  For example, 
the customer is generally considered to be the source of a business’s primary revenue 
stream.  Business operations are focused on meeting customer needs throughout the life-
cycle of the product or service.  Business operations are concerned with retaining existing 
customers as well as attracting new customers for future business growth through 
expanded revenue streams. 
 
5. Return on Investment 
Return on Investment (ROI) is a common financial measure based on historical 
data.  Viewed as such, ROI is a backward-looking metric that measures how well an 
investment has performed over time.  ROI metrics will not predict how investments will 
perform in the future or how to improve business results for greater future returns.  
Typical ROI calculations will require the organization to identify the total financial 
benefit received from an investment (technology project) while subtracting out the total 
investment required to develop, produce, and deliver that program to the customer.   
                                                 
34 Financial reductions made to current FY accounts. 
35 Financial reductions made to a previous FY account. 
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The commercial sector uses ROI as one investment decision criteria.  Dr. Simon 
Ramo, a former Vice Chairman of the Board and Chairman of the Executive Committee 
of TRW, summarizes the use of ROI from a business perspective: 
In some important, needed areas of technological endeavor now dependent 
on government financing, adequate investment funds will not be 
forthcoming from the private sector for the straightforward reason that the 
anticipated return on the investment, when compared with the risk, is not 
satisfactory.  The financial yield will not be seen as meeting the 
requirements of the private money market where superior investment 
alternatives are to be found.36 
A typical ROI formulation would look like:  
ROI = (Total Benefit - Total Costs) / (Total Costs) 
In this formulation total benefits would include revenue earned (or saved) by the 
organization in addition to any other line items that would add, directly or indirectly, to 
the organization’s bottom line.  In such cases, the “total benefits” term might simply refer 
to the cumulative cash flow (revenue stream) of an investment over time.  The “total 
costs” term would include such things as program development costs, administration 
costs, lost investment opportunity costs, organizational overhead, materials, facilities, 
cost of coordination, marketing costs, etc., and any other costs incurred.  
Another way that ROI is viewed is by comparing the net income to the 
organizations assets.  In this case the ROI equation would look like:  
ROI = (Net Income) / (Value of Assets) 
There are concerns that ROI measures tend to overstate the expected (or even 
experienced) rate of return (ROR) on the investments under consideration.  These 
concerns arise because it is actually extremely difficult to measure all of the costs 
associated with any program and even harder to isolate the financial benefits from any 
                                                 
36 Ramo (1980). p. 72. 
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one specific program.  The degree to which ROI overstates the economic value of the 
investment may depend on a number of factors:37 
• The length of project life.  The longer the project continues, the larger the 
overstatement tends to be. 
• Capitalization policy.  The smaller the fraction of total investment capitalized 
in the books, the greater the overstatement is. 
• The rate at which depreciation is taken on the books.  Depreciation rates that 
are faster than straight-line basis rates produce higher ROI calculations. 
• The lag between investment outlays and the recoupment of the outlays from 
cash inflows.  The greater the time lag, the greater the degree of 
overstatement. 
• The growth rate of new investment.  Faster growing companies will have 
lower ROIs. 
Estimates of reasonable ROIs for technology development projects is difficult.  
Norman Augustine, a former Chief Executive Officer for the Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, suggested 20% was a reasonable return: 
Numerous studies have shown that taxpayer investment in fundamental 
research yields double-digit returns; indeed, most suggest a payoff of at 
least 20 percent – not a bad deal in a time when your money-market fund 
is lucky to pull in 1 percent.38 
This 20 percent figure roughly matches that of some other investments, even 
some reported venture capital investments.  Although for venture capital firms there are 
usually serious issues with releasing investment return information because the funds are, 
in many cases, too new to measure returns accurately.  Even so, some do provide return 
data.  For example, Carlyle Venture Partners II L.P., a fund managed by the Carlyle 
Group, reported an annual return of 20.83 percent as of June 30, 2003.39   
Acceptable ROI figures will vary by investor.  The 20 percent ROI figures 
mentioned above are significantly higher than the 5 and 6 percent returns seen by some 
drug companies: 
                                                 
37 The ROI factors listed are based on information available at the “Value Based Management.net” 
website, URL = http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_roi.html, retrieved April 2004.  Multiple 
management texts and internet sources provide similar definitions for ROI. 
38 Augustine, N.R. (2003, August 8). Supporting Science and Security. The Washington Post, p. A17. 
39 Johnston, N. (2003, July 20). Funds Secrecy Under Attack. The Washington Post, p. D3. 
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The Bain consultants say drug companies are earning only a 5% return on 
their investment in finding new drugs, below levels typically demanded by 
equities investors.  Licensing products from other companies, which was a 
profitable strategy until recently, is now bringing only a 6% return on 
investment, they say.40 
Other “financial ratios” are also referenced in the literature and treated as ROI 
figures at times.  Since “ROI” does not appear to have a single, universally understood 
definition other financial metrics are sometimes used in its place.  “Return on Invested 
Capital,” “Return on Capital Employed,” “Return on Total Assets,” “Return on Equity,” 
and “Return on Net Worth,” all have similar, but different, meanings and might be 
referred to as a “return on investment” metric.  As a result, ROI estimates can be 
confusing.  When using ROI metrics it is important to ensure the definition being used is 
clearly stated.41 
 
6. Net Present Value 
Companies will calculate the “net present value” (NPV) for projects when 
preparing their corporate budgets.  NPV compares the value of a project (in today’s 
dollars) to the value contribution of that project in the future.  To make this projection 
assumptions are made regarding the anticipated inflation rate as well as the minimum 
required rate of return for the investment. 
By doing the NPV calculation a company can determine whether the total present 
value (PV) of a project's expected future cash flows will be sufficient to justify the initial 
costs today.  If the NPV of a prospective project is expected to be positive (i.e., money 
will be made from the project) the project would be an acceptable investment whereas if 
the NPV is shown to be negative (i.e., money would be lost due to this project) then the 
project would be an unacceptable investment and should be rejected.  In many cases 
internally competing projects are compared, via NPV calculations, in order for the 
                                                 
40 Landers, P. (2003, December 8). Cost of Developing a New Drug Increases to About $1.7 Billion.  
The Wall Street Journal. p. A9. 
41 Based on ROI information at the “Solution Matrix, Ltd.” website, URL = 
http://www.solutionmatrix.com/roigo.html, retrieved April 2004. 
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company to decide which of the competing projects are expected to have a sufficient 
corporate ‘value’ to merit funding. 
When calculating NPV the present value of revenue inflows are subtracted from 
the present value of revenue outflows.  The result is a “net” value estimate for the project 
at the current time and in current dollars.42 
The NPV is calculated as the present value of the project's cash inflows minus the 
present value of the project's cash outflows.  This relationship is expressed by the 
following formula:43 
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Figure 1.   
                                                
Net Present Value (NPV) formulation 
where:  
CFt = the cash flow at time t and  
r = the cost of capital.  
The cost of capital, also referred to as the discount rate, is the minimum rate of 
return which would be necessary for a project to be considered as an attractive 
investment.  This rate is determined by corporate executives. 
NPV measurement is widely used for making investment decisions.  One criticism 
of the NPV calculation is that it does not account for flexibility and uncertainty after the 
project decision has been made.  Some prefer to use a “Real Options” valuation to 
account for this shortfall.44 
 
7. Real Options 
The Real Options method captures the value of managerial flexibility in being 
able to adapt decisions in response to unexpected market developments.  Companies 
create shareholder value by identifying, managing and exercising real options associated 
 
42 Investopedia.com website, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/npv.asp, retrieved June 2004. 
43 Prentice-Hall website, http://www.prenhall.com/divisions/bp/app/cfldemo/CB/NetPresentValue.html, retrieved 
June 2004. 
44 Value Based Management.net website, http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_npv.html, 
retrieved June 2004. 
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with their investment portfolio.  The Real Options method applies financial options 
theory to help quantify the “value” of management flexibility and leverage uncertainty in 
a changing world.  When viewed as such, an organizations business strategy is more like 
a series of financial options than a series of static cash flows.45 
As a result, in valuations that involve significant future flexibility or where there 
is significant uncertainty or future revenue flows are close to the break-even point, such 
as long-term strategic scenario’s, flexibility can become a major source of corporate 
value.  In these situations the value of the option (“Real Options”) needs to be taken into 
consideration. 







                                                
Project duration 
Degree of uncertainty 
Cost of acquiring the option 
Potential cashflows lost compared to the full upfront commitment 
Risk-free interest rate 
Expected present value of future cashflows 
By introducing these factors into the business decision-making process, the Real 
Options method allows corporate decision-makers to leverage uncertainty and limit their 
risk.  In most cases the NPV and Real Options calculations are both used in corporate 
decisions.  For projects with a lot of uncertainty, the Real Options valuation estimate is 
often of equal order or greater than the PV for out-year returns.  This combination can 
change the “sign” of the NPV result, and thus change the decision to invest. 
 
8. Time-to-Market 
Time-to-Market (TTM) is a measure of how quickly an organization can bring a 
product from conception to sales.  From a business perspective rapid product 
development processes (fast TTM timeframes) are more profitable than slower product 
 
45 Treating strategic investments as financial options was brought forward by Timothy Luehrman. See 
1) Luehrman, T.A., (1998, July-August). Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the 
Numbers, Harvard Business Review and Luehrman, T.A., (1998, September-October). Strategy as a 
Portfolio of Real Options. Harvard Business Review. 
 25
development processes (slow TTM timeframes).  Rapid TTM processes are positive 
contributing factors for the success of an organization for the following reasons: 

















Premium prices are obtainable early in a product’s life cycle 
Faster breakeven on development investment 
There is a lower financial risk 
The product has a longer market life cycle 
There should be larger sales volume 
Greater overall profits and, therefore, a higher ROI 
 
The key process requirements to realize a rapid TTM would be: 
A vision of what is technically possible 
A clear understanding of customer needs 
Stability in product requirements or specifications 
An optimized product development process 
An accurate business model 
Availability of resources (human, natural, etc) to support the project 
Competent personnel 
Early involvement and rapid staffing build-up to support the parallel 
design of product and process 
Virtual product development including digital assembly modeling and 
early analysis and simulation to minimize time consuming physical mock-
ups and testing, and 
Design reuse and standardization to minimize costs. 
 
It is of interest to note the connection between ROI and TTM.  An organization’s 
TTM will affect the ROI realized due to the time correlation between the two metrics 




9. Supply Chains 
A Supply Chain consists of those organizations and operations that a business will 
use to produce and deliver a final product or service from the supplier's supplier to the 
customer's customer.46  Supply chain management typically includes managing supply 
and demand, sourcing raw materials and parts, manufacturing and assembly, warehousing 
and inventory tracking, order entry and order management, distribution across all 
channels, and delivery to the customer.  Supply chain management addresses a host of 
various complex interdependencies.  These interdependencies create an “extended 
enterprise” that reaches far beyond the factory door.  For the Navy this extended 
enterprise includes the (small and large business) manufacturers as well as the various 
Navy Laboratory and Warfare Centers (the Naval Research Enterprise, or NRE).   
In a business environment there has been a sharp focus on supply chain 
management and operations in order to reduce product costs.  This focus, in turn, is 
requiring a much greater responsiveness out of the supply chain partners in order to 
remain competitive and maintain sustainable business operations.  Desired business 
supply chain operations would include increased customer responsiveness and service, 
reduced inventory levels and procurement costs, and an improvement of the production 
and distribution assets.   
The benefits that can be obtained from careful management of the supply chain 
have been demonstrated by companies like Wal-Mart and Dell Corporation.  The Navy’s 
ability to manage its supply chain is a challenge due to the scope of the Navy and Marine 
Corps “business operations.”  Such a wide scope of operations arguably creates greater 
uncertainties in our supply and demand estimates.  Other factors such as the impact of 
competition (local and global), shorter product and technology life cycles, and the 
increasing use of international distribution and logistics partnerships have led to higher 
risks being experienced by our partners within the supply chain.  The literature says it is 
necessary to understand the risks being assumed by the various components of the supply 
chain.   
                                                 
46 Definition taken from the Supply Chain Councils' FAQ website, URL = http://www.supply-
chain.org/Resources/faq.htm, retrieved 15 July 2003. 
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10. Trust 
Another important aspect of the business environment, but one easily overlooked, 
concerns the issue of “trust.”  Trust is more than an ethical trait which is usually dealt 
with on a personal level, such as between individuals in a personal relationship.  It is also 
applicable to business relationships and corporate actions.  In business, just as it is true 
for personal relationships, trust is a matter of making – and keeping – commitments, of 
being dependable, responsible and truthful.  Just as in personal relationships a loss of 
trust can seriously erode business relationships and become obstacles to future activities.  
The opposite characteristics of trust would be selfishness, lying, cynicism, etc.  These 
types of characteristics will foster resentment, disloyalty and distrust.  When viewed from 
a business perspective: 
Trust forms the foundation, or the dynamic precondition, for any free 
enterprise system.  What constitutes that freedom is not only the right to 
make promises (to buy, to produce, to sell, to hire and pay, to give one's 
labor or one's expertise), but, just as important, the responsibility for 
keeping promises, following through on one's offers, making good on 
one's commitments.  The individual entrepreneur, like the giant 
corporation, depends on trust – including self-trust – to function in the 
business world.47 
Indeed, the importance of trust was specifically cited as a significant factor 
required for the effective implementation of the IPT concept by a major defense 
contractor: 
In any defense acquisition program, cooperation and trust between 
Government and contractor personnel are the two essential elements of a 
successful business partnership.48 
The literature mentions that although many businesses will have turned away 
from the old “command-and-control” organizational model, they end up reverting back to 
that model because employees and managers do not know how to practice “office 
politics” within a culture of trust.  Such behavior has deep ramifications for the 
organization at all levels (within the organization) and across outside boundaries 
(throughout the supply chain). 
                                                 
47 Solomon & Flores (2001). p. 11. 
48 Kao (2000), p 53. 
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Unless an environment of trust is developed and nurtured the potential 
effectiveness of the business operation will be necessarily constrained.  People within the 
organization, and throughout the businesses supply chain, will do their jobs but the 
atmosphere will not be conducive for them to offer the ideas, creativity and enthusiasm 
needed by a thriving, growing organization.  The repercussions of such a negative 
business environment will not only affect the employees within the organization but it 
will also adversely impact business relationships within the supply chain and, ultimately, 
with the customers as well. 
 
11. Making Progress and Embracing Change 
Historically there have been enormous difficulties in documenting and embracing 
the process of technological change.  The technical interrelationships of projects funded, 
and records of results achieved, have been so difficult to document that accurate 
reconstructions of how technologies actually develop and change our operations are very 
difficult to find.  There have been, however, some notable attempts to understand 
technology development and its relationship to research and development made.  At least 
two major studies were conducted.  The first, sponsored by DoD, was called Project 
Hindsight49 and the second was a study funded by NSF called Technology in Retrospect 
and Critical Events in Science (TRACES).50  Project Hindsight attempted to trace the 
contributions of basic research on specific weapons programs while TRACES looked 
over a longer time horizon and focused more on the commercial sector, making the two 
studies very hard to compare.  These studies looked at different aspects of tracing 
technology transitions but both also faced considerable criticism.51 
Attempts to quantify technological change in strictly economic terms, such as is 
done in the work of Jacob Schmookler, have also faced criticism and difficulties based on 
disagreements over some of the assumptions imposed.”52  As such, attempts to present a 
                                                 
49 Project Hindsight (1969), Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. 
50 TRACES (1968), IIT Research Institute for NSF. 
51 Kreilkamp, K. (1971). Hindsight and the Real World of Science Policy, Science Studies 1. p. 43-66. 
52 Sanders, B.D. (1966). Commentary on Invention and Economic Growth, Idea 10, pp. 587-608. 
 29
reasonably accurate interpretation of technological change continue to experience great 
difficulty due to the serpentine nature of technological advances, as well as the diversity 
and complexity of such changes. 
A number of researchers have reported a tendency for radical innovations to be 
developed outside the sectors most affected.  Edward Constant II53 provides an excellent 
discussion of the issues involved regarding the development of the turbojet engine and 
shows this innovative technological development was the culmination of more than two 
centuries of turbine development from water turbines and turbine water pumps through 
turbosuperchargers.  In his discussion Constant references researchers who had 
conducted similar case studies related to other technical fields.54 
The National Bureau of Economic Research has also reported on the great 
diversity in the development paths of radical innovations.  Their report also argues that 
economic growth from improvements in efficiency, productivity and product 
performance depend heavily on detailed, painstaking, incremental improvements in 
existing technologies (rather than the introduction of a completely new “disruptive” 
technology).55 
For the naval community, William McBride56 explores the technological and 
strategic paradigms that are inextricably linked for the Navy.  His study looked at how 
the naval profession addressed technological change.  He found that within the 
professional naval society the participants are bound by a strong traditional warrior ethos.  
In such a society new technology can be destabilizing to the traditional way of “doing the 
business” of warfare.  Some historians have described how traditional warrior ethos have 
been powerful filters against the adoption of new military technologies. 
                                                 
53 Constant (1980). 
54 Constant (1980) references two other sources which are of interest; (1) Jewkes, J., Sawers, D., and 
Stillerman, R., (1958). The Sources of Invention, (London: Norton) and (2) Hamberg, D., (1963). Invention 
and the Industrial Laboratory, Journal of Political Economy 71 pp. 95-115. 
55 National Bureau of Economic Research, (1962). The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: 
Economic and Social Factors. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
56 McBride (2000) 
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The difficulties with change are traced back to the concept of a paradigm by 
Thomas S. Kuhn.  Analogous to the concept of “puzzle solving” that Thomas Kuhn 
indicated was necessary for the advancement of normal science, Constant discusses the 
concept of traditional technology development as being the “improvement of the 
accepted tradition or its application under new or more stringent conditions.”57  He 
contends this type of behavior is how technological communities achieve progress.  
Constant further observes such developments are typically only achieved at great cost and 
through enormous effort from those communities. 
In his study Edwin Layton noted the importance of acts of creative 
“transformation” in transferring knowledge from scientific to technological social 
systems.  Layton’s views were that science and technology are separate but similar and 
interacting social systems: 
The passage of information from one community to the other often 
involves extensive reformulation and acts of creative insight.  This 
requires men who are in some sense members of both communities.  
These intermediaries might be called ‘engineer-scientists’ or ‘scientists-
engineers,’ depending on whether their primary identification is with 
engineering or with science. Such men play a very important role as 
channels of communication between the communities of science and 
technology.58 
There can be great obstacles to embracing a new technology or new solution 
because the old approaches are not abandoned easily.  The final decision regarding 
whether or not to invest in the adoption of a new technology may essentially be 
considered a “paradigm shift” in certain cases due to the difficulty in reaching that 
conclusion.  The decision, nevertheless, will ultimately depend on a number of factors 
including expected costs, efficiency and risks.  Other, non-obvious and – frustrating the 
scientific community – non-technical, factors will play an important role in these 
decisions as well.  Consideration regarding the ease with which the new system can be 
explained and understood, its compatibility with its intended environment and the extent 
                                                 
57 Constant (1980). p. 10. 
58 Layton, E. (1972) Mirror-Image Twins: The Communities of Science and Technology in 
Nineteenth-Century America, in George Daniels, ed., Nineteenth-Century American Science: A 
Reappraisal (Evanston: Northwestern University Press) p. 227. 
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to which it can be easily tried will all be factors in the final decision about whether a new 
technology will be accepted or rejected.59 
As has been shown, the complexity of modern technological systems requires 
long lead times, massive capitalization and extensive planning.  In a rebuttal to the 
Navy’s requirements-driven technology development process (such as the FNC Process), 
Constant has observed: 
Virtually all product development and most production are done in 
anticipation of demand rather than in response to it.60 
 
12. Effectiveness and Efficiency 
In many respects the issue of successful business operations boils down to an 
assessment of an organization’s effectiveness in performing its tasks and coordinating its 
efforts with others outside of its authority.  There has been a host of research conducted 
on measuring the improvement of an organizations’ effectiveness and efficiency.  
Although they are quite different these two terms are confused and are sometimes used 
almost interchangeably.  For a commercial endeavor the qualitative measures of 
productivity have been shown to be all based the concept of efficiency.  As has been 
pointed out: 
It is not satisfactory to measure production of goods or services by dollars 
spent for them (even when inflation is taken into account) and not 
recognize the improvements in the goods and services being produced.61 
Some of the research uncovered in this area is summarized as follows: 
• 
                                                
In 1963, Quinn and Mueller identified the need for long-range planning to 
determine the technologies relevant to a company’s business goals, 
planning technology transfer, and top management attitudes that foster the 
development of new technologies62. 
 
59 Constant (1980). p 16. 
60 Constant (1980). p 30. 
61 Ramo (1980). p. 64. 
62 Quinn, J. B. and Mueller, J. A. (1963, January-February).  Transferring Research Results to 






                                                
In 1977, Roy Rothwell compared nine studies of industrial innovation.  
Common success factors for industrial innovation among the nine studies 
were: good communication, clear identification of market needs, good 
planning and management techniques, innovation as a corporate-wide 
task, and efficient R&D.63 
In 1988, Lowell Steele posed a series of relevant questions when 
evaluating a technical operation.  The types of questions he asked were: Is 
adherence to project goals emphasized?  Are market inputs sought and 
used?  Are technical priorities made in light of resource priorities?  Are 
manufacturing requirements well integrated?  Is technology a persistent 
and effective advocate for innovation?64 
In 1996, Robert Szakonyi reviewed the measures of R&D effectiveness 
over the previous 30 years and identified 10 activities that were 
consistently used over that period as metrics for R&D effectiveness.  
Those activities were: 1) selecting R&D, 2) planning and managing 
projects, 3) generating new product ideas, 4) maintaining the quality of the 
R&D process and methods, 5) having a positive environment for 
motivating technical people, 6) establishing cross-disciplinary teams, 7) 
coordinating R&D and marketing, 8) the ability to transfer technology to 
manufacturing, 9) fostering collaboration between R&D and finance and 
10) linking R&D to business planning.65   
In 2001, Jim Collins reported on the results of a study where his team 
examined the histories of twenty-eight carefully selected companies to 
determine what factors were key for the eleven companies that were able 
to make the leap from “good to great”.66 
 
In Szakonyi’s research it was reported there have been numerous studies which 
have measured R&D operations but focused on R&D efficiency metrics (i.e., how much 
time and resources were required to complete an activity) rather than R&D 
effectiveness.67  Indeed, many of the business process initiatives being instituted by the 
government also appear to be aimed at improving the “efficiency” of government 
 
63 Rothwell, R. (1977). The Characteristics of Successful Innovators and Technically Progressive 
Firms (with some Comments on Innovation Research). R&D Management, 3. pp. 191-206. 
64 Steele, L.W. (1988, September-October). Evaluating the Technical Operation. Research 
Management.  pp. 11-18. 
65 Szakonyi, R. (1996).  Measuring R&D Effectiveness –1. Research Technology Management.  
pp.27-32. 
66 Collins, J. (2001).  Good to Great.  New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc. 
67 Szakonyi, R. (1996). p 30. 
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operations (i.e., lowering costs) rather than making those operations more effective.  In 
many cases these business process initiatives implement actions and policies to make the 
organization operate more efficiently but these same actions actually undermine an 
organization’s operational effectiveness by severely restricting the affected organization’s 
flexibility and, ultimately, its ability to rapidly respond to dynamic market conditions in 
the timely manner desired.  In an effort to make operations more efficient (cost-wise) 
they have imposed policies that have diminished the effectiveness of our operations and, 
as a result, have made the affected laboratories less competitive.  Such a result is the 
exact opposite of the original goals and intentions of the actions taken. 
A number of different metrics for organizational effectiveness have been 
proposed over the years.  Appendix D provides a listing of some of the measures of 
effectiveness encountered during this research. 
 
E. BUSINESS MODELS 
Business models are planning tools used by company executives to study their 
business operations.  A business model can be viewed as the ‘architecture of the revenue’ 
that a business will use in order to capitalize on the ‘value’ of a technology, product or 
service.  In this way a business model provides a way of studying how a business 
conducts its operations and how a company can generate revenue.  The business model 
spells out how a company expects to work, how it will make money, and how it will 
enhance “shareholder” value by describing its role and where it is positioned in the value 
chain for the product or service it produces. 
In most cases any successful business will have thought out and documented a 
very specific and detailed model of their operations.  The business plan outlines all 
components of a business’s operation and assigns qualitative performance metrics to 
portions of the business plan based on initial assumptions of how the business would 
nominally perform in steady state.   
The company's vision, mission, values, and business plan need to be thought 
through, written out, communicated, executed and tracked.  The discipline of putting the 
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business plan in writing will facilitate thinking through the important aspects of the 
business.  Doing so carefully and thoroughly allows organizations to identify obstacles 
and opportunities, determine areas in which additional attention is needed, set 
performance goals, establish resource and partnership strategies, and identify 
performance metrics to track.  In some cases, however, an organization’s business model 
will not be formally documented or will not be readily available to those outside of the 
organization.68 
It might not be unusual for a company to develop a number of separate business 
models.  If a company has several different products different business models may be 
needed to describe varying approaches to revenue generation, product financing, 
development and customer delivery mechanisms.  In such cases a top-level business plan 
would exist at the corporate level reflecting the company's overall plan, and separate 
business models would exist for each major product line.  These separate business models 
would each dovetail into the top-level corporate business strategy and corporate planning. 
 
1. How Business Models are Used 
Business models operationally describe a specific product line that supports a 
company’s strategic business plan.  Business models are developed in accordance with an 
organizations vision and mission statement, objectives, and strategies.  At a minimum, 
vision and mission statements should be drafted, published, refreshed and reviewed with 
all personnel annually.  These are important to maintain the focus desired, and to ensure 
all personnel are working as a team, with full understanding of the company's direction. 
The strategic business plan will provide detailed guidance on the preferred 
company approaches to conducting normal operations, influencing potential investors and 
ways of acquiring required financing.  Prior to the development of a business plan there 
will have been marketing research done and company executives will have already 
                                                 
68 This may be for security or for business competition reasons.  In such cases an approximation of a 
business model can usually be estimated by an examination of company actions, corporate literature, 
instructions, guidance, etc.  Even when business models are fully available, because of the competitive 
nature of business one can expect the most important details of a business model will be considered 
sensitive and not readily available to those outside of the senior leadership of company or organization. 
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developed a product or service as well as marketing plans.  By the time the business 
model is completed a company will already have a feasible product or service to offer to 
a targeted customer who is expected to be willing to purchase that product in some 
manner (buy, lease, rent). 
The thought process to create the business model enables a company to focus on 
the future as well as the present; provides the mission to accomplish the vision; provides 
the strategies and initiatives to accomplish the mission, while taking the steps to 
accomplish the vision.  The process enables a company to look three to five years into the 
future, and lay out the appropriate strategies and initiatives to get there. 
One of the uses of a documented business model is to periodically review the 
company’s status and compare the business planning to actual operations.  These reviews 
allow corporate executives to analyze what worked, what didn't, and make changes to the 
plan to enable greater and quicker strides toward the vision.  Regular reviews of the goals 
and objectives enable the team to re-focus on what was to be accomplished.  The review 
process enables executives to correct actions that had gone off course or came up short; 
and initiate new ones based on lessons learned, changes in the marketplace, changes in 
technology, etc.  The business model and its review provide the capability and tool for 
executives to be able to proactively manage the business, rather than “flying-by-the-seat-
of-one's-pants” and allowing confusion, chaos, and luck to manage the business.  
 
2. Components of a Business Model 
There is some variation regarding the specific components of a business model.  
This variation can be confusing when comparing business models in one reference to 
business models from another source.  As an example, in an article posted at an 
Accenture website some of the common characteristics of business models are discussed.  
In this discussion the authors outline what they feel the various business components to 
be.  They point out a business model can have several parts with some of these part each, 
in turn, being referred to as a model.  Examples of key sub-components of typical 
business models they mention are: Pricing model, Revenue model, Commerce process 
model, Internet-enabled commerce relationship, Organizational form and a Value 
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Proposition.  A common thread is that a business model describes what is unique about 
their company and, more importantly, what differentiates their product offering from 
those of competitors in the same industry.  They defines a business model simply as, “A 
real business model is the organization's core logic for creating value.”69 
In reviewing 70 companies they report no single model provided a guarantee for 
financially superior results but they did make an observation that the more successful 
models appeared to share three characteristics: 
1. Their products offered the customer some unique “value.”  Many times this 
value proposition was a unique combination of superior product, price and 
service. 
2. They were able to articulate a key product differentiator--something that made 
their product offering stand out when compared to products offered by their 
competitors.  Very successful models are also able to devise market-entry 
barriers that protected their revenue streams from being bled-off by 
competitors. 
3. The models were “grounded in reality” and based on accurate assumptions of 
customer behavior.  This point was key as it allowed the organizations to 
match their product delivery cost structures to their revenue streams. 
Other researchers have examined business models and come up with very similar 






                                                
A value proposition.  The value proposition is an estimate of the “value” 
created for potential customers. 
Market segment.  The market segment describes the potential customer 
sector in detail.  The detail will include a description of how the 
technology will be used and the anticipated revenue generation scheme. 
Value chain.  The value chain identifies the business partners required to 
create, and distribute the product to the customer. 
Cost structure and profit potential.  An estimate of the costs and profits 
based on the potential “value” of the product to the customer and the 
operating efficiencies of the company’s value chain. 
Value Network.  Describes the position of the company within an overall 
competitive network of suppliers and customers.  The value network 
includes direct competitors as well as those companies that provide 
complementary products to the targeted customer sector. 
 
69 Linder, J. and Cantrell, S. (2001). “What makes a good business model anyway? Can your’s stand 
the test of change?” URL = http: www.accenture.com.  Accessed April, 2003. 
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• 
                                                
Strategy.  Corporate plans that describe how a company plans to gain and 
maintain market share over their competitors. 
 
3. Public Sector Models 
The interest in business models has not been limited to the commercial sector nor 
is it an area of interest only to the United States.  Wassenaar researched Dutch electronic 
government e-commerce activities from a business perspective and presented it as a 
governmental value chain model.  His particular model incorporated the legislative, 
administrative and juridical functions of the Dutch government and linked these 
constitutions to public sector “trading” parties (citizens, etc).  It is noteworthy to observe 
in his paper that some of the issues driving this research appear to be completely 
analogous to similar issues being expressed here in the US.  For example: 
At one side, bureaucratic governmental organizations have to be 
reengineered and internally broken up in small self-containing flexible 
units in order to respond to the service needs of their citizens.  On the 
other side, they have to be externally integrated in interdependent 
networks coordinated by public-private governance.70 
In his discussion on business models, Wassenaar further observes, “Business 
models are a very often mentioned, but not a well defined concept in literature.  There is 
a lot of variety in interpretation of this concept.”  Even so, he also stated the core function 
of any business model was the delivery of “value” to a customer.  Although his research 
was focused on government e-commerce activities, Wassenaar stated his model was “an 
effort to transfer business concepts to Electronic Government in the public sector.”  
Wassenaar concluded the application of business model concepts to his government value 
chain model was indeed useful and remarked that it would be interesting to elaborate the 
business concept to the field of administrative (resource) management. 
 
4. Defense: Modeling Business Success 
Following the establishment of the Defense Acquisition Goals 2000, the 
Department of Defense has undertaken a number of business reform initiatives and has, 
 
70 Wassenaar, A (2000, September 6-8). E-Governmental Value Chain Models.  11th International 
Workshop on database and Expert Systems Applications (DEXA'00). pp. 289-293. 
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in some cases, established additional goals.  For example, DoD convened a study group 
to help implement a Section 912(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1998 recommendation to enhance commercial business environment education and 
training.  The DoD study group’s experience is summarized in the Department’s final 
report, “The Commercial Business Environment: Accelerating Change through 
Enterprise Teaming.”  This group based their work on a business model approach used by 
‘world–class corporations’ to manage and accelerate change within their organization(s).  
For the DoD the goal was to harness the Department’s array of improvement efforts, 
using the business model to transform the Department into a learning organization and 
fashion new cross–functional teaming roles.  The study group recommended using this 
model in the acquisition context, then broadening its use beyond acquisition after it had 




                                                
The Department was engaged in several pilot programs to test one step of 
the business model, validating its effectiveness in communicating and 
implementing a vision for improving selected defense projects. 
The Department planned to expand the use of the business model in the 
future. 
The Department expected to develop a knowledge management 
infrastructure, which is another key aspect of the business model.71 
Unfortunately, it was very difficult to determine what, if anything, has changed as 
a direct consequence of this report. 
 
F. MARKET COMPARISONS 
This section examines commercial and government business operations and 
attempts to determine under what conditions, and to what extent, the two are reasonably 
comparable.  In a general sense both types of businesses are focused on attracting 
customers, delivering a product or service to those customers, and obtaining revenue 
from those customers. 
 
71 Defense Link website, URL = http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2000/chap14.html, retrieved 
June 03. 
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The literature shows the defense business environment – the market – differs from 
the commercial sector in a number of ways.  The fundamental forces which drive the 
commercial business engines, supply and demand, do not operate in a similar fashion for 
the military sector.  Government and commercial organizations are not governed by the 
same rules nor are they assessed using the same criteria.  At a fundamental level the 
government does not strive to earn a profit and its legislative action tends to control, in 
fact reverse, any “growth” in the government budgets.  Where growth is a positive 
corporate metric for the commercial sector (business is growing), it can be viewed as a 
negative metric for the government sector (taxes are being raised). 
 
1. DoD - Commercial Comparisons 
The U.S. commercial sector is the “economic engine” for our country and 
continues to be healthy and robust.  Many organizations – profit and non-profit – strive to 
emulate its performance as best they can.  This sector is roughly summarized as follows: 
The U.S. economic system is built on the concept of free enterprise 
regulated by competition.  The marketplace is the testing ground for 
products and methods of production and management.  A well-managed 
firm will prosper, and a poorly managed one will fail.  Low costs mean 
higher profits.  Investors take risks that, if successful, will be rewarded by 
higher profits.72 
A further comparison looks at the differences in the fundamental notion of 
“competition” between the commercial and defense markets: 
Competition in the defense industry bears little resemblance to the 
competition of the open market place.  In the commercial market, price is 
usually a major factor in competition.  A producer attempts (1) to lower its 
price on an establish product, or (2) to produce a better product for a 
competitive price.  In both cases, the characteristics of the product are 
usually known and judged by the customer before a purchase is made.73 
Certainly, many of the primary attributes of the commercial sector (competition, 
etc.) are desirable to emulate within the Defense Department.  Yet the defense market 
differs from the commercial market in several important aspects.  For one thing the 
                                                 
72 Fox, J.R., (1988). p. 300 
73 Fox, J.R., (1974). p. 468. 
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defense market is not determined by supply and demand.  Rather than a paying 
“customer” it is the Congress – through a time-consuming, deliberative, and consensus-
based legislative process – which determines the amount the Defense Department will 
have for research, development and production (i.e., the revenue stream). 
Several previous studies have concluded that many of our defense acquisition 
problems over the years have been the consequence of actions taken due to a mistaken 
belief that the defense industry fits into a “free market model.”  Such an erroneous 
comparison of the defense “market” to an industrial business “marketplace” has been 
pointed out on several occasions.  As one study put it: 
Neither the defense industry nor defense programs are governed by the 
free market; defense acquisition programs rarely offer incentives 
resembling those of the commercial marketplace.74 
Furthermore, the defense business revenue stream does not come from a customer 
directly but through a congressional system that uses third or fourth party “proxies” who 
control the revenue on behalf of the paying (taxpayer) customer: 
The size of the defense budget for each fiscal year is determined by 
domestic political and economic conditions, by international events, and 
by the interests of the Congressmen and Senators who serve on defense, 
space and appropriations committees and subcommittees.75 
As part of his review of the differences between the defense and commercial 
markets, Fox presented a table of the major differences he has found.76  One of these 
differences was that the price of the weapon systems was not normally determined by 
market conditions.  One of the conclusions of his 1974 study was: 
Despite the Defense Department’s efforts to simulate a free enterprise 
environment, the uncertainties of weapons development and production 
preclude normal competition.77 
                                                 
74 Fox, J.R., (1988). p. 300. 
75 Fox, J.R., (1974). p. 38. 
76 Ibid. p. 39. 
77 Ibid. p. 469. 
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In a later book, Fox referenced an even earlier 1962 report on the Defense 
Industry by Peck and Scherer where they stated more directly: 
A market system does not now exist in the weapons acquisition process.  
We can state the proposition more strongly.  A market system in its 
entirety can never exist for the acquisition of weapons.78 
As a counter-point, some researchers have claimed that an analysis of commercial 
restructuring experiences, when compared to that of the DoD, are similar enough to merit 
close scrutiny and possible emulation.  The areas these researchers focus on seem to be in 
such areas as product strategies, cooperative programs and downsizing techniques79.  In 
an article Peter Drucker suggested a proper understanding of business theory was crucial 
when attempting to restructure a business.80  Most of these researchers expressed a 
preference for drastic cost cutting programs and recommend the DoD hire a team of 
‘battle-tested industry-restructuring experts’ and institute the formation of favorable 
business alliances.   
Even with such changes, however, companies may find that those that do a 
thorough job of analyzing and identifying the technical and financial risks for a proposed 
system design will probably find themselves losing to more optimistic competitors.  With 
little business to go around the defense industry community becomes a battleground for 
corporate survival.   
Such a dependence on government work hurts the defense contractors, too.  There 
have been reports where companies have reported that in their attempts to diversify, its 
engineers were unable to fulfill specifications for commercial products on a competitive 
basis because of the overhead costs that the engineers and managers had become 
accustomed to in defense work. 
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2. Congressional Influence 
Congress plays an important role in government business operations since it 
provides the funding for all government operations.  In this sense, Congress acts as a 
proxy for the taxpayer. 
R&D programs are considered at two main levels in Congress, that of 
authorizations and that of appropriations.  Authorizing committees develop special 
expertise in the programs they oversee and review the substance of these programs but 
the legislation they prepare does not directly result in spending but only provides 
guidance and sets appropriations ceilings.  For discretionary programs the power to write 
the legislation that provides actual spending authority resides in the Appropriations 
Committees of the House and Senate.   
One example of the negative impact that Congress can have on technology 
research and development programs was an amendment sponsored by Senator Mike 
Mansfield (D - Montana) to the fiscal 1970 defense authorization bill.  This amendment 
required that: 
[N]one of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used 
to carry out any research project or study unless such a project or study 
has a direct or apparent relationship to a specific military function or 
operation.81 
This amendment targeted what Sen. Mansfield perceived as a gross waste in 
general purpose basic research being conducted on taxpayer resources.  Although this 
amendment was only legal for one year, the congressional action sent a strong negative 
message to government research agencies which had significant after-effects such as the 
transfer of a number of defense research projects to civilian agencies.82  This type of 
legislative action is cited only as an example of the nature and magnitude of interactions 
that have gone on between Congress and agencies of the Defense Department since 
WWII83.  As a consequence of this type of legislative action the relationship between 
                                                 
81 P.L. 91-121, Section 203, as referenced in Smith and Barfield (1996), p. 24. 
82 Smith, B.L., & Barfield, C.E. (1996). Technology, R&D, and the Economy. Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution. p. 24. 
83 And continues to go on today in various degrees across all agencies of the government. 
 43
Congress and the DoD can become strained.  In the conclusion of a 1973 study of the 
weapons acquisition process, Dr. J. Ronald Fox made this observation: 
The current relationships between Congress and the Defense Department, 
among governmental defense agencies, and between government and 
industry, effectively prevent the system from functioning to its best 
advantage.84 
Fifteen years later, in a 1988 updated study of the weapons acquisition process, 
Dr. Fox’s conclusions were that not only had things not changed for the better but, in his 
estimation, the defense acquisition situation has continued to degrade even further over 
the years, in spite of intense focus on the part of many in the government and Congress: 
In 1988, the same statement applies, and, in my view as well as that of 
many in the Defense Department and the defense industry, the situation is 
worse in 1988 than it was in 1973 or in 1960.85 
This condition is absolutely central to the problems of technology transition and is 
indicative of what any S&T community is up against when attempting to transition new 
technologies and capabilities to a “market sector” that has not demonstrated the ability to 
function as intended since, essentially, its inception.  When coupled with the realization 
that the S&T community has no fiscal clout over the acquisition resources, the odds are 
stacked very high against the possibility of success. 
 
3. Market Economic Theory 
The “standard” market model is a core element in economic theory.  The standard 
model envisions a world of markets, each of which consists of a large number of 
unrelated buyers and sellers.  All buyers and sellers are assumed to share equally all 
relevant knowledge of the market and the market characteristics of price, quantity and 
quality change through the action of informed participants.  The quality of goods traded 
is assumed to be sufficient uniform so that buyers merely seek out the lowest price.  On 
the production side of the model sellers will control their production methods in order to 
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keep costs as low as possible in order to sell as large a volume as possible.  If all the 
conditions are met the market is said to be “competitive.” 
However, the standard market model oversimplifies some important and 
interrelated economic factors.  For example, a purely “competitive” market is not 
considered to be a desirable, nor sustainable, long-term condition for sellers on a free and 
open market.  Economic research has found that sellers will usually attempt to end this 
condition as soon as they can: 
Although it is possible to conceive of economic situations in which all 
contractors survive endless rounds of competition, that is not the typical 
state of the contract market in either the public or the private sector.86 
The research shows that sellers will try to reduce the level of competition so that 
they can command a stronger market position and therefore dictate market prices above 
their product costs.  A couple of the more typical ways a company will attempt to reduce 
market competition include the acquisition and merger of their competitors. 
Although, collectively, taxpayers stand to gain the most through sustained 
market competition, they have less individual incentive to politically 
defend competitive public contracting than sellers have to undermine it.  
Thus, even though competitive contracting seemingly promises more 
choice and better prices, the potential benefit for individual taxpayers is 
often insufficient for them to justify the investment of time and money to 
enforce sustained competition.  Contractors, on the other hand, typically 
stand to reap a great deal individually by ensuring that the public market 
structures work to their advantage.  Therefore, they are willing to invest 
the necessary resources to shape public markets in anticompetitive ways.87 
 
G. GROUP DYNAMICS 
1. Group Behavior and Collective Action 
There is substantial information on the formation of groups and the dynamics of 
their collective behavior.  At a very basic level, the primary function of groups and 
organizations is to advance the common interests of those groups of individuals.  As 
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social psychologists have pointed out, “the attraction of group membership is not much in 
sheer belonging, but rather in attempting something by means of the membership.”88 
Another common trait of group behavior found in the literature was a tendency 
for small, strongly-cohesive groups to exploit larger more loosely formed groups.  In his 
influential study on group behavior and group dynamics Olson observed: 
Where small groups with common interests are concerned there is a 
systematic tendency for “exploitation” of the great by the small.89 
 
2. Group Behavior in a Competitive Market 
The literature search into the theory of groups and organizations identified a 
number of specific analogies between group interests and behavior and the behavior of a 
competitive market.  There was also a strong correlation found between the theory of 
groups and organizations and game theory particularly, again, in reference to the actions 
associated with a competitive “business” environment.   
While all members of a group may have a common interest in a general sense 
they also have antagonistic interests where output is concerned.  One of the non-obvious 
results of a competitive environment identified in the literature is that if the firms in some 
industry are maximizing profits, the profits for the industry as a whole is less then it 
might otherwise be.90  This implies that groups in a competitive market who are looking 
out for their own individual self-interests will tend to cause the net yield for their group 
as a whole to be suboptimized. 
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With respect to funding of the S&T programs the resistance to provide resources 
voluntarily as witnessed within DoD,91 is completely consistent with behavior predicted 
by numerous contributors to the theory of groups, organizations and games.  Despite very 
strong motives for organizational allegiance (patriotism, ideology, common culture, etc.,) 
no significant organizational unit in modern history has been able to support itself 
through voluntary dues or contributions.  “Taxes, compulsory payments by definition, are 
needed.” 
 
3. Types of Groups 
The study of groups distinguishes a variety of different types of groups.  For 
example, there are “privileged” groups and “intermediate” groups.  A privileged group is 
one in which a subset of the membership have enough incentive for them to bear the full 
burden of providing the good themselves.  An intermediate group is one where no 
member receives enough benefit such that there is sufficient incentive to provide the 
good but is small enough that other members will notice if it is not helping to provide the 
good. 
A “federal” group is one which is divided into a number of smaller groups each of 
which joins to form a federation representing the large group as a whole.  If the central or 
federated organization provides some service to the small constituent organizations, they 
may be induced to use their social incentives to get the individuals belonging to each 
small group to contribute toward the achievement of the collective goals of the whole 
group.92 
The distinction between “exclusive” and “inclusive” groups is particularly 
enlightening and important because market groups differ fundamentally from non market 
groups regarding their attitudes toward movement in and out of the group.  An industry 
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driven, or “market”, group will desire to keep new additions from entering the group and 
sharing the market since all market competitors are rivals.  The ideal end-state condition 
for a market group would be for the dominant player to attain a complete monopoly of 
the market.  There can be collusion among a few members to actively deter new entrants 
into the group93.  Since the fixed benefit drive the membership of a market group to 
reduce the size of their group, this type of group is referred to as an “exclusive” group. 
For nonmarket groups the opposite behavior is found to be true, however.  In this 
case the larger the number of members of a group there is (to share the benefits and 
costs), the better for the group as a whole.  The difference in behavior of the market and 
non-market groups was found to be due to the cost of the “collective good” which is in 
fixed supply (resources).  In a market condition, if one group gets more of the resources 
then others will naturally get less of the resources.  In nonmarket situations, by 
comparison, the benefit from a collective good is not fixed in supply.  In a non-market 
situation the supply of benefits is not limited.  In this case the non-market benefit will 
actually expand as the group expands.  This type of group is referred to as an “inclusive” 
group.94  Whether a group behaves exclusively or inclusively depends on the nature of 
the objective the group seeks. 
 
4. Group Size 
Size was one of the factors in determining whether or not it is possible that the 
voluntary, rational pursuit of interest will generate group-oriented behavior.  Olson’s 
research found small groups were more successful in furthering their common interests 
than large groups.95 
With respect to group size, a number of studies of different communities have 
shown the sizes of the groups that actually do the work are quite small.  Olson references 
studies of groups as diverse as the Banking industry to U S Senate subcommittees, all of 
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which show similar results:  small groups can act more decisively than large groups. 
Olson also considers the actions or group behavior for corporations.  He examines the 
autonomy of management in the large modern corporation, with thousands of 
stockholders, and the subordination of management in the corporation owned by a small 
number of stockholders to illustrate the difficulties of larger groups. 
 
5. Incentives 
Economic incentives are not the only incentives.  Research shows that people are 
also motivated by other personal factors such as a desire to win prestige, gain respect, 
secure friendship, and other “social and psychological” objectives.  Indeed, in some cases 
these incentives with be more powerful than financial incentives.  These non-financial, 
social incentives complicate group dynamics but are a valid component of group 
behavior.  In many cases the non-financial incentives will strengthens group interactions.  
When group size is small it was found that the social incentives tend to play a more 
prominent role because “social status and social acceptance are individual, non collective 
goods.”96  Social incentives are important only in the small group and play a role in 
larger groups only when the large group is a federation of smaller groups.97 
 
6. Coordination Requirements 
Another important aspect of group theory is the degree of informal coordination 
or formal organization that is found to be necessary in order to obtain a collected good.  
Results of previous research indicate that very small groups do not require formal 
arrangements because there are sufficient incentives among the members to obtain the 
desired good.  In such cases the members are prepared to pay the entire cost themselves 
and use informal arrangements to spread the costs more widely.  In larger groups, 
however, it was found that there are not sufficient incentives and the desired good cannot 
be obtained without some formal group agreement, intense coordination efforts and 
formal organization.  There are a number of reasons for this outlined by the theory, one of 
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which is the decreased tendency of any particular member to be willing to shoulder a 
significant cost of obtaining the good.  The larger the group gets the more agreement and 
organization that is needed and the greater the number that will usually have to be 
included in the group agreement or organization.   
 
7. Costs 
One of the problems identified by group theory is that any group that must 
organize to obtain some ‘good’ finds that there is a certain minimum organization cost 
that must be paid irrespective of the amount of benefit it actually obtains and the larger 
the group size is the greater these minimal costs tend to be.  The costs of such 
organization become an increasing function of the number of individuals in the group.  
These group organizational costs are sufficiently significant that they cannot be left out of 
the model.98   
When the resource costs of a desired good exceed the point where they become 
more than any single member will bear, the literature mentions research reveals that 
further costs become necessary.  These additional costs are those new costs which must 
now be incurred in order to obtain needed agreements among group members regarding 
how the costs will be shared as well as the costs required to coordinate these continued 
efforts in order to obtain the desired good.  These are summarized as additional “costs of 
communication among group members, the costs of any bargaining among them, and the 
costs of creating, staffing, and maintaining any formal group organization.”99  As a result 
of these additional costs the cost of the first unit of any collective good is found to be 
typically quite high in relation to the cost of follow-on units.  Such an initial high cost 
results in a low initial ROI figure which ends up being a deterrent for further participation 
by some members and, again, complicates the group dynamics.  Furthermore, the theory 
predicts that even if the potential benefits were known to be immense, the higher absolute  
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total costs (of getting any output or product) the “less likely it becomes that even a 
minimal amount of that good can be obtained without coercion or separate, outside 
incentives.”100 
 
8. Integrated Product Teams 
In 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry directed the use of Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs) for defense acquisition purposes.  The fundamental principles 
behind IPTs are clearly based on those found in the literature for group theory and those 
of collective action (small group size, etc.).  Although there has been much written about 
the use and benefits of IPTs within the government there was, surprisingly, very little 
specific reference to IPTs found in the literature outside of the defense community.  
Although embraced by the defense acquisition community as an industry “best business 
practice” the use of IPTs actually had what appears to be an industrial production-line 
focus where workers were “empowered” by management to shut down production line 
operations – and save the corporation money – if they saw problems.101  In spite of its 
touted success my literature search did not reveal evidence of a continued emphasis on 
IPTs within the commercial sector beyond the 1980’s.  Furthermore, within the defense 
acquisition community – where the IPT concept has become a staple for consensus-based 
management because of the Perry directive – the effectiveness of IPTs was found to have 
been mixed.  The small number of independent studies found each report significant 
issues and mixed results regarding IPT performance and effectiveness. 
a. Problems Experienced by IPTs 
The studies and assessments of IPTs found in the literature all report 
similar problems with the implementation and effectiveness of the IPT concept.  An early 
study conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis reported an inability to empower 
government personnel with the responsibilities and authority necessary for effective 
action.  CNA traced this inability to empower personnel to the fact that DoN 
representatives “cannot commit irrevocably because their resources are not fixed and are 
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subject to reductions by the Congress.”102  This same study also found there was a lack of 
candid communications with the implementation of IPTs.  For the DoN, specifically, this 
study found there were “Chair-of-Command considerations that hamper free and open 
discussion”103 and that project managers “are reluctant to be candid in IPT meetings if it 
means revealing a potential fund surplus.”104  As a result of such an environment some of 
the objectives of an effective IPT – free and open communication, mutual trust among 
team members, etc., – appeared to be undermined due to a fear of loss of funding. 
Another study, on the utilization of the IPT concept within a major 
defense contractor, while generally positive about the ability of the IPT structure to “add 
value” to the government customer, acknowledged a difference of opinion (with such a 
conclusion) from a minority of IPT participants.  This study was also markedly mixed in 
the reporting of actual results achieved.  Even with a corporate implementation of the IPT 
model this study reported many of the same common teaming and group theory 
problems; excessive program reviews, workload conflicts by personnel, and very poor 
communication within and especially across IPTs.105 
A more recent study of IPT effectiveness in the DoD concluded the DoD 
continues to have “a long way to go” if it is to meet its own goals of effectively utilizing 
IPPD methods and IPTs.  The primary conclusion of was that DoD’s overuse of the term 
IPT was the key factor that IPTs were not being utilized to their full potential.  This study 
concluded that IPT members were not fully empowered by their organizations, 
employees were not educated to the extent necessary to execute their specialized tasks, 
and that the DoD blatantly overuses the term “IPT.”  This thesis quoted an IPT team 
leader as saying: 
We use the term ‘IPT’ pretty loosely within DoD. We call a lot of groups 
‘IPTs’ when in fact they are really working groups or review panels at the 
action officer level. We give lip service to IPPD, but DoD will never give 
r which the decision makers are General Officers, up the hierarchy unde                                                 
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SES’ and ultimately political appointees. So we convene an ‘IPT’ made up 
of action officers, all of whom recite a chorus of ‘I need to take this back 
to my principal’ and that principal forwards it on to his boss who 
(hopefully) makes the decision(s).106 
There are also hints of internal DoD decision-making conflicts evident in 
the conclusions.  As Monk reported: 
The IPPD process is considered to be a mindset that runs counter to the 
ways things have been done in the past. It also runs counter to the military 
culture where hierarchical processes have and continue, often necessarily, 
to be stressed.107 
One of the recommendations made called for the development of metrics 
to measure the success of IPTs in DoD because the study revealed that none were found 
to exist.  The observation was also made that the DoD acquisition workforce must be 
shown clear evidence that these practices will truly improve the quality of their work and 
would not end up being just another “fad.”108 
 
9. Consortiums 
The most interesting organizational structure found in the literature for effective 
business operations, technology development and transition was that of a consortium.  
R&D consortia are self-governing organizations (usually nonprofit) which are run for the 
benefit of their members.109  The owners are the customers, and their purpose is to 
develop new technology and put it into practice.  Primary funding for the consortia came 
from the members companies, with additional support coming from the government when 
the technologies involved prove to be of significant or strategic interest. 
In general, these R&D consortia are seen as consensus-driven organizations 
which have a relatively short time horizons and low risk tolerance.  Their focus was on 
developmental efforts rather than research and they were judged as excellent vehicles for 
taking research through the development stage and putting it into practice.  Because of 
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the consensus-driven component of the planning process the projects selected for 
development by consortia tended to favor low-risk, near-team projects greatly.110  
Industry members tended to use the consortia framework to gain benefits of 
standardization but avoided entering collaborations where the product developed might 
give their competition a competitive advantage. 
The research on consortia pointed out the essential role a “core group” played in 
the formation and governance of a consortium.  It suggests that a consortium’s 
effectiveness depends heavily on the quality of its “core group” leadership.  Personal 
leadership was a critical factor in a group’s success but the research results highlight the 
essential importance of consortia “core group” leadership.   
A consortia’s effectiveness was linked to a clear and unambiguous mission that 
had a high net value to each member.  Of those studied the most effective groups were 
those with a strong and effective core group.  The ineffective groups were found to have 
suffered from divergent interests, competitive rivalry and mission ambivalence.   
The most effective consortia pursued extensive coordination activities, including 
interactive communication schemes between consortium members and customers.  These 
consortia also utilized liaison representatives, maintained close proximity to their 
customers, conducted technology demonstrations at customer facilities and documented 
results religiously.  This level of professionalism and operational tempo mandated the 
consortia attract and retain highly competent technical and administrative personnel.111 
The group behavior of consortia members was not without problems, however.  
Corey notes there was reluctance on the part of some consortia to be proactive in many of 
the activities required to transfer the technology developments.  In the cases he studied 
the reluctance appeared to be caused by an aversion to the idea of needing to “sell” their 
technology developments.  These types of “marketing” activities seemed foreign to those 
normally engaged in conducting the research and development efforts.  Also, some 
consortia were found to be initially unwilling to fund necessary investments for 
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technology transition functions.  In these cases the consortia involved preferred to 
concentrate their funding on the research side of technology development.  Corey 
observed the transfer, or “diffusion”, of technology was inherently a difficult process.  He 
equated it to the marketing of change, often in the face of strong resistance. 
a. Differences with Private Enterprise 
One of the most interesting aspects of the consortia study was the insight 
provided regarding the challenges of managing the consortia institutions.  As Dr. Corey 
commented: 
… what I have learned is that the problems and requirements of effective 
consortium management differ significantly in degree from those of 
private enterprise, for three reasons.  First, each consortium has a plethora 
of internal and external stakeholders to satisfy.  Second, most are deeply 
involved with government agencies, ranging from state and federal 
regulatory agencies and administrative departments to the United States 
Congress.  Third, unlike private enterprise, the owners of consortia are the 
clients.112 
 
10. Military-Civilian Relations 
Within DoD the issue of military-civilian relations is a sensitive issue, from both 
community perspectives, yet these relations are central to many of the issues that hinder 
such efforts as research and development, technology transitions, and operational 
effectiveness.  The problem is ultimately a power struggle over which community should 
have the authority to control military readiness and operations.  History, however, is clear 
on the subject: 
Civilian control of the military has been an absolute and unquestioned 
principle throughout U.S. history.  The June 12, 1776, Declaration of 
Rights of Virginia sets forth this principle: in all cases the military should 
be under the strict subordination to and governed by civil power.”  The 
Constitution incorporated this principle, giving both the President and the 
congress power and responsibilities to ensure civilian control, it remains 
ill defined in the later 1980’s, as it has been for decades.113 
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The struggle over authority, responsibility and appropriate civilian influence over 
the military came to boil, and a successful (temporary) resolution, during WWII.  The 
urgent high priority demands of wartime operations combined with the appointment of a 
strong-willed scientist to a defense advisory position of authority and responsibility 
allowed great progress to be made.  The Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD) was widely acclaimed as being extremely successful in responding to wartime 
scientific demands.  This office was directed by Dr. Vannevar Bush, who felt the country 
needed a special organization to harness its technical talent.  OSRD teams shaped most of 
what the government’s research activities through World War II and fleshed out Bush’s 
vision of what scientific research and development could do when put to military use.  
These wartime successes would be the seed for later efforts to recreate these successes by 
requiring agencies to operate more like the businesses that delivered the weapons systems 
in high quantity and at high rates during WWII. 
Vannevar Bush was a talented, intelligent, strong-willed scientist who 
accomplished great things while running OSRD.  He felt strongly in the need for pure 
research and that a strong scientific community was vital to our national security.  He was 
instrumental in the establishment of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and, to a 
lesser extent, the Office of Naval Research (ONR).  He was, however, very forceful and 
opinionated and was considered by many to be “elitist.”  His forceful management style 
clashed with an equally forceful, certainly more politically savvy, military contingent 
coupled with a much weaker civilian leadership structure which, ultimately lead to the 
diminishing of his access to senior administration personnel (like the President, for 
example) and, eventually, a limit to his responsibilities.114 
Part of the cause of the frequent “clashes” that would arise under his tenure was 
due to the fact that Vannevar Bush was fundamentally uncomfortable with the Defense 
Department having a strong research agency, for several reasons.  For example, he felt 
the Services would attempt to direct the research and hinder scientific inquiry and 
progress.  He was also sensitive to limited resources and was convinced that DoD 
revenue would necessarily limit the amount available to the rest of the scientific 
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community.  He was also concerned that interservice rivalry would cause a great amount 
of waste in the DoD research conducted.   
The Navy’s military-civilian relations were so severe that Vannevar Bush is 
reported to have later said he gave the atomic bomb project to the Army rather than the 
Navy because of their problems in dealing with their military/civilian-scientist 
relations.115   
The literature reveals a number of contributing factors regarding the difficulties in 
the DoD military-civilian management infrastructure.  The overall DoD method of 
implementing civilian control U.S. military activity is greatly weakened by the brief 
tenure of the civilian appointees and their military counterparts.  The average assignment 
is less than three years.  For the civilians, the President makes the appointments and they 
need to be approved by the Senate, which becomes a political nightmare all of its own.  
To make matters worse, most political appointees have “no relevant experience but have 
been loyal to the President’s political party.”116  This opinion was reinforced in an 
interview conducted for this thesis with a former DoD political appointee.  This former 
DoD official pointed out that almost all defense acquisition political appointees have no 
acquisition experience when they take their appointment.117  Most of these [political] 
appointees had no significant experience in the Pentagon and had no idea what it took to 
get things done.  His sentiment was, “They initiate a lot and accomplish little.”  In some 
cases he felt they might leave doing no harm but, more often than we would care to 
know, they leave the system in worse shape than when they arrived.  A consequence of 
the political appointment system is that these appointees come with a short-term focus  
which (as with Congress) causes them to search out a “quick-fix” approach to problems 
rather than to the structural reforms needed for lasting improvements.  As Fox (1988) 
stated the situation: 
The Pentagon system for distributing responsibility and authority between 
civilian appointees and military officers seriously impedes the efficient 
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and effective functioning of the weapons acquisition process.  If sufficient 
defense capability is to be maintained efficiently and effectively, civilian 
control of defense activities must become a working reality.  Civilian 
appointees control few of the incentives or penalties for personnel 
performance.  They have only as much authority in the Defense 
Department as do the board of directors in a private corporation, often 
less.  Qualified civilians must, in deed as well as intent, control 
information channels and make the final decisions on defense priorities.  
Finally, to achieve stability within the department, it is imperative that 
Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries serve at a minimum, four-year terms 
of office.  Fundamental reform must begin both in Congress and in the 
Pentagon.118 
With respect to the overall architecture of the DoD and the Services there is also a 
very complicated organizational structure due to the reporting requirements of a dual 
military-civilian leadership chain of commands.  This unique reporting arrangement 
causes problems at all levels: 
A factor that continually thwarts efforts to reform management procedures 
is the ambiguity of the relationship between Secretaries and Assistant 
Secretaries and the military officers and civil service personnel who serve 
under them.  Military Officers’ promotions are controlled by their military 
service promotion boards.  Tenure regulations protect civil service from 
dismissal in all but the most flagrant and extreme cases of 
irresponsibility.119 
 
a. The China Lake Model 
One of the most innovative and successful military-civilian organizational 
experiments conducted was that at the Naval Ordnance Test Station (NOTS) at China 
Lake, California, in the late 1940s.  Close military-civilian cooperation was a cornerstone 
to operations at China Lake from the very beginning.  There were many factors which 
contributed to the organizational effectiveness but one of the major components critical to 
the technical success of the development activity was the innovative military-civilian 
architecture which was modeled on earlier OSRD principles put in place by Vannevar 
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119 Fox (1974). p. 459. 
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Bush.  Through experimental ordnance facilities at two locations,120 Navy’s Bureau of 
Ordnance decided to: 
…operate these installations on the principle that the technical activities 
would be conducted and directed by professional civilian scientific and 
engineering personnel, and that the role of the military personnel would be 
that of providing the necessary knowledge of operating conditions plus the 
administration required to make the laboratory a part of the Naval 
establishment in the broadest sense.  With this in mind those laboratories 
have consistently been staffed with professional civil service personnel of 
the highest quality obtainable, under the leadership of a Technical Director 
in whose hands the responsibility for the technical achievements of the 
laboratory is placed. 121 
The struggle over operational principles is difficult but remains at the core 
of the issues.  China Lake’s principles of operation, formulated in 1946, were drafted to: 
… make clear that civilian scientists worked in partnership with the 
military, not in subordination to it.  The principles also made clear that top 
leadership was shared between a commander and a technical director, 
rather than having one report to the other.122 
The intent behind these principles was to create an environment that 
would attract and retain the very best in scientific and engineering talent.  This intent has 
not been embraced without organizational struggle, however.  A summary of the civilian-







                                                
Civilian-Military operating ‘principles’ were established (1946). 
These principles were reformulated with minor changes (1955). 
Major changes were made, placing the military in charge of the civilians 
(1974). 
The principles were eliminated altogether (1976). 
The principles were rewritten but not reissued (1980). 
The principles were reissued as “operating principles” (1985). 
 
120 Two facilities were used, one on the west coast at China Lake, and the other on the east coast, at 
White Oak.  Both of these organizations have been very highly regarded. 
121 BuOrd Order No. 28-51, (1951, June 22), p. 1, as quoted in Westrum (1999), p. 14. 
122 Westrum (1999), p. 258. 
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These changes in the principles reflected a tug-of-war between the 
‘civilian-military partnership’ charter and the more traditional role as a Navy laboratory 
carrying out the Navy’s wishes. 
Many of the problems encountered as China Lake implemented their 
‘experiment’ are completely analogous to those we face today.  As an example, in the late 
1980’s one captain described the organization changes which were happening: 
In the 1960’s … there was still a good strong cadre of qualified people in 
the Navy … Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Weapons, Bureau of Aeronautics.  
In the 1980’s I don’t think it exists to that extent … the poor guys in the 
bureaus, their time is spent on budgetary problems.123 
Some of the things mentioned here–spending an inordinate amount of time 
on budgetary problems and a lack of strong qualified people–are equally valid complaints 
today.  One of the most important aspects of the management arrangement at China Lake 
was that uniformed personnel were very supportive of the mission and this support was 
instrumental to the operational success of the laboratory.  As was pointed out: 
They represented the customer. They brought fleet experience to weapons 
evaluation and acted as advocates for the systems after development.124 
The usefulness of these R&D facilities was also crucial to success.  The 
close proximity of laboratory and test range was very beneficial to the high operational 
tempo and allowed many iterations of a design to be tested very rapidly: 
Novel ideas could be developed and tested with little paperwork or delay.  
The key was to employ the full spectrum of R&D activities from initial 
conception to pilot production.125 
China Lake developed its goals from a deep understanding of the needs of 
the fleet, aided by the pilots who served on the station’s staff.126  Many of the very same 
transition difficulties (internal Naval rivalries, industry, etc) are very similar to those still 
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125 Ibid, p. 22. 
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in effect today.  What most concerned Dr. William McLean was that the system must 
respond to the needs at the user: 
If our designer is to be truly successful, he must have a more direct contact 
with this consumer than can every be provided by a set of written 
specifications … It is essential for the designer to question his 
specifications and to go back to primary sources in order to develop a real 
understanding of his problem, and the basis for the need, if he is to create 
a successful product.127 
As a consequence of the steady erosion of its authority and management 
flexibility at China Lake over the years128 the role of government laboratories became 
more of a watchdog organization for Washington rather than a research and development 
laboratory.  This diminished role reduces the effectiveness greatly. 
Some of the ‘transformational’ changes being implemented today also 
appear to be in-line with suggestions made in previous studies.  For example, among the 
numerous changed suggested by Dr. Fox was for a new, more flexible, more rewarding 
personnel system along the lines of the one demonstrated as successful at China Lake: 
Congress should establish an alternative personnel management system for 
key acquisition personnel that would provide greater flexibility in status, 
pay and qualifications of civilian employees, particularly at the senior 
level.  The successful China Lake project, in which key civilians received 
pay incentives and promotions, based on performance, is worth 
emulating.129 
Although the new personnel system being implemented within DoD may 
help the situation it appears to be off the mark and skirts a more fundamental issue which 
impedes change – that of military-civilian relations within DoD.  What made China Lake 
successful was not simply a flexible personnel system, which certainly helped, but the 
presence of a strong, positive military-civilian environment of collaboration that allowed 
a high caliber workforce to flourish.  The personnel system being implemented in our 
current transformational changes may prove beneficial but the biggest impediments to 
significant changes will not be surmounted without a candid discussion of the military-
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128 Erosion was more severe at White Oak, which was closed down through the BRAC process. 
129 Fox (1988). p. 314. 
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civilian leadership issues.  In order to introduce “transformational” changes into the Navy 
the DoD needs to embrace further fundamental changes and real change is based on our 
Constitution and, as a result, will need to be directed from the Congress: 
When Congress reactivates the concept of civilian control of the military, 
meaningful and lasting reform can begin.  There is no other starting 
point.130 
 
H. TRANSITION EXPERIENCES 
This section provides insights regarding technology transition experiences across 
the industrial and military sectors.   
 
1. A Small Manufacturer Perspective 
The information presented here is taken from notes from an interview with the 
President of a small manufacturing company.  This company has been in operation for 
forty years and is publicly traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange.  In 2003, this 
company reported net sales in excess of $750M and net earnings of approximately $20M.  
This company manufactures components for military and commercial customers 
throughout the world.  They employ approximately 400 people and use a large (>100,000 
sq. ft.), highly automated, manufacturing facility.  They manufacture more than 1 million 
items annually, shipping more than 2,000 products to more than 1,500 customers 
throughout the world  
The person interviewed was not familiar with the DoN Future Naval Capability 
technology transition process and so the information collected is more appropriate as a 
part of the literature search on the general issue of technology transition.  The 
experiences from an industry representative provide a useful benchmark for comparing 
DoN FNC technology transition experiences with those from the industrial sector. 
a. Corporate Tech Development 
The role of “science and technology” in small companies appeared to be 
slightly different for small companies, as compared to the larger DoN resources, but there 
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were many similarities in the whole product development process.  When asked to talk 
about the science and technology, product development, and technology transition 
experiences of his company, the industry representative was informative: 
We do not do basic science.  We don’t even do basic engineering really.  
Instead, as a small manufacturing company, we take the results of other 
people’s science and engineering and modify it in some way to turn it into 
a product that fulfills someone’s needs.  If we didn’t do this often and 
well, we’d soon go out of business.  The search for useful existing basic 
science or technology is usually a hit or miss proposition, dependent 
primarily on the individual efforts of the people involved in the transition 
process. 
In response to a question asking how his company approaches the problem 
of meeting customer needs the response was: 
I get new products to the market in two ways.  First, meet the needs of 
new markets using current products, possibly with minor changes.  
Second, identify and develop new concepts to provide new products to 
current markets. 
When asked if such an approach appears to help his company facilitate 
“technology transitions” the discussion was a bit more vague: 
In every endeavor which results in transitioning a concept into a useful 
product, it must be understood that there is no single transition step.  
Instead, there are an almost unlimited number of transitions.  Every time 
one person learns of a concept and then uses it, in any form, in his own 
work, a transition has occurred. 
With respect to the usefulness of committees, teaming arrangements or 
group decision-making bodies this person relates the following experience from industry: 
Because there are very few people actually actively involved in the 
product development process, it becomes a very personal process.  
Attempting to coordinate it by committee is seldom effective.  Even if a 
committee exists, the real decisions are usually made outside the 
committee as a result of personal selling of ideas or dictatorially.   
Additional comments made have direct analogy to some of the more 
fundamental difficulties of technology transition, regardless of the development 
environment being of the industrial or government sectors: 
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I believe that any program based solely on the developers recognizing the 
best applications for their inventions or the applicators recognizing the 
best available technology that might be brought forward, without some 
mediation agency who is comfortable in both worlds, is doomed to failure. 
Some of the issues predicted in the literature search do indeed show up in 
the experiences encountered by industry.  For example, relative to group size and formal 
coordination requirements, the President of manufacturing company commented: 
In small companies lines of communications are so short, and pertinent 
groups so small, that (formal programs) are not necessary.  Formal 
programs, and the meetings they generate, in general, do little to engender 
trust and teamwork, the cornerstone of effective product development.  
Even if a formal program exists, the real decisions are usually made 
outside the confines of the program. 
In response to a question asking what might be missing in our technology 
transition efforts, this interviewer suggested: 
I believe that almost all product development or transition programs 
ignore one crucial element.  That missing element is the bridge between 
the “inventor” and the “user”.  There are millions of great inventions 
available, and there are at least as many unfulfilled needs, but the 
challenge is to get them together, which is something I call innovation.  
Despite everything that has been written about managing innovation, 
innovation is a lot of art and a little science. 
b. Innovation Skills 
The President of the small manufacturing company identified four key 
skills which, he felt, helped to differentiate between excellence and mediocrity among 
those responsible for product innovation.  The skills mentioned were: 
• Unspecializaton.  This was described as a conscious effort to break out of 
isolation and gain a broader look at the world.  It was commented that this could 
take on many forms within the industrial sector.  One example cited, “If an 
engineer never visits a customer, especially an angry customer, he becomes 
isolated from that world and only sees it filtered through one or more third 
parties.” 
• Mediation.  This was described as “speaking the language and needs of other 
groups.”  This industry representative commented that in order to make use of the 
“unspecialization” skill an employee would need to learn how to recognize areas 
of compatibility and areas of conflict among the groups involved in the product 
development and technology transition process.  Such recognition was mentioned 
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as being the first step in the mediation process because it allows a person to 
emphasize compatibilities while providing a method of working around the areas 
of conflict.  As was commented, “The conflict has to be resolved first or the 
compatibility will never be recognized.  Such a skill requires working out 
comprises that enable both groups to feel they are vital parts of a partnership.” 
• Openness.  Being “open” to all ideas.  The importance here was the need to 
be viewed within the organization as being open to ideas, and fair, in order to be 
presented innovative ideas in the first place.  From this person’s experience, what 
a company doesn’t want is a situation where an idea gets suppressed and the 
critical “grain of truth” that was behind the idea becomes lost to a competitor.  
One of the comments made was that it is the “stupid ideas that are most often the 
cause of breakdowns between groups, and you can serve as a buffer and filter 
between the groups to avoid such breakdowns.” 
• Approachability.  This skill seems somewhat similar to “openness” but the 
distinction made was the importance, need and benefit for networking and being 
approachable (regarding new ideas) throughout the organization.  One of the 
comments made was “You will not learn or gain approachability by sitting at your 
desk.  You have to actively mix with the groups you need to have approach you 
with ideas, and you will have to gain their respect and confidence.  This may be a 
personal style issue, but I have seen more people’s effectiveness drastically 
decrease because they could not establish the required links with other groups.” 
c. Business Environment 
With respect to describing the proper “business environment” for 
innovation this person offered the following observations: 
There must be an atmosphere where everyone is encouraged to openly 
communicate with everyone else involved.  One of the most important 
aspects of the atmosphere has to be an acceptance of failure.  Unless 
everyone is as comfortable with communicating failure as with 
communicating success, the organization will lose the bulk of its 
experience.  There is an old engineering saying that you learn more from 
your mistakes than you do your successes, and I firmly believe it to be 
true.  Therefore, if news of failures is suppressed, the growth of the 
company will be severely compromised.  Just because an idea failed to 
pan out for one purpose, it might be just the silver bullet needed for 
another purpose.  I have seen this happen many times in my career, and 
expect to see it even more. 
A corollary to this acceptance of failure is a need for what I call "breathing 
space", particularly at the earliest stages of development.  In the context of 
a small company, this usually means "Don't tell Marketing."  What this 
really means is don't talk too much about new concepts being developed 
until there is a pretty good chance of success.  Otherwise, expectations can 
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get so high that it is impossible to get off of a losing technology 
gracefully.  When that happens, failure becomes unacceptable, and people 
will look hard for a scapegoat.  The next time, that person will be far less 
eager to come forward with a new idea.  Admittedly this seems to be at 
odds with the previously stated goal of open communication of efforts, 
failures as well as successes, but it is really not.  Just because the idea did 
not pan out doesn't mean that it is buried.  Since it was "just an idea" 
rather than the "savior of the company", it is easy to talk about what was 
learned during the effort, thereby enhancing communication. 
This person emphasized that the comments made should not be interpreted 
as meaning that corporations do not apply pressure for results in the development 
process, only that the most successful companies will be able to adjust the pressure 
applied appropriately for the stage of development of the concept.  This person went on 
further to say: 
There is no known reliable method for finding the right balance in any 
given situation, but I can almost guarantee that a committee is the least 
able to strike the proper balance.  Perhaps as programs get bigger and 
organizations more complex, a committee might be workable but in 
smaller organizations, that is why they have managers. 
d. Barriers to Effective Product Development 
A number of barriers to the product development process were mentioned: 
• Money.  “The lack of funds is always a barrier to transitioning technology.” 
• Secrecy. This person commented that “small companies get most of their new 
technology from outside the company.”  While small companies might be willing 
to “buy into” a development program for the technology innovations they might 
get from the arrangement, this person – based on his experience – felt that 
companies will seldom license a technology when royalties are involved nor will 
they pay an outright sum of money for risky technology.  “The small companies 
of my experience have only their technology to help them survive, and when there 
are continuing strings on that technology to outside the company, there is a level 
of discomfort.  When an outside entity knows that they are using a particular 
technology, and also probably how they are using that technology, it is almost 
impossible to keep that knowledge away from competitor.  Maintaining secrecy is 
particularly difficult when the outside agency is part of the Government, but 
customers are almost as bad and a frequent source of leaks is a vendor who also 
serves competitors.” 
• Language.  This was described as a manufacturing vs. engineering issue. It 
was commented that “open communication, and cross assignment of personnel, 
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can ease this problem.  However, to make sure it does not cripple the efforts, a 
mediator is necessary to monitor progress.” 
• Point of View.  A difference in points of view is a subset of the Thomas S. 
Kuhn paradigm scenario.131  It was suggested that open communication and cross 
assignment can ease this problem as well. 
• Ignorance.  If you never learn of a concept, you will never be able to make 
use of it.  This barrier may seem obvious but industry experience is that it is often 
overlooked, particularly as budgets get tight. 
• Not Invented Here (NIH).  From this person’s perspective this barrier is 
probably the most difficult one to overcome, and applies to ideas from outside the 
organization as well as to ideas trying to cross between groups within an 
organization.  It was commented that, “Unless there is an atmosphere of trust and 
mutual respect, NIH will kill almost every new idea.  It is here that managers 
demonstrate whether they are leaders or not.”  While competition between groups 
can be beneficial, it can very easily get out of control and change to a very 
negative force. 
e. A Summary of One Company’s Product Development Process 
In describing their product development process this person commented 
that, at some point in the product development cycle there is a need to impose controls 
over the process.  At the same time, there must be room left for “seedlings to sprout on 
their own” as well as the means to nurture these concepts to maturity.  The comments 
made were: 
My current company has a two stage “system” for this that is not unlike 
the systems I have seen in similar companies.  The slack is primarily built 
into the Engineering organization.  The Engineering test lab has the 
capability to manufacture almost anything that the main shop can produce, 
and the wherewithal to build the capability to do things that the main shop 
can't.  This gives me the opportunity to try new products, or permutations 
of existing products, outside the mainstream of the company, which is 
dedicated to shipping products to customers.  While these resources, and 
the accompanying budget, is controlled by the Chief Engineer, it is 
purposely set up with more leaks than a colander, to allow people in the 
organization outside of Engineering to have the opportunity to experiment 
with a pet idea.  The money spent on these efforts is a tiny percentage of 
the overall company budget, but is very important both for actually 
developing new ideas and for fostering the atmosphere for even more new 
ideas. 
                                                 
131 As described at length in Kuhn (1996).  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  (3rd ed).  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 67
While this process seems a bit chaotic, it really isn't.  The reason it is not 
chaotic is that it is based on close personal observation and limitation by 
the upper management of the company.  It is important to remember that 
there are only two layers between the President of the company and the 
machinist in the Engineering model shop, so keeping a close eye on what 
is happening is a relatively simple task.   
f. Some Personal Philosophy 
What follows are some miscellaneous comments provided during the 
interview that provide general insight into the technology development and transfer 
process as experienced by this person, from an industry perspective. 
Despite all of the writings about "managing innovation", the 
breakthroughs do not come from managed, tightly structured programs.  
The development of those breakthroughs into truly useful products takes 
more structure and discipline, appropriate to the scale of the required 
investment, but the seeds need air and light in order to get started. And 
you need a lot of them. 
An early stage of the product development process, the experimentation 
phase, was described as similar to the traditional “brainstorming” process where the 
quantity of ideas is more important than the quality of any individual idea: 
Anything that reduces the number of ideas being generated reduces the 
chances that a useful idea will be found.  For this reason, I have always 
tried to manage the development process similar to a brainstorming 
session.   
The person had concerns over the dangers in discouraging new ideas 
before they have the opportunity to be tested.  It is important, this person contended, to 
establish an atmosphere where people have a certain amount of freedom to act 
autonomously, keeping the checks and balances in place but quite loose and mostly out of 
sight.  
In a small organization, MBWA132 is almost enough to allow a manager to 
collect sufficient information to insure that no program can go too far 
before it gets some scrutiny, but provides enough flexibility that new ideas 
can be tried out informally before they get anything but peer scrutiny.  
Peer scrutiny occurs automatically, because in order to get anything done, 
the person who wants it done has to have some help.  It might be some 
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machining, it might be a quick test, it could be just help modifying a 
computer program.  In some manner, peers have an input into almost 
every new idea that gets tried.  Obviously, at this informal stage of peer 
review, only peers known in advance to be most likely to agree with the 
worth of the new idea will have an input. This is because the person with 
the idea is most likely to ask help from those he considers most likely to 
help him. Because at this stage, resources are not formally designated to a 
project and therefore must be diverted from other sources, the helper is 
giving up something. Human nature being what it is, he is likely to give up 
something to help someone else's idea only if he supports the idea, or 
owes a quid pro quo. 
A balance has to be struck between allowing flexibility and forcing 
development underground.  Development will still occur, even if forced 
underground.  Most engineers, and many marketers, want to be innovative. 
If you put them in an atmosphere where they are encouraged to try things, 
without too much red tape, you are likely to yield some outstanding 
results.  If you stifle that opportunity, either inadvertently or purposefully, 
you are likely to get some results that you are very unhappy with.   
If you are successful in developing a process for developing new 
technology, how do you go about keeping it focused on those things that need to be 
developed?   
This statement begs the question that we know what needs to be 
developed.  As is hopefully clear, on one level we don't want to keep it 
very focused.  At that level sufficient focus is usually provided by the 
choice of the people working in the area.  If you are interested in 
developing capabilities and products in the area of composites, you don't 
hire an electronics engineer.  While a decision like that is self evident, 
there are other choices you can make that, while more subtle, can have 
very pronounced effects on what type of projects are worked on.  
Choosing a composites engineer who started as a mechanical engineer will 
yield different results than choosing one who started as a chemist.  
Similar, one from an aerospace background will differ from one from a 
sporting equipment background.  Making choices like this is not focusing 
the efforts, merely getting them pointed in a general direction.  This allows 
for a lot of ideas to be floated while ensuring that the majority will be in a 
field of potential interest. 
At the next level, making use of some of these new ideas takes a greater 
focus than is afforded merely by the selection of people.  The choices now 
are to focus the efforts or focus the people.  In small organizations, it takes 
too much overhead to focus the efforts exclusively.  Instead, you have to 
put your investment in people, not systems.  Engineers, in my experience., 
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are largely self motivated people, at least those who choose to work in 
small companies.  If you try to over control them, they will let you, but 
their heart won't be in it, and most will probably leave in a relatively short 
time, totally frustrated.  This is another reason to focus people, not control 
their every effort.  Small companies who are successful in meeting their 
customers needs focus their people on their customers.  Does this sound 
like something you heard in a TQM class?  It was true long before anyone 
coined the term TQM, and will be true long after TQM is discredited and 
discarded for all the wrong reasons.  For engineers involved in developing 
products that they want their customers to buy and use, a focus on, and 
understanding of, the customer's real product needs is central to the 
success of a product development program. Once the engineer has a good 
understanding of what the range of needs are, he will naturally focus his 
efforts toward meeting those needs.  Thus, the only external effort to focus 
the efforts is to insure that the engineer is working for the right customer. 
In my experience, Salesmen almost never understand what a customer's 
needs are, and Marketers are only slightly better.  This is not to say that 
engineers are all that good either, but you have to realize that even the 
customer usually doesn't know what he needs.  Customers generally have 
some idea what kind of problems they have, but they don't know how to 
best solve them.  The difficulty arises because it is difficult to ascertain 
just what the root causes of the problems are.  It is important to remember 
that the customer of an engineered product is also transitioning 
technology.  For commercial success, you want your customer to 
transition your technology into his product development rather than that of 
a competitor's.  Your best opportunity to make this happen is to provide a 
product that most closely meets your customer's needs.  Remember, one 
man's science is another's finished product. 
 
2. Consortium Experiences 
R&D consortia were established in response to perceived external threats to U.S. 
technical competence and competitiveness.  Significant congressional legislation 
provided incentives for the formation of these joint technology development and 
transition vehicles.  As a result, by 1993 there were 592 consortia registered under the 
National Cooperative Research & Production Act.133  These external threats created an 
atmosphere of urgency and allowed collaboration on a level that might not other wise 
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have been feasible at the time because of competition and a free market economy 
paradigm.  A summary of the specific congressional legislation enacted:134 
• National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 
• Omnibus Trade Bill of 1988135 
• Defense Conversion Reinvestment and Transition Assistance Act of 1992136 
 
The factors which contributed to the rise of R&D consortia in the U.S. include: 
• There was a perceived national crisis 
• There was a favorable legislative climate 
• The industry was experiencing escalating research costs 
• There were changing perceptions of competitive advantage 
• There were changing industry sourcing patterns 
 
The literature reports R&D consortia have demonstrated themselves to be highly 
effective vehicles for R&D cost-sharing in areas of common interest to the member 
companies. 
…consortia have contributed significantly to the development and 
diffusion of technology in the industries they serve.  They have been 
effective in building industrial and academic infrastructures.  Many have 
developed new products to meet member-company needs and grow the 
end markets they serve.  Some have played an active role in the 
commercialization of new end products.  They provide vehicles for cont- 
and risk-sharing in research and development that are of broad use to the 
industries they represent, and ultimately to the nation.  Consortia serve as 
forums for the development of strategies for economic growth and 
national competitiveness, without limiting interfirm competitiveness or 
imposing a national industrial policy on US industry.137 
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a. Conditions for the Consortia 
In his study of consortia, Prof. Corey identifies a number of conditions 
which he found led to the rise and success of the consortia he studied.  These conditions 
were: 
• rapid technology development 
• escalating research costs 
• growing use of external R&D sources by corporations 
• industry-level R&D agendas that are beyond the resources or the self-interest 
of individual firms 
• growing use of cost-sharing arrangements between industry and government, 
for the development of the national economy, the support of the defense 
establishment, the protection of national resources, and the protection of the 
environment 
• industry and government funding 
• a favorable legislative environment 
b. Personnel 
The six consortia Corey studied saw great benefit in assigning technical 
personnel to their consortium for “technology diffusion” purposes.  Corey’s study found 
those consortia that used direct hired staff experienced greater difficulty with the 
technology transfer process.  According to researchers interviewed, the technology “just 
seemed to lay there.”  In general, success seemed to depend heavily on the emergence of 
member-company product champions. 
Getting the right people in the right job was also an important part of the 
technology transfer equation for the consortia.  As a leader at IBM stated: 
I try very hard to get a match between the people who have the right job 
assignment and can make use of the information once it’s known.  If they 
don’t have the right job assignment then they are still pushing it inside the 
corporation instead of pulling it in. 
At those consortia where the staff was direct hires, tech diffusion was 
found to have been more difficult.  According to researchers the technology “just seemed 
to lay there”.  Success seemed to depend on the emergence of member-company product 
champions. 
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c. New Ideas/User Needs 
For consortiums the technology transfer process was vibrant and very 
involved.  New project ideas were generated from task forces and committees.  For some 
consortia program managers worked with contractors to carry out the work.  Some used 
“Technology Transfer Managers” (TTMs) to play an important role in putting the newly 
developed technology programs into use in member organizations.  To facilitate better 
communications liaison executives were located in regional field offices to act as a bridge 
between the TTMs and those local managers in the utilities.  In order to identify the 
specific people for whom a technology fills a need, some consortia used “Technology 
Interest Profile” which was used to help identify target customers for a wide range of 
technology applications.   
The timely reporting of results was a major emphasis area for successful 
consortia.  Numerous test, summary and progress reports were circulated or made 
available to the member companies and partner organizations.  In most cases reports of 
various level of detail were prepared and made available for others, depending on their 
needs.  In order to “get the word out” one-page bulletins were disseminated to those who 
might have an interest in specific technologies and complete reports are sent out on 
request. 
d. Outreach Activities 
Some of the consortia conducted over 200 workshops each year to 
communicate new technical developments in direct, interactive sessions.  To make their 
technical knowledge as readily available as possible some developed an automated e-mail 
distribution system where requests could be sent and computer servers would 
automatically distribute hundreds of technical documents to the requestors. 
Consortia partners also made frequent contract with “commercializing 
partners” to familiarize potential customers and market members with the newly 
developed project developments.  The task of “marketing” fell to the consortium which, 
in turn, relied on its membership for active participation on task forces and advisory 
committees and in order to provide market research for their membership needs.  
Consortia members essentially fielded a technical liaison “sales force” in the regional 
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offices to identify and communicate with important decision makers.  Through the liaison 
function and the demonstration approach the consortium has developed a “push” 
marketing strategy.  In going directly to the customer field sites they are using “pull” 
techniques. 
e. Technology Demonstrations 
Technology Demonstrations were found to be very important to the 
success of the R&D consortia.  In the technology adoption phase host members 
increasingly request the evaluation of a technology achievement through some sort of 
operational demonstration.  Successful demonstrations are widely publicized through 
technical papers and bulletins which are given wide circulation to communicate results. 
It was found that end-product demonstrations required great skill in 
forming vertical alliances among consortium member companies and outside 
commercialization partners.  These agreements were not always easily reached, however, 
as they typically required intense negotiation and adequate profit opportunities (“return 
on investment” from participating member companies) before agreements could be 
reached. 
Additionally, the high cost of technology development activities mandated 
that R&D consortia develop much improved “R&D delivery systems.”  This was 
accomplished over the years through an increased use of more integrated and focused 
technology demonstrations.  The success of these demonstrations have had an impact as 
well.  In his book Corey reports that consortium performance is now being judged on the 
extent to which the consortium has been able to demonstrate the technology development 
in an operational scenario.  Most significantly, consortium management and corporate 
governing boards are slowly coming to realize that building and maintaining effective 
channels for the demonstration and delivery of technology takes substantial funding.  
This realization, Corey observes, is a fundamental shift in thinking from the previous 
traditional concepts that the role of the consortium is to do research and development and 
the role of partnership members is to take it away.138 
 
                                                 
138 Corey (1997). Chapter 5. 
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f. Technology Transfer 
Specific examples suggested that technology transition was most effective 
when it was: 
• Carried out by highly motivated individuals on the receiving end 
• Internally supported by top management 
• Executed in close proximity with scientists 
• Performed in a rewards-based environment. 
 
To be most effective, interactive communication between consortium 
members and customers was found to require very close proximity.  The technology 
transfer process was facilitated by utilizing well-established and well-maintained 
channels and risk was minimized by setting up demonstrations of new technology. 
The technology transfer process was not always easy for consortium 
members.  In many cases there was a reluctance on the part of the consortium members to 
be proactive in the “diffusion of technology.”  This reluctance was found to be linked to a 
negative perception regarding “marketing” the technology developed: the idea of having 
to sell technology seemed beyond the scope of those engaged in the scientific discovery 
process.  This mindset was detrimental to the entire technology transfer process and 
became a significant obstacle.  Corey reports that some consortia were initially unwilling 
to support an organizational investment in “diffusion functions,” preferring to concentrate 
their funding on basic research and the creation of new long-term technology advances.  
The “diffusion of technology” was found to be inherently difficult; at a fundamental level 
it was found to be the “marketing of change,” and was often required to be accomplished 
in the face of countervailing resistance. 
Consortium managers and governing boards eventually came to recognize 
that building and maintaining effective channels for the diffusion of technology would 
take substantial funding, just as marketing does in the purely commercial sector.139 
 
 
                                                 
139 Corey (1997). p. 108. 
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g. Proprietary Technology 
The value of proprietary technologies seemed to vary across the industrial 
sector and government.  Similar to regulated industries the level of corporate rivalry was 
found to be relatively low but so were the opportunities to secure some type of 
competitive advantage through the development of new and/or proprietary technologies. 
Partnerships via CRADAs were another very productive initiative for 
consortiums.  Hundreds of agreements with industry had been negotiated with both large 
and small companies.  It was remarked, “CRADA ventures may well have the potential 
of developing patentable proprietary technology of benefit to corporate funders in the 
pursuit of competitive advantage.”140 
h. Fees 
Consortia typically had membership fees that varied according to a firm’s 
size.  These fees were set and imposed by a core governing group.  These fees were, in 
effect, “taxes” imposed on the members to support some portion of the program.   The 
fact that this support is mandated implies that the governing bodies thought it was 
unlikely that it would be supported voluntarily.  The incentive to form a collaborative 
group is largely economic and the incentive typically comes from a group where the 
anticipated net benefit is estimated to exceed the anticipated total cost of the venture. 
i. Government Involvement 
One of the conditions for continued participation in a consortium 
arrangement was found to be a ‘high level of expertise in the formation and management’ 
of the consortia.  A review of the successful consortia studied reveal they were formed to 
serve as instruments of national policy or as integral parts of private enterprise.  
Furthermore, all of the successful consortia came from private industry.  The 
government-funded consortia, in the US, Europe and Japan, had failed to meet 
expectations.  Within the US there have been exceptions to this rule, notably DARPA and 
NIST consortia arrangements.  Part of the problem appears to be that government 
involvement caused such groups to have multiple goals.  While some of the goals were 
                                                 
140 Corey (1997). p. 118. 
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clearly economic, others were political.  In some cases the goals were not closely aligned 
with the consortia member interests.   
Those consortia that were heavily funded by the government were also 
very vulnerable to sharp budget cuts and shifts in public policy, national income and 
political priorities. 
Within such organizational structures the projects selected were required 
to benefit existing customers and this stipulation discouraged projects which might 
address new markets and pursue new customers. 
In the private-sector these consortia are formed as a result of economic 
incentives that exist for some potential membership.  Mission statements are focused and 
unambiguous and they survive as long as they continue to fulfill the needs of the 
members. 
 
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided background information to lay the foundation for the issues 
raised throughout the remainder of this thesis.  With respect to the broad issue of 
technology transition, the notion of whether the government can operate in a more 
business-like manner was shown to be a highly complex matter.  As the issue was 
explored it was seen to be a highly interrelated mix of issues such as military-civilian 
relationships and organizational structures that require careful examination in order to 
resolve the relevance and interdependencies among many of the important issues 
explored.  Of particular relevance to the FNC Process is the experience of the R&D 
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III. DON SCIENCE &TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an overview of the Department of the Navy (DoN) Science 
and Technology (S&T) Program.  The DoN S&T Program encompasses a number of 
individual subcomponents, one of which is the Future Naval Capability program.  This 
chapter is an extension of the literature search presented in Chapter II but provides 
increasing detail with respect to the DoN S&T Program.  For the reader, this general 
description of the goals and objectives of the S&T Program is necessary in order to 
appreciate the range of issues which can and do impact decisions made at the FNC level.   
The information presented here is not analyzed for technical content but is simply 
presented as the state of the S&T Program at the time this research was conducted.  The 
information presented has been drawn from a variety of public documents and attempts to 
reflect, as accurately as possible, the objectives of the S&T Program through 2003. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) was established by Public Law 588 in 
1946141.  The role of ONR is to plan, foster and encourage scientific research because of 
its importance to future naval power and the preservation of national security.  Naval 
research activities were to be conducted in augmentation of and in conjunction with the 
research and development conducted by other offices and agencies of the Department of 
the Navy.   
The Chief of Naval Research (CNR) is the Navy’s science and technology 
executive officer and the Office of the Chief of Naval Research (OCNR) was established 
in 1986142.   CNR  responsibilities  spanned  the Office of Naval Technology (ONT) and  
                                                 
141 Act of 1 Aug 1946, Public Law 588, 79th Congress (10 USC 5021-5024) 
142 SECNAVNOTE 5430. 29 September 1986. 
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were later expanded to include the mission and function of the Office of Advanced 
Technology (OAT), and the Office of Research and Development Center Policy 
(ORDCP)143.   
The OCNR functions and responsibilities were revised and updated in 
1991144.  The Office of Naval Research (ONR) was reconstituted in 1992 with 
additional changes to its role and responsibilities.  Changes made included the 
integration of ONR, ONT and OAT functions into ONR, the designation of the Naval 
Research Laboratory (NRL) as the Navy Corporate Laboratory and subsequent 
changes to ONR responsibilities relative to other Navy SYSCOM R&D Centers145.   
Under these changes a sampling of the responsibilities of the ONR as defined 
by these DoN notices and instructions includes: 
• Serve as the Responsible Office for the Navy RDT&E appropriation. 
• Assess, promote, coordinate and manage naval basic research, exploratory 
development and advanced technology development, directed at 
transitioning new capabilities toward fleet utilization and increased naval 
warfare capability. 
• Policy, oversight, and execution management for programs funded in the 
6.1, 6.2 and 6.3A Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy 
(RDT&E, N)146. 
• Maintain liaison regarding research and technology necessary to meet 
requirements for future fleet operations and capabilities. 
                                                 
143 Defense Management Report Implementation Plan.  2 October 1989. 
144 Office of the Chief of Naval Research, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5430.20D. 7 March 1991. 
145 Office of Naval Research, SECNAV NOTICE 5430. 4 December 1992. 
146 The DoD divides its RDT&E into seven Budget Activity (BA) categories, each of which being 
designated by a numerical code: Basic Research (BA1), Applied Research (BA2), Advanced Technology 
Development (BA3), System Demonstration and Validation (BA4), Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (BA5), Management Support (BA6) and Operational Systems Development (BA7).  For the 
DoD, the “Science and Technology” (S&T) component of the RDT&E budget comprises the BA1, BA2 
and BA3 accounts.  In the past the BA1 (Basic Research) category has been referred to as “6.1,” BA2 
(Applied Research) has been referred to as “6.2,” and BA3 (Advanced Technology Development) has been 
referred to as “6.3.”  The numerical taxonomy (6.1, 6.2, 6.3) is a carryover from past budget structures 
related to specific Program Elements (PEs).  This can be confusing since there are “6.3” PEs in BA4 and 
BA5.  The DoN S&T Program is responsible for BA1, BA2 and BA3 only.  S&T is separate from the 6.4 
and higher budget activity categories which are executed by other “claimants” of the DoN community 
(Program Executive Officers, Navy and Marine Corps System Command  Program Managers, etc). The 
reference to 6.1 funds here means BA1, the 6.2 reference means BA2 and the 6.3A reference means BA3. 
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• Provide scientific and technical expertise to DoN and DoD by assessing 
foreign research and technology, assisting in solving pressing naval 
problems, and evaluating research and technology inputs to systems 
development programs. 
• Develop and execute a program investment strategy with appropriate 
managerial and technical guidance. 
• Cultivate a positive working environment between Navy S&T 
communities and industry to promote collaborative efforts resulting in the 
transfer of military technology to the commercial sector. 
• Acquire and assist science and technology through a contracts and grants 
program.  This program would provide contracting services for other 
Navy, DoD, and Federal activities, where appropriate, as well as 
responsibilities for contract management relative to educational 
institutions for DoD and other Federal agencies by agreement.   
• Coordination and administration of scientific studies which span broad 
naval interests. 
• Encourage and promote education in the fields of science and technology 
and provide financial incentive programs to increase the technical talent 
base available for use in the Navy, government, and other national 
research and development efforts. 
• Collect and make available to the DoN information on S&T results, 
discoveries, trends in S&T activity, location and availability of scientific 
and technical expertise and facilities in the US and abroad. 
 
The ONR is a Headquarters Command.  As such it does not necessarily (or 
typically) perform the scientific research and technology development with its own 
personnel.  As delineated by the above guidance it performs administration and 
technology coordination services for the DoN and, with respect to joint efforts and 
operations, for the DoD.  The primary means for the conduct of these duties is 
through issuing contracts, grants, scholarships to academia, industry and a consortium 
of RDT&E facilities within the S&T community.  One such naval S&T consortium is 
the Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) which is made up of the Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL), the Navy SYSCOM Warfare Centers, and Federally Funded 
Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs).  Generally speaking, it is the 
employees of this wider consortium of NRE researchers, scientists and technologists 
that conduct the DoN S&T work on behalf of the ONR. 
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C. REPORTING STRUCTURE 
As the S&T Executive for the DoN the CNR reports to the Secretary of the Navy 
through the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition 
(ASN (RD&A)).  To perform his appropriation responsibilities the CNR is “dual-hatted” 
as the DoN Resource Sponsor for S&T (OPNAV N091).  The CNR reports to the Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO).  Figure 2 diagrams the CNR’s reporting chain of command. 
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Figure 2.   
                                                
Reporting Chain of Command 
 
1. Marine Corps Command 
The Marine Corps (MC) has a unique relationship within DoN S&T through 
mutual reporting arrangements.  The Commandant of the Marine Corps provides a 
general officer to ONR with responsibility as the Vice Chief of Naval Research (VCNR).  
The VCNR is a full partner in the leadership team at ONR.  The Commandant of the 
Marine Corps also assigns the CNR with the responsibility of Assistant Deputy Chief of 
Staff for S&T, a member of the Marine Corps General Staff.  This relationship was 
strengthened by the formal transfer of program management and fiscal responsibilities 
and personnel billets from the MC Systems Command (MCSC) to ONR in 1999.147 
 
147 The USMC/ONR S&T Integration activities were conducted over a several year period.  Initial 
USMC/DoN RDT&E responsibilities were documented by an MOA dated 29 November 1995.  A senior 
leadership meeting occurred on 4 February 1999 and 24 May 1999 with the terms of the agreement were 
documented in a Memorandum for the Record dated 16 July 1999. 
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D. PROGRAM COMPONENTS 
The DoN S&T Program can be approximated as two primary program 
components; a long-term, research-oriented, “Discovery and Invention (D&I)” 
component and a more near-term, application-oriented, “Exploitation and Deployment 
(E&D)” component.  DoN S&T execution resources (BA1, BA2 and BA3) are roughly 
equally split among these two programs. 
The level of investment for the DoN S&T Program is roughly set at 2% of Navy 
TOA.  This level of investment falls below the levels suggested by OSD guidance (3% of 
Navy TOA) and is far lower than representative investment levels from the commercial 
sector as well as other non-defense technical sectors within the government.148 
 
1. Discovery and Invention 
The Discovery and Invention (D&I) component of the DoN S&T portfolio 
addresses long-term naval needs.  The D&I portion of the Navy’s S&T program is 
resourced from the BA1 (Basic Research) and about half of the BA2 (Applied Research) 
accounts.  The intent of the S&T program is to focus this portion of the investment 
portfolio on long-term scientific research and the generation of new concepts and ideas.  
The exact definition of “long-term” is somewhat vague but it always implies programs 
with expected utility beyond the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), or current 
budgeting horizon.  This component of the S&T portfolio is sometimes referred to as the 
“Navy and Marine Corps After Next”149.   
ONR's fundamental approach to “Discovery and Invention” emphasizes the 
financial support of a very large number of research avenues to understand basic 
                                                 
148 This comparison roughly equates Navy S&T investment levels (BA1/2/3, a subset of the RDT&E 
investment) to commercial R&D investment levels.  This comparison is assumed reasonable since 
acquisition investments (BA4+, the rest of the RDT&E investment) are roughly equated to commercial 
production activities, which are not included in commercial R&D figures.  For 2002 data, non-government 
R&D investment levels are significantly higher that defense S&T investment levels.  For example, 
pharmaceuticals invest at 14.2%, software publishing at 12.9%, semiconductor manufacturing at 11.9% and 
computer design at 10.4%.  Within the Federal government navigation and control industries invest at 
5.2%, aerospace at 4.3% and scientific services invest at 2.3%.  This is a summary of NSF data from URL 
= http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/infbrief/nsf04320/start.htm.  Last accessed June 2004. 
149The terminology of a "Next Navy" and a "Navy After Next" is taken from Paul Bracken, "The 
Military After Next", The Washington Quarterly, 1993, 16:4 pp 157-174. 
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scientific principles and the accumulation of fundamental knowledge across a wide 
number of disciplines which have potential Navy relevance.  Such an approach allows the 
Navy to “buy-in” to a research area to assist and leverage significant advances being 
made by others interested in those science and technology fields as well.  Much of this 
work is academic in nature and is accomplished through grants and scholarships to major 
universities and industry.  Major research programs are usually in technical areas with 
specific naval interest (underwater weapons, acoustics, etc).  There are also areas of 
continuing research interest where there is a desire to maintain our national strengths in 
areas that are uniquely naval in nature. 
The D&I program is organized into technology research “thrust” areas.  ONR 
“thrusts” are integrated programs designed to foster innovation in a scientific or 
technological discipline (e.g. nanoelectronics, computational methods) or a discrete 
system concept or capability (e.g., underwater weaponry, combat casualty care).  There 
are two parallel sets, one describing the in-house programs of the corporate Naval 
Research Laboratory (NRL) and the Warfare Centers (ILIR, etc.), and the other the 
external programs managed by the individual ONR S&T Departments.  NRL thrust areas 
are supported by a core ‘technology base’ allocation of resources provided to NRL by 
ONR.   
Inputs to the D&I program come from two primary internal concept-generation 
processes; National Naval Responsibilities (NNRs) and Grand Challenges (GCs).  The 
NNR and GC processes each identify areas of high naval priority for future technology 
developments.   
 
2. Exploitation and Deployment 
The Exploitation and Deployment (E&D)150 component of the DoN S&T 
portfolio responds to near-term naval needs.  The E&D component of the Navy’s S&T 
program is resourced out of the remaining half of the BA2 (Applied Research) account as 
well as most of the BA3 (Advanced Technology Development) account.  This portion of 
                                                 
150 The “Exploitation & Deployment” phrase for the more applied half of the S&T Program is not 
used as often as the “Discovery & Invention,” the terminology for the research half of the S&T Program. 
 84
the S&T program has a much more immediate (short-term) warfighter emphasis as well 
as a significant focus is on demonstrating technical capabilities and transitioning these 
naval capabilities into acquisition programs and fleet operations.  Programs funded as a 
part of the E&D portfolio have expected utility within the Future Years Development 
Program (FYDP) and should be a part of the POM planning and budgeting process.  This 
component of the S&T portfolio is sometimes referred to as the “Next Navy.” 
The D&I thrusts projects in priority Research Areas provide the foundation of 
knowledge and limited concept definition and supporting technology development.  
These thrust areas are then assessed and prioritized for further refinement and 
development within the E&D component of the S&T product development model.  
Customer-focused programs, such as the Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs)151, make up a 
major part of the E&D component of the DoN S&T program.  Projects supported within 
the E&D’s FNC program have all been approved and prioritized by a series of Integrated 
Product Teams (IPTs) that consist of senior Navy and Marine Corps leaders.  Ultimate 
FNC ‘portfolio’ approval is provided by a Navy S&T Corporate Board.  This Corporate 
Board consists of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and 
Acquisition) (ASN(RDA)), the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), and the 
Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC).   
 
3. Program Integration and Flow 
Figure 3 illustrates the typical S&T product development model process flow.  
Concepts are fed into the D&I (BA1/BA2) component and as the knowledge is 
understood and developed it is moved into a higher BA category for more advanced and 
more naval-focused development and demonstration.  The number of projects supported 
are reduced as they mature and progress to higher BA categories but the level of 
investment goes up accordingly due to increasing integration costs.  Projects that are 
sufficiently developed and show naval relevance are integrated into naval capability 
demonstrations.  In this model successful naval project demonstrations should 
                                                 
151 The Future Naval Capability technology transition process will be addressed in greater detail in the 
next chapter of this thesis. 
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“transition” from the Navy’s S&T Program into an Acquisition program (BA4 and 
higher) desiring the demonstrated naval capability (either an entirely new naval capability 
































Figure 3.   The S&T Product Development Process 
 
4. S&T Community Partnership Outreach 
ONR has established a number of “outreach” offices to foster and maintain 
constant interaction and dialog with a variety of customer representatives.  This dialog 
helps ONR keep abreast of issues, problems and concerns from the various naval 
communities across the US and throughout the world.  This dialog provides ONR with 
needed feedback and insight regarding their S&T processes.  Typically these outreach 
offices have very small staff, which may be augmented by personnel from other naval 




a. Science Advisors 
The ONR administers the selection and assignment of a number of 
technical Naval Research Science Advisors (NRSAs) to naval commands throughout the 
world through the Naval Fleet/Force Technology Innovation Office (NFFTIO).  The 
NFFTIO provides a common interface among the NRSAs, the recipient Navy and Marine 
Corps Fleet/Force commands, and the body of technical experts employed by the various 
Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) facilities.   
Naval Research Science Advisors (NRSAs) are assigned to staff of the 
Navy and Marine Corps Fleet/Force commands for a two-year developmental 
assignment.  As part of their S&T advisory duties the NRSAs help to clarify and identify 
the S&T needs of the Fleet/Force and serve as an interface in finding and implementing 
technological solutions.  As members of the Commander’s staff, the science advisors 
develop important relationships with the warfighters and facilitate an increased 
requirements, science and technology dialog between the warfighter and headquarter 
communities.   The long-term assignment helps to assure that current naval warfighting 
needs are understood and accurately reported back to the S&T community.   
b. International Field Offices 
ONR staffs a small International Field Office (IFO).  IFO operations 
provide ONR with a convenient access into the international scientific and technical 
community.  With an increasing emphasis on leveraging technical contributions of our 
allies as well as the need for greater coalition interoperability capabilities the IFO 
operations provide ONR with an opportunity to nurture technical exchanges and 
collaboration possibilities with the global S&T community.   
c. SYSCOM Liaison Office 
ONR has established a headquarters liaison office with the Navy’s 
Systems Commands.  This S&T Liaison Office (STO), consisting of representatives from 
NAVAIR, NAVSEA, SPAWAR and CNET152, help to facilitate a continuous cross-
community S&T dialog regarding administrative and technology transition issues in 
                                                 
152 The CNET (Chief of Naval Education and Training) designation has recently been changed to 
NETC (Naval Education and Training Command). 
 87
support of general S&T transition efforts153.  The liaison activities promote a direct 
interaction between the S&T and acquisition communities to foster the development of a 
coherent, sound and effective S&T program that is consistent with the needs, guidance 
and priorities among the various naval acquisition communities, operational requirements 
and DoN S&T resources. 
d. Program MOU/MOAs 
In order to maintain a continuous, accurate dialog in support of S&T 
coordination activities with other program offices within the DoN, DoD and defense 
agencies ONR establishes other operating agreements, as appropriate.  At present count 
there are roughly 50 active Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) and/or 
Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) in force.  These MOU/MOAs provide increased 
visibility in the DoN S&T Program as well as formal agreement in research activities, 
increased technical collaboration and the leveraging of external agency resources for 
mutual benefit. 
e. Cooperative R&D Initiative 
There are some programs within the overall DoN S&T Program that 
appear to operate in a businesslike manner, meaning they generate revenue for the Navy.  
One such example is the Navy’s Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
(CRADA) program.  Although not large, the CRADA program generates a small amount 
of revenue.  The revenue flows from corporations to the government, typically the NRE 
Warfare Centers and Laboratories, because the quality of the research or the access to 
naval expertise is considered to be of significant value to those companies.  The number 
of CRADAs initiated by our Warfare Centers is small, on the order of 120 a year, and the 
percentage of those that actually generate revenue for the Navy is also small 
(approximately 25% of the total) as is the amount of revenue generated (on the order of 
$1M total across all CRADAs in any given year) but the fundamental approach is 
relatively unique within Navy operations. 
 
                                                 
153 Each of the acquisition communities negotiate separate Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) 
with ONR.  For example the original NAVAIR MOU was dated 15 June 1994, and the SPAWAR Lettter of 
Understanding (LOU) is dated 30 April 1996. 
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5. Laboratory Structure  
The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is the Navy Corporate Laboratory and 
primarily conducts Basic and Applied Research for the DoN.  NRL is a member of a 
larger Navy Laboratory system which includes the various Naval Systems Command 
Warfare Centers.  The NRL and Navy Warfare Centers are collectively part of an even 
larger naval RDT&E community referred to as the Naval Research Enterprise (NRE).  
The NRE consists of members of the research, development and test, and evaluation 
communities such as ONR, the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), the Systems 
Commands (SYSCOMs) and their associated Warfare Centers, Naval Medical 
Laboratories, and the Federally Funded Research Development Center. The NRE 
conducts the majority of the Naval S&T research and development and also assists in the 
recruitment of Science Advisors.154  Figure 4 shows the distribution of Navy’s 
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154 URL = http://www.onr.navy.mil/ctto/nre_description.asp, accessed June 2003. 
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6. S&T Program Inputs 
DoN S&T Strategic Guidance is captured in several ways.  A primary means is 
through the selection, approval and support of a few high-priority technical areas of 
unique naval interest.  These are two primary areas of input; National Naval 
Responsibilities (NNRs) and Grand Challenges (GCs).  These investment areas are 
research fields that are considered either to be unique to the Navy and critical to 
successful Navy operations.  By its nature this research supports fundamental naval 
capabilities that would not be supported outside of the naval community.   
 
7. National Naval Responsibilities 
A National Naval Responsibility (NNR) is a scientific area uniquely important to 
the Navy and Marine Corps and critical to Navy/Marine Corps wartime operations.  
Because of their unique naval nature the NNR areas require significant Navy investment 
since no other Service or Defense Agency will have a need to invest in these areas 
themselves.  Potential NNR topic areas are analyzed by ONR and boards of the National 
Research Council.  At the current time there are three NNR topic areas: Ocean Acoustics, 
Underwater Weapons, and Naval Engineering.   
 
8. Naval S&T Grand Challenges 
Navy S&T Grand Challenges (GCs)155 are long-term, highly challenging 
scientific and technical objectives that are being addressed by a focused series of related 
research efforts over a very long (20 year +) time frame.  Solving these Naval S&T GCs 
will help to enable future Navy and Marine Corps warfighting capability options that may 
be required by the “Navy After Next.” By emphasizing selected ongoing research and by 
introducing appropriate long-term research into our present R&D program, we can 
develop the capabilities that will be required for the future. 
Using a small panel of experts from ONR and NRL, a list of eight Naval S&T 
Grand Challenges were developed.  The GC thrust areas are either technical or 
operational in nature and have high level objectives regarding risk, excitement, and 
                                                 
155 URL = http://www.onr.navy.mil/sci_tech/grandc.htm, accessed July 2003. 
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motivational value.  The selected GCs have been approved by CNR and are being 
promulgated in the Navy and Marine Corps R&D community to provide long-term focus 
and program guidance for the DoN S&T Program.  ONR’s Chief Scientist periodically 
reviews the future progress of the Naval S&T Grand Challenges and initiates changes to 
the GC on a three year cycle.  The four Naval S&T Grand Challenges are: 
a. Naval Battlespace Awareness  
The challenge is to describe the current and future Naval battlespace in 
terms of the natural environment (space, atmosphere, ocean and the nearby land masses) 
and the disposition of friendly and enemy forces, with sufficient detail, accuracy, and 
timeliness to meet evolving Navy and Marine Corps mission requirements. 
b. Electric Power Sources for the Navy and Marine Corps  
The challenge is to develop new sources of power for the “Navy (and 
Marine Corps) after Next.”  The future power requirement for the Marine Corps is that of 
a portable long-lived power source which can provide power for all Marine-carried 
equipment.  The primary electric power source required for all electric ships and other 
Naval warfighting platforms must employ a non-petroleum fuel and must be safe, 
efficient, and have little undesirable emissions. 
c. Naval Materials by Design 
The challenge is to develop, beginning from first principles, computational 
procedures which will yield the composition, synthesis and processing recipes for 
required naval materials with superior properties, in a time frame of system development. 
d. Multifunctional Electronic Systems for Intelligent Naval Sensors 
The challenge is to develop highly multifunctional nanoscale architecture 
devices to their ultimate limits of high speed, small size and low power.  These future 
systems will interactively combine sensing, image processing, computation, signal 
processing, and communication functions, to achieve real-time adaptive responses.  The 
future implementation of these systems using devices of nanoscale architectures are 




9. Transformational Technology Transition Activities 
The difficulty of the S&T “transition” process is enormous and has been 
recognized by many.  At the DoD level a number of programs have been initiated in an 
attempt to address this issue and the DoN supports these DoD initiatives with its own, 
naval-focused, technology transition initiatives and programs.  The DoD, for example, 
continues to use the “Advanced Technology Demonstration” (ATD) and “Advanced 
Concept and Technology Demonstration” (ACTD) programs as its primary vehicles to 
transition technologies.  Both of these programs have demonstrated only mixed success 
over the years.  For the Navy the ATD program was replaced in FY02 by the Future 
Naval Capability (FNC) process. 
a. Tech Solutions 
Tech Solutions is a relatively new S&T initiative that intends to solicit 
real-time input from Sailors and Marines regarding fleet problems that need immediate 
technology solutions.  The “Tech Solution” model allows inputs to be received from the 
warfighter through a “reverse eBay” website156 where they are vetted across Navy NRE 
solution providers such as the Naval Warfare Centers, NRL, and Applied/University Labs 
looking for potential technology matches.  This program attempts to provide rapid S&T 
solutions to the warfighter.157  The approach is to provide Sailors and Marines web-based 
access to the expertise of the Naval Research Enterprise.  This access, via both internet 
and a secure military internet, targets E-4s to O-4s who work daily at the 
deckplate/ground level on ways to improve mission effectiveness through the application 
of technology.  Improvements from this effort are intended to help move the Navy toward 
its goal of a more effective and efficient use of personnel. 
ONR’s goal is to provide the Fleet/Force with prototypes that deliver  
“50–70% solutions” addressing immediate requirements and that can be easily 
                                                 
156 eBay is an internet auction service that claims to host millions of auctions at any given time.  This 
service is considered highly innovative due to its low overhead and inventory requirements as well as its 
ability to service millions of remote users simultaneously through the use of computer information 
technologies.  The eBay success story is based on the premise that if someone wants to sell something they 
can easily find buyers anywhere in the world using the internet.  For additional information on eBay refer 
to the official eBay tutorial website, URL = http://pages.ebay.com/education/.  Last accessed June, 2004. 
157 For additional information on ONR’s “Tech Solutions” business process refer to ONR URL = 
http://www.techsolutions.navy.mil/.  Last accessed June, 2004. 
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transitioned by the acquisition community.  To accomplish this Tech Solutions structures 
every project with definable metrics and includes appropriate Systems Command 
elements in an Integrated Product Team concept.  This approach was used to help ensure 
that technology transition “hook points” would be built into the solution in order to 
trigger the acquisition authority executives to move directly to final prototyping or a 
decision to buy. 
b. Swamp Works 
Swamp Works is another “transformational” initiative intended to push the 
envelope of S&T in search of technology breakthroughs that can benefit the operational 
Navy in the very near term (within 1-3 years) rather than the much longer time frame of 
more conventional technology development experiences (15-20 years).  Swamp Works is 
being thought of as a small program that will look for truly innovative and “out-of-the-
box” solutions to the most pressing Naval problems.  Swamp Works initiatives are 
considered very high-risk with the possibility of very high payoffs, if successful.  These 
initiatives are intended to address “disruptive technologies” to achieve breakthroughs and 
create “leap-ahead” naval capabilities in weapons, sensors, platforms, and warfighting.   
c. Venture Capital 
ONR’s Commercial Technology Transition Officer (CTTO) has pursued a 
“venture initiative” as a possible (rapid) alternative to our current conventional (slow) 
acquisition processes.  The goal of this venture initiative is to explore technology 
transition processes modeled after commercial venture capital practices and adapt those 
that show the most promise.   
Under this initiative there were two technology transition “wargame” 
exercises conducted.  These venture wargames are an attempt to explore opportunities for 
sharing technology with the commercial marketplace.  These wargames, with participants 
drawn from the government, industry, and the private venture capital community, explore 
possible opportunities for venture initiatives that would facilitate the introduction of 
innovative technologies from commercial industry into the naval services.  Initial 
indications  are  that  the  ability  to  “broker”  information  and  deals  among  interested  
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government program managers, intellectual property holders, and venture capitalists may 




This chapter presented a brief overview of the Department of the Navy (DoN) 
Science and Technology (S&T) Program.  The DoN S&T Program was shown to consist 
of a number of subcomponents including the Discovery and Invention (D&I) program 
and the Exploitation and Deployment (E&D) program (where the Future Naval 
Capability process is contained).  The integration and flow of the S&T program 
components was discussed as well as other relevant elements of the S&T program 
including ONR’s S&T community outreach efforts (the use of fleet science advisors and 
SYSCOM liaison officers) and the DoN NRE laboratory structure. 
The ways in which inputs are provided to the S&T Program was discussed and a 
summary of a few of the major S&T investment interest areas, National Naval 
Responsibility and Grand Challenges, were provided.  Finally, a few of the most recent 
transformational process initiatives, formulated under the current CNR, were 
summarized. 
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IV. FUTURE NAVAL CAPABILITIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a description of the Department of the Navy (DoN) Future 
Naval Capability (FNC) process.  The information presented here is an extension of the 
general literature review presented in Chapter II and the overview of the DoN S&T 
Program presented in Chapter III.  The stated goals and objectives of the FNC Process are 
described as well as the (approximate) chronological sequence of events, from 
memorandums and other guidance documentation collected, as they unfolded and the 
FNC Process was introduced throughout the DoN S&T community of stakeholders.  
Because of the ‘newness’ of the process there was no attempt made to describe the 
individual FNC projects to any degree of detail nor was there any attempt made to 
evaluate the success or failure of individual projects.   
As with the S&T overview presented in Chapter III, the information presented 
here has not been analyzed for its technical content but is simply presented as an accurate 
representation of the state of the FNC Process at the time this research was conducted.  
The information presented here was also drawn from a wide variety of public documents 
and documents the implementation of the FNC technology transition process through 
2003. 
This description of the implementation of the FNC Process will be informative 
and necessary for the reader to interpret the feedback provided by S&T stakeholder 
community personnel.  This data will be presented in the next chapter. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
In June 1999, the Navy approved a new investment process for the Department of 
the Navy (DoN) Science and Technology (S&T) Program.  This new S&T investment 
process focused on achieving a long-term view not anticipated by currently perceived 
Naval needs as well as a much more intense focus on nearer-term naval warfighter 
capability needs.  From a resources perspective this new S&T investment process divides 
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the S&T investment portfolio, which spans BA1 (6.1), BA2 (6.2) and BA3 (6.3), 
essentially in half.  The long-term view is termed Discovery & Invention (D&I) and is 
resourced through the BA1 and approximately half of the BA2 funds.  The nearer-term 
part of the portfolio is termed Exploitation & Delivery (E&D) and is resourced from the 
remaining half of the BA2 and the BA3 funds.  The primary component of the E&D 
portion of the S&T portfolio is a new technology transition process known as the Future 
Naval Capabilities (FNC).   
The Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) technology transition process is a new DoN 
S&T business model process that attempts to align and partner the Navy’s Requirements, 
Acquisition and S&T communities to focus S&T investments to transition high-priority 
advanced naval capabilities to the warfighter within the Future Years Development Plan 
(FYDP) budgeting and planning cycle. 
Under this new process approximately half of the DoN S&T budget will be 
focused on carefully selected investment programs; these programs will develop and 
demonstrate those advanced technologies that address and enable the high priority Future 
Naval Capabilities.  Transition sponsors will be closely coupled to the FNCs to ensure 
that the capabilities are delivered to the fleet in a more aggressive and timely manner. 
At the time of the establishment of this new S&T investment process, a list of 
twelve FNC emphasis areas was approved by a DoN “Corporate S&T Board.”  An 
Integrated Product Team (IPT) was formed for each FNC to provide oversight for the 
investment process.  Led by flag level personnel, each FNC IPT defined specific 
Enabling Capabilities (ECs), prioritized those capabilities, performed a technology 
assessment and identified technology gaps, and began the development of an appropriate 
S&T program which will enable those future capabilities to be realized, demonstrated, 





 C. THE FUTURE NAVAL CAPABILITY PROCESS 
1. Prelude to Change 
The Navy FNC technology transition process changes represent a DoN response 
to a continued dissatisfaction within the DoD of the Service’s inability to transition 
developmental technologies to their operational forces as well as to the US commercial 
sector.   
In 1998 the ASN(RDA) requested a study be conducted of the technology 
insertion issues.  A web site was designed and an electronic “survey” was posted and 
made available for comment throughout June and July, 1998.  The survey results were 
captured and analyzed with the results being briefed to the ASN(RDA) in December 
1998.  The Technology Insertion Process Action Team (PAT) report was part of a larger 
report delivered to the ASN(RDA) in Jan 1999.  From their analysis the Technology 






                                                
Enhance communication among stakeholder groups via annual S&T 
symposia 
Improve S&T coordination with acquisition program offices 
Institutionalize planning for technology incorporation 
Evaluate means for engaging all stakeholders in identifying S&T priorities 
Study better S&T incentives 
 
2. Reasons for Change 
The FNCs were established in response to the perception that S&T investments 
were not sufficient to enable delivery of new capabilities to the warfighter in a reasonable 
timeframe.  As articulated by senior-level management it was felt within the Navy that 
there were too many programs funded for the level of resources available and, as a result, 
there were not enough programs funded at a sufficient level (“critical mass”) to realize 
transitions from DoN S&T accounts (BA1 through BA3) to acquisition (BA4 and above).  
The ability to realize a technology transition requires a coordinated “hand-off” from the 
 
158 PowerPoint briefing, Technology Insertion Survey Questionnaire. Results briefing to Team Six 
Principals, 18 Dec 1998. 
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S&T (BA3) to acquisition (BA4) communities.  Figure 5 has been commonly used to 
illustrate the transition problem as being one where the S&T and acquisition community 
areas of responsibility do not overlap and the technology development and transition 
effort fails to transition by effectively falling into a perceived “valley of death.” 










Figure 5.   
                                                
The Technology Transition “Valley of Death” 
 
There was a desire to increase S&T support for high-priority Naval159 operational 
requirements, to improve the number of technology transitions, and to facilitate flexible 
and responsible prioritization.  More importantly, there was concern over whether or not 
the Navy’s S&T account delivered anything substantial to the fleet for the (currently 
$1.5B) annual investments being made.  There were a number of issues which fed this 
 
159 Navy & Marine Corps. 
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general concern; S&T investments were viewed as “platform centric160,” the SYSCOMs 
desired to gain control over the 6.3 advanced development account, the lack of reliable 
commitment from the acquisition community to “pick-up” mature S&T technologies, and 
a trend of S&T investment resource reductions over the years.   
 
3. Implementing Changes 
In 1998, shortly after assuming “dual-hat” responsibilities as S&T Resource 
Sponsor (OPNAV N091) and the Chief of Naval Research (CNR), the CNR was involved 
in discussions with the VCNO and offered proposals for an updated S&T requirements 
process.  These proposals, described in a 15 July 1998 letter from the CNR to the VCNO, 
broadly outline what is to eventually become the Future Naval Capability process.  The 




                                                
Focus “requirements” determination on a prioritized list of desired future 
capabilities rather than technologies.  A prioritized list of capabilities (vice 
technologies) would be provided by each OPNAV participant.  This 
involvement of OPNAV would also provide “corporate OPNAV buy-in of 
the result” and “corporate prioritization” among OPNAV priorities. 
Proposed the establishment of a DoN Corporate Board to bring the VCNO 
and ACMC together to interleaf USN & USMC desired capabilities. 
Proposed the use of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to develop and 
oversee the technology thrusts that would result from the DoN Corp Board 
decisions.  The IPTs would consist of appropriate SYSCOMs/PEOs, 
OPNAV requirement officers, ONR representatives, N091 staff and 
members of the S&T performing community.  This IPT process was to be 
modeled after the NAVSEA SUBTECH, Mine Warfare Tech Team, and 
NAVAIR-N88 aviation IPT processes161. 
 
160 A platform-centric approach implies the S&T investment decisions being made were based on 
traditional weapons system platforms such as ships, satellites and aircraft, rather than being based on 
warfighting capabilities.  One criticism of a platform-centric approach is that such an investment portfolio 
strives to maintain the “status-quo” and can be viewed as “plusing-up” acquisition programs of record.  
Another criticism of a platform-centric investment strategy would be that history has shown that such 
traditional approaches have rarely developed and delivered new and innovative solutions to warfighting 
problems. 
161 The Advanced Technology Review Process (ATRB) is a PEO (acquisition) driven process that 
reviews technologies applicable to aviation mission areas.  In 1998 the ATRB process was an F18-centric 
process (Strike Platforms ATRB) but has since been expanded to six active areas with two additional 
review boards in the planning stages.  Although a NAVAIR initiative, and launched by Aviation PEOs, the 






                                                
Proposed a restructuring of the S&T program into two equal parts which 
would consist of, essentially, “requirements pull” and “technology push” 
components.  The “requirements pull” portion of the S&T program would 
comprise “40+% of program; weighted towards 6.3” and a roughly equal 
“40+%” part of the S&T program would be made up of the “less applied 
part of the program (6.1 and some 6.2) to prepare for DoN future 
capability needs.” 
Make the 6.3 S&T program “demo-centric” and focus on demonstrations 
of different sizes as the S&T exit criteria.  The comment was made that 
“History shows that it is best to minimize lumping all demos into special 
programs that are easily targeted like ATDs, ACTDs.”  
The proposed requirements process would look for efficiencies in S&T 
management between the ONR and N091 organizations while striving to maintain POM 
and execution/planning division of labor.  The thrust of the proposed changes was 
intending to get from both organizations what they each do best: 
OPNAV: articulating and prioritizing its capabilities 
ONR: picking the technologies and performers to most affordably meet 
the desired capabilities. 
The proposed process changes were envisioned as being more difficult for N091 
but would result in less paperwork and a higher level of participation for the participating 
OPNAV requirements officers and technologists.  The observation was made that “unless 
S&T funding skyrockets, we must decide to concentrate on fewer things rather than 
satisfying everyone a little.” 
These proposed Navy changes received the immediate attention of the 
ASN(RDA) who requested the CNR prepare an annual report on the funding balance 
between the two components of the proposed S&T program.   In his letter to the CNR the 
ASN(RDA) commented: 
While your proposal focused on the “40+%” of the program that is most 
applied, I want to ensure that future Naval Science and Technology 
investments continue to look beyond just the currently desired 
capabilities.162 
 
162 ASN(RDA) Memorandum for the CNR, Science and Technology Requirements Process, 19 Aug 
1998 
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This requested report, which was also to include a brief appraisal of the core basic 
and applied research efforts that are considered “national naval responsibilities,” shows 
the high level of Navy leadership interest and, possibly, some concern that proposed S&T 
program changes would have a detrimental affect on long-term naval interests. 
In November 1998 the VCNO issued a memorandum expressing satisfaction with 
OPNAVs “collaboration on a revised Science and Technology (S&T) requirements and 
program formulation process163.”  In this memorandum the VCNO requested that the 
S&T program revision efforts be integrated with OPNAV N81’s new Integrated Warfare 
Analysis and Requirements (IWAR) process and articulated four critical attributes that 
the new DoN S&T process would have to meet: 
• A process involving senior DoN leadership that determines and 
prioritizes about ten desired future naval capabilities. 
• An integrated process team (IPT) approach with working groups 
led by OPNAV requirements codes to set requirements for the 
desired future naval capabilities and promote S&T program 
transition. 
• The creation of an S&T program encompassing about 50% of the 
S&T budget that addresses the ten desired future capabilities. 
• A review of that portion of the S&T program focusing on the ten 
future capability areas. The review should involve IPTs which 
include representatives from the fleet, OPNAV, SYSCOMs/PEOs, 
and Navy laboratories.  The results of the review should be 
presented annually to senior DoN leadership. 
The separate OPNAV communities each responded independently to a N091 
request for the identification of desired naval capabilities.  The Air Warfare Division 
(OPNAV N88), for example, provided OPNAV N091 with a prioritized list of 57 desired 
capabilities164 which were generated during a series of S&T workshops at Fort 
Belvoir165. 
                                                 
163 VCNO Memorandum for the Director, Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements, 
Department of the Navy (DoN) Science and Technology Requirements Process, 2 Nov 1998 
164 The 57 required aviation capabilities is referred to as the “Heinz 57” list. 
165 Memorandum for Director, Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements (N091), Science 
and Technology Prioritized Capabilities, 16 Nov 1998 
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The OPNAV N091 staff collected the prioritized future capability requirements 
and binned them into potential “future naval capability” focus areas of investment.  In 
addition to the OPNAV Resource inputs the N091 staff used the Fleet’s 17 Command 
Capability Issues (CCIs) for an initial starting point.  Original thoughts were to have 17 
FNC’s, one to address each Fleet CCI.  To provide additional flexibility the headings for 
the CCIs were used but the descriptions (requirements definition) were not.  Senior Navy 
management felt 17 technical focus areas were too many and there was a desire to reduce 
the number to approximately 10 focus areas.  After much DoN and N091 internal 
deliberation the final number of 12 FNC focus areas was settled upon.  The original 
twelve FNC technical focus areas were: 












Capable Manpower (CM) 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) 
Expeditionary Logistics (ExLog) 
Information Distribution (ID) 
Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare (LASW) 
Missile Defense (MD) 
Organic Mine Countermeasures (OMCM) 
Platform Protection (PP) 
Time Critical Strike (TCS) 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) 
Warfighter Protection (WP) 
This new requirements process was built around a consensus-based Integrated 
Product Team (IPT) process.  The VCNO issued an action memorandum directing 
support of the process and assigning a leader and co-leader for Navy requirements for 
each of the IPTs.  Per this guidance the requirements leader would be the chair for each 
IPT and while the IPTs would be “consensus-based bodies, the chair establishes IPT 
agendas, schedules and meeting locations with assistance from the OPNAV (N091) 
executive secretary.”  The IPT representatives would be Flag rank military or civilian 
leaders from within their offices with alternates being at the appropriate pay grades.   
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In a similar manner the Principal Deputy for ASN(RDA) issued a memorandum 
assigning a leader and co-leader for the Navy and Marine Corps acquisition position 
within the IPT166.  This memo also noted that IPT representation was approved for the 
Bureau of Medicine (BUMED), the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) and 
the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).  These organizations, 
although not formally considered acquisition commands, were approved for IPT 
participation due to their technology transition potential. 
A joint memorandum, issued by the VCNO and the ACMC, formally announced 
the Future Naval Capabilities S&T Process and distributed the IPT Charter167.  The IPT 











                                                
IPTs will operate on a consensus basis 
IPT members represent their entire appointing community 
IPTs will review and focus the Capability 
Chair leads IPT in the defining and prioritizing capability goals 
IPTs will describe programs in terms of project deliverables 
Capability to be delivered, time, acquisition or development opportunity 
There would be no a priori limit to funds 
Projects must be clearly prioritized 
Demonstration/Deliverable goals: 20% 1-2 years, 60% 3-5 years, 20% 5-7 
years 
Highlight “fact of life” barriers to change (e.g. known congressional 
interest items, OSD commitments, ramps) 
In a memo the Director, T&E and TR/Assistant Deputy Commandant 
(S&T)/CNR presented the S&T Corporate Board168 with specific information on the 
prioritized capabilities developed for the twelve FNC IPTs.  Concerns expressed at this 
point were that the enabling capabilities would represent true Navy needs of the future 
rather than “simple extrapolations of the current S&T program nor repairs of acquisition 
 
166 ASN(RDA), Memorandum for Distribution, Future Naval Capabilities Based Science and 
Technology Process, 22 June 1999 
167 VCNO and ACMC Joint Memorandum for Distribution, Future Naval Capabilities Based Science 
and Technology Process, 1 July 1999 
168 The first meeting of the Navy S&T Corporate Board was on 17 June 1999. 
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programs experiencing funding pressures” and that transition discussions should focus 
“not only on the point of fleet/force introduction of the capabilities, but also on the 
intermediate (6.4/6.5 level) programs required to carry the necessary technologies 
forward.”169  This memo indicated that N091 would prepare a POM-02 Sponsor Program 
Proposal (SPP) for the S&T Corporate Boards review in March 2000 and that the POM-
02 budget would reflect changes based on this new process. 
The initial guidance for the preparation of investment plans for funding within 
POM-02 requested S&T investment priorities be submitted without fiscal constraints. 
The funding requested in this stage of the process exceeded OPNAV POM budget targets 
by a factor of three.  In November 1999 a final prioritization of the FNC emphasis areas 
was released, and guidance on a proposed S&T technology investment program was 
provided170.  The guidance indicated that DoN S&T Program would be flat-funded 
(negative real growth) after FY-02 and that the same funding controls would apply in the 
outyears.  The guidance mentioned ASN(RD&A) interest in the S&T Program 
establishing deliverable goals and directed the IPTs to prepare an itemization of the 
capabilities they plan to deliver as well as a prioritization of other capabilities to be 
considered for an “above core” funding request.  It was noted that the DoN S&T 
investment plans would need to address other high priority applied (but non-FNC) S&T 
efforts referred to as “fact-of-life” efforts.  A review of all IPT proposals for the FY 2002 
Core and Above Core funds was announced171 by OPNAV N911 with the review board 
being chaired by N091B and composed of a single representative from CNO, CMC, ONR 
and ASN(RDA). 
The Requirements and Acquisition communities were generally supportive of the 
new  FNC  process.   As  an  example  OPNAV  Air  Warfare  (N88)  and  the  Naval Air  
                                                 
169 Director, T&E and RT, Memorandum for Science and Technology Corporate Board, Future Naval 
Capabilities, Ser N911T/9U542052, 5 October 1999 
170 CNO N091 Memorandum for Distribution, Future Naval Capabilities Fiscal Guidance, Ser 
N091/9Y53894, 23 November 1999 
171 N911 Memorandum, Guidance for the Submission of Core and Above Core Programs for FY 
2002, 7 January 2000. 
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Systems Command released a joint memorandum expressing support and offering 







                                                
Coordination (deconfliction) between FNC programs be a formal step in 
the process.  
Specific written criteria be provided to the IPT for allocating funds to Core 
and Above Core for FNC demonstration programs. 
The process for funding “high priority applied but non-FNC efforts” be 
clearly delineated.  The aviation community expressed concern over 
critical needs not included in any FNC program that were in danger of 
losing all funding and they wanted those programs to be funded out of 
these high-priority non-FNC program lines. 
A set of lessons learned operating procedures be documented from the 
S&T program building processes of four specific FNC IPTs.173 
A systematic approach to IPT conduct to ensure rigor in evaluation and 
prioritization. 
While being supportive of the process the aviation community was concerned that 
certain critical components to their program were severely under funded, such as the 
Total Ownership Costs FNC, and requested the TOC allocation be increased to 
“accelerate the development of S&T solution to our most pressing fleet readiness 
problems.” The aviation community was not the only ones offering recommendations on 
the FNC program content.  At this time similar FNC reallocation requests were also being 
provided to the CNR by others, for example the submarine community174, as well. 
The S&T Program structure changes being implemented by the Navy would be 
significant and would involve the writing of R-2 funding documents and the generation 
of an entirely new set of S&T Program Element (PE) documents.  As part of these 
changes ONR’s S&T Leaders were provided guidance on aligning the FNC Process with 
higher-level (DoD) processes such as the DUSD(S&T) Defense Technology Objective 
 
172 CNO-NAVAIRSYSCOM Joint Memorandum, Future Naval Capabilities Process, Ser 
N88/0U660109, 29 February 2000. 
173 The aviation community feedback singled out the Time Critical Strike, Littoral ASW, Missile 
Defense and Warfighter Protection IPTs as being particularly notable. 
174 NAVSEASYSCOM Memorandum, Request for ONR Support of Future Submarine Science and 
Technology and Research and Development, Ser 08/00-02154, 25 February 2000. 
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(DTO) process175.  The formal coupling of Navy S&T programs to OSD processes raises 
concern within DoN.  The concerns raised are due to the additional constraints that such a 
coupling imposes on the use and execution of DoN resources.  These additional 
constraints reduce the DoN’s flexibility in managing the S&T account through the need 
to obtain DoD approval for later programmatic changes.  The concern is that the added 
layer of management activity that such approvals require tends to slow down the 
innovation cycle.  In a memorandum to the DUSD(S&T) ONR emphasized the DoN S&T 
program would likely mean that some existing programs might be terminated early and 
that some of these program might be contained within existing DTOs.  A second point 
made was the new FNC Process would be “transition dependent” and that if a transition 
path is lost the S&T program would be “terminated or redirected, as will the 
corresponding DTO176.”  A greater awareness of the potential implications of the Navy’s 
FNC Process continued to generate concern from the Office of the Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering (DDR&E) regarding the Navy’s overall level of support of the 
DUSD(S&T) DTOs.  A follow-up letter to CNR raised continued concerns over the 
proposed drop in Navy funding of DTOs due to the impact the Navy S&T program 
changes would have on the DoD DTO program since the Navy was a significant 
contributor of the cumulative Service and agency 6.2/6.3 funding of DTOs177.  Navy 
funding levels of 29 percent were far lower than a previous DUSD guidance target of 50 
percent.  The level of DTO funding is an important issue for DDR&E because it gives 
credibility to the Defense S&T Reliance planning process and is used in support of the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) performance plan reporting and 
metrics that are reported within DoD, the Congress, White House, Industry, etc.  The 
                                                 
175 ONR ED-TD Memorandum, DTO-FNC Policy, 23 May 2000 
176 ONR ED-TD Memorandum, Harmonizing the DoN FNC and DUSD(S&T) DTO Processes, 01 
June 2000. 
177 DDR&E Memorandum for CNR, The Importance of Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs), 16 
August 2000. 
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concern was that Navy S&T Program changes could weaken the DoD joint Service and 
agency Reliance effort and cause DoD to fall short of GPRA targets.178 
In August 2000 approved guidance and POA&M for the FNC Execution Offices 
were provided179.  This guidance provided a brief overview of the overall S&T 
technology transition problem and presented the S&T Program changes, of which the 
FNC program is a component, as a way for the Navy to provide balance, integration and 
focus to resolve the transition problems.  The Navy’s S&T problem, as stated in this 
guidance memorandum, was: 
When resources decline S&T organization tend to divide what remains 
equally across existing programs. But S&T programs – especially 
maturing applied programs – require a critical mass of support if they are 
to transition.  Without some concentration of resources to keep priority 
programs at critical mass, little or nor progress can be made.  Furthermore, 
declining resources also tend to push organizations to pursue short-term 
goals at the expense of fundamental, long-range work – the principal focus 
of the ONR mission. 
This guidance presented the Navy’s strategy for the FNC Program and identified 
specific representatives for the FNC IPT Execution Offices.  As outlined by this guidance 
document each of the (twelve) FNC IPTs would consist of four representatives, one for 
the DoN Requirements (also serves as Chair for the IPT), a second for S&T (ONR), a 
third for Acquisition (SYSCOM/PEO), and a forth from S&T Resources (N091).  For 
each of the FNC IPTs a summary of the Objectives, prioritized Enabling Capabilities and 
designated representatives for the four Execution Office representatives was provided. 
                                                 
178 The Office of DUSD(S&T) would later release a DOD guidelines document (Technology 
Transition for Affordability, April 2001) to provide DoD S&T program managers with strategies for 
implementing best practices to achieve technology transition.  This document mentions the need to have 
S&T be “more rapidly transitioned to an operational capability to compensate for constrained DOD budgets 
and to keep pace with commercial availability of advanced technologies.”  This guidelines document 
addresses technology transition issues, concepts  and programs across all of the Defense Services and 
Agencies.  The Navy’s FNC program and the Chief Technology Officer were the two key Navy technology 
transition initiatives mentioned in this document.  The Navy’s TOC FNC was specifically mentioned 
separately as an important initiative, emphasizing the importance on system cost and affordability that 
DOD was placing on their technology initiatives. 
179 ONR Memorandum, POA&M and Guidance for Future Naval Capability Execution Offices, 8 
August 2000. 
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From a February 1 FNC Status briefing the FNC program development was 
continuing the process leading to execution of more “business like” programs.  The FNC 
Process approach consisted of developing business plans and securing transition 
agreements from the acquisition community.  New naval warfighting capabilities would 
be developed through the support of a number of “spike” programs180.  Clear exit criteria 
would be required and, introduced later in the process, the use of NASA technology 
readiness levels (TRLs) would be required as an attempt to standardize technology 
expectations.  At this stage business plans and transition agreements were generally 
considered to be “weak.”  It was determined that most transition plans lacked strong 
commitment from acquisition community. 
There were three separate FNC groupings identified.  Six of the FNCs had a 
focused customer group (Missile Defense, Time Critical Strike, Littoral ASW, Platform 
Protection, Autonomous Operations, and Organic Mine Countermeasures).  There were 
three other FNCs which had widely varying customer groups within the Naval 
community (Decision Support Systems, Expeditionary Logistics, and Information 
Distribution).  Finally there were three FNCs that were viewed as “trying to fit within the 
FNC Process” (Warfighter Protection, Total Ownership Cost, and Capable Manpower).  
This grouping, and the order within a group, seems to imply a high-level prioritization of 
the FNC IPTs. 
Proposed structure changes were presented to the Navy’s S&T Corporate Board 
on 12 April 2001 with a follow-up briefing being held on 23 April 2001.  Based on the 
approval of the Corporate Board FNC program structure changes were finalized and 
announced in late May 2001.181  These changes formalized the addition of two entirely 
new FNCs (Electric Ship and Littoral Combat) as well as the combination of the 
Information Distribution and Decision Support System FNCs into a single FNC to be 
renamed the Knowledge Superiority and Assurance (KSA) FNC.  These changes also 
                                                 
180 The “spike” terminology indicated the level of investment would be significantly increased (over 
current DoN investment levels) for a narrow warfighting shortfall area in order to deliver new capability’s 
within that technical area.  The narrow field of focus and high investment level defined the specific “spike.”  
The reference to spike investments was eventually dropped as the investments were simply referred to as 
the twelve individual FNCs.  
181 CNO Memorandum, Future Naval Capabilities, Ser N091/1U539112, 24 May 2001 
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formally changed the basic structure of the FNC IPT from that of four naval communities 
to five by adding a Fleet/Force representative to the IPT.  Consistent with previous 
guidance the new IPTs were charged with the responsibility of determining their enabling 
capabilities.  With these changes the list of FNC investment areas became: 













Capable Manpower (CM) 
Electric Warship and Combat Vehicles (EWCV) 
Knowledge Superiority and Assurance (KSA) 
Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare (LASW) 
Littoral Combat and Power Projection (LCPP) 
Expeditionary Logistics (ExLog) 
Missile Defense (MD) 
Organic Mine Countermeasures (OMCM) 
Platform Protection (PP) 
Time Critical Strike (TCS) 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC) 
Warfighter Protection (WP) 
 
A number of programmatic issues were under consideration at this time.  The 
formation, as an example, of an “Overarching IPT” was now under consideration.  The 
Overarching IPT concept was considered in the initial stages of the FNC Process but was 
discarded at that time as being unnecessary.  This version of the Overarching IPT would 
have N7 as the Chair of an OPNAV “Overarching IPT” which would consist of a military 
3-Star Oversight Panel.  It was also being suggested that a Fleet/Force (F/F) member be 
introduced as a 5th chair of the IPT for each of the FNCs.  It was recommended that CLF 
nominate membership as F/F coordinator.  Another recommendation under consideration 
was for ONR to formalize the FNC Process and develop an integrated multi-year 
schedule with the S&T Resource Sponsor, OPNAV N911.  
Regarding the establishment of a consistent metric for determining program 
technology maturity, DDR&E released guidance on the use of Technology Readiness 
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Levels (TRLs).182  The TRL definitions, based on a NASA framework, were 
incorporated into the plans for defining the technical maturity level for FNC investment 
projects.  The FNC exit criteria and the TRL would establish the technical maturity 
required by the acquisition community for transition.  The project exit criteria and the 
TRLs negotiated between the S&T community and the acquisition program manager 
would be the basis for a ‘contract for transition’ used in the technology transition 
agreements.  The most significant use of the NASA TRLs was their tie with the Exit 
Criteria as the defining metric in establishing technical maturity and a project’s readiness 
for acquisition.  
The business aspect of the FNC program remained an area of management focus.  
In November 2001 guidance was provided for the development of business plans required 
for each FNC Execution Office.  The business plans were focused on documenting and 
negotiating the transition of the S&T spike program to an acquisition customer.  The 
business plan183 was regarded as the highest-level plan generated by an FNC and would 
provide a description of the work and exit criteria at the product level and would be 
supported by detailed plans184 for the individual S&T products.  As described by this 





                                                
To provide both a common, product-focused management tool and a 
common, universally understood language across all the FNCs. 
To provide an internally consistent means by which the S&T senior 
leadership can monitor and evaluate the products being developed. 
To provide consistent, technically grounded data to defend worthy 
programs or to terminate programs that have not demonstrated 
effectiveness. 
To focus resources to ensure the critical mass needed to meet the exit 
criteria. 
 
182 DDR&E Memorandum, Interim Guidance for Implementing Technology Readiness Levels, 5 July 
2001 
183 ONR Memorandum for Distribution, Future Naval Capability Business Planning, 9 November 
2001 





                                                
To provide an up-to-date document that keeps management and the 
execution team informed of the products and resources being applied to an 
FNC. 
 
This business planning guidance provided a template to be used in the 
development of business plans as well as definitions on a variety of terms including 
enabling capability, exit criteria, return on investment (ROI), risk assessment/risk 
management, technologies, and transition. 
By the start of 2002 a number of external events were having an impact on the 
FNC Process.  Such factors as a new CNO and CMC, the release of the QDR results and 
SECDEF transformational directives were initiating a review of the FNC Process and 
transition products.  Of particular importance to the FNC Process, because of its heavy 
emphasis on the need for firm and credible transitions to acquisition programs, was the 
cancellation or reduction in scope of some acquisition programs within DoN.185  Such 
high level programmatic changes to acquisition program would potentially jeopardize a 
number of the FNC IPT project transitions.  Program redirection as a fallout of the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks was a possibility as was program resource reductions as 
a result of the need to fund the war on terrorism.  There was also a recent formulation of 
an OPNAV requirements “Technology Oversight Group” to coordinate the requirements 
planning among the various OPNAV codes as well as a completely new OPNAV 
requirements process called Mission Capability Packages (MCPs). 
Severe DoN budget pressures lead to a series of reviews that looked at the FNC 
portion of the S&T program in greater, and more critical, detail.  A summary of the major 
points from the May 2002 Technology Oversight Group (TOG) review team comments 
on the FNC program are186: 
The definition of what constitutes an FNC Transition has not been 
formally promulgated.  Three separate types of possible transitions were 
discussed in limited detail. 
 
185 For example the DD-21 and VTOL UAV programs. 






                                                
In general detailed budgets had not been prepared by the IPTs and were 
not available by the end of the review.  Without this information the TOG 
review team could not assess the cost, schedule and performance plans for 
the various projects.  It was also noted that a significant analysis of 
resource requirements had not been performed. 
Some work more properly aligned in 6.3 is planned for execution with 6.2 
dollars.  The (negative) impact of the FNC program on the 6.2 portion of 
the E&D program was evident in a comment made regarding the 
“awkward” funding profiles which resulted from projects having to use 
6.2 dollars to complete work after the 6.3 resources were exhausted. 
Routine “taxes” had not been planned for execution of the projects.  The 
observation was made that confusing and conflicting message had been 
sent to the IPTs concerning whether or not their execution plans should 
account for nearly 10 percent taxes assessed each year on R&D programs.  
The suggestion was that the FNCs should be planning for 10 percent of 
their resources to “end up in other areas” due to undistributed 
Congressional reductions, pricing adjustments, and unforeseen 
requirements.  
Significant FNC project funding was being allocated to demonstrations to 
be conducted in the outyears without, was the opinion, full justification. 
 
These TOG reviews, coupled with the FNC program structure changes, were 
forcing a closer scrutiny of entire FNC programs in order to find the required resources to 
make the transitions occur as planned.  This closer examination of the FNC programs 
started to raise questions regarding the underlying initial assumptions that all FNCs were 
created equal.  This review, as an example, was very critical of the Capable Manpower 
FNC and the review team suggested a further review of this FNC would be needed to 
“show that duplication of work or research already conducted by industry and 
government is not occurring.”187  At the same time, however, neither of the two new 
FNCs (Littoral Combat and Electric Warship) was reviewed because their programs had 
not been solidified.  Both, however, appeared to be viewed from an apparently more 
sympathetic vantage point by the review team noting that “neither FNC has been funded 
to the desired level.”  The results of the O-6 level FNC program review and 
 
187 The issue regarding the CM FNC revolved around fundamental differences of opinion regarding 
whether or not the projects being funded by the CM IPT were S&T in nature and/or being done at a 
sufficient level by industry or others.  Although Manpower and Training were clearly articulated priorities 
of the CNO this FNC funding issue would surface on several occasions for the CM IPT. 
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recommended program reductions were released in mid-June 2002.188  The TOG met 
later in the month to review earlier recommendations and requested the O-6 FNC review 
team to assess the FNC projects with respect to relevance to transformation as defined in 
Sea Power 21.  The results of this assessment were released in July 2002.189  After 
having examined the strength of the transition agreements, value to the warfighter, and 
alignment with the QDR/Navy Transformational Roadmap for the FNC spike projects the 
TOG identified 29 additional projects from six of the twelve IPTs for reductions190.  The 
rationale provided for recommended reductions were that the programs targeted were not 
aligned to the QDR/Navy Transformation Roadmap, did not an adequate transition 
commitment and had a low (perceived) value to the warfighter191.  Following reclama 
discussions the TOG Option 1 reductions to the FNCs were eventually restored and 8 
percent of planned FY 2003 FNC funding was placed on administrative hold.192 
One of the objectives of this period of reviews was an attempt to stabilize FNC 
program funding at new thresholds ($500 M or 30% TOA).  Another objective was to 
formalize the OPNAV requirements process by instituting a more formal method to 
consider major program changes.  A number of programmatic issues were being raised at 
this time among the stakeholder community.  For example, there was concern that a 
formal method to initiate new projects into an FNC did not exist.  Similarly, a formal 
process did not exist for the termination of FNC IPT projects or for adjusting the FNC 
IPT Enabling Capabilities across the FYDP.  Other areas of concern included the possible 
need to rebalance the FNC portfolio to free-up resources for new OPNAV investment 
priorities,   standing   up   a   new   EC  to  address  the  Navy’s  Counter-Terrorism/Force  
                                                 
188 CNO Memorandum,  Final Results of O-6 Level Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) Review, Ser 
N091/2U539057, 17 June 2002. 
189 CNO Memorandum, Results of O-6 Level Review on Transformation in Future Naval Capabilities 
(FNC), Ser N091/2U539084, 19 July 2002. 
190 PowerPoint briefing, Navy FNC Program. Dynamic Management Processes Assuring Program 
Relevance, 12 Aug 02 
191 PowerPoint briefing, Navy FNC Program. A Key Part of Naval Transformation, 13 Aug 02 
192 ONR Memorandum, Update to Fiscal Year 2003 Department of the Navy Science and Technology 
Investment Guidance, Ser 08E1/169, 2 October 2002. 
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Protection concerns, address the structure of the DoN S&T FNC Process beyond FY 
2007, as well as the appropriate OPNAV N7/N8 role regarding FNC program 
requirements definition. 
By the March 2003 TOG meeting the FNC Process was looking at aligning with 
the CNOs Naval Power 21 Process.  The IPT structure was back to a “four seat” 
arrangement due to the merging of the S&T Resource Sponsor executive secretary 
position (N091) with the S&T position and the (previous) addition of the Fleet/Force 
position.  Overall requirements guidance was being coordinated by the TOG with 
representatives from N6/7, DASN(RDT&E), CFFC, CNR and MCCDC.  Top-level 
guidance was approved by the Navy’s S&T Corporate Board which consists of the 








                                                
Budgets have been stabilized. 
Transition agreements remain vital to program success. 
There has been an alignment of IPTs with Naval Power 21. 
Decision to protect the CM and WP FNCs and align them with Sea 
Warrior. 
A “new start” process is being looked at.  The IPTs update their business 
plans on a quarterly basis and have been encouraged to think about 
opportunities for new project starts within their existing ECs or anticipate 
the possibility for an introduction of some entirely new ECs.  The goal is 
to gradually transition to a process for delivering capabilities beyond 
FY07.  A staggered approach is desired in order to avoid having a 
completely new set of FNCs and/or ECs start in FY08. 
The EWCV FNC was considered “below critical mass” and restructured to 
become the “Advanced Electric Capabilities Systems FNC”. 
Additional program flexibility, via possible TTA transition ratios, are 
being considered.  There have been discussions regarding the 
implementation of an 80:20 ratio for TTAs.  This ratio would require only 
80 percent of IPTs funding needing to be tied to specific transitions, where 
TTAs would be required, thereby releasing the remaining 20 percent of 
IPT funding to be available for more innovative S&T efforts where a TTA 
would not be required. 
 
 
193 PowerPoint briefing, Future Naval Capabilities Review, 13 March 2003. 
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The TOG Terms of Reference were released in May 2003.194  The TOG 





                                                
Integrate and assess all FNCs; align resources and investment strategy to 
address the four Seapower 21 Naval Capabilities. 
Provide FNC investment guidance directly to the Chief of Naval 
Research/Director of Navy Test and Evaluation and Technology 
Requirements (N091). 
Review/Approve future FNC program changes (new starts, terminate 
existing FNCs and enabling capabilities within an FNC). 
Provide a summary of activities to the S&T Corporate Board as 
appropriate. 
 
4. External Reviews 
The FNC Program has undergone a number of management reviews and program 
assessments over the past couple of years.  When the FNC program was first being 
established, for example, there was a review of the programs being funded by the Navy’s 
Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) program to determine the potential 
applicability of ATD program to the new FNC Process.  This purpose of this review was 
to evaluate the ATD program in terms of its “applicability to designated Future Naval 
Capabilities.”195 
As the FNC program was being established there were a variety of assessments 
conducted.  There were monthly assessments of transition readiness and execution 
progress at the project level (cost, schedule, technical).  There were periodic status 
meetings (some monthly, some quarterly) intended to resolve a number of miscellaneous 
programmatic issues being encountered.  At the same time there were also a number of 
additional alignment assessments with other processes and initiatives such as the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the new CNO’s stated priorities, the OPNAV 
Mission Capability Packages (MCPs), the Command Capability Initiatives (CCIs), and 
ONR’s National Naval Responsibilities (NNRs).   
 
194 ASN/ACMC/CNO Joint Memorandum, Technical Oversight Group (TOG) for Future Naval 
Capabilities (FNCs), 23 May 2003. 
195 CNR Memorandum, Department of the Navy Advanced Technology Development (6.3) Program 
Review, Ser 35/116, 1 June 1999. 
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An assessment of the FNC program was held in September 2000.  The purpose of 
this review was to review the status of the FNC program portfolio “regarding 
prioritization of efforts, demonstration schedule, transition funding and any unintended 
consequences resulting from POM-02 funding decisions.”196  According to guidance 
documents OPNAV N091 staff would review the technical issues and comments 
provided and recommend programmatic adjustments. 
Another program assessment was conducted at Johns Hopkins University Applied 
Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) in late March 2001.  Although several reviews of the 
FNC program had already occurred, the guidance for this review stated that this 
assessment was intended to support the PR-03 process and meet the VCNO requirement 
for an annual review of the S&T Program.197  At this assessment review a number of 





                                                
The creation of a Commercial Technology Transition Officer (CTTO) 
role.  This position, a refocusing of the Chief Technology Officer duties, 
would use ASN 6.4 funding to assist in establishing transition paths.  The 
stated thoughts were that the commercial sector has technology “on the 
shelf” that cannot be developed or fielded in a rapid manner due to low 
Return on Investments.  The CTTOs access to, and use of, 6.4 resources 
would provide “bridge” funding in support of transitions. 
The creation of a Naval Technology Transition Officer (NTTO) was 
announced as well.  The NTTO duties would be analogous to those of the 
CTTO regarding the search for a transition target for the capability being 
developed by the FNC programs.  
There was a desire to create two new, additional, FNCs: a Marine Corps 
FNC, Littoral Combat, and a Navy FNC, Electric Ship.  There was a 
desire to keep the number of FNCs constant which would require some 
FNCs to be combined in order to make room for the two new FNCs.  Two 
FNCs were identified as likely possible candidates for program 
consolidation; the Information Distribution FNC and the Decision Support 
Systems FNC. 
OPNAV N70 would be used to coordinate the overall OPNAV 
requirements input for the FNC program.  It was noted there was a clear 
mismatch between naval missions and available S&T resources.  The role 
 
196 CNO N091 Memorandum, Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) Assessment, Ser N091/0U539170, 9 
August 2000. 
197 CNO N091 Memorandum, Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) Assessment Guidance to Presenters, 
Ser N911T10/1U539018, 07 March 2001. 
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of N70 would be to monitor all of the FNCs and recommend overarching 
adjustments to ensure the Navy’s highest priority capabilities would get 
the necessary level of support. 
The issue of “taxes” was raised.  Since the 11 December 2000 Program of 
Record was released the FNC were asked to provide input on an 
approximately 11% tax.  The two new FNCs would likely be funded by a 
2% tax across the board.  There was also talk of another possible “tax” 





There was discussion over the lack of acquisition community 
representation as well as discussion over the Fleet’s voice not being heard 
by those inside the beltway. 
 
An N091 assessment of the FNC program was conducted over a two day period at 
the Warfare Analysis Laboratory at Johns Hopkins University/Applied Physics 
Laboratory (JHU/APL) in January 2003.  This assessment was the first to be presented to 
the newly established Technology Oversight Group (TOG) and was to present an overall 
FNC status of each of the FNC spike programs regarding prioritization, transition 
funding, demonstration schedule, staffing, etc., and to discuss problems and issues they 
may have encountered.  During the introductory remarks the following major points were 
made regarding N091’s assessment of technology transition issues: 
There would be close examination of the level and strength of 
commitment of POM04 resources identified by the FNCs. 
Transition Agreements were discussed.  These will be required for all 
projects to ensure funding continuity.  Programs without signed transition 
agreements are subject to becoming bill-payers for other initiatives.   
 
Because of continuing and immediate demands being placed on the DoN S&T 
account as a result of budget cuts being taken across the board in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom, a Technology Working Group (TOG) meeting was held in March 
2002 and a follow-up TOG review of the FNC projects was held on 6 May 2002.  This 
review team conducted an assessment of the FNC projects based on value to the 
warfighter and the strength of the transition.  The focus of the review team was on those 
projects that were identified as having low value to the warfighter and low strength of 
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transition to acquisition.  With some exceptions most projects outside of one standard 
deviation below the mean were recommended for removal.198  A reclamation meeting 
was scheduled for mid May 2002 where affected IPTs could make their case for the 
restoration of funding reductions.  The guidance memoranda stated that IPTs could 
“propose alternative reductions that result in the same funding profile” since funding 
discussions would be on a “net zero sum basis.”  
a. Red Teaming Review 
To help ensure the funded IPT enabling capability investment areas were 
adequately understood and would be leveraged by the Navy properly the CNO directed 
the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) initiate an independent “Red 
Teaming” process to provide an independent assessment, and investment guidance, for 
future rounds of the FNC Process.  Specifically the Red Teaming process was attempting 
to develop recommendations in time to affect any FNCs which might be selected for the 
PR-03 budget cycle199.  This Red Teaming of the FNCs would evaluate candidate FNCs 
against potential future threats and disruptive technologies.  The Red Teaming process, to 
involve wargaming exercises and quantitative analysis, was implemented to attempt to 
answer questions regarding the utility and technical assumptions of the various 
technology options.  Red Teaming personnel would include, at a minimum, personnel 
from NWDC and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).  Objectives of the Red Teaming 
process would be to develop a comprehensive POA&M consistent with the next round of 
FNC to be selected (PR-03) and to develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for the 




                                                
The extent to which the FNC Process encourages discovery and tolerates 
technology push and pull. 
The extent to which the FNCs are future-going, vice toward legacy 
concepts. 
Whether the FNC Process is responsive to the Capstone Concept for the 
Navy After Next. 
 
198 CNO Memorandum for Technology Oversight Group, Results of O-6 Level Future Naval 
Capabilities Review, Ser N091A/2U539024, 7 May 2002. 
199 CNO Memorandum, Red Teaming of Future Naval Capabilities, Ser N00/0U500042, 22 May 2000 








                                                
Range of Navy tasks addressed. 
Whether the FNCs have implementation paths vice being “slaved to 
legacy acquisition processes and existing programs”. 
Does the FNC Process develop key enablers, specifically for the full range 
of naval operations in the littoral. 
 
b. Inspector General Report 
The DoD Office of the Inspector General (IG) conducted an audit of the 
Navy’s effectiveness in transitioning advanced technology products to military 
applications.  The IG team audited the Navy’s Advanced Technology Program, including 
the FNC Process, and released a report sharply critical of the Navy’s efforts in February 
2003.201  The report recognized the Navy created a new structure to manage its science 
and technology efforts to facilitate the transition of technology, but concluded that 
improvements on the coordination of technology transition activities were still needed.  A 
summary of the findings of the audit include: 
All of the working level IPTs reviewed lacked charters establishing roles 
and responsibilities. 
S&T project recipients (customers) were not always included in the 
working-level IPTs.  There was also a reported lack of agreement on 
technology readiness levels and exit criteria as well as limited 
documentation regarding IPT issues and actions. 
None of the (five) acquisition recipients had identified funding for those 
technologies scheduled to transition in FY 2002 and 2003. 
 In this report the IG observed that Congress and DoD officials had 
previously voiced concern that technology had not transitioned to the warfighter quickly 
enough.  In order to maximize the benefit of the S&T program to the warfighter the 
VCNO instituted the FNC Process in FY 1998 to focus the science and technology 
investment on achieving capabilities for the naval forces.  The new technology transition 
process shifted the DoN S&T emphasis from conducting basic research and development 
on long-term, high-risk technologies to developing more focused products that would be 
demonstrated, using pre-established exit criteria, within 7 years.  The IG audit 
 
201 DODIG Report, Navy Transition of Advanced Technology Programs to Military Applications (D-
2003-053), 4 February 2003. 
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conclusions were, essentially, that a number of the ONR processes (management control, 
technology transition, performance appraisal, etc.) were not achieving the results desired 
effectively. 
c. NRAC Report 
The Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) released a report on 
life cycle technology insertion that mentioned the FNC Process.202  The NRAC panel 
looked at a variety of technology transition issues and, regarding the FNC Process, 
reported that: 
The panel found that the FNC process for exploiting naval S&T is not 
currently working as planned.  The primary issues with the FNC Process 
relate to a lack of proper planning, lack of review, lack of involvement by 
integrators and end-users, and a lack of critical mass in terms of funding. 
 
5. Mapping Products to Requirements 
The original twelve FNC S&T investment areas were established by OPNAV 
N091 staff from inputs received as a result of a data call (Nov98).  Although N091 
maintained the original OPNAV requirements it was decided not to provide the FNC 
IPTs with the requirements.  It was decided that it would be more useful to allow each 
FNC IPT to start out with a clean sheet of paper and determine its own requirements and 
operational focus.  As a result, none of the original requirements were deliberately 
addressed by any of the FNC IPTs.  As time went on and external exposure of the S&T 
investment areas became more pronounced there was a need to assess the relevancy of 
the FNC products to a variety of externally generated naval needs and requirements.  
FNC products were mapped to OPNAV Mission Capability Packages (MCPs),203 
Command Capability Issues,204 DoD Operational goals,205 National Naval 
Responsibilities,206 to the QDR,207 as well as to the CNO's Sea Power 21 thrust area 
pillars (Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing and FORCEnet). 
                                                 
202 Naval Research Advisory Committee, Life Cycle Technology Insertion, NRAC 02-2, July 2002. 
203 Excel spreadsheet, FNC_Product_MCP_Assessment, 9 Jan 02 
204 Excel spreadsheet, FNCs mapped to 2002 CCIs, 14 Feb 02 
205 Excel spreadsheet, FNCs mapped to DoD Operational Goals, 19 Jan 02 
206 Excel spreadsheet, FNCs mapped to National Naval Responsibilities, 17 Jan 02 
 120
 6. Communications 
OPNAV N091 staff, serving each IPT in an Executive Secretary role, would serve 
as the primary cross-FNC means of communications.  In January 2001 the establishment 
of a DoN S&T Website was announced by ONR.208  The DoN S&T website was to be 
secure and would facilitate unclassified information flow and promote cross-community 
collaboration.  The website would support the entire S&T Program and would provide a 
convenient source of information for the FNC Process.  The website would provide the 
Navy and Marine Corps community a number of services including discussion groups, a 
calendar, document exchange, and postings in specific areas of interest.  Due to the 
sensitive nature of military information only members of the government S&T 
community would receive access. 
 
7. Stakeholder and Participant Feedback 
To capture an assessment of the FNC Process from the perspective of S&T 
stakeholders and participants in the FNC technology transition process, a series of 
personal interviews of stakeholder community personnel was held and an FNC Process 
feedback survey was circulated among the stakeholder communities via electronic mail.  
For a more informed response attempts were made to contact individuals who were 
actively involved in the FNC Process.  In many cases this was difficult due to the 
rotational nature of the OPNAV military positions as well as due to numerous personnel 
who retired or left government service.  NRSAs were asked to provide fleet input on the 
survey in their Science Advisor capacity.  The interviews and survey responses were for 
non-attribution and helped establish a baseline for how the S&T FNC business process 
was being viewed across the S&T stakeholder community.  The unedited survey 
responses are included as Appendix A of this thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
207 Excel spreadsheet, QDR_FNC_Mapping-PreTOG, 12 Mar 02 
208 ONR Memorandum, Naval Science and Technology Website, Ser 00ST/4155, 08 January 2001. 
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D. SUMMARY 
The Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) process was initiated in FY 1998 to focus 
the DoN S&T investment on the achievement of future capabilities for Naval forces.  The 
FNC Process was designed to align and partner the requirements, acquisition, and S&T 
communities to deliver and transition high-priority naval capabilities to the warfighter 
over the FYDP.  The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and 
Acquisition approved the FNC Process and the specific S&T investment areas that 
concentrated one-half of the Navy’s S&T Program resources on achieving the selected 
high priority naval capabilities in a greatly accelerated manner. 
 
1. Integrated Product Teams 
The core component of the FNC Process is a consensus-based decision-making 
IPT made up of Flag Officer or Senior Executive Service level personnel from each of 
the requirements, acquisition, and S&T communities.  The IPT approves the naval 
capability investment areas, prioritizes the required enabling capabilities and approves 
the selection of S&T products to deliver those capabilities to an acquisition program 
within the FYDP.  Each FNC IPT represents the entire DoN community for their 
investment area and the IPT ensures investment decisions are done in a consensus-based 
manner.  Personnel on the various IPTs would be established by the following authority: 





ASN(RDA) office assigns Transition responsibility 
CNR assigns S&T Execution Leader 
N091 (S&T Resource Sponsor) assigns the Executive Secretary/Resource 
Rep 
Fleet/Forces Command assigns Fleet/Forces Representative (added later) 
 
2. Program Structure 
There is no ranking or prioritization among FNCs as each FNC is considered to be 
of equal importance to the DoN.  An FNC is a high level area of naval research focus that 
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is divided into a number of prioritized Enabling Capabilities (EC’s).  These EC’s are 
considered essential for the delivery of the fundamental (future) naval capability.  Each 
EC is made up of a number of S&T “spike” investment areas which deliver a specific 
product(s).  The EC spike areas are not prioritized.  Each FNC spike will provide 
significant technology option(s) and operating concepts for the required DoN future naval 
capability.  Each S&T spike investment area will have a significant budget and will 
establish definite program milestones and technical objectives.  Each spike program will 
establish concrete deliverables and culminate in well-defined demonstrations and 
transition the naval capability to a DoN acquisition program or industry. 
 
3. Business Processes 
There has been a direct effort to use best business practices in the execution of the 
S&T FNC program.  As an example, each of the FNC IPTs were directed to develop 
business plans which would detail the S&T portfolio investment decisions being made by 
the individual FNC IPTs.  These business plans would document the ‘business case’ for 
the overall S&T investments and document the exit criteria being used.  These business 
plans would describe the technical maturity level of the technology through Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRLs), contain high-level execution information, and identify a 
specific acquisition community that would transition the demonstrated capability.  The 
acquisition community commitment to transition would be documented by Technology 
Transition Agreements (TTAs). 
 
4. Technology Transition 
The primary goal of the FNC Program is to ensure that DoN S&T programs 
develop and transition mature technologies in support of specific high-priority naval 
capabilities and deliver these new capabilities to acquisition programs for operational use.  
Technology Transition Agreements (TTA), negotiated between an ONR S&T program 
manager and an SYSCOM/PEO acquisition program manager, are used to document the 
transition plans.  In the negotiation of a TTA there are a number of key components that 
must be agreed upon.  These include exit criteria, completion/transition year, level of 
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maturity/risk (Technology Readiness Level), description of product and a demonstration 
of TRL.  Although a core component of the transition process, a precise definition of 
what constitutes a transition has been very difficult to quantify.  Generally the 
identification of an acquisition 6.4 PE in a TTA has been the fundamental metric for 
transition intent.  A FNC Review team reviewing the S&T portfolio for the TOG 
commented that “the definition of what constitutes an FNC Transition has not been 
formally promulgated209” and described three different types of transitions (hardware 
installation, software development and a process/procedure development). 
Using an acquisition program PE (BA4 and up) can cause problems if the targeted 
transition platform experiences problems of its own (as was the case with the DD-21 
program).  “Any cancellation of an acquisition program for which an FNC project was 
designed to transition will cause termination of the FNC project as well210.” 
 
                                                 
209 Enclosure 1, Item #1. Results of O-6 Level Future Naval Capabilities Review, OPNAV (N091) 
memo 3900 Ser N091A/2U539024 dated 7 May 02. 
210 Enclosure 1, Item #9. Results of O-6 Level Future Naval Capabilities Review, OPNAV (N091) 
memo 3900 Ser N091A/2U539024 dated 7 May 02. 
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V. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review presented in Chapter II provides background information on 
DoD business process guidance as well as more general commercial business processes, 
metrics and models.  An overview of the Navy’s S&T Program was presented in Chapter 
III.  Detailed information of the implementation and execution of the FNC program, a 
major subcomponent of the Navy’s S&T Program, was then presented in detail in 
Chapter IV.  This chapter builds on the understanding of the FNC program within the 
framework of the DoN Program and analyzes data from the FNC Process in an attempt to 
determine if the FNC Process has in fact allowed the DoN to operate in a more 
businesslike manner.  Evidence of an achieved ability to operate in a more businesslike 
manner would be in line with DoD guidance. 
Data were collected from a variety of independent sources in an attempt to 
capture correlating indicators.  Interviews were conducted with a variety of personnel 
throughout the stakeholder communities.  The interviews sought information on DoN 
business processes as well as the Navy’s various technology transition processes and any 
issues encountered when attempting to transition new technologies to acquisition 
programs.  Some of the interviews were formal (questions with responses recorded and 
later transcribed) while others were informal discussions that were not recorded.  In one 
case a formal interview was not captured due to a recorder malfunction.  Interviewees 
consisted of active duty Flag Officers, current/retired civilian Senior Executive Service 
members from ONR and the SYSCOMs, past/present FNC IPT members, a former 
ASN(RDA), a military industry sector Corporate Vice President (for a high-level, non-
government perspective on the technology transition problem) and several personnel 
supporting DoN S&T processes in various capacities. 
An electronic survey was circulated to persons who were knowledgeable of and 
actively supported the FNC Process in some capacity.  The objective of the survey was to 
obtain credible feedback on the FNC Process from persons who were intimately involved 
in the process and therefore knowledgeable of its goals, objectives and processes. 
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B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
This section compares business operating principles to the processes involved in 
the implementation of the DoN FNC Technology Transition Process.  The analysis draws 
upon data collected during the literature survey of previous chapters as well as insights 
obtained from formal personnel interviews and more general informal discussions.   
 
1. Operating Guidance 
High-level guidance within the DoD has been very consistent over the years and 
appears to be in line with reasonable business practices: make the government agencies 
more efficient and lower the costs of doing business for the taxpayer.  The focus of these 
initiatives has consistently to reduce costs.  Instances can be found where guidance from 
various agencies within the government has been found to be conflicting but this conflict 
appears to stem from the different (and sometimes conflicting) missions, objectives and 
priorities of the various agencies involved.  The conflicts are not resolved because of the 
bureaucratic infrastructure that has evolved over time.  One example which relates to the 
DoN S&T account is the 3% growth guidance from OSD which appears to be in conflict 
with budgetary priorities and actions taken at the DoN level.   
 
2. Defense Strategy. 
OSD emphasis has clearly been on developing joint capabilities and in support of 
joint operations and experimentation.  This joint warfighting emphasis is completely in 
line with guidance that emphasizes a business approach to operations in order to reduce 
costs.  In this regard the push for greater jointness among the Services and Agencies is 
seen as a means to help DoD achieve greater cost reductions. 
At the current time, however, there is not an overall Naval S&T strategy which 
has been articulated and integrates DoN objectives, priorities, and roles for planning joint 
capabilities development.  Recent changes to the DoN S&T Program are an attempt to 
establish such a strategy by providing a balance between the long-term investments (the 
D&I half of the S&T Program) and short-term warfighting priorities (the E&D half of the 
S&T Program).   
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In accordance with OSD emphasis the DoN has pursued a “capabilities-based 
process,” the Future Naval Capability process, to identify and prioritize naval needs, 
develop solutions, and deliver these new capabilities to the operational warfighter.  
Implementation problems have arisen, however, as a result of guidance that appears to 
provide confusing or conflicting investment priorities and severely constrains the 
program, fiscally.   
The Services have historically been responsible to define their own needs, 
develop their own technical alternatives, and select and resource their own desired 
solutions.  Within DoD there is concern that the Navy will not actively pursue new 
innovative or joint programs.  There is some evidence of such a reluctance found in the 
Navy’s lack of support for the ACTD program as well as the DoN’s resistance to growing 
their S&T account to 3% of Navy TOA.  Such actions undermine the DoD emphasis for 
realizing cost savings through multi-service program efficiencies.  Improving 
interoperability among the Services continues to be a high priority emphasis for OSD 
which will require greater collaboration and program integration at all levels. 
 
3. Business Principles and Environment 
All interviewees expressed some degree of skepticism regarding the utility of 
applying business principles and using business models within the DoN S&T technology 
transition processes and framework.  Most persons interviewed acknowledged they could 
see parallels between business processes and the OSD, DoD, and DoN directives over the 
years but felt the government and commercial sectors were too different to be able to 
make useful comparisons.  Some thought the idea was absurd and one person, at least, 
thought the whole notion (the DoN trying to operate like a business) was “pure folly.”  A 
more typical response provided during the personal interviews, when asked for thoughts 
on the government trying to operate more like a business one SES-level interviewee 





a. The Profit Motive 
Businesses are driven by profit and new growth in business.  One simple 
example of such fundamental corporate objectives can be found in a passage by the 
Boeing Company printed in a short corporate history.  This small volume, which recounts 
the early years of the Boeing Aircraft Company, notes that even though the Boeing 
Airplane Company survived with contracts from the U.S. Army, and others, additional 
growth was needed: 
It was clear, however, that to prosper, the company needed to build, mass 
produce, and sell aircraft of its own design.211 
At the S&T level, within the DoN, the same profit motives of the 
corporate sector do not seem to apply.  Where businesses strive to increase profits by 
keeping their costs down the emphasis within the government is on how fast it will be 
possible to get the money out the door and how fast is it spent—“obligations” and 
“expenditures.”  The government starts out with a budget and tries to spend exactly that 
amount of money over the course of the year with no residual funding left over.  Industry 
tries to maximize their profits by increasing revenues while holding their expenses to a 
minimum.  The two operating principles represent two very different extremes.  As a 
mater of fact, because of Navy Comptroller actions, there are real disincentives when 
attempting to operate more efficiently.  Because of the way the finances are managed 
there no mechanisms that would allow the Navy to reprogram savings earned from one 
program to other uses.  As mentioned in an interview: 
Any money that is taken away from you this year, you don’t get back.  
And it has an effect on you next year because if you’re only growing at 
inflation there’s that much less you’re allowed to grow. 
There are two points of note here.  The first point is the disincentive 
caused by the Navy Comptroller taking any ‘savings’ earned through operating 
efficiencies.  Such an approach immediately discourages innovative approaches to 
achieving increased operating efficiencies because any efficiency realized would actually 
work to decrease future revenues rather than increase them.  The impact of this 
                                                 
211 The Boeing Company (1998), A Brief History of the Boeing Company, p. 7. 
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fundamental approach to conducting business operations is widespread and severe.  For 
example, some of the stove-piping claims and lack of program integration might be 
viewed as a natural result of such an approach to business operations.  The second is the 
reference to growth at the inflation rate which, essentially, implies no real growth at all.  
No company could be successful with growth rates locked to the inflation rate. 
b. The Customer 
For any business the customer is the source of revenue and, as such, is the 
primary focus of business operations.  In marketing terms, for successful companies, the 
customer is the target of a well planned, focused, marketing strategy.  The four 
controllable variables of the “marketing mix” (product, price, promotion and place) are 
all focused upon satisfying the wants, needs and desires of the customer.  When analyzed, 
the data collected from the responses to questions in the participant survey and personnel 
interviews indicate that a clear identification of the customer for the FNC Process was 
anything but obvious for those actually involved in the technology transition process.  
This confusion was due in large part to the discontinuities caused by having separate 
acquisition and financial resource systems used by the government.  The confusion, 
however, is central to the problem studied within this thesis: an examination of business 
principles on the implementation of the FNC technology transition process.  From a 
business perspective, if the identification of the customer is in doubt the ability to 
effectively focus those business activities required of the marketing mix is greatly 
diminished.  The expected net result from such a business venture would reasonably be 
ambiguous results, wasted resources and frustration for all parties involved.  FNC Process 
stakeholder feedback, as documented by comments made in the FNC Technology 
Transition Survey, appear to provide strong support for such an assessment. 
c. Investment Indicators 
In contrast to the commercial business sector, few useful metrics were 
found to guide DoN S&T investment decisions.  The consequence of this lack of 
information is a widespread lack of awareness and appreciation of the need, utility and 
return on FNC investments being made by the IPT structure.  Such a lack of awareness 
was indeed found by the assessments of the IPT provided by stakeholder participants who 
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completed and returned the FNC technology transition survey and, additionally, by many 
who were interviewed for this thesis.   
There have been numerous volume of literature devoted to “resource 
allocation” concerns (where to invest limited resources) but very little was found 
objectively quantifying the payback, or return on investment, for S&T investments 
already made.   
Many of the most common business environment performance metrics and 
“state of health” market indicators surveyed as a part of the literature search for this 
thesis were found to have no direct government investment comparison.  The lack of 
useful metrics and performance indicators, however, does not mean that DoN S&T 
investment decisions are not subject to similar market forces.  What it does mean is that 
absent useful metrics to guide the investment decisions the decisions are being made with 
less confidence and with considerably more risk.  Investment decisions are being made 
using the information that is available.   
Investors have a pesky tendency to discount into the present value of a 
company’s stock price whatever rate of growth they foresee the company 
achieving.212 
This principle is one possible rationale for the observed decline in the 
investment of the DoN S&T account over the last forty years.  The decline in the DoN 
S&T account is an indicator of a fundamental business investment problem for the DoN 
S&T account–there are no good performance indicators for S&T readily available.  
Within the business environment there are a host of such indicators which are used to 
make investment decisions.   
A company must deliver the rate of growth that the market is projecting 
just to keep its stock price from falling.  It must exceed the consensus 
forecast rate of growth in order to boost its share price.213 
The negative implications caused by the lack of such fundamental 
investment decisions tools are accented when one expects investment activity that does 
not materialize.  For example, the restructuring of the DoN S&T account combined with 
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212 Christensen, C. M. and Raynor, M. E. (2003).  p 4.  The emphasis is in the original text. 
213 Ibid, p 4.  The emphasis is in the original. 
the increased budgets as a result of the terrorist attacks of 2001 caused some within the 
DoN to anticipate an increase in the Navy’s S&T account, which did not occur.  (The 
comparison of AF, Army and DARPA accounts would be useful.) 
d. Oversight 
Unless they were found to have made serious mistakes businesses have 
been allowed wide latitude in running their operations without undue outside 
oversight.214  The same is not true within the government where there are checks and 
balances in place which are designed to prevent an accumulation of power.  Although 
originally credited to the Boeing Company as they developed the 777 aircraft, the IPT 
concept is one not commonly found within the corporate sector (at least in the manner 
implemented by the FNC’s).  Based on the need to reach consensus agreements the FNCs 
IPT decision making structure is much more in accordance with House and Senate 
committee and staff dynamics and operations.  Both arrangements are very similar; both 
reach agreements based on consensus and both organizational structures depend on 
significant support from staff to provide the decision maker with the information required 
to reach a decision.  In both cases the quality of the staff is critical to the effectiveness of 
the organization.215 
One of the persons interviewed for this thesis suggested there are some 
clear differences in how the two sectors (commercial and government) are allowed to 
operate.  This person’s observation was: 
We don’t have the flexibility that a business does – to quickly change 
directions.  We can’t even buy things when we want to buy them!  We’re 
so constrained by the laws of the appropriation.  Businesses don’t have 
Program Element numbers.  If the President of a business wants to take 
$10M out of salaries, $50M out of salaries, whatever, and put it into his 
Research pot, he does it.  Or if he wants to take it out of Research and says 
“I really need more people,” he does.  Boom.  We can’t do that.  If you 
want to think of the Admiral as the President of a company, we can do it 
but within tight limits and with LOTS of oversight. 
                                                 
214 This is not necessarily true in some social areas (for example, health and environmental protection) 
where regulation has been tight since damage to citizens and the environment can be severe and permanent.  
Also, the recent corporate financial scandals, such as ENRON, are clearly leading to an increase in outside 
oversight and will change the environment for the commercial sector as well. 
215 Baker (2001), p. 98. 
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Throughout the implementation of the FNC Process the IPTs have 
periodically received additional guidance that reduced their resources and forced them to 
make capability tradeoffs in order to comply with fiscal constraints.  Responses indicate 
that IPT investment decisions are made without serious joint IPT or Service 
consideration.   
Attempts to refocus the FNC investments over the past few years have 
been mixed.  Several changes to the FNC Program were made; an Electric Warships and 
Combat Vehicles FNC was added, a Marine Corps Littoral Combat & Power Projection 
FNC was added, and the Information Distribution FNC was combined with the Decision 
Support System FNC to create the Knowledge Superiority and Assurance FNC.  Other 
intended actions, such as the termination of an entire FNC (Capable Manpower) were 
overturned during high-level program reviews.  As such the process is viewed as fairly 
inefficient and the various stakeholder communities have little incentive to fund joint 
programs unless directed by Congress. 
OPNAV is not adequately engaged in the IPT process and, because of 
higher priority budgetary issues, spends an extraordinary amount of time on OPNAV 
resource issues rather than on defining the desired warfighter capabilities and establishing 
the requirements for the S&T investment programs.  Their focus is on how their 
resources are currently being spent rather than on planning new future capabilities in 
support of an overall DoN strategy.  This emphasis forces OPNAV representatives to 
focus on immediate problems at the end of the process, rather than being proactively 
involved earlier in the planning process.   
In many cases OSD programming guidance (i.e., 3% growth in S&T 
account) and emphasis (i.e., joint programs and ACTDs) is in direct conflict with Navy 
priorities.  In the case of ACTDs, the emphasis on “jointness” is forced into the program 






Businesses succeed or fail based on their selection of high quality personnel.  The 
direct linkage between a successful organization and the personnel it utilizes was a 
recurring theme uncovered in the literature search, personal interviews, and survey 
responses.  This observation is nothing new and was emphasized in a July 1945 Report to 
the President by Vannevar Bush, then Director of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, “The most important single factor in scientific and technical work is the 
quality of the personnel employed.216” 
Businesses typically select a powerful leadership, provide them with authority and 
compensate them accordingly.  This approach to management allows the persons 
involved to make decisions quickly which allows them to be more responsive to company 
needs.  The management approach taken by businesses is thus in stark contrast to that of 
typical government management operations, and FNC management operations in 
particular, where decisions are made at a slower pace and are deliberately reached at 
based on multiple-organization consensus. 
 
5. Use of Business Models 
There is a wealth of literature that supports the need for and documents the 
successful use of appropriate business models across the commercial sector.  Businesses 
aren’t in business for very long without such models.  In fact developing an appropriate 
business model may become a central issue for the FNC Process since 
… technology by itself has no inherent value; that value only arises when 
it is commercialized through a business model.  As with [other 
technologies] the same technology commercialized through two different 
business models will yield two different economic outcomes. 
To create value from a technology, companies must create a business 
model for it, or else allow someone else’s business model to govern the 
value realizable from the innovation.217 
                                                 
216 Bush, Vannevar (1945). Science: The Endless Frontier. USGPO, Washington DC. Pg 15 
217 Chesbrough (2003), p. 156. 
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Within the DoN S&T Program there is no known business model for the FNC 
Technology Transition Process.  Although an exhaustive search was not attempted, there 
were no formal business models found for any of the major programs within the DoN 
S&T Program.  There were instructions, guidelines and process diagrams found for a 
number of projects but nothing that appeared to document and model the expected 
parameters of business operations, as would be the case for a business model. 
For the FNC Process, strides were taken to operate in a business like manner 
through such things as written business plans and transition agreements.  Both of these 
documents were targeting the acquisition community and addressed such issues as 
technology readiness levels and delivery schedules. 
Another planning tool found in use was technology roadmaps.  A roadmap in this 
context is somewhat analogous to a business model in that the roadmap identifies paths 
through which the technology can be inserted into an acquisition program.  The 
technology provides the “value” to the targeted acquisition program.  There is one thing 
that a roadmap does not take into consideration that is critical – a detailed discussion of 
resources needed to achieve the objectives of that roadmap – nor is there a general 
discussion on how the technology will pay for itself once it has been “purchased.”  In all 
cases the roadmaps did not address resourcing requirements.  Unless the roadmap was 
specific to a current acquisition program it was generally assumed that 100% S&T 
funding would be required to fund the technology development effort throughout its 
development cycle and eventual transition to some undefined future program. 
 
C. INTERVIEW FEEDBACK 
One OPNAV representative, when asked if their management was happy with the 
FNC Process, responded: 
That’s a hard thing to address because of all of the turnover.  Our current 
Admiral is too new to directly say “Yes, it’s great” or “No, it’s not.”  He’s 
too new at working it and is still trying to decide.  And he needs evidence 
to see that we’re getting somewhere. 
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When asked what it is that OPNAV wants out of the FNC Process the response 
was crisp, clear and to the point, “He’d like to see products that transition to the fleet 
from the FNCs within a reasonable amount of time.”  This participant went on to explain: 
He’s pretty adamant that we don’t need to be spending hundreds of 
millions of dollars on things that wind up going nowhere – and we don’t 
get an output from them.  The bottom line is he’d like to see an output.  
That the money’s being spent and we’re getting something out of it. 
This view of the FNC Process is consistent with the documentation establishing 
the process as well as on the emphasis on transition and delivering product to the 
warfighter in a more rapid manner.  This comment also conveys the distinct impression 
that DoN S&T resources may have been wasted in the past and that there is little to show 
for all of the S&T investments of the past.  Whether or not this impression is supported 
by fact becomes beside the point if this impression is widespread.  This impression, 
raised by an OPNAV representative, points to a recurring and continuing problem for 
S&T – an inability to articulate tangible benefits that have been delivered to the fleet as a 
result of past S&T investments.  Whether true or not, many representatives outside of the 
S&T community simply do not “believe” that much has been delivered.  The S&T 
community does itself a disservice by not being able to clearly trace past investments to 
tangible products and new warfighting capabilities.  In a sharp contrast to standard 
practices of the commercial sector the DoN S&T community has, in the past anyway, 
invested very little time and effort into marketing their successes and capabilities.  The 
existing lack of awareness of the benefits of the S&T programs is a natural result of this 
disconnect from the consumer and customer of those products previously developed. 
Another interviewee, a PMA Program Officer, expressed an opinion that some of 
the current S&T initiatives are probably futile efforts in trying to change the way S&T 
does its business: 
ONR is not an Acquisition Command so if they’ve developed a ‘business 
model’ that allows them to ‘buy’ technology and deliver it to the fleet, it is 
out of place.  And they will fail.  And they should expect to fail miserably.  
I  think  they’re  seeing  that about now.  They don’t have the right people,  
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they don’t have the right background and they don’t have the desire.  If 
they really want to get their technology out of the building they should try 
to work with us more. 
Having the right people to do the job (as well as making sure the wrong people 
are not involved), as alluded to in this remark, is a common theme found over and over 
again within the numerous documents researched for the literature survey chapter of this 
thesis, from personnel interview remarks and in the participant survey responses 
themselves.  Ultimately it’s all about the people. 
When asked about the FNC Process’s ability so far to support and transition 
specific programs out of S&T one interviewee, an OPNAV science advisor, commented: 
In the time that I’ve been here I have seen cuts by ONR where they’ve cut 
some programs completely out and others have been left and I am not real 
positive about what has been transitioned, about how many programs have 
actually transitioned.  We get asked all the time and we just don’t know.  
No one seems to know, not even ONR, and they’re their programs. 
This comment makes it clear that the question of transition, central to the FNC 
Process, remains unanswered even by those deeply involved in the process.  Here an 
OPNAV representative, the source of the financial resources which support the FNC 
Process as well as the source of the capability requirements that the IPT programs are 
intended to respond to, indicates they do not have a firm grasp on what products and 
capabilities the FNC Program is delivering to the Navy.  Furthermore, this comment 
indicates that the OPNAV representatives do not believe the ONR representatives have a 
firm grasp on this fundamental metric either.  This observation seemed odd and when 
questioned about the level of engagement between OPNAV Requirements Officers (ROs) 
and ONR representatives this person commented there has not been a lot of interaction 
observed and that, “I think there is a need for a more cooperative effort between ONR 
and OPNAV.  It appears that that’s being attempted but its not working.”  Clearly, 
portions of these two communities are not working together as closely as they could. 
When questioned about obstacles that prevent the Navy from transitioning 
technology concepts into acquisition programs more rapidly one of the interviewees, a 
Flag Officer PEO, remarked: 
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I think there’s several.  One, I think we struggle with, is the identification 
of what the requirement is.  And I use that word “requirement” very 
carefully because we’re talking more about providing capabilities.  I 
believe in the past we have relied too much on identifying the solution too 
early and therefore when you bring the widget to the table and it doesn’t 
meet that specific, and sometimes narrowly defined, requirement then we 
do not have the support of the warfighter or the resource sponsor in 
carrying that out.  One is an identification of the right capability we are 
trying to deliver.  The second piece is often we do not involve a wide 
enough group in the early decision making of bring technology in.  What I 
mean by that is that you’ve got to bring in, in my view, the warfighter, the 
program manager, and the industry technology folks, all in and agree 
where you want to go.  And you’ve got to be willing to accept failure in 
the viewpoint that if that particular widget technology approach doesn’t 
work then you have a back-up plan you can bring in.  In our case 
sometimes we take something like an ACTD, which has a wonderful 
selling point in a particular time and space, and we’ll go out and see what 
are some of its limitations and what its capabilities are and yet we have not 
put together a plan to transition it.  You know, what if it is successful?  
You have to do that with the funding -- the resources --  and we tend not to 
be very open in that viewpoint.  So, in summary, I would say that the 
obstacles are we identify the requirement too narrowly in some cases.  
Secondly, we don’t have a back-up plan when it fails and don’t have an 
option to go somewhere else.  And thirdly, we are a little reluctant to 
actually put the resource stream in place early enough so that the impetus 
to succeed is there today. 
This response, from a Flag Officer Acquisition PEO, provides important insight 
into a number of key technology transition obstacles being experienced today.  The first 
problem mentioned was that, from an Acquisition PEO perspective, the DoN continues to 
struggle in identifying specific naval warfighting requirements, now being expressed as 
needed naval capabilities.  The shifting emphasis from requirements to capabilities is 
fully consistent with OSD, DoD and DoN emphasis on capabilities and the efforts to 
articulate a “capabilities-based” set of requirements.  The fact that an Acquisition PEO, 
the organization that does the system engineering and buys the weapons systems used 
throughout the DoN, mentions a lack of a clear set of (capability-based) requirements as 
the first obstacle to fielding new technologies should be an immediate “red flag” for any 
S&T process that attempts to influence such systems. 
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The second obstacle mentioned was a lack of buy-in from a broad constituency 
(“we do not involve a wide enough group in the early decision making”) in the early 
phases of program development.  The FNC’s IPT approach is an attempt to mitigate this 
problem by bringing appropriate community leaders together to discuss these programs at 
an earlier stage of development.  In some regards the IPT approach has helped but the 
effectiveness of the IPT approach as currently implemented is questionable.   
The third critical set of obstacles mentioned by this interviewee was the fact that 
there has been very little effort made in actually planning for a successful technology 
transition.  Not only are there no transition plans, there are also no back-up plans if the 
technology were to fail and the PEO’s are “a little reluctant to actually put the resource 
stream in place early enough so that the impetus to succeed is there.”  From an 
acquisition perspective (risk-adverse), the fact that there is “no back-up plan” is a metric 
which emphasizes the lack of serious intention to transition the technology if it were to be 
successful. 
With the obstacles mentioned here there is little doubt regarding the difficulties 
which can be expected to be encountered when attempting to transition new and 
innovative technologies in the DoN Acquisition paradigm of today.  In fact, within such 
an environment it would be a remarkable feat if technology were transitioned without 
extraordinary assistance. 
Another interviewee, a civilian technologist from a SYSCOM PEO, provided 
roughly similar observations: 
Well, the POM-process for one.  We live in that process … where we’re 
going to now ask for the money in FY06 and quite often there are 
technologies available now but the technology readiness level that they’re 
at is key.  So we need processes that allow us to fund those systems while 
they look very promising at a TRL level of, say 3 or 4 – that’s the NASA 
TR level – to take them up to a 6 or 7.  Our sponsor is risk-adverse, and 
rightly so.  He doesn’t want to invest in premature stuff and he may end up 
dragging a large program along at a very expensive burn-rate or expense 
rate before the technology has proven that it’s [useful] for his core 
function.  And without new processes and additional emphasis on the ones 
we have we’ll have difficulty moving it along.  ONR certainly has had 
some excellent programs.  I’d like to cite the FNC program and programs 
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that don’t have POM funding; they have transformation technology 
investments.  They have excellent program inside of ONR and ONR needs 
to be reinforced in their funding availability as well as their authority to 
pursue those types of things.  And we would like to see that happen, 
certainly within our PEO. 
A number of remarks made here are equally important and relevant to this thesis.  
The DoD POM process was specifically mentioned as an obstacle in transitioning 
technology to the acquisition program.  This acquisition office technologist identifies the 
need for a way to fund technologies while they are relatively “premature” (at a low TRL) 
until they prove their worth for the [PEO] sponsor’s “core function.”  The DoN S&T 
account is intended, of course, to perform this function (fund technologies under 
development) but the key point here is the desire or need for funding only those 
technologies that will ultimately prove to be aligned with this PEO’s “core function.” 
What is being asked for, by this acquisition representative, are technology options 
for conducting their missions in new ways (“transformation technology investments”).  
This representative indicates that portions of the acquisition community see a payoff in 
developing technology options without requiring the acquisition community to foot the 
bill (“ONR needs to be reinforced in their funding availability as well as their authority to 
pursue those types of things”).  A problem arises, however, due to the fact the DoN S&T 
account services all Navy Acquisition PEOs.  The difficulties that might be encountered 
when attempting to service the PEO communities S&T needs can be better appreciated 
through recognition that each of the SYSCOMs has multiple PEOs aligned with the 
SYSCOM mission areas and each PEO has multiple program offices (PMA, PMS, PMW) 
aligned to platforms acquired through the PEO for its mission.  Most of these program 
offices, in turn, have responsibility for multiple weapon system platforms used to execute 
specific missions.  Finally, each of these specific platforms has naval capabilities and 
specific mission requirements that could be enhanced by new technology developments.  
Expecting any organization to effectively service such a diverse community of naval 
missions, capabilities and requirements across the spectrum of the DoN, without clear 
priorities and guidance, is unrealistic. 
 139
When asked a different question about the importance of the Navy’s S&T 
Program to develop options this same civilian PEO representative emphasized, “…we 
need new solutions to many of our warfighting problems …  The technology is a driver.  
We have to get it out there and test it.  We have to examine it, we have to look at it.”  
Obviously the need is there, the problem becomes one of prioritization and execution. 
When asked how we might be able to expand our current technology transition 
processes to incorporate cooperative system demonstrations the response from the Flag 
Officer PEO interviewee was: 
My viewpoint is you have to, again in a collaborative manner, determine 
what the end result is you want to be at and then you have to, in the 
beginning stages of a program, bring in all of the attributes of the program 
– the human interface, the actual warfighting capabilities of the system as 
well as the longevity of how you are going to maintain this system.  You 
have to bring in all of the attributes at the beginning of the design phase.  
That goes back to the partnering between industry and government where 
you bring in sometimes non-traditional, from academia, from the 
commercial industry, so that we can not assume what the solution is but 
identify what the problem is and bring solution sets to it if we have a 
problem. 
This response is in line with the IPT-approach taken by the S&T FNC Program: 
get the most appropriate stakeholder communities involved early in the development 
phase of the program.  An important aspect of this remark is the mention of a need to 
“determine what the end result is you want.”  As obvious as it seems, knowing what is 
wanted is a fundamental component to the whole technology transition process.  All 
important metrics (technical performance, schedules, resource requirements, etc) will be 
derived from knowing what is wanted as well as helping to determine how best to 
achieve the desired objectives. 
With respect to the same question another Flag Officer commented: 
I think we’ve got to have money behind it from the mission point of view.  
If our money stays platform focused it will real hard to get capability-
focused.  I think if we can get OSD and others driving exercises and 
driving missions, not all of the money but some of it, I think it will help. 
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This comment again raises the importance of and the need for stable and reliable 
funding as well as the emphasis for an increasingly joint focus via OSD planning.   
Another Flag Officer interviewee, an OPNAV Resource Sponsor, who was asked 
about the problem of transitioning advanced technology concepts into acquisition 
programs, offered the following comments: 
We need to fill identified gaps.  You can get the best widget out there but 
if it duplicates a capability we already have there will not be a whole lot of 
interest. 
You need an S&T sponsor.  We aligned around the FNCs and hopefully 
your proposal would fall within one of those FNCs or in some of the 
aviation, carrier, surface or submarine technology areas. 
Risk.  Realistic schedules, balanced with risk and cost, are things we will 
look at.  Secretary Young is looking at some ways to accelerate 
technology in that process but clearly risk has to be balanced as a part of 
that. 
How do you maintain requirements stability?  Clearly it's all about money.  
We have worked very hard at getting realism into the operational 
requirements documents, the KPP's – the key performance factors – versus 
spiral development, which seems to be a new buzzword.  What we've 
experienced in the past was people biting off more than they can chew in a 
given capability.  Then we de-scope the program further down the line 
which does not lend you to requirements stability.  Going after those core 
functions first and spiraling to those spin-off capabilities is probably a 
better way to go.  Not ending up with the “gold watch” mentality.  If you 
can tie these into an OSD or joint requirement they end up being much 
more defensible.  
The alignment of the Warfare sponsors with the resource sponsors has 
steadied the requirements out.  The biggest problem we will have in the 
future is that as future defense budgets go they will drive our funding 
priorities and we have to adjust capabilities based on that. 
These comments, made by OPNAV resource sponsor leadership, are critically 
relevant to the technology transition discussions of this thesis because they clearly 
illustrate the focus and importance of the resourcing (i.e., program funding) challenges 
being faced by OPNAV leadership and the possible impact these resource challenges can 
have on FNC IPT programs.  As stated by this Resource Sponsor, stable program 
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requirements, a must for any successful development program, is directly linked to 
funding: “Clearly it's all about money.”  As problems arise (“…people biting off more 
than they can chew in a given capability…”) the net result is that “we descope the 
program further down the line” and the repercussions of such decisions reverberate 
throughout the system.  This observation is significant because under the FNC Process 
guidelines it is the OPNAV community, in its capacity as the Chair of each of the FNC 
IPTs, which has the responsibility to establish the warfighting requirements and for 
ensuring that DoN resources would be available to acquire the capability once it has been 
demonstrated.  The S&T Chair of this IPT-lead process is responsible to design a project 
that responds to the requirements and delivers a solution within resource guidelines 
mutually agreed to.  None of the new naval capability solutions under development seems 
likely, or even achievable, if the developmental system requirements are tied to funding 
fluctuations and do not remain stable. 
During discussions about how the corporate sector approaches the technology 
transition issues the comment was made, “One of the first things that we needed to be 
was a very reliable partner in defense and to be very sure that when we make a 
commitment that that commitment was always met and that everybody would always 
have faith that it would be met.”  With respect to how can the government operate more 
like a business the response was: 
I think first and foremost is a valued partnership.  I think that is where it 
starts.  The specifics of that are probably having to do with the joint 
sharing of needs and those could have a few specifics of their own.  Like 
roadmaps.  The one thing we would like to do is get our technology 
investment aligned with Navy needs.  So if we could get our joint 
roadmaps where we could debate and agree on and get our investments, 
joint investments, aligned around them it would be best.   
Some acquisition streamlining, of course.  At companies such as [ours] we 
only have a fixed amount we can spend on business ventures and every 
dollar we spend on responding to proposals or things of that sort is a dollar 
that we don’t spend on the warfighter.  Streamlining the acquisition 
process would enable dollars to be spent on warfighter needs.   
And I think cross-learning.  We probably spend a lot of time as an industry 
trying to understand the needs of folks in PEOs and organizations like 
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[OPNAV] N7/N8 and the pressure that those folks are under.  Some of 
that the other way so that we could be partners in meeting each others 
needs I think would be helpful.  But overall, we see the need for speed and 
agility and that really is through partnership. 
The items mentioned by this industry representative mirror, almost identically, the 
needs expressed by DoN personnel.  From this input the Navy’s technology transition 
process needs are seen to be not very different from those of a typical major corporation, 
if different at all.  The items mentioned by this corporate executive include a joint sharing 
of needs, the importance in aligning [corporate] technology investments with those needs, 
a debate and agreement among stakeholders on the level of investment required to 
respond to those needs, simpler acquisition processes and a “valued partnership.” 
 
1. Summary of Personal Interviews 
Sixteen interviews were conducted with high-level personnel across the 
stakeholder spectrum.  Most persons interviewed were at the active military Flag-officer, 
civilian Senior Executive Service (SES) or commercial Vice President (VP) level.  A 
more detailed breakout of the 16 persons interviewed would be as follows: 





4 civilian Senior Executive Service (2 retired, 2 currently active) 
1 political appointee (a former ASN(RDA)) 
2 industry representatives at the Corporate Vice President level (1 large 
defense company, 1 small industrial company) 
5 senior civilians at the GS-15 level (2 OPNAV, 2 S&T, 1 Acquisition.  
All were active.) 
In all cases those who were approached agreed to be interviewed and all offered 
insights into the technology transition process with respect to their position, experiences 
and observations.   
Most, but not all, of the interviews were recorded.  All of the interviews were 
conducted in an informal manner and were intended as a comparative source of 
information to the data captured through the e-mail surveys.  In one instance the data 
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from a recorded interview was lost due to a recording problem.218  All of the interviews 
were reviewed for content and some of the recorded interviews were transcribed to 
capture exact quotations for reference in this thesis. 
Interviewees provided valuable insight regarding senior-level management 
thoughts on DoD and DoN efforts to operate in a more business-like manner in general 
and the effectiveness and utility of the FNC technology transition process in particular.   
 
D. SURVEY RESPONSES 
In an effort to collect credible feedback on the FNC Process a survey was 
circulated via e-mail to persons who were knowledgeable of and participated in the FNC 
Process.  The intent was to obtain credible feedback on the FNC Process from persons 
who were involved in the process and knowledgeable of its goals, objectives and 
processes.  An attempt was made to request feedback equally across all stakeholder 
communities in order not to bias the conclusions through a disproportional response rate 
from any particular community.  Obtaining feedback on the FNC Process presented some 
challenges.  In a very large number of cases key personnel had moved on to different jobs 
or retired from civilian or military service.  Personnel turnover was found across all 
communities but most frequently within the OPNAV Requirements community where 
IPT Chairs, Military Requirements Officers and civilian detailees were in frequent 
rotation.  It appears that a large number of key S&T personnel also turned over (left for 
other jobs or retired) as the FNC Process evolved.   
There were also a few persons who declined the opportunity to provide feedback 
on the FNC Process mostly out of what appeared to be a high degree of frustration with 
the process and a lack of desire to expend any additional effort on what they viewed as a 
futile paper exercise.  As one person remarked: 
I am embarrassed I was ever a part of that process.  I don’t want to be 
associated with it any more, in any capacity.  Now I belong to an 
organization that cares about their people and knows how to conduct its 
business.  I don’t ever want to look back again. 
                                                 
218 In this instance the battery drained shortly after the interview started. 
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 1. OPNAV Community Response Analysis 
Survey responses were received from two IPT support categories (Principal IPT 
member and Working Group member).  Due to the nature of the OPNAV role in the FNC 
Process receiving responses from only these two IPT support categories, for the OPNAV 
community, is considered reasonable.  The survey response ratio (surveys 
returned/requested) was 38.5%. 
a. General Questions 
Respondents identified three different customer categories with respect to 
the FNC Process (the OPNAV and acquisition communities and the warfighter) and 
described the FNC Process’ connection to the deployed warfighter (Fleet/Forces).  There 
was agreement, among those that elaborated further, that the acquisition community is the 
immediate customer charged with the responsibility to deliver a capability to an end user, 
the deployed warfighter (fleet).  Several respondents commented on the importance of the 
acquisition community to the FNC Process.  One respondent remarked “the acquisition 
community owns the process to deliver capability to the Fleet.”  Again referring to the 
acquisition community, another respondent remarked: 
they are the folks who must take the result of the S&T and ‘engineer’ or 
design the technology into a system or component so that technology can 
benefit the warfighter. 
All agreed the goals and objectives were explained to the OPNAV 
community.  There was some criticism, however, with respect to the adequacy and 
effectiveness of the understanding of those goals and objectives within the OPNAV 
community.  As an example, one respondent commented: 
[T]he current FNC goals and objectives are somewhat confusing and those 
goals, objectives, processes and overall FNC background are very poorly 
understood within my community of warfare requirements. 
Another respondent drew a direct connection between an apparent lack of 
OPNAV buy-in of the FNC Process, as evidenced by OPNAV questions, poor project 
execution and the resulting funding reductions observed throughout the FNC Process: 
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ONR has not followed through on the execution and delivery of the S&T 
product.  Hence all of the questions by OPNAV and associated reductions. 
A contributing factor to an apparently suboptimal level of awareness (of 
the FNC Process goals and objectives within the OPNAV community) would be the 
degree of personnel turnover within the OPNAV community.  An observed high 
personnel turnover rate is commented on by these OPNAV respondents as well as by 
respondents from other stakeholder communities later in this chapter.  Personnel turnover 
rate, by itself, does not tell the whole story since much more depends on the quality of 
personnel assigned to the tasks.  The fact that there is a high turnover rate, due in part to 
OPNAV’s use of military personnel and civilian detailees who rotate through job 
assignments on a fairly frequent basis, provides an environment of instability.  It is 
difficult to generalize because, depending on the qualities of the specific persons 
involved, this may be good or bad but it is always changing.  Data capturing the actual 
turnover statistics for the FNC IPTs was not collected and an analysis of the impact 
personnel turnover(s) had on the FNC Process is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Respondents indicate the impact of the FNC Process within the OPNAV 
community has been largely minimal.  As a caveat to this impact assessment one 
respondent emphasized the FNC Process is a recent change to previous DoN processes 
and so it would be “unreasonable to judge the output of a process which has not had 
sufficient time to generate an output.”  While this is certainly true for the FNC Process as 
being studied in this thesis it would not hold true for the Navy’s technology transition 
process in general (when looked at over longer periods of time). 
There were both positive and negative aspects to the respondents’ impact 
assessments.  One positive aspect mentioned was a delay in the reduction of S&T dollars 
in the budget cycle.  It was commented that “the concept of maintaining a level-funding 
stream to reduce the burden on managers of efforts was one of the pillars of the FNCs.”  
With the FNC’s original resource allocation of one-half of the DoN S&T Program budget 
being reduced to a level close to a lower cap of $500M (between one-fourth and one-third 
of the S&T Program budget) it is questionable if such a ‘level-funding stream’ has been 
realized. 
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Other comments made addressed more fundamental business concerns 
such as Return on Investment (ROI), the number of management reviews and declining 
funding levels: 
The impact so far is that we are expending a large amount of effort which 
appears to have little return on investment.  We participate in a unending 
chain of reviews and nothing ever seems to change except for a reduction 
to the FNC funding and their associated program cuts. 
There was also some criticism of ONR’s management of the S&T 
execution dollars: 
ONR has routinely reduced dollars available to the FNCs to execute.  Why 
is that – OPNAV has not reduced the dollars available to FNCs.  Where 
are those funds being diverted and how are they being better used to 
support the customer? 
Although the FNC Process is an (OPNAV) requirements-driven process, 
survey respondents did not report the high degree of engagement through the IPT that 
would have been expected.  Responses such as “minimally” and “overall FNC resource 
sponsor” seem to down-play the importance of the OPNAV role in the FNC Process 
(establishing requirements, serving as Chair for each of the individual IPTs and 
planning/programming fiscal resources).  OPNAV representatives play a central role in 
the FNC Process but their ownership of this role and the method through which they 
exercise their authority appears to be mixed.  A comment made by another respondent 
mentions another mechanism through which OPNAV personnel participate and attempt 
to influence the FNC project selection process: 
The submarine community engages the FNCs generally through the 
SUBTECH process and through participation in the N706 and pillar 
assessments. 
This comment refers to another requirements review process within the 
Navy and indicates that attempts are being made to integrate some of these other efforts 
with the Navy’s S&T investments being decided within the FNC Process.  This comment 
refers to the SUBTECH process which services the Navy’s submarine community.  Other 
similar requirement review boards and processes would include NAVSEA’s SURFTECH 
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process, for the Naval Surface PEO community, and NAVAIR’s ATRB Process, serving 
Aviation PEO interests. 
In response to the question asking how important the FNC Process was to 
OPNAV operations the responses varied but were generally positive.  One respondent 
saw importance in the IPT decision-making forum as “A means to define and deliver a 
valued product to the customer.  A ‘peer’ product definition and review process.[sic]”  
Another respondent viewed the FNC Process as a critical mechanism for the Navy to 
maintain its warfighting superiority but did not feel the process had been implemented 
effectively: 
The FNC Process is critical to maintaining our technological edge.  
Unfortunately, in its implementation, the FNCs have not focused 
effectively on meeting our needs.  So, the FNC Process is critical but the 
current program being executed is not meeting our critical needs. 
b. Transition Questions 
With respect to the fundamental issue of transitioning technology to the 
warfighter none of the survey respondents expressed strong confidence that programs 
would transition, at least as originally planned.  One example of a response: 
I don’t think that we predict transitions very well.  However, I think that 
most of the work will transition … just not as planned. 
Funding reductions were also cited as a reason for missing transition 
windows, or the cancellation of programs entirely: 
Unfortunately the ONR taxing schedule and fees have delayed or 
eliminated a significant number of the original transitions.  The taxes have 
caused the FNCs to cancel, rescope or alter the program plans under false 
fiscal requirements. 
In response to the question asking where the FNC projects would 
transition to most respondents were of the opinion that the projects were being 
transitioned to current acquisition programs of record (“Those programs that already had 
the funds” and “… to 6.4 and 6.5 R&D”).  Another comment suggested transitions were 
being made to “Pet projects or politically inspired”.  The charge that projects are 
transitioning to ‘pet projects’ is somewhat subjective and more difficult to pin down but 
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the remark made about ‘politically inspired’ projects can be examined with some 
objectivity.  The increasing number of congressional plus-ups over the past several years, 
shown in Table 1 (page 217), would be an example of one metric that seems to provide 
some credence to the comment made. 
There was not a lot of feedback provided by respondents offering 
examples of transition metrics being used by the various IPTs.  This general unawareness 
is an indication the establishment and use of appropriate project transition metrics 
remains a problem within the FNC Process.  One comment offered: 
It varies by IPT.  Some (such as TOC) do a “return on investment” 
analysis so their metric is dollars.  Others rely on warfighter assessment of 
greatest need.  Still other IPTs accept the ONR program manager input 
without much questioning. 
The two biggest obstacles to transitioning technology as planned, 
according to the OPNAV respondents, were related to budget and personnel instabilities.  
With respect to budgeting problems one respondent cited “Zero-growth budgets” as an 
obstacle and another remarked that: 
ONR siphoning off funds to pay “taxes.”  The funding reductions have 
required the IPTs to change scope, cancel projects, and delayed delivery 
and [extended product delivery] timeframes. 
With respect to personnel issues a respondent cited an “inability to 
maintain stability in personnel (at OPNAV principally) and budget processes that don’t 
allow for the introduction of new things easily.”   
Respondents indicated there was not a general agreement on project 
maturity, cost and schedule.  For the FNC Process the lack of agreement on these metrics 
is a serious issue since these agreements are the primary basis for the transition 
agreements between the S&T and acquisition communities.  The biggest issue, from the 
respondent comments, was with the technical maturity level of the programs.  An FNC 
IPT projects’ technical maturity level is estimated using NASA’s Technology Readiness 
Levels (TRLs).  For the FNC Process one respondent commented, “the TRLs, for 
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transition, have a fairly wide spread.  Different communities have different standards that 
they are used to in accepting transitions.”  Another respondent commented: 
ONR has allowed the efforts to be turned over at TRLs greater than 
prescribed by the BA level.  This was done in most cases to persuade the 
acquisition community that the technology solution will meet their 
requirements. 
With respect to collaboration efforts among the IPTs most of the OPNAV 
respondents were unaware of any collaboration efforts.  Only one OPNAV respondent 
offered any evidence of IPT investments being shared: 
There are only two cases of any significance where a product relies on 
contributions from two FNCs.  [Anti-Torpedo Torpedo] ATT has the 
weapon and the sensor in two different FNCs and turbine engine 
technology is funded in two places.  However, there are a large number of 
dependencies in the sense that, for example, time critical strike relies on 
developments in KSA for there to be an overall improvement in strike 
capability.  In fact, KSA provides the communication’s for many other 
developments to be utilized effectively. 
What is significant here is that the two programs mentioned in this 
comment (ATT and turbine engines) are also examples of programs where significant 
technological strides have been made over a number of years.  Some survey respondents 
indicated they were aware of areas that were receiving joint funding and named a few 
specific projects.  For example, the Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine 
Technology (IHPTET) project, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), and 
the Navy’s Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV-N) were all identified by 
respondents as joint projects.  It is significant to note that none of these programs are 
funded jointly due to an IPT-initiated action.  They are jointly funded because of previous 
funding agreements or are special-interest items.  From participant responses there does 
not seem to be any evidence of IPT projects being funded jointly as a objective, goal or 
pursuit of an FNC IPT. 
c. Process Questions 
Respondents provided mixed responses to the question asking if the IPTs 
have been effective.  One respondent felt the IPTs have been effective, commenting that 
the IPT process has:  
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… brought the 3 communities together (Acquisition, OPNAV, S&T).  I 
did not include the “Fleet” as I believe their investment horizon is based in 
the acquisition community and not in the FNCs.  The FNCs are a 2-10 
year delivery window to the Fleet after technology transition to the 
acquisition community. 
Another respondent provided a more mixed assessment of the IPTs across 
the board.  This respondent has observed that the differences in IPT effectiveness across 
the FNCs have been largely a function of the time and effort sunk into the process by the 
IPT Chair: 
Some have; others are not (I’ve been on 5 IPTs).  Some used to be 
effective but have become ineffective over time.  It all seems to depend on 
the willingness of the Chair to spend the time to listen and exercise 
judgment to actively manage the program.  The good IPTs have chairs that 
invest the effort and strive to get a balanced OPNAV input.  The bad ones 
‘rubber stamp’ the ONR execution manager program without even 
bothering to synthesize the overall OPNAV input. 
The IPT effectiveness question is best summed up in the comments of 
another respondent; the IPTs have provided a “Good dialog but execution objective still 
weak.” 
The decision-making process within the IPTs seems to be a complicated 
dynamic.  Most respondents indicated decisions were made in a consensus manner, based 
upon group discussions.  For example, one comment made was: 
Consensus.  Much discussion on the ramifications of the decisions.  Lately 
though, since Dec 02, it has been done somewhat unilaterally by ONR.  
The remaining IPT members have been lead along with the “short” fuse 
responses. 
Other comments made indicate some of the IPTs are operating 
inconsistently.  The observation provided by a different respondent, for example, 
indicates some IPT decisions may be of a more ‘directed’ nature than consensus-based 
(“The one with the most stars wins”).  Another response to this question was: 
Varies … consensus in some while it’s directed in others.  The charter for 
IPTs specifies that they act through consensus but it would appear that 
most chairs don’t understand that concept. 
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From survey respondent observations IPT personnel have turned over, 
roughly, between three and six month intervals.  As one participant has observed: 
On average, I’d say that there is a change to each IPT every six months.  
Certainly, it’s rare today to find anyone who can remember why or how 
the program was initially formulated in any FNC.  The most stable 
element (the N911 rep) has now officially disappeared so there is 
absolutely no corporate memory on any of the IPTs. 
Other respondents provided “quarterly” and “every 6 months” estimates 
while some indicate slightly longer durations: 
The TOC chair, S&T Lead and Resource Sponsor has remained the same 
since the inception of the IPT.  The acquisition rep has changed three 
times (averaging about 13 months).  LASW has rotated quite a bit.  AO 
has rotated quite a bit. 
Not much insight was provided regarding how the IPT portfolio was 
selected.  The only comments made by the OPNAV respondents were “existing ONR 
projects” and “varies.”  This seems to indicate, for the most part, that respondents view 
the original IPT portfolio as largely a reflection of S&T projects that were already 
underway. 
Most respondents indicated they knew of no process for the selection of 
new programs within the FNC framework.  From an OPNAV perspective this opinion, 
although being expressed fairly widespread across all respondents, would not be 
completely accurate.  For OPNAV the (new S&T program) issue is two-fold; 1) doing the 
resource planning to ensure that funding is available for those new programs and 2) 
selecting the new programs themselves.  The task of securing OPNAV resources to pay 
for new programs in the outyears is an essential component of the new program process.  
Without ensuring resources would be planned for and made available there would be no 
reason to select new programs.  When most think of a process for the selection of new 
programs they think of the selection of the specific programs themselves with the 
underlying assumption that OPNAV has the resource component of the equation figured 
out.  This, however, can be a poor assumption as evidenced by the drain on the S&T 
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resources.  OPNAV was in fact planning resources for new programs in the outyears.  As 
one participant comments: 
There was a process that N911 was going to implement but now that there 
is no N911 there isn’t anyone who knows what was intended.  But, in a 
nutshell, there were funds set aside beginning in FY-06 to begin new 
FNCs.  Selection of new FNCs was scheduled to support the POM-06 
process.  This was also necessary to let the FNCs startup and see where 
the problems were before committing any additional funds.  This could 
have been a hedge against any sever execution problems in the existing 
FNCs. 
With the recent changes in OPNAV N911 there is valid concern over how 
the important issue of resource planning for the DoN S&T account will be handled in the 
future.  Having a full-time OPNAV S&T advocate who is knowledgeable of S&T 
processes, issues and concerns and takes ownership of these S&T issues when difficult 
decisions and trade-offs need to be made is critical to the long term health and vitality of 
the DoN S&T account.  With all of the recent changes it is not clear, at this point anyway, 
where that OPNAV advocate role resides.  As one survey respondent summarized, “… 
there was a process but there doesn’t seem to be one today.” 
For the selection of the specific programs themselves there is evidence 
that at least some of the IPTs had a process, although the details of their individual 
processes are apparently not widely known outside of their Working Groups.  Such a 
process, which one participant mentions, was based on the fact that “the cut list from the 
original submitted program is an excellent starting point.”  This process was used by a 
few of the IPTs (KSA and TCS, for example). 
d. IPT Meeting Questions 
All of the OPNAV respondents were informed, and regularly attended, the 
IPT meetings.  Discussions with participants reveal that when the FNCs were first being 
established the IPT meeting frequency was very high but that, as time passed, the meeting 
frequency has dropped off considerably.  This is reflected in a remark made by one of the 
participant who observed that IPT meetings “Started out weekly, then monthly, then 
every two months.  Now it’s about 3-6 months.”  Other, more recent, participants 
provided an approximate 6 month meeting frequency figure. 
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For the most part, OPNAV respondents confirmed all stakeholder 
community representatives attended the IPT meetings either in person or via VTC.  There 
was a distinction made between IPT members attending IPT meetings and other (non-
IPT) representatives attending the IPT meetings.  The distinction made was: 
IPT members attend IPT meetings.  If the members are doing their jobs, 
they are getting community input BEFORE they sit down at an IPT 
meeting.  IPT members participate in IPT meetings.  This has nothing to 
do with any community designations. 
e. Communication Questions 
Respondents were mixed in their assessment as to whether or not they felt 
they were kept informed of relevant S&T information.  One respondent thought so, two 
thought they were not and another indicated “sometimes.”  The comment made by one 
participant was: 
What is the definition of relevant?  Many of the S&T initiatives to address 
the capability shortfalls were ONR efforts to begin with.  I am not aware 
of any executed effort that was not funded by ONR in 2001.  The 
acquisition community representatives are not involved in the issuant [sic] 
of BAAs or evaluating the proposals.  So the short answer would be no. 
Respondents indicated they went to ONR (Deputy PM and Execution 
Managers) and the IPT representatives for needed FNC information.  In response to the 
question asking if there was any information respondents felt they needed but did not 
have the most piercing stated need was for “a true prioritization of requirements.”  This 
response is interesting because it comes from the OPNAV community, which was itself 
charged with the responsibility to do the requirements prioritization for the FNC Process.  
Within the DoN FNC Process the S&T Community would develop programs in response 
to valid Navy requirements.  This comment reveals a frustration, from within the 
OPNAV community, stemming from the inability of OPNAV to direct the FNC Process 
as originally envisioned.   
Survey responses indicate the S&T website has not been widely used 
within the OPNAV community.  One respondent acknowledged using the website only 
seldom (monthly) and two others indicated they almost never use it.  Responses such as 
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“minimal” and “useless” indicate the S&T website is obviously not viewed as a useful 
tool within the OPNAV community.  At the working level, a sense of frustration and 
some level of distrust between the OPNAV and S&T communities are evident in the 
following comment: 
The important information is/was removed by ONR comptroller (hardly 
an open book) since it was considered not in the best interest of ONR to 
have an audit trail (funds, decisions, history and free thought). 
The frequency of interactions between respondents and the S&T 
community covered a wide range.  Responses varied from weekly, monthly to bi-
annually (every 6 months) and included a less quantifiable response, “whenever they 
wanted.”  Such a large variance in the frequency of interactions seems unusual and might 
be caused by a number of things including the small (respondent) sample set and the fact 
that some of the respondents all less engaged with the S&T community due to their 
having moved on to different job assignments.  It is also possible the variance is an 
accurate indicator of the OPNAV community’s level of engagement within the FNC 
Process.  Such a variance implies the FNC IPTs differed significantly among one another 
in their interface to the S&T community.  If such were the case it would be interesting to 
explore the relationship between the level of engagement between the OPNAV and S&T 
communities and the “success” of those IPTs.  Such an investigation is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
f. Satisfaction Questions 
All respondents expressed some level of dissatisfaction with the FNC 
Process.  Within one of the comments there was an indication of some hope that the FNC 
Process would herald fundamental changes to the way S&T does business (“Initially – 
sort of, later – no”) that has not fully materialized.  Along these same lines was another 
comment made that it (the S&T process) was “back to business as usual.”  Even with the 
dissatisfaction there was another remark made was that it (the FNC Process) was still an 
improvement over the pre-FNC ways of doing business. 
The aspects of the FNC Process which were cited as ‘working’ were the 
greater awareness of S&T investments and the senior level engagement that the process 
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has arranged.  One respondent summed it up as “getting the stakeholders together” and 
another observed “there is far more visibility into the S&T program today than there was 
5 years ago.”   
The cross-community dialog, via the twelve FNC IPTs, was formalized at 
a higher level (flag level) than previous transition processes.  To some degree such a high 
level dialog had the effect, as commented by one participant, to help justify the S&T 
investments and, effectively, defend the S&T Program “against OPNAV attack.” 
These positive attributes of the FNC Process were realized through the 
formation of a number of independent FNC IPTs.  There are questions regarding the 
effectiveness of IPT operations.  One participant suggested “OPNAV leadership is 
correct but the IPTs are at too high a level to devote the time necessary.”  Even though 
the process might be fundamentally correct there is still an issue with the IPT being at too 
high a level to devote the time necessary to manage the process effectively.   
There were several opinions offered as examples of aspects of the FNC 
Process that was not working.  In no particular order those items suggested by the 
OPNAV respondents are summarized as follows: 
(1) Investing in Naval Needs.  A core component of the FNC 
Process is that Naval S&T resources would be directed toward solving high-priority naval 
needs.  Yet one of the comments submitted, “Redirecting ONR funding toward needs,” 
suggests this remains an area of concern.  A different comment made, “too many people 
try to apply their parochial standards to the FNCs and don’t ever bother to concern 
themselves with the scope of the S&T that Navy has to pursue to fulfill it’s widely 
varying missions,” suggests the problem is rooted in the biases of those participating 
within the framework of the process. 
(2) IPT operations.  One of the comments made suggests the 
IPTs have been ineffective due to the fact that the decision-makers are too disconnected 
(grade-wise) from the working level members who actually have responsibility for 
assembling the IPT project portfolios: “OPNAV leadership is the right thing but it’s at 
too high a level to spend the time required to make intelligent oversight decisions.”  A 
 156
similar comment made expressed awkwardness in “Having one and two star admirals 
justify their decisions (IPT programs) to 0-6s.” 
Originally the IPT structure was championed as having the 
OPNAV Requirements Chair speak for all requirement communities.  Attendance sheets 
from early IPT meetings reveal multiple OPNAV representatives would be in attendance, 
to advance the interests of their community.  Over time the perception has changed to 
where the IPTs are viewed as being “owned” by the community from which the Chair 
comes from.  This morphing of the focus of the IPT over time leads to participant 
comments made voicing concerns of the “Inability of the principals to look outside of 
their respective domains (ships to consider aviation; tactical versus logistics; and so on).”  
The shift in the IPT emphasis areas to one where they are directing the IPT investments 
towards one warfighting community rather than pursuing a more broad naval emphasis 
leads to another concern voiced by an OPNAV participant, that of the appearance of 
“Stovepiping of product lines within the IPT selection process.”   
There is no doubt the FNC Process increased the level of 
awareness of the S&T Program with the OPNAV community.  By virtue of the 
implementation approach taken, the IPT consensus-based decision-making process, there 
was a greater awareness within the acquisition community as well.  As might be expected 
a natural consequence of this arrangement is an increase in the bureaucratic oversight 
process caused by adding layers of review and responsibility.  Because of the 
involvement of different organizations (OPNAV, HQMC, S&T, SYSCOMs, etc) the net 
result is a confusing set of difficult inter-organizational processes that become virtually 
impossible to satisfy without a willingness to compromise.  One comment made was 
there are now “Too many people now have to do separate reviews because there is no 
single S&T oversight organization in OPNAV to coordinate reviews.” 
(3) Funding.  A perceived level of inadequate funding has 
been a shortfall cited by many throughout the FNC Process.  As one respondent has 
observed, the “funding of FNCs has been a dismal failure from the beginning.  Too many 
FNCs were funded so they have inadequate resources.  This was a basic failure to down-
select at the start.”  “Any and all taxes levied.  These were allocated in the plan.”  The 
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“blue vs. green” funding issue was mentioned in a comment as well, “Navy dollars 
funding USMC programs at expense of Navy programs.”  A final resource-related 
comment made cited the observed high cost of administering the FNC Process, “ONR 
spends too much on an inflated and unnecessary FNC bureaucracy.”   
(4) Accountability.  A fourth category raised accountability 
concerns.  One comment made, “IPTs don’t hold ONR responsible for their execution,” 
suggests serious execution issues persist and implies the IPTs have not been able to 
manage these issues effectively.  Another similar comment, “ONR appears to do what it 
wants,” also suggests that operations are run somewhat loosely.   
The most important aspects of the FNC Process mentioned were 
the “cross community communication” it has generated, the “stability and OPNAV 
oversight” of the transition process and the fact that the naval community, in general, is 
“getting visibility into ONR decision-making/results.” 
g. Additional Comments 
Comments submitted by representatives within the OPNAV community 
fell into three distinct general areas; 1) those dealing with process concerns, 2) those 
raising concern over the use of the Navy’s S&T resources to pay for management costs 
and 3) those providing comments on the usefulness and limitations of the FNC 
Technology Transition Survey itself. 
(1) Process Concerns.  One of the comments made relates to 
the fundamental issue of the continuing difficulty in achieving an investment balance 
across the S&T account.  The comment, “there still remains an element of ‘game playing’ 
which appears to be motivated to secure the most $$ vs. what’s right for the fleet,” 
correlates to other similar comments made elsewhere within this thesis (for example, 
numerous “stovepipe” remarks) and is an indication these problems remain. 
A number of comments were made regarding the issue of 
‘transition.’  One comment made points out “it has been said that there is insufficient 
resources in Navy Acquisition TOA to truly transition the number of products pursued by 
the FNC program.”   
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Another comment made suggests the FNC Process places too 
much emphasis on trying to guarantee transitions: 
Over-emphasis on transition – transition argument is disingenuous.  Needs 
to be revisited & redefined.  Evidence of S&T product in Acq[usition] 
community POM submittal unrealistic.  Few current important capabilities 
were 1st driven by a requirement. 
There are several items of interest within this comment.  The 
emphasis on transitions stems from the FNC mandate that significant S&T financial 
resources would be applied to solve problems that address warfighter needs.  For those 
with significant experience in the technology development “business” the realities of the 
transition process have not been as straightforward as the FNC Process strives for and 
suggests.  This disconnect suggests the FNC Process’ rationale and emphasis for the need 
to show a transition itself is tenuous, possibly leading to the respondents’ “disingenuous” 
perception.  The suggestion to revisit and redefine transition expectations is a good one 
and appears to be based on the experience that important naval capabilities (i.e., past 
“transitions”) were not achieved as the result of a highly structured requirements process 
using customer transition agreements negotiated years in advance.  To be effective any 
future technology transition “expectation” discussions would need to be open, candid 
discussions at the flag/SES level with all stakeholder communities participating.219   
This participant has observed that showing a transition, as 
evidenced by the S&T product appearing as an acquisition program POM submittal, is 
“unrealistic.”  Part of the issue is one of timing (the S&T program selection processes do 
not necessarily align with Pentagon internal POM schedules) and part of the issue is a 
consequence of the budgetary pressures of the OPNAV and acquisition community 
weapon system procurement trade-off compromises which occur up to the 11th hour of 
the due date.  Expecting a (relatively) long-range S&T project to influence next budget 
cycle financial decisions is, in fact, highly unrealistic.  The respondent suggests, “If ONR 
wants to transition it should look at its current set of 6.3 products and begin packaging 
these to solve acquisition community needs.” 
                                                 
219 For the FNC Process there has been no evidence found that such transition “expectation” 
discussions were ever held with all stakeholder community participants; the FNC Process appears to have 
evolved out of VCNO/CNR discussions and was initiated without cross-community deliberation.  The fact 
that there have been a number of significant acquisition issues with the FNC process supports the 
suggestion that a discussion of expectations be held. 
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(2) Management Costs.  Another sets of comments provided 
focused on management costs, the high degree of administrative support which has been 
used to support the FNC Process and questions the appropriateness of using S&T 
resources to pay for such support when ONR receives funding outside of the S&T budget 
“to pay for the management of assigned S&T programs; including personnel salaries.”  
The issue raised is concerned with the increased amount of administration consumed by 
the FNC Process even though the Process itself has brought no new resources to the S&T 
account: 
It is therefore reasonable to expect that ONR could manage the FNC 
allocated funds with roughly the same number of personnel; which was 
possible prior to the FNC establishment.  Nevertheless, they have seen fit 
to increase staffing by setting up a fairly robust additional management 
structure for the FNCs.  Rather than reassigning current ONR personnel to 
fill these positions, they have elected to bring in a substantial number of 
IPAs, contractors and detailees.  These people then charge to the dollars 
allocated for the various FNC projects for which they are to manage. 
The increased staffing levels referred to, however, were more 
likely an unintended consequence of the increased oversight from the various stakeholder 
communities rather than a scheme to dilute the development work being done within the 
S&T account.  With the immediate and intense emphasis on securing acquisition program 
‘transition agreements’ over the FYDP it is probably not reasonable to have expected 
traditional ONR (BA1, basic research oriented) employees to step in and fill the 
numerous (independent) program support positions created by the establishment of 
twelve independent IPTs.  The real oversight seems to be that this rapid increase in 
staffing was completely unanticipated and, as such, there were no provisions made to 
fund these new support positions.  The only sources of funds were the IPT resource 
accounts themselves.  This points to another concern raised in the survey, the negative 
impact of using S&T resources for these management and administrative support tasks: 
In an environment where S&T dollars and their associated buying power 
has been on the decline, ONR is exacerbating the problem by diverting 
S&T execution funds to an increasing amount S&T management funds.  
This management initiative results in fewer research dollars leaving 
Ballston Tower. 
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The net result of the increasing management costs of the FNC 
Process is a reduction in the amount of funds available to execute the tasks and deliver 
the desired new capabilities.  As one respondent observed: 
This is a significant drawdown of critical funding which the resource 
sponsor expected to be available for the actual conduct of S&T efforts 
versus salaries.  Only now are the FNC IPTs beginning to ascertain the 
reduction in FNC transitions that can be supported due to this whittling 
away of the dollars.  When coupled with the expenses for the new 
unfunded FNCs and the “other” withholds, there is a significant reduction 
in FNC productivity and capabilities lost. 
(3) Survey Limitations.  A final set of comments focused on 
the survey itself and the problems and shortfalls in attempting to capture a balanced set of 
meaningful data when using surveys rather than interviewing personnel directly.  As was 
commented, “These surveys always make me exceedingly nervous because you are 
bound to accept the answers of the uninformed and the ignorant along with the 
knowledgeable and you probably can’t distinguish between them.”  This point is certainly 
true and is a legitimate limitation of the data collection approach taken for this thesis.  
The survey format was chosen as one data collection method for this thesis for a number 
of reasons, one of which was convenience.  By sending out a broad survey to a wide 
distribution I could collect answers to a large set of questions and could compare 
responses to the exact same questions.  I could also collect responses in a directly usable 
format (transcription not needed).  As was mentioned earlier, an attempt was made to 
seek out the input of individuals who were directly involved in the process and so were 
familiar with the many aspects of the process.  For whatever reason many of those 
individuals declined to participate, greatly limiting the available data set.  The participant 
survey, however, represents only one method of data collection used.  Other mechanisms 
were used to broaden the type of data collected and, hopefully, correlate findings by 
using data from independent sources.  Other data collection methods included personnel 
interviews and the collection of statistics. 
Another comment made, regarding the FNC Process and how it 
took shape, was: 
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I suspect that most of your respondents have no knowledge of the 
objectives and goals nor any knowledge of the initial charge by VADM 
Pilling to N091 to initiate the process.  In fact, most folks in ONR were 
completely unaware of what N911 was up to with respect to FNCs for 
roughly the first six to eight months of effort.  Only [Dr. Fred] Saalfeld 
and [RADM Paul] Gaffney were knowledgeable of everything that was 
being done.  This void has been filled by urban legends which are not even 
remotely accurate. 
Certainly what is said here is true, too: most involved in the 
process became involved long after the initial discussions among the senior naval 
leadership (CNO, VCNO, CNR, ONR TD/ED) were held. 
 
2. S&T Community Response Analysis 
Responses were received from each of the four FNC support categories (Principal 
IPT member, Working Group member, Project support and Other support).  The survey 
response ratio (surveys returned/requested) was 63.6 %.220   
a. General Questions 
Responses to the question asking “who is the customer?” spanned the 
entire RDT&E spectrum.  OPNAV, ONR, acquisition PEOs, PMs, and SYSCOMs and 
the warfighter were all listed by respondents as valid S&T customers.  Although each of 
these separate communities was viewed as an S&T customer, the acquisition community 
was identified as the customer most often.  As one respondent remarked: 
... the purpose of the FNCs is to demonstrate the maturity (and mature [it] 
if necessary) of a particular technology or set of technologies to support 
their introduction into a SDD program either in total or in part.  As such, 
the customer would be a PMA or PMS ultimately. 
Among those within the S&T community the responses were not 
unanimous either.  Another respondent, from the perspective of a NRE S&T 
representative, felt the customer of the FNC Process was “unmistakably” ONR itself.  
Two other survey respondents listed multiple communities as customers and still another 
                                                 
220 For the S&T Community, there were 11 survey requests made and 7 surveys were returned.  
Requests were made to Navy and Marine Corps members (military and civilian) of FNC IPT members and 
FNC working group support members. Survey requests were made from approximately one-half of the 
FNC community and the survey responses received covered roughly one-third of the FNC community. 
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identified the warfighter as the customer.  None of the respondents suggested OPNAV as 
being a (sole) customer.  These responses (to the “customer” question) are interesting in 
light of OPNAVs central role in the FNC Process (OPNAV flag officers serve as Chair of 
the FNC IPTs) as well as due to the fact that the fundamental restructuring of the FNC 
Process was founded on the S&T community building their projects in response to naval 
warfighting requirements and priorities decided upon by the OPNAV community.  From 
a purely “business-process” perspective the fact that there is no single, recognizable, 
customer identifiable by those involved in the process is an indication of confusion and 
should be cause for some concern.  In the case of the S&T Program this confusion stems 
from the Defense Departments’ research, development, and acquisition processes and the 
overlapping roles played by the various communities that are involved in the processes. 
There was unanimous agreement among all respondents that the goals and 
objectives of the FNC Process have been adequately explained within the S&T 
community.  The assessment of the impact the FNC Process has had within the S&T 
community was mixed.  Most respondents provided a positive assessment, overall, but 
there were also some issues raised.  For example, one respondent provided a negative 
impact assessment based on the (declining) amount of work being done at Labs within 
the NRE community.  For this person the FNC Process has had: 
Quite a dampening effect.  In theory, the FNC Process should “focus” 
efforts on identified requirements; in practice, the focus of resources (i.e., 
money) on key favored industrial partners seems to have frozen or 
eliminated a significant portion of Navy Lab S&T work. 
Another respondent felt it was too early to evaluate the impact of the FNC 
Process but expressed concern over continuity within the S&T account: 
I think that the process has had little impact as yet.  The primary reason for 
this comment is that it is too early in the FNC’s life to determine if it will 
successfully transition technology to programs.  I’m also concerned that 
there lacks continuity between the 6.1 and 6.2 world such that new 
concepts would flow from research up. 
Similar continuity, program planning, and system engineering issues were 
expressed by other respondents in their “additional comments” remarks.  The most 
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positive aspect of the FNC Process has been the increased visibility of the DoN S&T 
investments and an increased dialog regarding those investments.  The areas affected 
most were those programs farther along and closest to a transition window of 
opportunity.  Understandably these would necessarily be predominantly the stakeholders 
of current programs of record (POR).  This observation was supported by the survey 
responses.  Because of the uncertainty involved, when looking beyond the current POR 
time horizon the reliability of any impact assessments of the FNC Process becomes much 
more questionable. 
With respect to the overall importance of the FNC Process many of the 
respondents were divided in their assessment.  Responses ranged from the lukewarm 
“probably not very much” to “highly important to continue technology advancement and 
demonstration.”  Another remark emphasized the importance of maintaining credibility 
and trust: “If their promise is kept, they could be an extremely important source of 
technology to feed new concept improvement and development.” 
b. Transition Questions 
Most respondents were not confident the FNC Process would transition 
programs as originally planned.  The respondents’ lack of confidence is noteworthy since 
the question of transition is at the very core of the FNC Process and was one of the 
primary reasons for restructuring the Navy’s S&T account.  One respondent conveys 
doubt over whether FNC transition rates would show any improvement over previous 
process transition rates (i.e., Navy ATD transition rates): 
Discussions with some PMAs and S&T practitioners suggest that the 
general sense is that transition rates won't be noticeably better than before 
the FNC Process. 
Other respondents also expressed doubt regarding the FNC Process’ 
ability to transition products, citing difficulties such as budget and schedule fluctuations.  
Another respondent was more positive and suggested that even if the planned transitions 
were not achieved as originally planned there might still be transition opportunities.  In 
such instances the determining factor might hinge on the ability of the S&T community 
to accept new inputs and recognize new transition opportunities wherever they may arise: 
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… I am equally as confident that there exists opportunities for the 
technology demonstrated to find transitions outside of their plan.  If the 
only metric used is the metric of meeting the planned transition, then there 
is a significant risk that the majority of the FNCs contributions to systems 
will not be accounted for when measuring their value. 
Regarding the use and identification of metrics, survey responses were 
split between those who cited the use of TTAs as the primary transition metric and those 
who had not seen any published metrics or stated they did not know of any transition 
metrics at all.   
The acquisition process stood out among respondents as being the current 
major obstacle to transitioning technology as planned.  A number of different reasons 
were offered, from a lack of “stable S&T funding” to a more subtle but equally disruptive 
“acquisition manager’s lack of real interest.”  Another respondent commented on how the 
acquisition process seems to favor contractor-developed incremental solutions over 
competitive solution options that would be seen as a threat to the current POR: 
The system is not put together to easily accept technology generically 
demonstrated under the FNC program.  Frankly, I feel that the system dis-
incentivizes the transition.  To try and quickly summarize, it is my opinion 
that the contractors working military systems are incentivized to fail as 
they continue to be paid for failure while success completes a program.  
As such, new technology that will improve things not specifically 
developed by the contractor is not easily inserted into a program being 
executed by a contractor.  There are examples of this.  If you wanted to 
significantly increase the percentage of transitions from the FNC to a 
program, choose only projects that are executed by contractors and that are 
a significant enhancement to an existing system such that they have it 
locked up and there is a large tail to bring it to fruition.  This way they are 
incentivized to transition. 
This observation represents a serious systems acquisition obstacle to our 
ability to introduce innovative new solutions and, ultimately, lower system acquisition 
and life cycle costs.  Another respondent also commented that “the transitioning 
technology competes with or threatens an on-going activity that has an entrenched 
constituency.”  A further issue raised was the difficulty in fielding a technology solution 
in a timely manner.  This, the military’s equivalent metric for “time to market” in the 
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business world, is another area where the FNC Process aimed to improve.  The comment 
made was: 
 
… I would guess the biggest obstacle is that, by the time the technology is 
ready to transfer, it is already seriously out of date.  At the same time, as 
delivered, it is often poorly designed and executed (from a Human Factors 
perspective). 
A final comment refers to difficulties as a result of a cumbersome 
acquisition process that has become consumed by cost and places the military in a 
position where there are no viable choices but to accept technology solutions for weapons 
system designs that are completely controlled by organizations that seek to maximize 
profits through marketing proprietary solutions: 
Two obstacles are (1) the difficulty in constructing a technology transition 
roadmap (i.e., identifying technology insertion opportunities for a platform 
or system), and (2) NIH; i.e., the difficulty in getting a contractor to 
transition a 'Navy' solution once matured. 
The Navy’s S&T community is outside the acquisition process and, as a 
consequence, has no means to directly affect transition opportunities that are controlled 
by these other organizations.   
The responses to the question asking if there was agreement on project 
maturity, cost and schedule were mixed.  Those respondents supporting the IPT through a 
Working Group or at the Project Level felt there were agreements on cost, maturity and 
schedule but members of the Principal IPT were not as confident; one representative felt 
there was good agreement (through the use of TTAs) but a second IPT representative felt 
there was not a general agreement (a third IPT respondent did not answer the question at 
all).  These agreements are typically worked out at the Working Group and Project 
Levels so it is understandable that IPT support staff at these levels would feel confident 
they have worked out adequate agreements.  It is a good indication that the IPT S&T 
support staff feed they have agreements in place (through TTAs or other mechanisms) 
but there is a disconnect on this question within the S&T community since the members 
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of the Principal IPT are not, apparently, as confident in those agreements as their support 
staff. 
For the two questions that asked about collaboration efforts most 
respondents either chose not to answer the question or indicated they did not know.  Two 
respondents were aware of products being funded through multiple IPTs and one 
respondent was aware of an FNC product that was a part of an ACTD and so had OSD 
funding.  Another two other respondents, however, indicated they were not aware of any 
multi-agency funding. 
c. IPT Process Questions 
The question about the effectiveness of the IPT generated a mixed 
response.  One respondent, at the Project level, felt the IPT was “adding a measure of 
what they were intended to” while another respondent, at the Working Group level, did 
not feel the IPT was effective (“No, too many changes in ‘Leadership.’”).  The IPT 
respondents were all over the board; one felt the IPT was effective, another did not know 
and the third did not answer the question. 
When answering the question on how decisions are made within the IPT 
most of the respondents did not provide feedback data by either leaving the question 
blank (two IPTs, one “Other”), answering they ‘Don’t know’ (Project level) or with a 
‘not applicable’ reply (“Other”).  For the two respondents who did provide feedback the 
IPT decision-making process involved a discussion within the IPT itself.  The Working 
Group representative said the IPT decisions were made as the “OPNAV member decides 
with rest of IPT concurring” and the IPT representative responded that decisions were 
reached through a “Voting of primary members.”  These are not inconsistent observations 
since the IPT members approve investment decisions in a consensus manner in both 
cases.  The question of how does the IPT make its decisions essentially reduces to one of 
an understanding of the role of the OPNAV member (as Chair of the IPT) and the nature 
and depth of the discussions among the IPT members.  Most of those responding 
indicated that the project portfolio selection process was done in what appears to be a 
controlled and informal manner by the IPT.  There is no formal process enforced across 
all IPTs and, as a result, the portfolio selection process is different for the various IPTs.  
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In general there was consensus that an S&T investment portfolio was prepared by the 
S&T representative, using a working group, and presented to the IPT for concurrence. 
Respondents were split in their observations regarding whether or not a 
process exists for the selection of new programs.  At the project level the input provided 
was: 
Not an official one that I am aware of.  I think this is a really large 
problem with the FNCs as they have been locked up since the first 
programs were selected and thus do not have a viable way of introducing 
new concepts as need and execution changes. 
At the Working Group level the survey participant felt there was a process 
which consisted of the working group ranking proposed new starts and submitting this 
ranking to the IPT for action.  At the IPT level, however, there was conflicting inputs.  
One IPT respondent replied “Yes – sort of” while a second IPT respondent replied simply 
“No” and a third left the question unanswered. 
Responses regarding the frequency of data calls were somewhat mixed.  A 
number of respondents were involved in only a few IPT data calls during the previous 
year and the estimates they provided (of the number of data calls) differed enormously 
from the one participant (an IPT representative) who replied that data calls were frequent 
and a problem (37 separate data calls in the one case with the others being in the one-two 
range).  The large variability is probably a function of the specific IPTs involved as well 
as to where the data calls are being directed.  This implies that data calls are a significant 
and disruptive factor for the small group of people receiving the data calls, those doing 
the bulk of the FNC administration and management.  For those outside of this small 
group data calls are not a major concern because they do not see them as they are filtered. 
d. IPT Meeting Questions 
Regarding the question asking if participants were kept informed of IPT 
meetings, the responses varied in accordance with the type of support provided to the 
IPT.  Generally speaking those providing support at a lower level (at the “project” or 
“other” levels) did not feel they were being kept informed of IPT meetings while those 
providing support at a higher level (“working group” and “IPT” levels) did feel they were 
 168
being kept informed.  These responses are consistent with previous input on how the IPT 
functions and supports the observation that the IPT is primarily supported by an S&T 
Working Group with this Working Group receiving input from personnel at the Project, 
and Other, support levels as necessary. 
For the question asking if survey respondents ever attended IPT meetings 
the responses provided were consistent based on the support level and the resulting 
notifications provided.  At the project level one of the responses was “No…I don’t think 
I’m invited” while members at the working group and IPT levels indicated they had 
attended IPT meetings.  One respondent, supporting the IPT in the “Other” category, 
indicated attending IPT meetings “infrequently.” 
Respondents indicated IPT meetings are held a couple of times a year with 
more frequent interaction being done via e-mail.  Survey respondents also confirmed that 
all communities generally participated in the IPT meetings either “in person or by VTC.” 
e. Communication Questions 
Although most of those responding felt they were being kept sufficiently 
informed of relevant S&T information, communication flow was identified in some of 
the responses as an area of concern.  One respondent, at the Working Group level, 
mentioned having to search for information.  Another respondent commented: 
This is a significant challenge in the S&T area.  My lab is continually 
working to identify means of improving information flow.  We are not, in 
my opinion, at a point where we can rest comfortably and say that we have 
achieved optimal communication. 
When they do need FNC information respondents almost unanimously 
responded they went to ONR S&T representatives or the Program Manager for the 
needed information.  It is interesting to note that only one respondent, serving the IPT in 
an “other” capacity, mentioned going to the S&T website for FNC information. 
When asked if there was any information they needed but did not have, 
survey responses were equally divided between those who felt there was information they 
needed but did not have (“Yes, FY05 – FY09 ONR TOA $$”) and those who thought 
they had sufficient information. 
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Survey responses indicate the Navy’s S&T website has not been used to a 
great extent.  Most respondents were aware of the website but indicated they have used it 
very infrequently.  The infrequent website use appears to stem from the fact that users 
had found the data posted there to be outdated (“Not often, but I have used it.  
Information seems old.”).  One items of significance was that IPT members all indicated 
they had never used the S&T website at all.  Such a response is consistent with the view 
of how the IPT operates; the members of the Principal IPT would not have any need for 
the S&T website since they would get their information directly from the Working Group 
members.  Accordingly, membership below the Principal IPT level would seem to have 
the greatest need for the S&T website.  In fact, however, survey responses indicated these 
members used the website infrequently because they also found the website to be an 
unreliable source of needed information. 
The survey responses indicate the S&T website was not viewed as being 
useful to the S&T community.  Consistent with other community website responses the 
S&T community Principal IPT members did not use the website and those respondents 
that did use the S&T website indicated the website was only marginally useful.  Some of 
the typical criticisms of the website were that it was “too generic and old” and that it had 
“very limited; top-level info.” 
f. Satisfaction Questions 
With the exception of one IPT representative, survey respondents from all 
categories were consistent in their mutual dissatisfaction of the FNC Process.  One reason 
cited for the dissatisfaction related to the problems encountered when participants 
attempted to introduce new concepts into the S&T pipeline.  With no established or 
known process to follow, no reliable visibility into IPT priorities and schedules, no 
consistent source of FNC policy guidance or assistance, and limited information 
availability the ability to influence the FNC Process seems extraordinarily difficult to 
anyone who is not an active member of the Working Group for each IPT.  The end result 
is a cumbersome process that appears to broken.  As one respondent commented, 
“[W]ithout a viable way to insert new concepts, the process seems broken.  Also, the 
level of taxation is too high.” 
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Although it might be too early to conduct a comprehensive assessment of 
the FNC Processes transition track record, there were a couple of areas cited by the 
participants as examples of areas where things seemed to have worked.  The FNC 
Process concept was mentioned as being “a good one” by one respondent.  This agrees 
with a remark made by another respondent to the effect that the FNC Process has 
provided a “better linkage between S&T and Acquisition.”  Another respondent also 
expressed satisfaction that technology demonstrations were still being funded under the 
FNC Process. 
On the whole, however, most respondents were agreed in their assessment 
that the FNC Process itself was not working.  A variety of shortfalls were offered, most 
dealing with “process” issues.  One respondent suggested an essential metric for the 
success of the Navy’s future naval capability process might be the ability to demonstrate 
an openness that allows for the introduction of new concepts and ideas into the DoN 
system.  One of the comments made was that it was “[t]oo early to tell, but certainly the 
introduction of new programs is necessary if the FNC Process is to remain viable.” 
There were a couple of comments that attributed FNC Process shortfalls to 
basic process implementation issues such as poor communications, program (in)stability 
and dynamics (“Rules keep changing, ONR does not really support all FNCs”).  As one 
respondent observed the FNC Process grew out of Navy resource planning between the 
VCNO, OPNAV and ONR and these changes were probably not widely understood in the 
early phases, even within the S&T community.  Fundamental changes to the Navy’s S&T 
Program (Program Element changes, etc) were made over time but, from the perspective 
of many affected by the changes, those changes may appear to have occurred “virtually 
overnight.” 
The people I know in the labs are not sanguine that the process has been 
clearly articulated or properly executed.  Furthermore, a non-trivial 
portion of the labs’ work has been shut out due to lack of funding.  
Although I cannot speak for everyone, the entire FNC Process seemed to 
materialize virtually overnight and to starve many competing programs.  
This perception is, no doubt, at least in part a byproduct of a less-than-
successful program of communication. 
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Another comment indirectly references the significant and practical 
interdependencies and programmatic difficulties encountered when the S&T community 
(BA1 – BA3) attempts to transition technical products to the warfighter through an 
acquisition process (BA4 +) they have no control over and which is risk adverse.  
Although the respondent doesn’t elaborate, the comment briefly touches upon a few of 
the important issues with the FNC technology transition process: “Recognition of the 
interdependencies between FNCs and between multiple FNCs and PORs and how to 
address these.” 
An increased dialog with the acquisition community was cited by several 
respondents as the most important aspect of the FNC Process.  Other important aspect 
was the Navy’s obvious priority on addressing near-term fleet requirements with longer-
term S&T resources.  As might be expected, there are important implications for the 
Navy’s research infrastructure when pursuing such a technology investment approach: 
The notion that the Navy is willing to focus its resources on its most 
important Fleet/Force requirements.  At the same time, it is essential that 
all stakeholders in the Naval Research Enterprise clearly understand the 
importance of this undertaking and are onboard with the process as well. 
In reviewing the feedback on the FNC Process, provided through the 
survey responses, it is not clear that the members of the Navy’s research infrastructure, 
collectively referred to as the Naval Research Enterprise, understand their role and area 
of contribution in this new way of doing business within the DoN.  As has been observed 
by some of the comments made by survey respondents there are many participants within 
the S&T community who appear to be confused and frustrated by the new technology 
transition process. 
g. Additional Comments 
The additional comments fell into three general groupings; comments on 
the lack of a technical Systems Engineering approach to the programs supported, 
comments on the management of the process itself and comments on the funding 
problems encountered within the FNC framework.   
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In the first grouping of comments, those with a systems engineering 
flavor, the FNC Process was criticized for failing to go far enough in its attempt to 
change how the Navy executes its S&T business.  The attempt to transform Naval 
operations through the introduction of new and novel Navy capabilities are seen to have 
fallen short by the criticism that the “FNCs are, in effect, 12 new stovepipes.”  The 
suggestion the FNCs might be interpreted as new stovepipes is not entirely unexpected; 
the FNCs were designed to focus a significant percentage of Navy S&T resources on a 
smaller number of high-priority technology “thrust areas” which were derived from the 
Fleet CCIs and OPNAV inputs.  So while the FNC might have created a different set of 
technology investment areas is not surprising the connotation of them being simply new 
“stovepipes” is a negative one, implying a number of disparate investment areas with 
little collaboration across FNCs or even within an FNC.  A different comment also 
explores this issue by observing the projects funded within an FNC do not mutually 
support each other to reach critical mass for that desired naval capability, as was 
originally the intent.  The observation that the FNCs have “no real system view, emphasis 
is just on FNC EC to one aspect of a single POR” implies the FNCs remain a bunch of 
individual projects attempting to deliver capabilities to specific programs of record with 
no obvious synergistic design or integration planning of the projects themselves.  Very 
similar sentiments were expressed by a number of survey respondents.  One respondent 
remarked there is no planning beyond the current PORs for what the FNCs should look 
like in the future and that there was no IPT “above the IPTs at the 12 FNC level” to 
provide guidance (although the TOG might be viewed as such an “overarching” IPT).  
The lack of “jointness” was commented on as well by the same respondent who felt the 
FNCs are not in line with the CNO’s vision for Sea Power 21.  A final comment by this 
respondent was an observed lack of interest in the FNC program on the part of the 
OPNAV and acquisition communities. 
The second grouping of comments were of a ‘process’ nature.  One 
respondent commented, “If you read the FNC documentation, the process is a good one.  
In reality, though, ONR, N-091, TOG, etc., etc., keep pulling up the tree to check the 
roots.”  Another respondent suggested the FNC Process has been mismanaged by the 
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Navy: “ONR leadership has failed the FNC Process.  Witness the turnover in S&T leads.  
Instead of being held in high esteem by ONR, FNCs appear to be an obstacle to CNR’s 
plans.”  The essence of this remark is a thread that runs through many of the surveys and 
interviews.  It is difficult to come up with an exact figure but personnel turnover within 
S&T and the FNC infrastructure has been extraordinarily high.  Where this type of 
turnover might be viewed positively (wring out the old, inject new blood into the system) 
it can also be seen in a negative light (loss of corporate memory, experience and project 
continuity). 
The question of accountability was raised in a comment made by another 
respondent: “Have any of the FNC’s been judged to have failed and been terminated or 
had their “Board of Directors” replaced?”  This is an important criticism.  Although there 
has been a barrage of reviews conducted over the (short) life of the FNC Process there 
have been no assessments of “failure” levied against any of the FNC’s.  Two of the 
FNC’s (Capable Manpower and Warfighter Protection) have been repeatedly targeted for 
serious funding reductions and eventual termination but such targeting has been due to a 
lack of requirements rather than a failure of the IPT or the technical projects themselves.  
In fact the reason these IPTs survive such reductions is probably due to the constituent 
communities that were too unified to allow significant reductions to be imposed.   
The third grouping of comments dealt with funding issues.  Funding has 
been raised as an area of concern among all stakeholders.  With reference to a seemingly 
endless round of internal and external programmatic reviews, and the funding 
perturbations that might reasonably follow such reviews, one of the respondents made a 
blunt request for Navy management to reduce the level of oversight and the 
programmatic disruptions which invariably results from such intense bureaucratic 
oversight: “Stabilize the funding & stop reviewing us all the time.  Give us time to do 
some of the work!” 
The impact volatile funding levels had on program management was a 
common theme in responses.  The difficulties caused by the funding turmoil was 
especially evident in light of the tremendous effort imparted to garner formal transition 
agreements with acquisition program managers for projects being funding with S&T 
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resources.  Each round of funding reductions could reasonably mandate a renegotiation of 
transition agreements already agreed to as well as jeopardize those agreements being 
negotiated.  The atmosphere created becomes one of increased technical uncertainty and 
programmatic risk; attributes not welcomed by acquisition program managers who are 
inherently risk-adverse.  The resultant effect of this instability was: 
Funding instability AND requirements for signed TTAs has left a bad taste 
in the mouths of our customers.  We’ve had to renege on TTAs we’ve 
signed. 
Typically S&T level of investment is low when compared to any major 
acquisition program.  The funding instability issue mentioned, if left uncontrolled, causes 
several problems.  One, for the acquisition community, is that it jeopardizes a much 
larger pool of acquisition resources.  A second consequence is that it forces the 
acquisition manager to either develop alternative technical solutions or to demote the 
technical solution being developed to a lower priority naval capability (one that has little 
of no impact if not developed on time).  This, in effect, characterizes the Navy’s S&T 
investment to one of almost technical irrelevance.  A third consequence is one of a lack 
of credibility due to an ability by the S&T community to live up to negotiated 
agreements, such as was stated above.  This funding instability has very serious 
ramifications for the transition process because it undermines the sense of trust among 
the transition partners and fosters a perception that the S&T negotiators have no 
credibility to back up future agreements.  If not resolved, continued funding instability 
problems might very well undermine the results the FNC Process hopes to achieve; 
transition technology to the warfighter.  If formal transition agreements (TTAs) are the 
primary vehicle through which new and innovative technology is transitioned to the 
warfighter but these transition agreements can’t be agreed upon because of perceived 
S&T funding instability issues then it is reasonable to presume the number of transition 
agreements would go down and, as a result, the number of transitions would become 
fewer.  The logic sounds circular but illustrates the cause and effect nature of the 
transition agreements and the FNC transition metric itself.  There is no doubt that other 
factors (from an S&T perspective as well as from the requirements or acquisition 
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perspectives) that will also affect the Navy’s ability to transition new technology to the 
warfighter but funding will be an important one to control. 
h. S&T Community Analysis Summary 
The survey respondents included at least one representative from each of 
the four basic support categories (Principal IPT, Working Group, Project Level, and 
Other).  Of particular interest was an examination of the responses to the questions by 
representatives of the different support categories.  In examining the responses it was 
observed that each question generally received a number of “not applicable,” “do not 
know” or the responder did not provide a response at all.  A higher than expected number 
of “no response” answers are attributed to a survey, from an Principal IPT representative, 
that was returned with only a few of the survey questions answered. 
With one possible exception, the survey responses were found to be 
reasonable and consistent.  The responses provided are reasonable for the indicated level 
of support provided to the IPT.  Collectively, the respondents also provide a consistent 
picture of IPT dynamics within the various IPT support groups.  The possible exception 
refers to response ST-7 where the level of support is indicated as being at the IPT level 
and the Project Level.  Some of the responses from this respondent appear to be 
inconsistent for an IPT representative and seem to be more in line with representatives 
supporting the IPT at the Project Level.  It is possible the survey responses from this 
individual are a complicated mix of observations formed through supporting the IPT in 
several ways.  For the purposes of this survey the responses of ST-7 seem consistent with 
others if taken as input from a participant at the Project Level. 
 
3. Acquisition Community Responses 
Survey responses were received from representatives that supported the FNC 
Process in all stakeholder categories.  Representatives at the Working Group level were 
the  most  frequent but responses were received from representatives of the Principal IPT,  
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at the Project level and those that supported the IPT in an “Other” capacity as well.  The 
survey response ratio (surveys returned/requested) for the acquisition community was 
53.9%.221 
a. General Questions 
Most respondents felt the “customers” for the FNC Process were the 
Program Managers for current acquisition programs.  Respondents acknowledged the 
warfighter as the ultimate customer, as the end user of the products developed, but 
nevertheless felt the FNC Process was targeting meeting the needs of acquisition 
programs.  As one respondent commented: 
The eventual user of the technology is the Sailor and Marine.  However, 
the most immediate customers are the PARMs [sic] and the Major 
Acquisition Program Managers. 
Although similar comments were made by others as well the question of 
who, specifically, is the customer of the Navy’s FNC Process was not as clear to other 
respondents.  Another respondent commented: 
Good Question.  I could speculate as to who it is but it is not clear from 
my involvement as to who the process framers believe is the customer. 
Another respondent appears to have some difficulty pinpointing a specific 
customer and expressed the opinion that the FNC Process was really targeting the Navy’s 
Headquarters Command, OPNAV, as the customer: 
Hard to say.  It seems like OPNAV is who is being appeased through the 
IPT.  But it’s the Acq[uisition] PM’s who deliver the capability to the fleet 
and it’s the fleet who are the end-item users. 
Clearly there are divergent views, and questions, with respect to “who” 
within the DoN the FNC Process is serving.  This last comment is in line with the 
viewpoint that the FNC IPTs build programs in response to identified naval requirements.  
The OPNAV community provides the financial resources for the products developed but 
                                                 
221 For the Acquisition Community, there were 13 survey requests made and 7 surveys were returned.  
Requests were made to Navy and Marine Corps members (military and civilian) of FNC IPT members and 
FNC working group support members. Survey requests were made from just over one-half of the FNC 
community and the survey responses received covered roughly one-third of the FNC community. 
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it is the acquisition community (PEO’s and their PM’s) are responsible to manage and 
deliver these products to the warfighting community. 
All respondents were in agreement that the goals and objectives of the 
FNC program were explained within the acquisition community.  Even though there was 
good agreement in this regard there were some important issues raised.  One issue, a 
recurring one through the survey responses, was the lack of open dialog on how new 
thoughts, ideas and programs would be pursued and introduced into the FNC Process.  As 
one respondent remarked: 
Early on (98) the theory was described.  Questions such as “how do new 
projects begin?” were deferred. 
Other respondents questioned the consistency (“Yes, but the explanation 
has not been consistent either over time or by presenter”) as well as the penetration of the 
message throughout the acquisition community (“Numerous times, but I’m not sure 
everyone was ever contacted”). 
Responses to the question asking about the impact the FNC Process has 
had within the acquisition community were mixed with the overall consensus seeming to 
be that the net impact has been only modest at best.  As one respondent has observed: 
Some initial modest improvement in OPNAV participation (in FNC Chair 
role).  Some increased communication between PMAs and ONR FNC 
PMs.  In both cases, improvement has seemed to fade as people have 
turned over. 
Another participant conveys two aspects of the FNC Process; a positive 
one where S&T investments were directed toward fleet priorities that had not been 
typically addressed by the S&T community and a second, negative, aspect where the 
FNC Process seemed to get quickly bogged down in a series of numerous program 
reviews, process changes and funding cuts: 
Two main impacts.  One increased hope in that more funding has filtered 
to items or people that normally have not benefited from ONR 
investments.  Second extreme frustration at the continued reviews, 
changes in scope, budget cuts, taxes and other issues that take all of the 
efforts and through it away before resulting in a product.  This impact is  
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amplified when most of the efforts put forward in the early stages were 
completed without funding based on the future benefit that in many cases 
will not materialize. 
Another respondent views the FNCs as an improvement over the Navy’s 
previous technology transition process, the ATDs: 
Better continuity, less of a “food fight” for ATDs that didn’t necessarily 
connect to programs. 
There was a variety of manners in which respondents mentioned they 
engaged the FNC Process.  Most appeared to engage the FNCs through such means as 
acquisition members of the IPTs (There are acquisition representatives as members of 
some of the FNCs and periodically Major Acquisition Program team members meet with 
FNC membership”), SYSCOM technology review boards and key ONR contacts.  Some 
responses seem to indicate dialog problems exist but did not elaborate further (“Through 
ONR PMs, but with much difficulty”).  Another respondent, supporting an FNC at the 
IPT Working Group level, provided greater insight into the nature and type of interface 
problems that may commonly exist within the FNC Process: 
It has varied throughout the process.  At times – especially in the 
beginning – we were very organized with a centralized representative for 
our community within our FNC.  As the process evolved and people 
changed, it has ping-ponged back and forth and sometimes both at the 
same time between project level direct engagement and formalized 
centralized organization engagement.  More specifically – often there is 
direct engagement from the ONR program management with the 
acquisition representatives on an individual effort and other times the 
ONR-NAVAIR contact is brokered through a single individual who 
coordinates a NAVAIR response.  The problem has been assessing when 
which method is correct and lead to either issues of mistrust (centralized 
communications) or misunderstanding of command priorities (direct 
project level communications). 
Although some respondents clearly see the FNC Process as being 
important to the acquisition community most responded in a lukewarm manner when 
asked about the important of the FNC Process.  One comment suggests the importance 
and impact of the FNC Process has been reduced because of the manner in which it is 
being implemented.  Even though the goals and objectives may have been articulated 
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within the acquisition community, if these goals and objectives are not synergetic, or if 
they are not well understood, the results will be less than optimal.  If the process 
questions and issues are not resolved the process devolves to one that is merely 
“endured.”  As one respondent commented: 
To my community the FNCs are extremely important since there is no 
other source of S&T investment for my community.  The specific question 
of how important is the process is somewhat different in that the process 
does not appear to be clearly defined and articulate and as such is not 
understood.  The result is the process is something that we endure to 
ensure that we can continue to maintain even the smallest of S&T 
investments in cost reduction and sustainment technologies. 
This comment suggests the importance of the FNC Process stems from the 
fact that the FNCs represent an important source of Navy investment resources to reduce 
risks and lower costs for delivering improved capabilities to the fleet.  This assessment is 
consistent with a comment made by another respondent: 
On a day to day basis not very important.  However, on a long term basis 
it is one of the few places where new technology is being developed to an 
acceptable level of risk for insertion into acquisition programs. 
Another respondent more succinctly links the importance of the FNC 
Process to being the primary source of revenue within the NRE for technology 
development purposes.  The Navy’s S&T Program has responsibility to manage and 
support the technology development efforts throughout the DoN community.  Over the 
past several years while S&T accounts in other agencies have been going dramatically up 
an opposite trend has been true, for a variety of reasons, within the DoN.  Frustration 
over this shrinking pool of resources within the NRE community is expressed by this 
respondent: 
Importance lies in the flow of money to conduct S&T.  For whatever 
reason, S&T funds are in decline and nowhere more than at the warfare 
centers.  FNC managers seem to be directing funding away from NAWC. 
Another respondent’s comment briefly touches upon the thorny issue of 
who has “control” over the S&T resources.  The issue of control is a common thread that 
appears throughout the interviews and surveys – the question regarding who has (and 
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should have) ultimate control over the direction and use of the Navy’s S&T resources is 
central to the problem of transitioning technology.  As one respondent remarked: 
Critical to some, barely understood or appreciated by others – still others 
regard FNC funding as money that should be theirs, but they can’t direct 
it… that’s not necessarily a bad thing. 
The issue of “control” has been a problem before the FNC Process and will 
continue to be a problem after the FNC Process has been superceded by some other later 
process.  More to the point is that for real progress to be made the Navy’s S&T Program, 
and its technology development process, needs to be clearly articulated, understood and 
agreed upon by all stakeholder communities within the DoN. 
b. Transition Questions 
Respondents were mixed with respect to their confidence as to whether 
programs would transition as planned.  Some respondents were confident about 
transitions they had control over: 
I am confident that most if not all projects that I am involved with will 
transition successfully provided the S&T produces the intended results.  I 
am so confident that I have budgeted most transition efforts directly into 
my RDT&E line. 
The lack of confidence was attributed to a lack of confidence in 
maintaining adequate funding to complete the technology development effort: 
Some will transition, probably not as planned (schedule-wise).  Many will 
never transition due to repeated funding cuts by ONR. 
The use of transition agreements provides a higher degree of confidence 
due to the interaction and dialog necessary to get the agreements signed.  As is 
mentioned, if this dialog is diminished the confidence in the transitions is diminished as 
well: 
In the case of signed TTAs, confidence is higher.  Lack of regular and 
ongoing comm’s puts even these agreements at risk. 
Without exception, survey respondents agreed that FNC programs are 
being transitioned to current acquisition programs of record.  The awareness and use of 
metrics for transition was, however, less clear.  The metric most frequently cited was a 
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generally vague one of “transition” (via signed technology transition agreements, TTAs) 
without a more complete description of what such a metric might actually mean.  Other 
metrics mentioned were the use of a 6.4 PE, NASA technology readiness levels (as an 
estimate of technical maturity) and warfighting value.  Some IPTs have made an attempt 
at trying to identify useful metrics.  As one example: 
Return on investment and successful transitions.  ROI is for project 
prioritization and performed by NCCA.  Transition is a measure of success 
of the projects themselves. 
The identification and use of meaningful technology transition metrics is a 
difficult problem for all of the FNCs.  The current approach relies primarily on the use of 
TTAs with the acquisition program managers.  While this approach is useful it drastically 
limits the potential market for the technology development effort without being able to 
guarantee the transitions will occur as planned.  Most troubling is that the difficult and 
important issues regarding transitions are not being widely discussed among the Navy’s 
stakeholder communities.  Whether intentional or not the whole ‘transition’ problem 
seems to have been suppressed, possibly because the problem is such a difficult one and 
no community wishes to make the compromises that would be necessary to resolve it.  As 
one respondent has observed: 
This has never been well explained (or consistent across all FNCs).  TTAs 
should not be the only measure. 
There were two primary obstacles mentioned by survey respondents in 
relation to problems in transitioning technology as planned; our acquisition process and 
funding instability.  It is significant to note the acquisition community itself recognizes 
some of the serious shortfalls inherent in our current acquisition process.   
The use of NASA’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL) assessments were 
introduced into the FNC Process as an already-proven useful metric of relative 
technology maturity.  The practical problem in doing so, however, has been that when 
such maturity assessments are applied to whole programs at the IPT level the wide 
latitude used in making such assessments make the maturity assessments meaningless.  
As one participant commented: 
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The state of the technology is not at the maturity level desired to 
sufficiently reduce risk and the DoD budgeting process does not allow 
major programs to budget for emergent technology insertion into 
programs.  Additionally prime systems integrators have little incentive to 
use new technology that does not increase their profits. 
Funding problems (insufficient or unstable) were mentioned in a number 
of returned surveys as a major problem.  One respondent remarked there have been 
“Seemingly constant funding level changes.  There is little stability.”  Another respondent 
expressed a similar observation with additional emphasis: 
1. Funding.  2. Funding.  3. Funding.  More specifically:  1. ensuring 
transition funding is in place.  2.  preserving FNC funding in light of all of 
the cuts and taxes to produce the technology sound product on the timeline 
promised.  3.  Convincing the powers that be that a spec or manual change 
is a viable transition path that does not require a funded budget line and 
that the project should not be canceled due to weak transition agreement. 
Difficulties with the Defense Department’s acquisition process were 
mentioned, too.  The current cumbersome and convoluted military requirements 
generation process and how it is (or is not) integrated into a coherent Navy headquarters 
(OPNAV) resource budgeting and program acquisition strategy was alluded to in brief 
comments (“Today’s requirement/budget process”) as an obstacle as was the general lack 
of efficient and effective communication among those very same stakeholder 
communities (“As before, lack of comms with transition sponsor”).  This communication 
problem is another that surfaces throughout the surveys and interviews.  The net result is 
that program advocates seek out requirements from any of a myriad number of (valid) 
communities for their program.  The effort to obtain an endorsement (what that may 
mean may vary) becomes a marketing job and drives the technologist to be overly 
optimistic in program abilities and unrealistically conservative in estimating development 
schedules, cost and performance.  Since there are no costs or metrics or accountability 
there is no problem with this approach since you are playing with someone else’s money.  
As one respondent has experienced: 
Underestimating the expense and scope of development required to reach 
program office expectations combined with overestimation by program 
offices of maturity of what will be delivered. 
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These types of transition obstacles continue to exist throughout DoN 
because program expectations are not discussed in depth at significant levels among the 
stakeholder communities.  As a result of this communication shortfall there exists a lack 
of understanding of the enormous issues, and consequences, involved.  This, too, is not 
the problem of only one community but is equally a problem of all involved. 
In general, acquisition community survey respondents thought there were 
agreements in place for project maturity, cost and schedule.  This is understandable since 
the majority of these agreements were reached as a necessary condition for the approval 
of required TTAs and many of these same acquisition personnel were involved in the 
brokering of these transition agreements.  Even so, when sampling across the acquisition 
representatives there was not unanimous agreement for maturity, cost and schedule.  For 
example, as one respondent has observed, “My view is that some of this exists but on a 
case by case basis” while another remarked “Sometimes but frequently not.”  These 
observations imply the agreements are less pervasive, or less stringent, than one might be 
led to believe at first glance.  The tendency to be overly optimistic in program planning is 
again seen in the observation of yet another participant: 
Generally, though that agreement is frequently based upon “success 
oriented” projections. 
The questions that asked if any of the IPT products were funded by 
multiple IPTs or by joint Services or Agencies (i.e., AF, Army, DARPA, etc.) generated a 
mixed response.  For both questions some respondents thought there was multiple and/or 
joint investments but a roughly equal number did not think so, were unaware of any, or 
simply indicated they did not know.  One respondent, however, was able to provide some 
details for an instance where there is some evidence of program integration among 
separate IPTs: 
Yes, for instance anti torpedo torpedo relies on a weapon and passive 




Regarding pursuing funding from multiple IPTs, another respondent 
recounts the FNC programs’ early emphasis on cross-FNC collaborations that were not 
fully realized due, again in part, to funding shortfall and stability challenges experienced 
by all of the FNCs: 
There seemed to be some initial cases of this but the recurring budget cuts 
seems to have forced them into one FNC or another. 
A similar observation is mentioned by another respondent as well: 
Not that I am aware of although we did attempt to get a project funded via 
multiple IPTs.  The other IPTs did not either care to pursue this route or 
have the funding to spare to do so. 
The focus on a “lack of funding” is an easy crutch to use but the data does 
not come close to supporting such a narrow view of the events.  The FNC’s were 
envisioned as a “new way of doing business,” one that would focus one half of the 
Navy’s S&T budget on addressing the highest priority challenges and technical issues of 
the Navy.  The program started out with a $750M budget which was gradually reduced 
by 1/3, to the approximate $500M level (still a significant investment).  The lack of a 
cross-FNC collaboration emphasis should not be confused with, or blamed on, a funding 
deficiency but should be recognized as endemic to the IPT’s approach to implementing 
the FNC Process – maintaining S&T resources for a small naval community at all costs.  
Viewed in this manner funding might be simply a convenient excuse to not do something 
the IPT does not have a desire to do.  Unless there is an obvious benefit for one IPT to 
support the capabilities of another IPT there will not be any collaboration.  This approach 
is not consistent with the “joint” emphasis being pursued at the DoD level but is reflected 
in the observations of the survey respondents.  Although there were two exceptions most 
respondents reported they were not aware of any jointly funded IPT programs.  As one 
participant remarked: 
No program that I know about.  Some programs have joint funds but only 
because it’s mandated.  Nothing’s joint by choice (look at the Navy 
interest in ACTDs – nil). 
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This comment is contrasted by that of another respondent who noted that 
the KSA FNC “has an ACTD” as well as a remark made by a different participant:  In our 
FNC we have at least one project that is receiving funding from both the AF and the 
FAA. 
Conflicting comments such as these are an indication of the low level of 
awareness and collaboration among the IPTs regarding what they are each doing.  This 
lack of awareness tends to lend credence to the earlier criticisms of “stovepipes” across 
the FNCs, a criticism of the earlier ATD program as well.  Furthermore, it seems that 
even when the IPT develops products that will likely have known joint utility there is 
evidence of little collaboration.  Providing an example of such a case a respondent 
commented: 
Not aware, though some products, like an improved ALE 50 towed decoy, 
will likely be used by Air Force as well as Navy planes. 
There may be numerous reasons for deciding not to pursue joint funding 
but such an approach runs counter to the trends, guidance and direction being 
disseminated by the DoD over the years.  For whatever reasons, the FNC Process has not 
been able to effectively engage in a significant number of collaborative projects either 
within the DoN (cross-FNC) or within DoD (joint Service or Agency).  The Navy’s 
participation within the ACTD process, mentioned numerous times, is one possible 
metric in this regard.  An investigation into the issues encountered when involved in a 
joint program is beyond the scope of this thesis but should be explored. 
c. IPT Process Questions 
Respondents were mixed in their assessment of the IPTs effectiveness.  
This varied mixture is undoubtedly a reflection of the differences among the individual 
IPTs and their support teams.  Recognizing the IPTs operated differently, there were 
those who offered a more positive assessment of the IPT.  As one participant has 
observed: 
Largely.  My perception is that it varies.  Some seem to play very even 
handedly, while others seem to have been hijacked by the community to 
which the chairman belongs. 
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In other cases, although respondents provided a more negative assessment 
of how the IPT manages its investment portfolio, there was still the feeling that the FNC 
Process, flawed as it is, is better than the transition process that preceded it:222 
Short answer is NOT VERY.  But must be considered against what the 
alternative would have been.  Pre-FNC approach would have suffered 
even more from the continuing reduction of budgets. 
Responses to the question asking for information on how decisions are 
made by the IPT indicate the IPT members discuss options but the final decision is made 
by the Chair (“By the chair after considering all points”).  Another respondent, 
supporting the IPT at the Working Group level, has observed that the decisions are 
“generally worked out at a senior manager level, then ratified by the IPT.”  Further 
insight into the IPTs ratification process would be helpful to an understanding of IPT 
dynamics.  The consensus-based approach of typical IPTs can easily devolve to a 
‘design-by-committee’ approach that hinders creativity and innovation and encourages 
nominal performance so long as everyone involved in the decision gets something for 
their community from it.  Hints of this approach are evident within the remark, “Flag-
level tradeoffs.  The Chair makes the IPT decision.” 
Respondents were in general agreement that the personnel turnover rate 
within their IPTs has been high.  As an example, one respondent mentioned the IPT’s 
acquisition representative was already on their third IPT member.  Comments such as 
“My observation is all too often” and “Lots.  There’s always someone new,” although not 
specific, indicate a highly volatile membership and team dynamics.  The military 
emphasis and component of the IPT, of course, contributes to the membership turnover 
rate due to the rotational nature of their billets.  Such an organizational structure lacks 
continuity and places an increased emphasis and reliance on the part of the Chair, as the 
decision-maker.  A high turnover within the Chair position, which sometimes occurs as 
evident by the remark “Chair alone has changed 6 times in 3 years,” becomes a more 
damaging and disruptive situation for the IPT to contend with.   
                                                 
222 For the Navy, the process that preceded the FNC process was called the ATD process.  The ATD 
process is still used by other Services. 
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From participant responses it appears the IPT portfolio selection process is 
essentially a closed-community and fairly subjective one.  Those involved confirm that 
each IPT runs its own selection process since there is no uniform process enforced for all.  
This type of approach tends to present a fractured appearance as indicated by one 
observers remarks, “From the outside, each FNC has a different, subjective method.”   
While some indicated they were not knowledgeable about the IPT 
portfolio selection process (i.e., “Don’t know”) others indicated the selection process 
consisted of IPT support staff preparing the S&T program and presenting to the IPT for 
approval (“ONR proposes changes to flags & executes”).  This type of process is 
supported by another respondent, supporting the IPT at the Working Group level, who 
participated in the portfolio creation process: 
A relative ranking based on warfighting contributions, technical likelihood 
of success, and fiscal restraints. 
This indicates that an IPT S&T strategy is attempted at the Working 
Group level.  Additional information would be needed to understand the dynamics at the 
IPT level when deciding which programs get approved and for what reasons.  A comment 
submitted by another respondent implies the final IPT decisions involve a compromise 
among the stakeholder communities involved with that IPT: 
ONR submits a program and the IPT approves the program.  As long as 
there’s something there for everyone it’s usually ok’d. 
Clearly not everyone is happy with how the program selection process is 
managed by the IPT.  As another participant comments: 
If this means projects, initial selection was a process that I was a part of 
but would rather not discuss.  Cuts are implemented from the bottom of 
the prioritized project list based on return on investment. 
This statement appears to be two separate comments run together.  The 
first (“If this means projects, initial selection was a process that I was a part of but would 
rather not discuss”) appears to express the participant’s frustration with the initial 
selection process as the FNC’s were being established.  The second comment, however 
(“Cuts are implemented from the bottom of the prioritized project list based on return on 
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investment”), indicates that some of the IPTs, at least, do have a process for the 
cancellation of programs that fail to meet some type of metric. 
In answering the question regarding whether or not there is a process for 
the selection of new programs, some of the respondents indicated there was.  In 
particular, the KSA FNC was singled out for having a new program process.  Another 
respondent referenced an apparent relatively recent change to an IPT that brought about a 
process for selecting new programs.  In answering the question this respondent 
commented: 
Yes, but that has largely developed since I have become distanced from 
the process. 
Looking at the responses to this question from the various IPT support 
levels might be useful.  One participant, serving as a member of the Principal IPT, 
indicates the new program selection process is handled through a “group discussion” at 
the IPT level.  A second participant, serving as a support team member at the Working 
Group level, commented “one is currently in development but none exist today.”  A third 
respondent, serving the IPT at the project level, remarked: 
If there is, I have not heard of it other than the prospect of replacing a 
terminated project—which possibility seems to have been overtaken by 
budget cuts before a new project could be started.  None that I have ever 
heard about. 
These observations, although not intended to imply a direct reflection of 
any specific IPT, do seem to be consistent with the emerging view that the new program 
selection process across the FNC IPTs, as a whole, has not been implemented or widely 
articulated.  These observations, by participants actually involved in the process, seem to 
indicate that the investment decisions within an IPT are made rather informally through 
consensus-based discussions among IPT members.  Since the bulk of the IPT 
programmatic “work” is done by the support staff at the Working Group level it is 
understandable that participants at this level are working out the details of a more formal 
selection process but this remains a work-in-progress.  At a lower level of support, at the 
technical project level, these efforts are not readily apparent.  Staff supporting the IPT at 
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the Project Level are removed from the decision process and cannot easily gain insight 
into how IPT investment decisions are made.   
The question about the number of data calls the participants were involved 
with over the past year is also interesting when the responses from the various IPT 
support groups are examined.  At the IPT level the response was “many, many, many” 
while at the Working Group level the responses from two different participants were 
“Me, none, the IPT, many” and “One or two.  It has either slowed down or I have been 
pushed farther out of the loop.”  At the Project Level the responder felt the question was 
not applicable (“N/A”).  These responses indicate the data calls were targeted primarily at 
the IPT members who may have drawn support from the various Working Groups as 
necessary.  It appears that data calls did not reach the support staff at the Project Level on 
a widespread basis. 
d. IPT Meeting Questions 
This group of questions was written to draw insight into the manner in 
which the IPT meetings were conducted as well as an attempt to determine how closely 
the various support groups were engaged with their IPT.  The first question asks if the 
respondents are even informed of the IPT meetings, for a starting point.  Responses 
indicate that invitations to the IPT meetings are made at the Working Group level but are 
not generally passed down to the lower levels of support (Project Level and Other).  The 
Principal IPT representative reports receiving invitations as do the representatives at the 
Working Group level.  At the project level the respondent replied, “Not formally—word 
of mouth at best.”  At the “Other” level of support the replies were “No” and “Seldom.” 
For the question that asked if our respondents have ever actually attended 
an IPT meeting the replies returned were a unanimous “Yes” indicating that at some point 
in the FNC Process all survey respondents were engaged with the IPT to some degree. 
Responses to the question asking about the frequency of IPT meetings, the 
responses indicated IPT meetings were occurring on an approximate quarterly basis.  
Respondents at the IPT and Working Group level indicated quarterly meetings while 
respondents at the lower levels of support (Project and Other) felt the question was not 
applicable to them or, as in one case, replied “semi-annually.”  Once again, the fact that 
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the lower levels of support do not know the meeting frequency for the IPT indicates they 
are not being engaged in these deliberations. 
Respondents reported mixed observations regarding whether or not all 
stakeholder communities were attending IPT meetings.  Although the Principal IPT 
representative responded that all communities were represented (“Yes, or their 
rep[resentative]s”), such a response does not necessarily mean representatives from each 
of the stakeholder communities actually did attend the IPT meetings.  Responses from 
most other responders seem to differ in this assessment and indicate attendees were 
primarily OPNAV and ONR with the fleet representatives not typically being present.  As 
one respondent at the Working Group level commented, the IPT meetings were 
“frequently missing fleet representation.” 
e. Communication Questions 
The communication questions were designed to provide some insight into 
the amount and quality of information exchange that was going on within the IPT and its 
support staffs.  The first question asks whether or not the participant has been kept 
informed of relevant S&T information.  The response, across the spectrum of responders, 
was largely “No.”  There were two possible exceptions within the acquisition 
community; one from the IPT representative and the other from one of the three Working 
Group representative responders.  All other responders indicated they were not being kept 
adequately informed.  One participant observed “New information is not pushed out very 
aggressively” and another focused on my “relevant” qualifier, suggesting that the IPT 
sends what they think is needed rather than what may be needed:  
Relevant is the key word and in the eye of the sender.  They believe I am. 
I do not believe I am. 
In response to the question asking where participants go to get any needed 
FNC information, most survey respondents said they went to the S&T representatives and 
trusted agents.  This feedback reinforces the view, presented earlier, that the S&T 
investment portfolio is prepared by the Working Group and presented to the IPT for 
concurrence and approval.  It is significant to note that the two exceptions to these 
comments were both from the “Other” IPT support category and in both cases the use of 
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the S&T website was cited as a major (in not primary) source of FNC information.  The 
utility and usage of the FNC website is commented on elsewhere but, suffice it to say, the 
FNC website is not considered to be an extremely reliable or accurate source for FNC 
information at this time.  One possible explanation for the use of the S&T website by the 
“Other” IPT support staff would be one of necessity due to a remote location: they use it 
because it is all they have ready access to.  Of course it is possible that for their IPT the 
information at the S&T website is fairly accurate or that the information they require in 
of a more generic nature. 
In response to the question asking if there was any information the 
participants felt they needed but did not have, the replies were mostly “yes.”  The two 
exceptions to this question, once again, were from the IPT representative and from one of 
the three Working Group support team members.  All other survey respondents 
mentioned information they would have liked to have but were not able to get.  Some 
information seems so fundamental to the FNC Process that its absence is astonishing.  To 
cite a few examples, some of the items the respondents had difficulty in obtaining 
included transition agreements, recent briefings, new IPT Enabling Capability 
descriptions and “new desired program directions.”  The fact that these items were not 
easily obtainable indicates a communication problem, workload overload or a lack of 
willingness to respond to the requests.  Whichever is correct the lack of response to such 
fundamental information requests generates an impression that the process is flawed and 
unfair.  One respondent remarked on a desire to have access to IPT financial information: 
[I] would love to have a current program of record.  Financial data is 
always hard to get and expect it will be near impossible now that N911 is 
no longer part of the IPT. 
This latest remark refers to the past role of OPNAV N911 as the Executive 
Secretary for each of the IPTs.  In this capacity N911 would prepare and make available a 
POR for the entire FNC Program.  Although this POR was never completely reconciled 
with the ONR records it did provide an accurate “snap-shot” of the S&T investments 
from the Resource Sponsor perspective and provided a point of reference from which 
stakeholders could obtain an estimate of the intended DoN S&T investments in any 
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particular thrust area.  Over the past year organizational changes within OPNAV have 
eliminated the N911 office and many of the Resource Sponsor duties appear to have 
migrated to OPNAV N70. 
The responses to the question asking how frequently participants have 
used the DoN S&T website indicate the website is not widely used.  The implied 
infrequent usage is consistent with the website usage data provided earlier.  At the IPT 
level the website was used “rarely” while at the Working Group two respondents 
indicated “never” and the third did not know.  At the Project level the respondent 
remarked, “Never, anymore.  After numerous initial attempts, found there was almost no 
info posted.”  Again the two exceptions were those that were supporting the IPT at the 
“Other” level.  In these cases the website was used “very often” and “at least once a 
week.” 
When assessing the S&T websites usefulness respondents did not rate it 
very high.  Most users appear to have tried using the website but then found the data to be 
out of date, unreliable, and not helpful.  At the Working Group level one respondent 
commented the websites’ usefulness was “Unknown.  It was always so badly out of date 
that I stopped using it.”  Another respondent, also at the Working Group level, felt the 
data there is “Useless.  Info[rmation] is old and unreliable.  I have to double-check 
anything there that matters.”  These sentiments correlate with another comment made (at 
the Project level of support) regarding its usefulness, “Somewhat useful at the beginning, 
but that info has never been updated.”  Even the respondents of the “Other” support 
category gave the S&T website a lukewarm assessment.  One respondent commented,  
“It’s OK.  Often all we can get” and the other remarked “The latency of the information 
does not make it very useful.”  From a section of the acquisition community that is 
actually trying to use the S&T website as intended these assessments indicate an area that 
needs improvement. 
In response to the final question of this section, how frequent is the 
interaction with the S&T FNC representatives, the answers indicate there is a good deal 
of interaction.  The IPT representative response indicates a close working dialog with the 
S&T representative; they interact on a weekly basis.  At the Working Group level two of 
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the respondents reported meeting with the S&T representatives a couple of times a 
month.  The response of another Working Group participant indicates there is some 
friction between the acquisition and S&T communities.  In this case the interaction was 
described as such: 
When they want something that they can only get from me.  When I want 
something I can only get from them.  Otherwise we avoid each other. 
The interaction, of course, may be affected by other factors.  The 
interaction might vary considerably by IPT (as already indicated some IPTs are more 
“open” than others) as well as be personality-dependent.  Some of this dynamic is 
reflected in another comment made: 
Depends on the FNC.  KSA: once every 3 months;  FFP: once a month 
(more frequently with POM06 process);  ACES: once to twice a month. 
f. Degree of Satisfaction 
The overall level of satisfaction expressed by the survey respondents was 
decidedly mixed.  As might be expected the IPT represented was satisfied.  Other 
participants, however, had somewhat different assessments.  Two respondents were 
satisfied with one of them commenting that the FNC Process was “Far better than what 
existed before.”  Another respondent gave the process a mediocre rating (“On a scale of 1 
to 10 it is a 5”) while the other respondents simply answered the question “No.” 
A number of things were mentioned by respondents when asked for 
examples of what has worked in the FNC Process.  Comments provided indicated there is 
a sense of a greater unification within the Navy as well as simply the accomplishment of 
“getting stakeholders together.”  Another comment made was that the FNC Process has 
forced a “Consolidation of focus areas to allow meaningful accomplishments” which is 
very much in line with the original intent of the FNC approach.   
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A number of things were also mentioned when asked about what has not 
worked for the FNC Process.  The most frequent item mentioned was inadequate funding.  
Other items mentioned included a lack of effective communications/teamwork and a 
continuing tendency to pursue technologies in a “stovepipe” manner.  With respect to the 
funding issue, one respondent commented, “Funding has not been stable nor of the 
amount originally planned when the FNC Process was started.”  This response was 
consistent with other responses as well (“Constant cutting of FNC budget” and “Fencing 
the FNC accounts from cuts (even discretionary ones)”).  The remark made about the 
lack of communication and teamwork was: 
Teamwork and communication.  We continue to function with an us and 
them mentality.  Believe that the IPT is viewed as an impediment that is 
only there to dilute ONR authority. 
Finally, another participant suggests the Navy’s FNC Process has not been 
able to break down some of the traditional barriers that have been carried along from the 
‘old way of doing business.’  The comment made was: 
It’s still a ‘good old boy’ network with the old stovepipes.  Not much has 
changed wrt [with respect to] getting things out the door faster.  The case 
for the usefulness of S&T to the warfighter has not been effectively made. 
The reference to “stovepipes” is made by several different individuals at 
different times and implies that much has not changed.  The two other remarks are 
probably more significant, however.  The reference to “getting things out the door faster” 
is actually a fundamental metric of the FNC Process.  The FNC Process focuses on 
delivering new capabilities and products to the warfighter over the FYDP (rather than 
over a longer-term) so that S&T products will in fact go “out the door faster.”  If “not 
much” has changed, as the respondent believes, than the FNC Process would indeed be 
viewed as a failure.  The other remark, that the case for the usefulness of S&T to the 
warfighter has not been made, is another fundamental issue and might possibly be the 
root cause for the changes to the S&T Program to begin with.   
According to respondents the most important aspect of the FNC Process 
lies in the collaboration and program planning the process requires.  As one respondent 
commented, the importance was “Enforced planning and collaboration between FNC, 
acquisition program offices and acquisition sponsors.”  Another participant suggested the 
importance was in having “a formal process to examine and plan for future technology 
needs.  Without this, S&T investment would be chaos.”  This remark resonates with a 
comment made by yet another respondent: 
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It should be that all communities have a voice so that we can ensure that 
the S&T investment is focused in areas that will best benefit the Sailors 
and ensure that the transition follows the S$T [sic] investment in a timely 
manner.  It should also be that it allows for more secure budgets of both 
the S&T investment and also the transition funding but I have yet to see 
that happen. 
g. Additional Comments 
Successfully developing a new technology, a new warfighting capability, 
and transitioning this new capability to the warfighter in a rapid and timely manner is at 
the core of the DoN FNC Process.  To accomplish this goal the Navy needs the right 
people doing the right job.  Even then, it is extremely difficult.  One of the comments 
made by a respondent suggests we might not have our teaming correct: 
Technology transition is not an easy business and frankly does not appeal 
to the personality of many outstanding research scientists.  I believe it 
would enhance each of the FNCs if they had a transition advocate to help 
facilitate the "marketing" and identification of potential applications for 
the various technologies in development by the FNCs. 
The specific issue raised here mentions a possible need for “marketing” 
the FNCs through the use of a transition advocate.  There is no doubt that such an 
advocate is essential to any successful project but the more general issue raised here 
seems to be whether or not research personnel are the most appropriate people to be 
charged with transitioning technologies to the fleet.  The argument would be that 
researchers will not necessarily have the most appropriate skill set needed since the 
variety of skills required to develop, test and produce a product are different for each 
phase of the product development cycle.  It is reasonable to expect researchers to be more 
interested in research rather than expect them to be interested and competent in the 
numerous other phases of technology transition.  When compared to commercial business 
operations the FNC Process spans a far too narrow, too technical, too limited, talent pool.  
As was commented in the quote above there are other disciplines required to bring a 
product to market and these disciplines are not normally found involved in current IPT 
operations. 
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A second comment refers to the manner in which the FNC Process was 
implemented and the inability of the IPTs to manage the investments within their thrust 
area effectively: 
If every IPT followed the perscribed process, the FNCs would be much 
more highly considered than they are now.  Unfortunately, some FNCs 
persist in pursuing the desires of individuals or of communities that feel 
ownership regardless of the likelihood of actual transition. 
What this comment seems to suggest is that stovepipes still exist within 
the IPTs and, as such, constitute an integral component of the FNC Process.  Even on 
paper the FNC Process has shortfalls but when the process is allowed to be mismanaged 
to appease specific communities these original shortfalls grow into unmanageable voids 
and the entire process loses credibility. 
Another comment referred to the inherent disconnect between the 
governments’ desire to pursue more efficient business operations models and its inability 
to consistently follow-through on the details of such a pursuit: 
Recent DoN directives seem to promote “industry” models for conducting 
our business.  Do not fully agree as motives are different, but even if we 
must, DoN fails to stick to the model of industry that places significant 
and faithful investment in R&D (~2% off the top line) and does not allow 
that level to be cut.  S&T cannot be allowed to be an afterthought.  While 
we complain about a lack of money for current military budgets (and 
“war” bills), S&T is not successful when viewed as a totally COTS 
approach.  Technology must be worked sufficiently ahead of the insertion 
point to allow for successfully and affordably integrating the solution into 
the targeted “system”—both the platform and its network-centric 
operational scenario.  Remember successful S&T means “leading the 
target” and involves anticipating both needs and solutions—up to 20 years 
in the future. 
The desire to follow industry business models derives from an intense 
desire to reduce system costs.  As the literature search showed, there is a perception 
within the government that the commercial sector is “better” than a corresponding 
government operation; that commercial operations are more efficient than analogous 
government operations; that commercial manufacturers can produce newer, more 
innovative, products faster, and more cheaply than government entities can; that 
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commercial entities have higher caliber personnel than that of corresponding government 
organizations.  In some cases this perception will hold true but it is not necessarily true in 
general.  The implementation of commercial “best practices” and “business models” 
cannot be done in a piecemeal fashion.  As this person indicates there are differences 
between the two sectors and these differences must be properly accounted for in whatever 
model is used.  Many of the things that help make the commercial sector successful are 
areas where we many times choose to deviate, usually for cost reasons.  The net result is 
that by doing so we sacrifice the gains we had hoped to realize.  
The current acquisition process is an example of such an area.  Many of 
the acquisition approaches taken (i.e., COTS) have become so cumbersome that the 
benefactors are not the taxpayer, nor the warfighter, but the defense contractors that sell 
the government proprietary systems intended to attract continuous future dividends.  
Rather than take a much simpler approach, where the government owns the design and a 
number of contractors would compete for the contract award, the government gets locked 
into a sole source design and escalating costs.  The DoN S&T account can be used to help 
reduce the costs but S&T investment continues to be viewed negatively within the Navy. 
Another comment referred to the problems of communication and focus 
within the FNC Process.  Both of these issues are important for the FNC Process to 
achieve its objectives.  As has been observed by one participant of the FNC Process: 
I have noted repeatedly in my comments that communication and single 
focus should be the benefit of the FNC Process but I do not believe that all 
parties have bought into that idea and if they have not done so by now 
they never will.  In my FNC, I continue to see patterns repeat themselves 
which tells me that nothing is really changing.  I had hoped that the FNCs 
would be a good first step in planning of projects from S&T through 
fielding and allow for better investment of resources but now I think it is 
just another flag officer good idea that has gone bad. 
Effective and widespread communications, as well as a clear set of 
objectives, is necessary for the FNC Process to succeed.  This comment indicates, in spite 
of  all  of  the  programming  and process changes that have occurred over the last several  
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years, these remain difficulties remain today as they have in the past.  This observation 
seems to resonate with another, made by a different participant, that the FNC Process has 
not been managed effectively: 
It seems like the Navy tried to make some fundamental and needed 
changes but they seemed to mismanage it.  I think they let the process get 
completely out of hand and it became a huge political funding food-fight 
within the Pentagon.  Not sure why but it seems like the Navy is doing all 
they can to avoid using the existing SYSCOM infrastructure.  It’s ironic as 
that’s probably where their biggest successes have/will come from.  It’s 
the SYSCOM ranges, labs and warfare centers that have the in-depth 
Systems Engineering expertise to implement solutions quickly.  
Disappointing. 
This comment suggests that greater benefits could be realized through a 
more effective use of the DoN’s NRE infrastructure.  As several participants have 
articulated the Navy’s Laboratory and Warfare Center infrastructure claims to have 
experienced a sharp decline in S&T funding and attributes this to a redirection of funds 
elsewhere by the IPTs.  The decline in funding issue aside, it is certainly true the Navy 
has a substantial investment in its unique NRE laboratory system and that using this 
infrastructure, and its experienced personnel, to its greatest advantage would be highly 
beneficial. 
h. Acquisition Community Analysis Summary 
The survey respondents for the acquisition community included at least 
one representative from each of the four basic support categories (Principal IPT, Working 
Group, Project Level, and Other).  Of particular interest was an examination of the 
responses to the questions by representatives of the different support categories.  
Generally speaking the acquisition community provided more “useful” responses than 
was the case for other communities’ respondents: there were fewer “N/A,” “Don’t 
Know” or blank responses. 
The survey responses for the acquisition community seem to be reasonable 
for the support category indicated and consistent within categories.  Collectively, the 
respondents seem to provide a consistent picture of IPT dynamics across the different IPT 
support groups.   
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On the whole, the acquisition community provided a more positive 
assessment of the FNC Process than the other stakeholder communities.  The more 
positive assessment is largely a consequence of the fact the acquisition community is 
generally seen as the “customer” of the FNC Process and is on the receiving end for the 
technologies and capabilities under development.  When viewed from the acquisition 
community’s perspective, unless there is a technical execution problem, it is completely 
reasonable to expect a more positive assessment of the FNC Process. 
 
4. Fleet Response Analysis 
Survey respondents indicated they supported the FNC Process in an “Other” 
capacity, primarily as a Naval Research Science Advisor (NRSA) to a Fleet Command.  
Although responses were requested from a wider variety of Fleet/Force personnel, 
including IPT representatives, the only replies received were those from ONR’s 
community of NRSA’s stationed at Commands throughout the world.  Accordingly the 
survey input provided, on behalf of the Fleet/Force community, might not be completely 
representative of “the Fleets” input.  The survey input provided is considered valid for 
this community since the NRSAs serve a wide assortment of Fleet Commands, are 
engaged with senior leadership at these Commands, and knowledgeable of the issues and 
concerns facing these Commands.  The survey response ratio (survey’s 
returned/requested) for the Fleet/Force community was 22.2%.223 
a. General Questions 
In most cases respondents identified the "customer" of the FNC Process as 
being “the Fleet,” or “the warfighter.”  Acquisition Programs of Record (PORs) were the 
second most frequently selected choice for “customer” of the FNC Process.  One 
respondent  attempted  to  identify  the  customer  a  bit  more  accurately by commenting  
                                                 
223 For the Fleet/Force Community, there were 27 survey requests made and 6 surveys returned.  
Requests were made to Naval Research Science Advisors, Navy and Marine Corps members (military and 
civilian) of FNC IPT members and FNC working group support members.  Because of the large difference 
in the response rate (between the F/F Community and the other Navy-MC stakeholder communities) it is 
presumed that a certain number of requests were not completed due to rotational assignment changes of 
duty station or position.  No attempt was made to quantify requests not returned from the F/F Community. 
 200
“SYSCOMs for transition; Warfighter for validation.”  No respondent identified the 
Navy’s Operational Headquarters Command, OPNAV, as a customer for the FNC 
Process. 
Most respondents indicated they felt the goals and objectives of the FNC 
program were explained to their community.  There were two exceptions where 
respondents felt the goals and objectives were not properly explained to their community.  
If accurate, the omission of one of these communities, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), 
would represent a particularly significant oversight in light of their evolving role in the 
establishment of warfighter requirements and the intent to have S&T program develop 
advanced technology programs that would respond to warfighter needs.  With respect to 
the goals and objectives of the FNC program, the observation provided was: 
They were never, to my knowledge, explained to JFCOM, be it the staff 
officers or the leadership team. 
Responses were mixed in evaluating the impact the FNC Process has had 
within the warfighter community.  For various reasons most respondents felt the FNC 
Process has made little to no impact within their community.  In one case the assessment 
was viewed as little/limited because the “acquisition community eventually responds to 
Fleet mission needs” while another respondent felt the reason for such little impact was 
because there were “no fleet demos in the past two years and no new capability was 
delivered.”  Another respondent’s assessment made reference to an observation regarding 
the high cost of developing and delivering new warfighting capabilities.  Although the 
respondent did not elaborate further there was an observation made that “capabilities (for 
ASW) were very expensive resulting in acquisition problems.”   
Not all respondents were completely critical of the impact on their 
community.  One respondent commented that the FNC Process “gives a voice to the fleet 
to provide guidance to the technical community” while another respondent felt that the 
FNC Process would have some impact on transitions but more due to the requirements 
process itself. 
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Almost all respondents were markedly critical of the manner through 
which their community engages the FNC Process.  Some indicated they knew of no 
formal mechanism for engagement over and above the initial warfighter requirements 
activity that created the FNC’s (“We don’t – years ago the CCIs influenced the FNCs, but 
no real engagement since.”) while another indicated their S&T engagement has been, and 
continues to be, primarily through the assigned Science Advisors (“Before: CCIs/NRSA.  
Now: NRSA”).  The Science Advisor’s, of course, are not assigned the responsibility of 
being the Fleet’s designated member of the FNC IPT.  There was some criticism of the 
effectiveness and utility of the Fleet Representative position on the IPT.  One respondent 
indicated his community engaged the FNCs poorly and commented: 
Fleet input to FNC Process limited to IPT Fleet rep[resentative], often 
passive rep from CFFC lacking time, TADTAR and technical background 
to effectively represent fleet interests.  FNCs rarely solicit fleet input 
additional fleet input.  ONR management and much FNC management 
does not appear to welcome any external input into FNC decisions. 
Another observation made was that the warfighter’s involvement in the 
FNC Process was coming “too late in the development process.”  Another input 
expressed additional “process” frustrations due to an inability to influence the FNC 
investment portfolio and a lack of adequate communications between the two 
communities: 
Although I asked early on (2000) and made suggestions on this, none were 
ever implemented.  Early on, the Missile Defense FNC made contact with 
JFCOM to ensure that their work would be “born joint” but that 
relationship, to my knowledge and despite my attempts to facilitate, was 
‘stillborn.’ 
Respondents were mixed, and weighted more heavily toward the negative, 
in their net assessment of the overall importance of the FNC Process to their warfighting 
community and warfighter operations.  Most felt the FNC Process should be important 
but that the program, as being currently administered, has so far failed to meet 
expectations.  One respondent commented that “The process is not very important as it is 
currently defined.  The products and what the FNCs are purporting to do should be very 
important to the joint Community – particularly in those areas of joint concern such as 
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decision-making, C4, ISR, Missile Defense, Fires, etc.”  Another observation was that the 
“FNC Process is not having near the fleet impact it should have.  Sea Trial process 
appears to be at least in part a reaction to 6.3 failure to serve fleet needs.” 
Those that felt the FNC Process was important to their community 
provided more positive assessments.  One important aspect of the FNC Process was the 
FNC Process’ control of a significant percentage of the Navy’s S&T budget (“In 
principle, very important, since it controls half of 6.2 and most 6.3 funding.”).  A second 
rationale was due to the increased visibility the FNC Process has offered the Fleet on 
programs under development (“Provides opportunity to see which technologies are likely 
to be available beyond the FYDP”) while a final comment, although not providing great 
detail, indicated the FNC Process was “quite important” to their operational community 
for technology development reasons (“especially related to littoral warfare”). 
b. Transition Questions 
None of the respondents expressed much confidence that FNC products 
would transition as planned.  The most positive statements provided were “Somewhat” 
and “If funding is maintained.”  Another comment made was that “Apportionment of 
ONR budget reductions to FNCs seems to have little correlation to needs of either 
acquisition community or Fleet.” 
Almost all respondents indicated they believe FNC programs are being 
transitioned to existing acquisition PORs and to the SYSCOM R&D offices that plan for 
acquisition.  Only one respondent identified the fleet forces as the transition target. 
Most respondents were unsure of and unable to identify any metrics being 
used by the IPTs.  Although nothing specific was provided one respondent did link FNC 
metrics to OPNAV’s recent Mission Capability Package (MCP) assessment studies.  
Whatever metrics might be used one of the respondents offered an opinion on the 
usefulness of the metric:  “None that affect FNC funding decisions.”   
The two most often cited obstacles to transitioning advanced technology 
as originally planned were the current acquisition process (to approve new programs) as 
well as funding cuts to approved programs already underway.  Some of the comments 
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made suggest a breakdown in communications between the technology development 
community and the operational community (the warfighter as the end user of the 
product).  With respect to funding cuts it was suggested that these cuts appear to be made 
without a full appreciation of fleet priorities (“Continual cuts in FNC funding, apparently 
disproportional to cuts in Navy S&T funding, and allocation of those cuts with little 
apparent regard for fleet priorities.”).  Another comment suggested that transition 
problems were related to the lack of active engagement of the operational community in 
the FNC Process: 
I do not know if it is the “biggest obstacle” but the fact that JFCOM was 
never engaged in this process could hamper implementation at a later date 
considering that current DoD leadership is very focused on reducing 
redundant service programs in favor of joint solutions (ref: MID-912, 
rewrites of 5000, institution of new requirements process, etc.)  Perhaps it 
is the “biggest obstacle” after all. 
Finally, technology development performance difficulties were also cited 
as reasons for a lack of transition (“Projects take longer to develop and cost more than 
expected”).  Most respondents were not aware of any agreements on project maturity, 
cost and schedule (“If there is, it isn’t visible to Tycom N8s.”).   
Although most respondents were not aware of any FNC products receiving 
funding from multiple IPTs there were two respondents who indicated they knew of cases 
where this was happening.  One respondent provided some specifics: 
Not necessarily bad if efforts are coordinated and complementary (e.g. 
REDS).  An impediment to useful technology development when efforts 
are uncoordinated and competing for available funding (e.g. KSA and FFP 
phased array antenna efforts). 
None of the respondents were aware of any FNC products that were being 
funded jointly with another service or agency.  Navy participation within OSD’s ACTD 
program was mentioned as a possible joint service vehicle but the respondent was not 
aware of any such FNC program.  Mentioning the ACTD program is significant since it is 
the Fleet Forces that would normally benefit by the Navy’s participation in the ACTD 
program through the operational evaluation and experimentation of new technologies, 
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capabilities and operational concepts through the use of the residual systems provided to 
the warfighter.  There was one cautionary comment regarding the definition of joint: 
Be careful how you define “jointly” though.  There’s Multi-Service and 
there’s Joint.  Some things are best transitioned and funded by a single 
service (ASW, for instance), others may have only multi-service 
application (fixed wing aircraft) while others such as C4ISR, Missile 
Defense, Fires, etc. have jointness inherent.  Then there’s “Inter-agency” 
which is increasingly becoming as important to the DoD and joint 
community as ‘Joint.’ 
c. IPT Process Questions 
Most respondents expressed the sentiment that, in their opinion, the IPT 
structure has not been effective.  One of the comments made was that “IPTs seem to have 
mere figurehead role in FNC decision reviews driven by ONR FNC managers and ONR 
management.  Fleet representation does not appear effective in most IPTs.” 
Responses regarding the IPT decision process (directed decisions or 
reached by group consensus) were mixed.  Most respondents indicated they did not know 
about and were unsure of the IPT decision-making process or they chose not to answer 
the question.  Those that did respond were in agreement that the IPT was a formal 
approval body that acted on programmatic decisions done by a working group.  One 
respondent stated that IPT decisions were done “mostly by the FNC ONR staff, with no 
more than pro forma review by IPTs” while another respondent remarked “proposed FNC 
projects are discussed in the working groups, recommendations made to the executive 
panel and approved by the Flag Panel.”   
Most respondents were not sufficiently familiar with IPT dynamics to be 
able to comment on the membership turnover frequency.  Regarding portfolio selection, 
most comments expressed the belief that investment portfolios are prepared by ONR staff 
and merely approved by the IPT functioning as an executive panel rather than as 
Integrated Product Team in the formal sense of the term.  One respondent commented the 
portfolio was prepared “mostly by the FNC ONR staff, with no more than pro forma 
review by IPTs” while another respondent provided a more vague observation 
(“Execution of FNC portfolio decided by IPT”).   
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The objective of establishing thrust areas to respond to warfighter 
problems is an important, fundamental, component of the FNC Process.  One respondent 
correctly identified the (fleet) Command Capability Issues (CCI’s) as being the origins of 
the individual FNC thrust areas but another respondent expressed frustration at not being 
able to influence the investment selection process for his community interests: 
I attended one review of an FNC (sorry, I forget the name) but was not 
asked for my opinion on the IPT portfolio.  I did come armed with a fleet 
capability need but could not get anyone to listen to me. 
Responses regarding whether or not there exists a FNC Process for the 
selection of new programs indicates there are none and various attempts are being 
explored as a result.  The fact that there is no formal process for new programs matches 
those responses that indicate the process varies by IPT and that some IPTs are more open 
to outside influence and further along than others in this aspect (“Yes, some FNCs due a 
RFP and complete evaluation”).  Another respondent observes that the lack of a new 
program selection process presents certain problems for the Fleet (“This seems to be a 
difficulty”).  Another observation made was that the NAVSEA community is making 
attempts to influence the IPT through one of their internal technology requirements 
boards (“New programs are presented at SUBTECH”). 
The responses regarding the number of data calls were mixed.  Two 
respondents replied they were not asked to respond to data calls at all while other 
respondents acknowledged receiving some number of data calls.  The remoteness of the 
deployed Command can have an affect on these data calls as indicated by one response, 
“… it was difficult to participate while in the field.” 
d. IPT Meetings Questions 
Most respondents indicated they are not normally informed of IPT 
meetings and, as a result, are not able to maintain an accurate awareness of IPT 
development activity and progress.   
Never.  Any information I get on FNC meetings comes from SURFTECH 
staff or CFFC NRSA.  I have repeated asked to have a consolidated 
calendar of FNC events maintained on the ONR web site, without effect. 
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Most Fleet/Force respondents also indicated they have never attended IPT 
meetings.  Some respondents felt they were not invited (“Generally invitation only”). 
Knowledge regarding the frequency the IPT meets was mixed.  One 
respondent was not sure, another commented “at least quarterly” and another felt “they 
all seem to meet too infrequently to exercise effective control of FNC.” 
There was general agreement that all community representatives did not 
attend IPT meetings.  Interestingly some responders felt that regular IPT participants 
were from the S&T and SYSCOM Acquisition communities (“ONR and acquisition POC 
PMO”, and “Technology developers and warfare centers”). 
e. Communication Questions 
The questions on communications generated a mixed set of responses.  
Although a few respondents felt they were in fact being kept adequately informed on 
FNC matters the majority responded that this was not the case.  Some suggested that 
some FNCs were “better than others” in keeping the information flowing but some were 
frustrated at the effort it took to stay informed (“I have to hunt for it.”). 
Some of the respondents indicated they go to the DoN S&T website to get 
any needed FNC information.  One reason for this would be due to their remote location 
but another reason appears to be due to the lack of information flowing from the IPT’s on 
their own accord.  As one respondent commented: 
With some exceptions, the FNCs do not distribute information to me, and 
apparently don’t distribute information effectively beyond the ONR staff 
and IPT reps.  KSA, LASW and OMCM are better in this respect, but 
none of the FNCs consistently keep stakeholders beyond the acquisition 
POR PMO and the IPT informed. 
Other sources of information cited were the ONR IPT POCs as well as the 
Acquisition PM and performers.  Even with the poor information exchange it appeared 
that most respondents did not feel there was information that might need but did not have 
(or could not get).  In answering this question it seemed that respondents felt they could 
get whatever information they might need: 
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I can always ferret information and use contacts at ONR to ask questions.  
But after being rebuffed, I instead would go to OSD for my technology 
needs via ACTDs, JT&Es, DARPA.  If I went to ONR, I would go in with 
a Naval partner (CLF, CMFL, CNSW) who shared a joint issue with me – 
and never did I engage an FNC to fulfill that need but instead went to 
NFFTIO money (Fleet/Force Innovation Program) 
Comments on the actual usage rate of the DoN S&T website indicated a 
low usage rate.  Only one respondent acknowledged using it “a lot” while others 
indicated they tried it but did not continue to use it.  One respondent commented “I 
perused it a few times but found it hard to navigate and a lot of the information dated.”  
Although it’s possibly the most easily accessible source of S&T information (available 
anytime over the Internet) most respondents indicated they actually use the DoN S&T 
website only rarely, if at all, mostly because the content is dated.  As another respondent 
observed: 
With all its deficiencies it is the only source of FNC information readily 
available from ONR.  I rely on SURFTECH, the CFFC NRSA and direct 
contact with ONR FNC staff for more timely/useful information. 
Responses regarding the usefulness of the information at the S&T website 
were mixed as well.  One respondent thought the website was “Useful, but not pertinent” 
while another assessed its usefulness as being “Little to none.”  Another respondent 
observed: 
Content is highly variable between FNCs.  A lot of the information is 
obsolete.  Navigation is an impediment to finding useful information even 
when there. 
Besides the information being out of date the content was questioned as 
well.  As another respondent commented: 
I tried to keep up with the various websites – a lot of time there is very 
little in these websites except old briefings used to justify the original 
FNC. 
The frequency of interaction between survey respondents and the S&T 
FNC representatives appears to be mixed as well.  Some indicated they interact with 
ONR representatives “often” or “monthly” while others indicated they do so very rarely 
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or have not yet done so at all.  Others commented that the ONR representative was the 
best POC for FNC information and commented: 
Whenever I need current and evaluated information; averages several 
times a month but highly variable. 
f. Degree of Satisfaction 
Although one person responded they were satisfied with the FNC Process, 
most other respondents indicated they were not.  One person was undecided but 
commented “it no longer seems as responsive to the fleet as it should be.”  Another 
criticized the FNC Process as being “totally inflexible.” 
The fact that the FNC Process has attempted to address Fleet needs was 
repeatedly mentioned as the one thing that seemed to work.  For example, one respondent 
commented that the “initial program prioritization based on CCIs seems to have worked.”  
Another respondent thought the attempt to focus S&T resources on a limited number of 
technology areas was something that worked (“focusing critical mass of funding in 
certain areas”). 
There were a number of provided as examples of things that did not work 
with the FNC Process.  In general these related to the difficulty in transitioning the 
technologies as originally envisioned.  In a couple of responses it was suggested that the 
FNC Process was still unable to adequately respond to fleet needs.  The lack of synergy 
between the Navy and DoD regarding the ACTD process was also mentioned as a 
shortfall as was the FNC’s IPT process itself (“decisions still too often driven by ONR 
and POR staff priorities vice big-Navy need priorities”).  S&T program funding issues 
were offered as still another example of what was not working (“No stability and budget 
drills”). 
Summarizing the individual inputs, from the Fleet’s perspective the most 
important aspect of the FNC Process was the fact that an attempt was being made to 
capture fleet input and transition new technologies to meet the warfighters needs.  As one 
respondent commented, the most important thing was “transitioning technology to fill 
highest priority gaps in fleet capabilities – not happening often enough or soon enough.” 
 209
g. Additional Comments 
The additional comments provided offer insight and expanded views on 
how the FNC Process has been perceived by representatives of the warfighter 
communities.  One of the comments, aimed primarily at ONR, provides a glimpse into 
the fleet’s perception of ONR’s ability to focus on developing technologies of use to the 
fleet: 
For what it is worth, the rare comments I hear about ONR at flag level are 
to the effect that too much S&T funding still being directed to what the 
scientists want to work on versus what the Navy needs.  I can’t honestly 
dispute that is still happening, but feel it is unfair to blame the scientists 
doing the work; a fair share of the blame should be given to the managers 
at ONR and the acquisition PORs. 
There is plenty of blame to pass around within this comment and not all of 
it would necessarily fall to ONR.  As the execution agent for the Navy’s S&T program 
ONR is a Headquarters command which performs an administrative function for the 
Navy.  ONR personnel do not perform the research themselves but they do plan out the 
programs that accomplish the needed research and development for the Navy.  Certainly 
this function requires that ONR personnel maintain close contact and good working 
relationships with the warfighters.  With the FNC Process an increased emphasis has 
been to have the S&T programs respond to established requirements provided by the 
Navy’s Operational and Headquarters communities; OPNAV and Fleet/Force 
representatives.   
A more subtle, and more troubling, aspect of this comment, however, is 
the reference to the only “rare” commentary heard about ONR.  The infrequent reference 
to ONR, and the role they play in technology development, indicates that fleet 
representatives are not generally conscious of the connection between the advanced 
systems they use everyday for the defense of our nation and the role of the ONR in 
planning for the research, development and delivery of these systems.  The rare 
commentary implies fleet representatives do not acknowledge the Navy’s S&T 
community as being a significant player in the Navy’s technology research, development 
test and evaluation cycle.  This situation is also mentioned in another comment made: 
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I heard ADM (ret) Cebrowski speak recently (at the Naval Industry 
Conference) and he stated that “Science and Technology that helps the 
joint Warfighter tends to be without a constituent” and said while he had 
no answers on how to fix this that either we should change the way the 
current system is incentivized or create a new organization to handle this. 
For the Navy’s S&T military and civilian headquarters and laboratory 
infrastructure – the Naval Research Enterprise – this statement has potentially devastating 
implications if not resolved within the Navy.  These statements indicate the Navy’s 
operational community does not appear to acknowledge the benefits and utility of the 
NRE infrastructure and, more damaging, that the S&T infrastructure does not have an 
effective constituent community looking after its interests. 
Most of the comments were somewhat critical of the Navy’s inability to 
deliver new technical capabilities and options to the warfighter via the FNC Process.  As 
an example, one comment was: 
Need to get products to the fleet and force for evaluation and input.   Stop 
hiding in labs and get connected & get real! 
Other comments addressed timescales and the fleets’ desire to have new 
technology options provided in a much more timely manner.  A further observation was 
made relative to a disconnect between the current slate of approved FNC projects and 
DoD attempts to deliver technology demonstration hardware to the fleet for evaluation 
and experimentation purposes.  Specifically: 
The fleet’s time horizon is almost immediate.  The FNCs look much 
further into the future.  It seems that much up-and-coming technology is 
entering theater through at-sea tests and demos, but not much of this 
technology seems to have a tie to the FNCs.  A notable example is the 
Assured Access experiment, which is about two-thirds Littoral ASW and 
one-third MCM.  Thus, one would think that the two corresponding FNCs 
would be engaged, but I have not seen any such connection.  Much state-
of-the-art technology is being fielded for fleet evaluation during this and 
similar experiments, yet this technology does not seem tied to the FNCs, 
or at least the link is not apparent.  There seems to be a general lack of 
awareness here as to what the FNCs are and how they can be of benefit to 
the fleet.  Other technology venues seem to be making a much bigger 
impact.  Bottom line: The FNCs no longer seem closely tied to the fleet, 
but in order to succeed, they should be. 
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This comment overlays a fundamental component of the nature of the 
entire technology development problem, relative responsiveness.  The needs of the 
operational warfighter can certainly be considered “immediate;” we are at war as this 
thesis is being written.  The comment that the FNC’s look “much further into the future” 
is somewhat relative.  The FNC’s look across the Navy’s FYDP which, when compared 
to the “immediate” present might be considered far into the future.  As technology 
research and development activities or acquisition timelines go, however, the FYDP 
timeline is considered near-term rather than long-range.  Such a fundamental terminology 
disconnect implies highly divergent expectations. 
The lack of participation of FNC projects in fleet demonstrations and 
experimentation is another important observation.  When originally planned the FNC’s 
were “demo-centric” with the intent to deliver new naval capabilities through technology 
demonstrations.  Although the FNC program still strives to demonstrate the developed 
capability the costs of these demonstrations, considered to be a ‘post-6.3’ activity, created 
serious funding problems.  In addition to the costs of these demonstrations, the intense 
need to transition the S&T products to an acquisition program eventually caused a 
shifting of the emphasis from warfighter capability demonstrations to one of meeting 
acquisition programmatic cost and schedule requirements for the tech-insertion “window 
of opportunity.”  This shift is relevant to another comment made which referred to the 
Navy’s decision to “choose” not to participate in OSD’s ACTD program over the past 
several years: 
The way in which ONR has chosen to “play” in the ACTD program is also 
indicative of a “head in the sand” organization unwilling to accept the new 
rules that are forming.  I would suggest that ONR consider changing the 
focus of some of the FNCs to Future Joint Capabilities – become a leader 
in joint S&T by inviting the other services in (perhaps by using the TARA 
and associated committees) and expand their IPTs to include combatant 
commanders as appropriate. 
 212
Certainly the Navy’s participation in the OSD ACTD program has not 
been very robust, as is seen by its funding track record over the past several years.224  
There are a number of reasons for the lack of vigorous support in the past, including cost, 
budgeting and a lack of technical coordination and cooperation among the various 
(requirements, S&T, acquisition, fleet, etc) stakeholder sectors within the Navy. 
 
5. Summary of Participant Surveys 
A “convenience” survey sample was selected for use in this thesis research.  The 
decision to use a convenience sample was made for a number of reasons: 
• The survey participant pool could be directly selected. 
• The survey would be more convenient for the respondent. 
• Survey responses could be easily correlated. 
• The survey response rate could be easily determined. 
• The survey contained questions of a somewhat sensitive nature. 
• Any feedback provided would be directly useable (anonymously). 
• I had access to the e-mail addresses for the target population. 
• The survey could contain a large number of important open-ended questions. 
64 surveys were electronically circulated to specific individuals to solicit 
stakeholder feedback by actual participants in the FNC Process.  Of the 64 surveys sent 
out 25 surveys were completed and returned for an overall survey response rate of 39%.  
The number of responses across the four stakeholder communities were approximately 
equal; five were received from the OPNAV community, seven were received from the 
S&T community, seven were received from the Acquisition community and six were 
received from the Fleet/Force community. 
The 39% survey response rate is not considered unusual and is consistent with 
independent survey response results published by the RAND Corporation225.  In their 
study they found the literature contains some fairly rigorous attempts to compare the 
response rates of surveys delivered via e-mail to those delivered via traditional mail and 
                                                 
224 The Navy is not unique in this regard as all Services have taken similar positions.  OSD priorities 
for joint Service programs, products and capability demonstrations typically are in conflict with priorities 
within any single Service.  Since the Services, and not OSD, “pay” for the technical work being done their 
priorities tend to get the final say, unless overwhelming pressure is applied from external sources. 
225 Schonlau, M., Fricker Jr., R.D. & Elliott, M.N. (2001).  Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail 
and the Web.  Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation.  Publication MC-1480-RC. 
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the internet.  Their results conclude surveys using e-mail as the sole response mode 
generally did not achieve response rates equal to those of postal mail surveys or those 
using the internet.  Sample sizes vary but the response rates experienced for this thesis are 
roughly consistent with those of the RAND study. 
In contrast to the personal interviews, not all of the people contacted agreed to 
participate in the e-mail survey.  In most cases those who chose not to participate simply 
failed to respond to the original request.  In other cases persons who agreed to participate 
later failed to return the survey.  In such cases only one attempt was made to request a 
return of the completed survey.  In two other instances, as a likely result of their 
frustration with the process, persons informed me directly they did not wish to complete 
the survey and thereby contribute anything further to the FNC Process “churn.” 
Survey questions were developed based on a broad knowledge of the goals and 
objectives of the DoN FNC technology transition process.  Each survey asked two 
general questions – which stakeholder community the respondent represented and the 
type of support they provided the FNC -- which were used to group the responses for 
later analysis.  The returned surveys were grouped into one of four stakeholder 
communities; OPNAV, S&T, Acquisition and Fleet/Force.  For analysis purposes the 
original intent was to use the five stakeholder communities identified in the survey (S&T, 
Requirements, Acquisition, Resources and Fleet representative) but the response rate was 
from the Requirements community was so low that the Requirements community 
(OPNAV N7X, typically) and the Resources community (OPNAV N091, typically) 
responses were eventually combined, for analysis purposes. 
The survey then asked 31 questions across six categories; FNC General (4 
questions), Transitions (7 questions), IPT Process (6 questions), IPT Meetings (4 
questions), Communication (6 questions) and Satisfaction (4 questions).  There was one 
final category provided, Additional Comments, where space was provided for the 
respondent to offer additional input of their choice or for additional space to provide 
clarification for a response to an earlier survey question.  Finally, a “vertical” analysis 
was conducted of the responses within each of the four major stakeholder communities. 
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 E. OTHER INDICATORS 
1. Website Usage 
The DoN S&T FNC website226 was established on NRL servers in early 2000.  
This website was intended as a central clearing house for sharing DoN S&T information, 
including FNC information, among stakeholder communities.  Figure 6 shows the user 
























































































Figure 6.   
                                                
S&T Website Login Frequency (Apr00 – Dec03) 
The graph of Figure 6 shows an initial high rate of usage as the website was stood 
up and the FNC program building process was in full swing (through 2001).  After this 
initial high rate of activity there is a clear negative usage trend as increasingly fewer 
users choose to access the website for data.  This negative trend is likely a reflection of 
the perceived utility of the website; as users find the S&T data is not updated and 
maintained they do not return.  This overall trend matches the comments made in the 
 
226 DoN S&T website, https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/cgi-bin/login-form.cgi, last accessed July 2004. 
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survey responses.  The rapid frequency increase in December 2003 is likely due to 
internal activity underway at ONR and NRL to update the website and data. 
The literature survey of business models and practices revealed a strong 
utilization of internet technologies for conducting business operations in an efficient, 
effective and powerful way.  Literature on the Dell Computer Company, for example, 
revealed the extent to which Dell used their web-based servers.  Although the internet 
and web-based technologies are obviously being used by the DoN S&T Community in 
many areas to conduct a wide range of general S&T business operations (BAA 
announcements, etc) the data collected does not provide strong evidence of a similar 
reliance or utilization of the internet technologies for the conduct of FNC business 
operations. 
 
2. Congressional Influence 
Unavoidably, politics has always played a role in the DoN S&T Program (all 
funds come from Congress).  Recent data indicates the role and level of Congressional 
oversight is increasing: the S&T Program is becoming increasingly more “political.”  
One indication of the increased role of the Congress is evident by the steadily increasing 
amount of Congressional “plus-ups” to the S&T budget.  Such a “plus-up” is money 
added to the budget which is very clearly identified for a very specific purpose, usually to 
fund work being done by a contractor in the Congressional district of the submitter.  
Typically these projects have been developed outside of the military and do not have 









2000 $ 1,420,110 $ 1,757,520 $ 345,800 
2001 $ 1,463,103 $ 1,856,453 $ 396,350 
2002 $ 1,713,170 $ 2,085,433 $ 395,175 
2003 $ 1,607,253 $ 2,080,336 $ 510,085 
Table 1. Navy RDT&E S&T Budget Plus-ups227 
 
The increasing level of “plus-ups” can be viewed from different vantage points.  
One is as recognition of the service that ONR performs for the DoN – the execution agent 
for science and technology.  From this vantage point congressional representatives are 
viewed as the customer and plus-ups are a good thing, being responsive to customer (i.e., 
congressional interest) needs. Congress uses ONR simply as the vehicle to administer and 
execute naval S&T programs which are of priority interest to congressional members and 
their constituents.  There is no internal naval review of warfighter need or utility because 
Congress, as a representational body of the citizens of this country, has the ultimate say 
with respect to our nation’s needs and resources.  Used in this manner ONR does not 
serve a technical function but merely serves as an administrative “pass-through” between 
Congress (supply) and the constituent (demand, and customer).  Congress uses ONR 
because ONR is the most convenient vehicle to pass resources through to constituents, is 
efficient at administering contracts, and has the technical expertise to effectively manage 
the contract. 
A second interpretation of this trend, however, is as a metric indicating the current 
S&T processes are not effective and that organizations are “going around” ONR and 
taking their case directly to Congress for more immediate action.  From this perspective 
                                                 
227 Appropriated less President’s Budget does not equal Congressional plus-ups due to S&T receiving 
specific Congressional decreases each year. 
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the DoN S&T processes have become too bureaucratic and non-responsive to perceived 
warfighter needs.  
The problem with a heavily politicized process is that politicians get rewarded for 
delivering benefits to constituency groups.  The result is an environment in which 
substantial change is risky and politicians are punished more for trying something and 
failing than for running a mediocre or ineffective organization. 
 
F. BUSINESS MODEL CONCEPTS 
Using business model concepts presented in Chapter II as a benchmark, no 
evidence was found to support the notion that a robust and effective FNC business model 
is in place within the DoN.  The data collected for this thesis through a broad range of 
literature research (Chapters II, III and IV), personnel interviews and stakeholder survey 
responses confirm such a lack of a strong S&T business model. 
 
1. Value Proposition 
A convincing case has not been made regarding the value provided to the DoN by 
the FNC Program.  There is no objective reporting system in place and no quantifiable 
metrics by which to measure technical progress and eventual success (or failure).  
Although several stakeholders expressed the opinion the FNC Process is an improvement 
over previous technology transition processes (i.e., the ATD process), the overall 
assessment from the stakeholder community’s appear to be very mixed.  Indeed, the FNC 
Process suffers from many of the very same criticisms (high number of bureaucratic 
reviews, etc) of the ATD process.  Furthermore, both processes fail to provide 
stakeholders with easy and reliable access to information causing a high degree of 
frustration.  Although the FNC Process has done a good job in raising an awareness of 
the S&T account to the Fleet/Force Stakeholder Community it does not articulate a clear 
reason for and use of the FNC investments.  The Fleet/Force Community is interested in 
the FNCs because they perceive the investments to be “their money” and they do not 
want to lose it.  Beyond that perception there is no widespread understanding as to how to 
influence the investments.  Indeed, survey respondents expressed a great deal of 
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frustration in the FNC Process due to their general inability to direct investments towards 
projects that would directly benefit them.  Although the Fleet/Force Community has been 
vocal supporters of the FNC Process, the target of the technology transition process has 
been the Acquisition Community via Technology Transition Agreements.  Unless the 
FNC Process Business Model is changed to target the needs of the warfighting 
community in a much more immediate and direct way the support shown by the 
Fleet/Forces stakeholder community can be expected to greatly diminish in a rapid 
manner. 
 
2. Product Offering 
The DoN FNC Program services the S&T needs of the entire DoN over the 
FYDP.  There are more than 200 individual products being planned for and supported 
across twelve FNC IPTs servicing all warfighting communities within the DoN.  
Although the level of awareness of the S&T account has increased as a result of the FNC 
Process, spreading the investment across so many projects has resulted in a very fractured 
constituency.  Many believe there are too many programs being supported by the current 
process.   Furthermore, the effectiveness of the current process is unknown.  Across all 
naval communities the participants in the process have expressed a general lack of 
awareness of examples of specific programs that have transitioned or even the status of 
current programs being supported. 
The DoN capabilities-based approach for the FNC Process, as envisioned, is a 
‘top-down’ approach which requires the S&T community to respond to requirements 
developed by the warfighting community.  The OPNAV Resource sponsors have been 
designated as the Chair of the IPTs and are responsible to define the requirements for the 
S&T community.  The later addition of the Fleet/Force representative was to increase 
buy-in of the FNC Process to the deployed warfighter. 
The FNC Process, as implemented however, takes a “bottom’s-up” approach 
because programs typically originate from the S&T community via working groups or 
committees with approval or general guidance by the IPT.  This approach has been 
criticized as being easily influenced by special interest programs rather then developing 
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capabilities derived from sound warfighting analysis.  It appears likely this approach is 
used, however, because of the OPNAV community’s demonstrated inability to effectively 
engage the FNC Process to the degree required due to other higher OPNAV priorities 
(budgetary).  Very recent changes to the FNC Process now levy a small staff within 
OPNAV N70 with the responsibility to define the requirements for the future warfighting 
capabilities.   
 
3. Resources 
The DoN has considerable resources (personnel, facilities, etc) at its disposal but 
the ONR does not appear to be sufficiently engaged with its NRE components in order to 
take advantage of the “corporate” resources necessary to deliver new capabilities to the 
warfighter in a more rapid and cost-effective manner.  Along a similar vein the 
management of the NRE components do not appear to be proactively engaged in activity 
designed to attract FNC work, either.   
The Navy Laboratories and Warfare Centers which make up the NRE are, 
essentially, the “value chain” for the DoN S&T account.  Critical DoN expertise is 
employed across the NRE.  Significant systems engineering, systems integration, and 
analytical capabilities exist across the NRE but it does not appear that the FNC Process 
will take advantage of these NRE capabilities as they view them as costly and in 
competition with outsourcing contract priorities.  As a result, the effective utilization of 
this “value chain,” critically important to any successful business operation, appears to be 
highly inefficient and possibly discouraged.   
The desire of the FNC Process is to develop solutions to warfighting capability 
needs and develop and transition these solutions in a rapid manner.  A more collaborative 
technology transition process would define the warfighting capability needs and use the 
appropriate expertise within the NRE components to develop a number of competing 




4. Financial System 
As indicated in personnel interviews and participant surveys the DoD POM 
process used to resource the S&T account is ineffective.  The DoN level of investment 
for the FNC Program has steadily declined since the inception of the program as the 
Navy struggles to comply with increasing DoD guidance and other administrative 
demands on a budget that has not seen real growth in a number of years.  Complicating 
matters is the fact that the level of Congressional plus-ups has steadily increased over this 
same time period, greatly reducing the amount of discretionary dollars available for use 
to the DoN to develop and deliver the warfighting capabilities desired.  These actions 
have occurred while we are at war and the corresponding budgets of other agencies (i.e., 
DARPA, etc.) have seen significant growth. 
As resources have gotten tighter the IPTs have been forced to make their own 
tradeoffs to comply with ever-increasing fiscal constraints.  The data supports the 
perception that IPT investment decisions have been made without serious joint Service, 
or even joint IPT, coordination and collaboration.  As a result the FNC Process can not be 
said to support the OSD emphasis on joint Service operations and continue to be viewed 
as inefficient and “stovepiped.” 
 
G. CORRELATION TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section offers a brief comparative analysis of the major points found in the 
literature review to FNC Process feedback captured through the FNC survey responses 
and the interviews conducted. 
 
1. Cost and Capability 
The cost of weapons and platforms has been accelerating, but so has their 
capabilities.  An analysis that focuses only on the cost side of the equation runs the risk of 
missing the main point – is the Navy getting the best value?  Getting the best value has 
been a primary justification for the Navy’s investment in its in-house technical 
capabilities.  What appears to be happening is that the NRE’s role of independent advisor 
has been greatly devalued.  This devaluation affects the Navy’s ability to function as a 
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smart buyer and limits the NRE’s usefullness as a tool to ensure the Navy does get the 
best value. 
 
2. DoD - Commercial Market Comparisons 
An analysis of commercial business operations, when compared to that of the 
DoD, were found to be similar enough to merit close scrutiny, especially in the areas of 
product development planning strategies and cooperative technology development 
techniques.   
One of the primary tools used by the commercial sector was a business model.  
Numerous sources, and persons, emphasized the use of an accurate business model was 
essential to planning successful business operations.  The business model, built around 
the revenue flow for a business, dictated the important business decisions.  The use of 
any such business model by the DoN, or even the Defense Department for that matter, 
was not supported by the evidence collected for this thesis.   
The FNC Process revealed the Navy has made some effort to mimic commercial 
business concepts.  Business terminology (such as “Corporate Board”) are sometimes 
used and business plans were required by the FNC IPTs for funding projects.  These 
efforts, however, seem superficial in the context of their implementation.  Enough 
fundamental differences were found between the commercial and defense approach to 
question the thesis assumption that the DoN has approached the technology transition 
process in a business-like manner. 
 
3. Civilian-Military Chain of Command 
Significant differences in the leadership and management approaches in business 
operational styles were found to exist as a result of fundamental differences in the 
commercial (civilian) and military organizational structures.  The Defense Departments’ 
(military) “Command and Control” leadership style and use of available personnel 
(civilian and military) on a rotational basis were much different from that found in the 
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literature search for the commercial sector.  The personnel constraints on hiring and firing 
within DoD were also much different from that of the commercial sector.   
Even with such differences, however, the literature search produced evidence 
which showed there have been cases where the DoN has been able to operate more 
effectively and transition technology to the warfighter at a quicker pace228 – although 
they did not articulate it in such a way, in those cases they operated more “like a 
business” than today. 
a. The New C&C 
When comparing the experience of the FNC Process with the (past 
experience) data uncovered during the literature survey it is clear that all communities are 
dissatisfied with the results achieved so far and that further improvements are not 
anticipated without further significant changes.  There is virtually no doubt that process 
changes are still needed in order to realize the increased technology transitions originally 
desired of the FNC Process.  Although it would be highly controversial, past experience 
with innovative Navy “experiments” that appear to have been much more effective than 
the current FNC Process offers a possible framework for such additional changes.  The 
data collected suggests fundamental changes are needed to move the DoN away from the 
traditional C&C–Command & Control–leadership style to a new paradigm C&C–
Communication & Collaboration–leadership style.  The Command & Control leadership 
style is a natural fit for the military warrior mission but, as the literature and past 
experience has repeatedly demonstrated, this leadership style has not been generally 
effective in leading organizations whose mission is to innovate and develop and transition 
new concepts and capabilities.  The positive results of a few novel DoN experiments 
suggest at least two components to be critical to the success of any approach taken: 
(1) The Importance of Communication.  The need for, and 
importance of, communication was found throughout the literature.  The need for 
additional communication was also universally mentioned by survey respondents and 
persons interviewed for this thesis.  To its credit the FNC Process has gone to great 
lengths to increase the visibility of the DoN S&T planning process throughout the DoN 
                                                 
228 A quicker pace equates to the commercial sector as a reduced “Time-to-Market.” 
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and the increased visibility does generate an increase in the communication rate among 
the stakeholder communities.  However, based on the feedback provided from the senior 
leadership personnel interviewed and the FNC Process participants responding to the 
survey there is more that needs to be done. 
(2) The Need for Collaboration.  As with communication, the 
need and importance of collaboration in developing and transitioning new products was 
found throughout the literature.  In reviewing the survey responses one thing that is clear 
is the complete lack of any reference to any sort of collaboration activity in any shape or 
form.  There is no significant reference to collaboration among FNC IPT’s nor is there 
any significant reference to any joint Service collaboration, a primary OSD objective.  In 
fact the only collaboration activity referenced appear to be those that were mandated by 
previous (pre-FNC) agreements.  The FNC Process does attempt to encourage intra-Navy 
collaboration through the use of the IPT construct but the IPT framework does not appear 
to have been effective in and of itself.  The IPT framework, as a consensus-based 
oversight group, was formed at too high a (DoN leadership) level to facilitate 
collaboration at the project level.  As it devolved the IPT framework seemed to, 
effectively at any rate, simply map the DoN S&T resources into OPNAV slices to obtain 
corporate Navy buy-in regarding the S&T projects under development.  There is no 
evidence that, at the DoN level, collaboration was ever attempted with any other Service 
(such as with an ACTD).  From the feedback provided there is no evidence that there was 
any significant effort to collaborate within the Navy (for example, through a cross-FNC 
effort) either.  The one very significant exception was the Navy-Marine Corps S&T 
collaborations that have underway over the past several years.  The MC success within 
the FNC Process can be directly attributed to the proactive approach the MC have taken 
to the FNC Process and their efforts in making the Navy-MC collaborations works.  The 
MC success’ within the FNC Process clearly show that collaboration efforts can work. 
b. Creating the Right Environment 
When comparing the body of literature for what worked and what did not 
regarding technology development and transition to the experiences reported for the FNC 
Process  a  couple  of  items  appear  to  clearly  separate  “from the pack”  of  all  issues  
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encountered.  These items can roughly be generalized as “environmental” issues and 
point to a need by the DoN to promote a more positive technology development 
“environment.”   
(1) Having the Right People.  As past experience shows, and 
the literature strongly supports, having highly competent people doing jobs they have 
been trained for is a primary metric for any successful organization.  Equally important, 
but possibly not as obvious (certainly more difficult), is being able to remove people 
from performing functions they are not competent to perform.  The need for highly 
competent people exists at all workforce levels; managerial excellence is necessary as 
well as technical excellence.   
(2) Fostering Cooperation.  Both the survey responses and 
personal interviews reveal a significant level of frustration with the FNC Process, at all 
levels of participation.  There is little evidence in the data collected to suggest there was a 
significant degree of cooperation among stakeholders within the FNC Process.  
Cooperation in this context is intended to be different from collaboration activities on a 
specific project.  Many of the survey responses convey clear frustrations at an inability to 
obtain data on the S&T Program of Record, individual S&T projects and IPT priorities.  
Many of these frustrations may be linked to the poor communication habits commented 
on earlier but they appear to be widespread and go beyond organizational boundaries.  In 
some cases personnel within ONR, for example, reported similar difficulties in obtaining 
FNC information as those outside of ONR. 
The difficulties in cooperating are also reported within the 
literature for organizations attempting to transition technology in the commercial sector.  
In Corey’s study on consortia, the technology “delivery process” was very involved and 
sometimes required an intense level of cooperation (and technical collaboration) among 
consortia members.229  Indeed, the level of cooperation appears to have been at degrees 
higher then found in the current FNC Process.  The consortia study provides evidence 
that such cooperation, although difficult, can achieve good results. 
                                                 
229 Corey (1997).  pp 47-54, 132-142. 
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Post-WWII Navy (BUORD) organizational “experiments” with 
innovative approaches to developing and delivering ordnance to the warfighter in an 
accelerated manner provide insight into another form of cooperation largely unaddressed 
elsewhere–that of the critically important roles between the military and civilian 
leadership in technology development organizations.  The literature regarding the 
BUORD “experiment” at China Lake reveals an unusually high degree of cooperation 
between (local) military and civilian leadership at China Lake.  This highly effective 
leadership team is widely credited with providing the bureaucratic buffer which allowed 
the scientists and engineers at China Lake the flexibility needed to develop and deliver 
innovative products at unprecedented rates.  As innovative as such a unique military-
civilian partnership team is, the literature also shows that such an arrangement was 
resisted from “corporate” Navy and steadily devolved to one more amiable to senior 
Navy leadership.230   
The high degree of S&T cooperation between the Navy and 
Marine Corps is a testament to the positive results achievable through cooperative 
planning activities.  The FNC survey responses indicate the Marine Corps personnel have 
demonstrated a high degree of cooperation, among the Marine Corps team at Quantico, 
Virginia, and, within the FNC framework, between Navy and Marine Corps at ONR.  As 
the literature review of the FNC Process revealed, this high level of cooperation was the 
result of senior Navy leadership planning prior to the implementation of the FNC 
Process.  The important factor was that this new cooperative leadership arrangement231 
was executed in earnest by the Marine Corps team.  As the survey responses indicate the 
                                                 
230 A senior civilian SES (retired) interviewed for this thesis commented that the original 
organizational arrangement at China Lake was permitted by “Corporate Navy” only due to the personal 
integrity and influence of the personnel (Navy Admirals and civilian scientists) directly involved.  Once 
these persons moved on or retired “Corporate Navy” immediately acted to dilute the authority and 
responsibilities of the unique operating arrangement at China Lake. 
231 The “cooperative” leadership arrangement mentioned here refers to the DoN agreement that 
created a Marine Corps position as Vice CNR (VCNR) at ONR.  This senior level of cooperation within 
DoN (between the “Blue” Navy and the “Green” Marine Corps) is widely viewed as a success and has been 
instrumental in the Marine Corps’ influence on the establishment of DoN S&T priorities and the allocation 
of resources to address those Marine Corps priorities. 
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Marine Corps approach to the FNC Process was vastly different from the OPNAV 
approach, and was far more successful as a result.232 
 
4. Group Theory and Decision-making 
A comparison of the experiences reported with the FNC Process to the literature 
for group behavior theory and collective action decision-making processes was insightful.  
For the FNC Process, an Integrated Product Team (IPT) framework was the primary 
vehicle for group action and was based on a consensus decision-making agreement 
among the DoN stakeholder community representatives.  The use of the IPT structure 
stems from acquisition reform initiatives within DoD dating back to SECDEF William 
Perry when it was considered a “best practice” used by the commercial sector.  Ironically, 
an extensive survey of the literature revealed no significant reference to the continued use 
of the IPT framework within the commercial sector.  The IPT framework appears to be 
primarily an acquisition community consensus-building tool with no apparent or 
widespread use or utility outside of the DoD acquisition community.  Furthermore, 
previous thesis’ and independent reports which examined the effectiveness of the IPT 
framework within DoD were found to be largely critical of the IPT model and universally 
reported negative results–the consistent conclusion throughout these independent studies 
was that Integrated Product Teams have not been effective for DoD programs. 
With respect to the implementation of the IPT model for the FNC Process, the 
experiences reported by the survey respondents as well as the feedback provided by those 
persons interviewed suggest that some of the same IPT shortfalls reported in the literature 
continue to plague the FNC Process’ implementation of the IPT.  For example, in a 
manner completely analogous to the consortia experiences reported by Corey in the 
                                                 
232 Generally speaking, OPNAV did not always support IPT Working Group meetings with military 
personnel but relied on detailees and contractor IPA’s to provide OPNAV input.  In contrast to OPNAV’s 
approach to the FNC Process, the Marine Corps appear to have always ensured a uniform Marine attended 
a Working Group meeting for each IPT of interest to the Marine Corps.  It was commented that the lack of 
a OPNAV uniform sent a clear message regarding the level of importance of the S&T planning process and 
the results appear to reflect that degree of importance. 
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literature, the consensus-driven nature of the IPT’s decision-making process tended to 
favor low-risk, near-term projects.233 
For comparison purposes, it is informative to note the literature does mention 
other organizations which have executed technology development (and transition) 
programs of roughly comparable size and scope to the Navy’s FNC Process.  As an 
example of a comparable program of approximately the same magnitude (resource-wise) 
and duration was the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Advanced 
Technology Program (ATP).  The NIST ATP provided $556M over a four-year period 
(1990-1994) in support of 177 R&D projects.234  This compares to the FNC Process of 
roughly $500M (per year) in support of 200 projects over the six year FDYP. 
Similarities were found between the behavior of the FNC IPT operations and the 
behaviors predicted by group theory, the field of mathematics that studies the dynamics 
and decision-making behaviors of groups of people, and game theory, the field of 
mathematics that studies strategic behavior in competitive situations.  Many of the 
frustrations and comments provided by participants in the FNC Process strongly correlate 
with the predictions found in the literature. 
 
5. Difficulties with Change 
The experiences of the FNC Process, as evident through the survey responses and 
the personal interviews, are consistent with the difficulties in implementing fundamental 
changes reported in the literature.  Much of this difficulty can be traced back to the 
concept of paradigms as developed by Thomas Kuhn.  For truly innovative–disruptive by 
any measure–technological developments the difficulties experienced in the development 
of the turbojet engine documented by Edward Constant are very informative.  The Navy, 
in particular and as documented by William McBride, has historically struggled with 
embracing technological change.235   
                                                 
233 Corey (1997). p. 152. 
234 Corey (1997). pp 119-120.  Although the NIST ATP program is smaller than the Navy’s FNC 
Program, a reasonable comparison could be made against a couple of IPT’s within the Navy’s FNC 
Process.  Although informative, such a comparison is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
235 McBride (2000). pp 5-7. 
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Much of the Navy’s struggle appears to boil down to a fundamental lack of “trust” 
which results from its deeply ingrained “Command & Control” warrior ethos.  A lack of 
trust is one common thread found throughout the responses in the survey’s returned by 
participants of the FNC Process.  Ironically, since the thesis of this research was an 
assessment of the government’s ability to operate more “like a business,” the essential 
need for “trust” was mentioned by both corporate persons interviewed for this thesis. 
The issue of trust might also be found in the Defense Departments’ dual military-
civilian leadership structure and the subtle struggle over “who” actually controls the 
military.  With respect to technological development within the military the issue is 
particularly relevant.  The Navy’s history of technological change, documented by 
William McBride,236 and the high-level military and political struggles that Vannevar 
Bush experienced as Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
during WWII are informative.237  Even with these struggles the literature does provide a 
few examples of organizational “experiments” where a military-civilian operating 
arrangement was established that was conducive to highly innovative technological 
developments that were transitioned to the warfighter in a greatly accelerated timeframes.  
The key, of course, is in understanding the defense “environmental conditions” which 
allowed such experimental leadership arrangements to arise and flourish and why they 
were eventually abandoned. 
 
6. The Importance of Technology Demonstrations 
When attempting to transition technical developments to operational status the 
literature supports the notion that functional demonstrations of the technology are 
extremely beneficial for the acceptance of those developments.  In his study of R&D 
consortia Corey provides numbers examples of the utility of technology demonstrations.   
The FNC Process, a more ambitious derivative of the previous Navy ATD 
process, started out as a demonstration-centric process but devolved to a delivery-centric 
process which relies on the negotiation of technology transition agreements as a 
                                                 
236 McBride (2000). 
237 Zachary (1997). pp 159-163. 
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necessary requirement for IPT funding.  The exact shift from a demonstration-centric 
process to a delivery-centric process is difficult to pin-point precisely from the literature 
review but appears to be due, in part, to the cost of funding the number of technology 
demonstrations which would have been required.  From the feedback provided in the 
survey responses there is a very mixed assessment as to whether or not the transition 
agreements are credible.  In at least one survey response there was acknowledgement of 
transition agreements that were not met and several other respondents expressed 
skepticism regarding the technology agreements negotiated.  From the feedback provided 
by respondents there was little evidence to support the notion the FNC Process has been 
able to facilitate the delivery of new capabilities to the operational community in a more 
focused and accelerated manner.  One reason for the lack of such evidence, 
understandably, is due to the short timeframe the FNC Process has been in effect. 
 
7. Lack of a Technology Assessment Function 
One of the key issues, found throughout the literature as well as in the FNC 
Process feedback and in the personal interviews conducted, was the need for a 
mechanism to assist management regarding fundamental technical resourcing decisions.  
The complexities of technology development processes have consistently presented 
tremendous challenges to the manner in which we measure and assess them.  The failure 
to make appropriate (resource allocation) decisions early in the development cycle results 
in valuable resources being spent on technical options that will ultimately not be 
successful or militarily useful.  Over time the accumulated net effect of such a situation 
might, arguably, cost the Navy hundreds of millions of dollars in “lost opportunity costs.”  
The literature shows this to be a fundamental technology development problem that has 
existed for years and, furthermore, is one not limited to the military.  For example, the 
elimination of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) left Congress without an 
organizational tool to tap into for the expert scientific and technological advice needed 
for effective legislative decision-making.  Similarly, the DoN has no organization that is 
chartered to perform a similar function for Navy technical decisions.  This deficiency has 
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become increasingly critical, as more and more of the decisions faced by the DoN and the 
Congress require judgments based on highly specialized technical information.   
The Office of Naval Research could, using its technical naval expertise across the 
NRE infrastructure, fill such a role for the DoN but, at the current time, does not.  Since 
Congress is the source of Navy resources there is a tendency to view Congress as the 
ultimate “customer” but the Navy’s interface with Congress is predominantly passive: 
Congress uses ONR largely as a conduit for funding projects of interest to influential 
members.  The literature substantiates that successful businesses do not maintain a 
passive interface with their customers, however.  The FNC survey responses indicate that 
current congressional influence has been viewed largely as disruptive to the Navy’s S&T 
planning processes.  The Navy would be better served by having ONR assume a more 
proactive interface with Congress through some form of technology assessment role for 
the entire DoN.  Such a proactive dialog should help identify and communicate serious 
technical issues and funding shortfalls that would require congressional action to resolve.  
At the current time there is no obvious mechanism for the Navy to engage with Congress 
in such a dialog. 
 
8. Collaboration Mechanisms 
The most interesting collaboration mechanism found in the literature was that of 
the R&D consortia described by E. Raymond Corey.238  His (1997) study concluded that 
although R&D consortia differed they were largely successful in developing and 
transitioning technology’s to consortia members.  In his final analysis the R&D consortia 
model was useful and he predicted that consortia-type organizations will continue to 
evolve over time.  Consistent with research findings throughout the literature Corey 
found one of the most important conditions for successful consortia was the recruitment 
and use of highly competent personnel in the formation and the management of consortia 
operations.  The R&D consortia placed an emphasis on and made frequent use of 
                                                 
238 Corey, E. R. (1997).  Technology Fountainheads.  Boston: Harvard Business School Press.  In this 
informative study Corey examines the economic, social, and political aspects of six consortia in detail. 
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customer liaison personnel exchanges to assist in communication activities and to better 
understand important issues and concerns.   
In many cases the consortia have a significant political component as well.  
Congress usually played a role in the initial formation of a consortium and, in many 
cases, provided initial “seed” funding to entice the formation of the consortium.  The 
consortia formed as a result of highly visible national need and served Congress as an 
instrument of national policy while being coupled to an integral part of private enterprise.  
Indeed, the more successful consortia came from private industry.  In contrast to this, 
Corey found that government-funded consortia (specifically, those from the US, Europe 
and Japan) generally failed to meet expectations.  Part of the problem appears to be that 
government involvement caused the consortia to have multiple goals, some of which 
were economic, some were political and others that were not necessarily aligned with 
consortia member interests.  Those organizations which were heavily funded by the 
government, for example, were vulnerable to sharp budget cuts and shifts in public 
policy, national income and political priorities.  With obvious relevance to the FNC 
Process, this instability created significant problems for the consortia involved. 
Typically, the consortia were formed as a result of strong economic incentives 
that existed for a clearly identified group membership.  Commercial competitors joined 
consortia but were very deliberate in defining clear collaboration agreements.  As a 
result, consortia mission statements were typically very focused and unambiguous and 
the consortia survived only as long as they continued to fulfill the needs of the members 
(they delivered an acceptable “return on investment” to the participating corporations). 
Decision-making within the consortia appeared to be somewhat analogous to the 
consensus-based decision-making framework of the FNC Process.  The focus of the 
consortia was usually short-term (advanced development-oriented) rather than long-term 
(basic research-oriented).  Within each of the consortia studied the projects selected were 
normally required to benefit existing “customers” and this stipulation ended up 
discouraging projects which would have tended to entice new markets and new 
customers. 
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Many of the fundamental components of the R&D consortia appear to be 
analogous to the core components of the FNC Process.  The difference appears to be in 
the implementation methods used rather than in the components of the two approaches 
(R&D consortia and FNC’s) themselves.  Without having explored this matter further it 
appears the R&D consortia were implemented in a far more “deliberate” manner than has 
been the case so far with the FNC Process. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented data from a wide spectrum of sources and provided an 
analysis of the material collected.  Administrative data within the bounds of DoN S&T 
Process itself (instructions, guidance memorandum, briefing material) and independent 
data from outside the S&T Process (open literature reviews, congressional reports, 
government studies, website server statistics) were used to provide an indication of the 
success of the DoN’s ability to operate more effectively and in a “business-like” manner.   
FNC survey response feedback data from participants with first-hand knowledge 
of the FNC Process was supplemented with information obtained through personal 
interviews with senior-level Defense Department and Corporate leaders.  This 
information was assimilated to obtain useful insight into some of the issues encountered 
when attempting to operate the government “like a business,” technology development 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis examined the objectives, processes, and methodology of the 
Department of the Navy's (DoN) most recent Science and Technology (S&T) technology 
transition process–the Future Naval Capability (FNC) process–with a business process 
perspective.  The general notion of a DoN S&T “business environment” was explored to 
assess whether or not a military-based business environment has been conducive to 
realize technology transitions in an accelerated manner, as was the intention of the FNC 
Process.  This research identified a significant number of fundamental issues and 
suggests changes to the technology transition process that might prove beneficial to 
future efforts. 
The research methodology used for this thesis consisted of collecting relevant 
data from a variety of independent sources for correlation and analysis.  Because the FNC 
Process affects all naval communities, this approach was used as a way to minimize 
biases from any one particular stakeholder community in an attempt to reach balanced 
and objective conclusions.  The data collected consisted of an extensive literature search 
of a number of technology development and business-process concepts, personal 
interviews, and stakeholder feedback using an electronic survey.  The (face-to-face) 
personal interviews were conducted with senior-level DoD, DoN, and Industry 
representatives who were directly involved in either technology program planning 
processes, the DoN FNC Process, or both.  An anonymous electronic “customer 
feedback” survey was used to target a population of specific individuals who were active 
participants in the FNC Process.  Generally speaking, the respondents to the electronic 
survey were at a lower management level than the personnel interviewed:  survey 
respondents were typically at a working level while the senior personnel interviewed 
were at “corporate” decision-making (Flag/SES/VP) levels.   
The survey responses provide a first-hand account of the end result of the FNC 
technology transition process, as experienced by personnel across all stakeholder 
communities.  These feedback responses, representing the net effect of the FNC planning 
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process, were examined in light of the remarks provided by management personnel 
interviewed to obtain insight of management policy and interpretation.  Both collections 
of data were further examined under consideration of the background data provided by 
the literature search.  The intended net result was to produce a detailed study that would 
link history and theory to management planning processes to, finally, the actual 
implementation processes and results achieved. 
 
1. Original Thesis Questions 
This thesis addressed the questions presented in Chapter I.  A literature search of 
business principles and relevant government guidance was presented in Chapter II.  
Appendix B provides a summary of the variety of revenue approaches commonly used in 
commercial business models.  Chapter III presented an overview of the DoN S&T 
Program and described the changes in the execution of the Navy’s S&T Program.  
Chapter IV provided a chronological history of the implementation of the Navy’s FNC 
Process.  This chapter also described a number of significant changes to the FNC Process 
which have been implemented since its inception. 
The extent to which the FNC S&T business environment was conducive to 
accelerating technology transition was explored in Chapters IV and V: Chapter IV 
provided details regarding the S&T “business environment” and Chapter V presented an 
analysis of the data collected.  Appendix A provides the raw, unedited, FNC Process 
survey feedback data. 
The issue of technology transition metrics for the FNC Process was addressed in 
Chapters III and IV, as part of the overview of the S&T and FNC Processes, as well as in 
the data collected and analyzed in Chapter V.  In Chapter V, the data collected through 
personnel interviews and survey responses provided additional insight into how the FNC 
IPTs operate and their use of transition metrics.  A number of significant technology 
transition issues were illuminated as a result of the data collected for this thesis.  
Appendix D provides a summary of measures of effectiveness metrics uncovered during 
the literature review for this research. 
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The extent to which the current DoN transition efforts offer an improvement over 
past efforts was discussed during the data analysis of Chapter V and in concluding 
remarks.  Some of the problems in technology transition were found to be tightly coupled 
to our current acquisition system.  Appendix C provides a summary of a few of the major 
issues typically encountered by the S&T community when attempting to transition a new 
naval capability to the warfighter in a more accelerated manner (as intended by the FNC 
Process). 
 
2. Period of Thesis Relevance 
This study covers the “initial implementation phase” of the FNC technology 
transition process.  Although some projects were already underway the initial 
implementation phase of the FNC Process started formally with FY02 funding and 
continues across the FYDP through FY07.  As my research was concluding a “second” 
implementation phase of the FNC Process was in the planning stages and, as the editing 
was being completed, was in the initial implementation stage. 
 
3. General Observations 
The issue of technology transition is a highly complex and difficult matter.  As 
the literature review illustrated, the problem has been looked at for a long time and there 
have been no long lasting, quick fixes; no obvious, easy answers to the numerous issues 
uncovered.  At a very basic level there are at least two fundamental approaches to the 
problem of realizing greater technology transitions; 1) a “top-down” approach where 
corporate policy is implemented in a “command and control” structure by management, 
and 2) a “bottom-up” approach where significant change is attempted at lower 
organizational levels and disseminated at the working level for maximum impact.  An 
optimal solution would probably comprise an intelligent combination of these two 
approaches.   
Regardless of the approach taken, the literature provides a wealth of independent 
but consistent analysis which support the notion that organizations succeed as a 
consequence of strong leadership and good people.  Strong leadership provides the 
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organization with a clear vision and communicates goals and objectives.  These 
organizations seek out, attract, and retain the best people for the jobs that need to be 
done.  Equally important, they remove people that are not in the right job. 
As the issues of technology transition were explored for the DoN, some very 
significant issues were exposed.  The literature search conducted revealed that many of 
these issues are not necessarily new yet remain unresolved–a testament to their difficulty.  
One such issue is that of the general principle of governance and an organization’s 
administrative capability.  ONR is an administrative organization that has been chartered 
by Congress to foster and develop new technical capabilities for the DoN.  Its 
effectiveness is directly related to its ability (or inability) to effectively administer its 
duties.  As other government organizations have found, “Public trust in government 
depends on being able to deliver.”239 
Acquisition Reform initiatives have caused the DoN to rely heavily on an 
increasingly politically active “for-profit” organizational system for delivering the 
products its warfighters require for the defense of our nation.  Over the years the 
devolution of technical administrative capability, authority and responsibility from 
government agencies to a nebulous network of contractors has turned our naval 
technology development capability into an ineffective and inefficient bureaucracy.  
Budgeting processes that may have worked for traditional bureaucracies are less effective 
when dealing with nongovernment organizations.  Personnel systems designed to insulate 
government from political interference have had difficulty in preparing a workforce 
skilled in managing indirect government.  It may not be so much that the Navy has 
mismanaged the S&T Program but that the Navy has chosen to manage the program 
through a vast network of contractors in order to avoid the political fallout which would 
result with stating the case for an expansion of the DoN.  The use of contractors itself is 
not the problem but the government’s inability to manage its contractors and, as a result, 
the programs it has the responsibility to manage. 
Assessments of the DoN S&T Program have been critical over the years and, as 
 research, the FNC Process is proving to be no exception to indicated by the results of this                                                 
239 Kettl (2002), p. 17. 
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such criticism.  Independent assessments of the DoN S&T Program by such organizations 
as the National Academy of Sciences have consistently reported a lack of systems 
analysis and a void in the DoN’s independent technical assessment capabilities.  Indeed, 
from the literature search there was no evidence found that such a technical assessment 
service is being provided to the Navy by any of its organizational entities. 
For the DoN, and unique among the military Services, the Office of Naval 
Research was established by law in 1946 as a military research organization.  It was 
originally planned as a (post-WWII) “stop gap” measure in anticipation of the creation of 
a larger civilian-led agency which would support basic research for all military S&T 
needs.  Among other political issues of that time-period there was considerable military 
resistance to the establishment of such a civilian-led agency.  In 1950 a much scaled-
down, presidential-controlled version of Vannevar Bush’s vision was enacted into law as 
the National Science Foundation (NSF).  The scope of the NSF, however, differed greatly 
from that originally envisioned by Bush.  As an example, NSF would not focus on 
medical or military research needs.  It is relevant to note that with the exception of the 
Navy, with ONR having already been enacted into law, no other Service has been the 
recipient of a congressionally-created civilian-led research organization within their 
Service240.  The civilian-military leadership tension, clearly evident in the early years 
through a documentation trail, still exists today. 
From its very inception the fundamental “business model” used by ONR–to 
distribute resources among universities to conduct basic search241–has been the subject of 
criticism, even within academic circles.  For example, only a short while after ONR was 
established James Conant, president of Harvard, wrote Vannevar Bush a letter 
questioning the approach being taken by ONR as well as the quality of the research being 
delivered in this manner: 
The gossip I pick up in academic circles, both here and in other colleges 
(through the respective presidents) is that there is a great deal of concern 
                                                 
240 DARPA, a Defense Department research agency, does not report through any of the military 
Services but reports directly to OSD. 
241 Greenberg (2001), p. 48.  At the time the ONR was formally established it had already established 
177 contracts totaling $24M, a lot in 1946. 
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about the way the Navy is pouring out money for so-called fundamental 
research.  The recipients are glad to get it, of course, but are wondering 
why it is flowing in that particular channel, and rather suspect there is a 
joker somewhere.  I have also heard that some of the grants are to very 
second-rate people in third-rate institutions.242 
Regardless of the type of organization an extensive literature search revealed the 
single, most important, component of a highly effective, successful organization–whether 
civilian, military, non-profit or commercial–was a quality workforce.  Repeat reference to 
this essential trait was found in references to documents from Vannevar Bush. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. DoD Guidance 
The research conducted for this thesis confirms a continued emphasis to operate 
government departments, agencies and organizations in a more cost-effective, efficient, 
“business-like” manner.  At the OSD level there is a strong emphasis placed on the 
conduct of joint service operations, interoperability issues and achieving cost reductions.  
For OSD, the first two emphasis areas provide additional impetus for the third.  Within 
the Navy, a military service component of OSD, the priority of emphasis areas appears to 
be in reverse order; the primary emphasis has been predominantly on realizing weapon 
system cost savings with less attention being given to the interoperability and less yet to 
other joint service operational concerns.  This diametrically opposed emphasis area 
prioritization greatly complicates technology development efforts within the Navy.  For 
the Navy the priority differences are likely due to typical “consumer-like” market forces 
and a desire by the Navy to maximize an immediate Return on Investment (ROI) for its 
naval (vice joint) warfighting systems.  For the Navy, quantifiable naval ROI measures 
for weapon system cost savings are more easily realized, measured and recapitalized than 
those of such multi-service goals such as interoperability and joint operations.  Naval 
systems are therefore understandably supported with a higher priority than joint Service 
technology development demonstrations and weapons systems.  Nevertheless, as current 
warfighting operations make very clear, interoperability and joint service operations can 
                                                 
242 Greenberg (2001). As quoted on pages 48-49. 
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be expected to be an increasing emphasis within the DoD and, presumably as a 
consequence of such high-level attention, increasingly within the DoN as well. 
 
2. Business Comparisons 
The government is not a business and, in spite of continued attempts over the past 
twenty years, has great difficulties emulating business operations in a significant way.  
The literature search uncovered significant differences in fundamental operating 
principles such as supply/demand, customer focus, and revenue generation that a 
meaningful detailed comparison is very difficult.  In areas where useful comparisons can 
be made, administrative and business processes for example, the DoN’s FNC Processes 
did not compare favorably to the results of successful businesses.   
a. Strategy and Vision 
One area of comparison is the absence of a clearly articulated Naval S&T 
strategic plan for its current operations as well its transformational initiatives.  As has 
been already observed by the GAO, “The need for a strategic plan when attempting major 
organizational and operational changes, such as those the navy is undertaking, has also 
been long recognized in the private sector as a best business practice.”243 
b. Personnel 
As the literature attests, more than any other factor the quality of 
personnel has the most predominant impact on the effectiveness of an organization.  
Literature surveyed substantiated that high quality personnel can overcome even serious 
process shortfalls.  Because the emphasis of the FNC Process was to transition new 
warfighting capabilities to the operational forces in a much accelerated manner, the FNC 
Process was designed around an Integrated Product Team (IPT) approach.  This 
approach, it appears, was based on the understanding that ONR personnel (i.e., scientific 
researchers), although responsible for the execution of DoN BA1 through BA3 resources, 
were not necessarily skilled for the variety of tasks required by those Budget Activities–
even more so when required in an accelerated timeframe.  In response to these additional 
management needs ONR has brought in a community of contractors, detailees and 
                                                 
243 Military Transformation: Navy Efforts Should Be More Integrated and Focused. (2001, August) 
GAO-01-853. p. 6. 
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Interagency Personnel Agreement (IPA) personnel to handle some of the immediate 
administrative and acquisition-focused tasks.  This increased workforce has, however, 
reduced the level of S&T resources available and generated additional external criticism. 
c. Integrated Product Teams 
The use of an Integrated Product Team (IPT) construct to manage the FNC 
program development responsibilities–a core component of the FNC Process–is a 
management structure which was not found to be widely used within industry, certainly 
not in the manner implemented by the Navy.  There was no significant reference to such 
an organizational structure for the business community found in the literature search.  In 
the manner implemented by the FNC Process the IPTs consensus-based management 
structure dilutes authority, complicates the decision-making process and generally slows 
down the technology development cycle.   
d. Investment Metrics 
In contrast to the commercial business sector the Navy has been using 
very few useful economic investment metrics to guide investment decisions.  A 
significant effort has been devoted to “resource allocation” concerns but very little has 
been done regarding quantifying the ROI for investments already made.  Many of the 
most common business environment performance metrics and market indicators surveyed 
as a part of the literature search for this thesis were found either to bear no direct 
investment comparison or were not in use by the DoN.  In contrast to the DoN, a 
significant amount of work has been done by other Government agencies (for example, 
NIST) and economists with respect to these types of metrics. 
The lack of useful metrics and performance indicators does not mean that 
DoN S&T investment decisions are wrong.  What it does mean is that absent useful 
metrics to guide the investment decisions the decisions are being made with less 
confidence and with considerably more risk. 
e. Management Reporting Structure 
Although examples of corporate management terminology and 
organizational structure were found to have been transferred to the Government sector 
(i.e., the reference to a “Board of Directors”) such correlations were found to be very 
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weak and without substance.  Such terms appear to be used in name only and have not 
been substantiated by formal and meaningful organizational changes.  Significantly, there 
was one critically important relationship–the CNR’s dual-reporting relationship to the 
CNO and to the ASN(RDA)–where a reasonable equivalent could not be definitively 
found in the commercial sector at all. 
 
3. S&T Program 
Historically, the Navy’s support of the need and utility of new technology 
development activity has been mixed.  The lackluster support of technology development 
on the part of the Navy appears to be due mostly to a low perceived ROI on the resources 
invested.  The long-range view of S&T was not viewed as effective; the DoN saw very 
little product for their $1B+ annual investment over the years. 
There has been a large turnover in ONR personnel over the past few years.  This 
turn-over possibly allows the opportunity for increased flexibility in program content but 
is not making the process more efficient.  Increased involvement at the OSD level 
appears to create new problems as a result of directed mandates without the resources to 
execute these mandates since (DoN) program execution responsibility does not reside at 
the OSD level. 
A disturbing observation regarding the DoN S&T Program is the lack of positive 
Congressional support of the program as evidenced by the resources provided within the 
context of current wartime operations.  The S&T Program was visibly implementing 
program structure and planning changes when the terrorist attacks occurred but were 
largely unaffected by the resulting Congressional POM programming and appropriation 
actions (excepting unplanned congressional plus-up activity).  This disregard of the 
existing DoN S&T account is an indication of a lack of confidence by the Congress 
regarding the management of the S&T account by ONR. 
a. Investment Level 
In comparison to the corporate sector (for example, pharmaceuticals) the 
literature appears to confirm DoN S&T investments are disproportionately low.  The 
current DoN S&T investment level, roughly at 2% of Navy TOA, continues to fall 
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significantly below the levels suggested by OSD guidance (3% of Navy TOA).  There 
seems to be little hope for change since increases to the DoN S&T account (BA1-BA3) 
would necessarily come from other accounts (BA4+) within the DoN RDT&E line.   
From a budgeting perspective the DoN S&T account is considered a “level 
of effort” program within the larger DoN resource allocation process.  One reason for the 
Navy’s technology investment portfolio being funded as a “level of effort” for budget 
purposes is because an S&T performance model does not exist at the OPNAV level, as is 
the case for other investment components of the DoN budget.  Without an accurate 
performance model there is no means through which changes to the DoN S&T account 
could be iterated in order to assess the resulting change in S&T product output–to 
effectively determine the ROI on the investment changes which might be under 
consideration.  As a result there is no quantifiable way senior Navy leadership can assess 
the benefits they receive from current investments or quantify any changes that might 
occur through funding changes to that account.   
b. Program Imbalance 
Although implemented as an attempt to realize a more appropriate balance 
of the short-term needs of the Navy as compared to the long-term needs, the recent 
restructuring of the S&T account has actually created a greater imbalance in the S&T 
account because of the impact the restructuring has had on the BA2 (Applied Research) 
efforts.  Breaking the three traditional S&T categories (BA1: Basic Research, BA2: 
Applied Research, and BA3: Advanced Development) into two new categories (D&I: 
Discovery and Invention, and E&D: Exploitation and Delivery) has created a void in the 
BA2 category because half of the BA2 resources have become directly aligned with a 
specific FNC and are, therefore, unavailable for use.  The BA2 category is critically 
important to S&T since it serves as a bridge between the Basic Research (BA1) 
advancements and the Advanced Development (BA3) efforts for the Navy. 
c. Reporting Relationships 
The dual reporting relationship of the CNR–on the one hand as the S&T 
OPNAV N091 resource sponsor reporting to the CNO and concerned with the short-term 
warfighting needs of the Navy and, on the other hand, as the CNR reporting to the 
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SECNAV and concerned with the long-term research and innovation needs of the Navy–
appears to complicate matters further.  Such a reporting relationship forces the CNR to 
“serve two masters” at once and, in so doing so, trade-off issues and concerns from one 
end of the S&T spectrum for those at the other end of the S&T spectrum.  These 
compromises are being made in an environment that has become increasingly politicized 
over the years–as evidenced by the increasing influence on the S&T account through 
congressional plus-ups–while offering the CNR very little discretionary latitude to pursue 
possibly more innovative approaches to immediate warfighting needs.  All-in-all, the 
resulting S&T research and development environment has become very difficult and 
demanding, at best. 
d. Reporting of Results 
The S&T community further exacerbates a difficult situation and does 
itself a disservice by not being able to articulate a convincing return on investment (ROI) 
for the resources it manages and executes.  There is no consolation in the knowledge that 
the literature overwhelmingly supports the notion that describing the S&T ROI is an 
incredibly difficult problem and one that is common to many organizations within the 
government and commercial sectors.   
e. Congressional Oversight 
The rise in the number and amount of congressional plus-ups provides an 
indication of the level of outside dissatisfaction with the S&T process.  Whether for 
purely political purposes or because they feel the S&T program and processes are flawed, 
technologists appear to be doing an “end-around” of the S&T process by going directly to 
their Congressional representatives -- and this trend is increasing.  If sufficient additional 
resources are not provided to the S&T account to pay for these congressional interest 
items the impact on the S&T account, and transition planning activities, can be 
substantial.  The continued declining DoN S&T budgets do not appear to support the 
notion that the Congress is satisfied with the performance of the DoN S&T investment 
portfolio. 
f. Coordination 
The importance of effective coordination is seen throughout this thesis.  
The administration, research and development of highly complex science and engineering 
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projects require robust coordination activity to be successful.  As was pointed out in the 
literature search, the real metric of effective administration processes is the proper 
coordination of required activities.  “No problem is more central to administration than 
coordination.”244  Effective coordination will allow responsibilities to be shared among 
administrators at different agencies, at multiple levels of government, and among 
nongovernmental partners.  The more managers rely on networks to reach the various 
naval “customer” communities, the more they need to coordinate their activities in order 
to be successful. 
From the survey responses the level of coordination within the FNC 
Process was shown to be unsatisfactory and largely ineffective.  There were exceptions 
but most respondents, across all stakeholder communities, expressed dissatisfaction with 
many of the activities that are typically used for the proper coordination of activities.  As 
the FNC Process matured and the responsibility to manage the FNC projects became 
more broadly shared in order to secure transition agreements, devising effective 
coordination strategies has become an increasingly difficult problem.  There was no 
evidence found which showed that this coordination problem was being addressed in any 
way, however.  There is a small245 SYSCOM liaison staff but the primary FNC 
coordination activities are done through the program managers for the specific programs 
being funded. 
Part of the reason for this lack of coordination activity is, of course, due to 
the additional cost of any such coordination effort.  At a time of declining budgets 
shouldering the cost of an activity that does not provide a clear, tangible product may be 
resisted.  The literature search did reveal that a common problem encountered by 
collective action groups was paying the added costs of coordination; the 
recommendations of past research suggested these costs should never be left out of the 
business model.  These were identified as “the costs of communication among group 
                                                 
244 Kettl (2002), p. 163. 
245 There is a single NAVAIR, NAVSEA, SPAWAR, and CNET SYSCOM liaison representatives in 
the SYSCOM liaison office as well as a separate NLCCG Warfare Center liaison.  Each of the SYSCOMs 
and Warfare Centers have a larger number of technical ‘detailees’ working specific projects at ONR on a 
limited rotational basis and as necessary.  The NRL and MC SYSCOM liaison function is done differently 
and are considered to be more tightly integrated throughout ONR. 
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members, the costs of any bargaining among them, and the costs of creating, staffing, and 
maintaining any formal group organization.”246  
g. Long-Range Planning 
At the current time there does not appear be any effective means through 
which the DoN can investigate truly transformational approaches to naval warfighting.  
The redistribution of the DoN S&T account (which created the FNCs) has shifted focus 
to the short-term, low-risk, incremental technology development activity at the direct 
expense of those development efforts needed to investigate operational concepts and 
technology options in support of longer-term naval warfighting concepts and operations.  
A steady increase in outside oversight has imposed demands on a shrinking pool of S&T 
financial resources.  There was no direct linkage found between high-level (CNO, SSG or 
other) naval think tanks, project planning and technology demonstration efforts.  As far 
as could be ascertained there is no naval group specifically chartered to do such 
technology option assessments in order to explore, examine and raise critically important 
technology implementation issues to an appropriate DoN level for consideration, and 
resolution.  The literature search shows this to be a long standing problem within the 
DoN and, as the results of this research illustrates, the situation has not improved 
significantly over the last 50 years. 
 
4. The Future Naval Capability Process 
The DoN’s FNC Process was implemented in an attempt to achieve a “better” 
balance between long-term objectives and short-term naval operational needs.  Although 
a direct link was not confirmed in the literature search, the FNC Process appears to be a 
reasonable response to earlier criticisms of DoD technology insertion processes.  In 
particular, the FNC Process appears to be a thoughtful response to a “Team 6” Process 
Action Team (PAT) study conducted for ASN(RDA) in 1998.  The FNC Process might 
even be considered as a reasonable response to earlier DoD desires for new “capability-
based” technology insertion processes as well.  Earlier defense studies recommended a 
                                                 
246 Olson (1971), p. 47. 
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“capabilities-based process” for identifying warfighter needs, creating new technology 
options, developing innovative solutions, and delivering the new capabilities in an  
accelerated manner.  The FNC Process, as envisioned and documented in the 
implementation paper trail, does appear to meet the major objectives of the desired 
criteria for these studies.. 
Ironically, reducing life cycle costs–although clearly a near-term naval need and a 
consistent warfighter high priority request–do not appear to have been a primary focus of 
the FNC Process.  The FNC documentation reveals that several of the IPTs that focused 
on these types of technology issues–Total Ownership Cost, Capable Manpower, and 
Expeditionary Logistics, for example–were among those most aggressively “targeted” 
FNCs for resource allocation reductions247.  The reasoning for such apparently 
contradictory behavior appears to be due to a conflict in priorities and objectives among 
the operational warfighter, acquisition and S&T communities which was not easily 
resolved by the IPT structure or at higher DoN levels.  Such technical emphasis areas, 
although critically important and of immediate need by the warfighter, were nonetheless 
viewed as “low tech” developments that can be easily delivered by defense contractors 
through normal acquisition community processes.  These same warfighter needs and 
requirements, however, ended up having a low relative priority for funding within the 
acquisition community and so have great difficulty getting resolved in an effective and 
timely manner. 
a. Funding 
The S&T Program budget was found to be approximately 2% of Navy 
TOA.  The FNC component of the overall S&T Program was initially resourced at ½ the 
DoN S&T Program budget.  As a result of a large number of programmatic reviews the 
resources allotted to the FNC Program were gradually reduced–by roughly 50% -- to its 
                                                 
247 Indeed, to cite an example of such “targeting”, the CM FNC was at one point under serious 
consideration for elimination (the allocation of zero resources) and was eventually moved out from the 
FNC Process structure effective for what I refer to as the “second implementation phase” of the FNC 
Process and just beyond the period of relevance for this thesis. 
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current level of approximately $500M.248  The disruptions caused by repeated re-
evaluations appear to have been substantial due to the number of projects involved 
(200+) and the level of investment of these projects.  When the “ripple effect” is 
considered the net result was severely detrimental to the administration and continuity of 
the entire technology development process.   
b. Investment Indicators 
There was a general lack of investment indicators found in the 
documentation.  Although there were significant attempts at implementing a business 
process approach to the IPTs through mechanisms such as “Business Plans” these plans 
did not provide additional information with respect to investment indicators.  As far as 
could be determined the IPT made investment decisions using very informal investment 
indicators, if they used any at all.  
c. Use of Integrated Product Teams 
The IPT approach–central to the FNC Process–has been inadequate to 
provide the leadership and guidance needed, in the manner implemented.  As process 
implementation guidance, senior-personnel interview feedback and process participant 
survey responses have all clearly indicated the IPT structure is strictly a consensus-based 
program approval board with minimal overarching (cross-FNC) integration, visibility and 
demonstrated interest.  The data collected for this thesis has identified a variety of 
problems across all stakeholder communities: 
(1) The OPNAV community, as Chair of the IPT and 
responsible to establish the requirements for programs approved to deliver the desired 
future naval capabilities, has not been embraced the FNC Process in a meaningful way.  
The important issue of requirements (who generates) remains unresolved by the FNC 
Process.  The quality of the requirements generated by OPNAV in the first cycle of the 
FNC Process was mixed.  For all practical purposes the OPNAV community remained 
consumed with important and pressing budget and higher-level OSD issues to develop a 
                                                 
248 Reductions effectively continue.  This figure is before the removal of the Capable Manpower and 
Warfighter Protection FNCs from the “core” FNC portfolio.  This action (removal of these two FNCs from 
the portfolio) is considered to have occurred following the period covered by this thesis. 
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consistent, focused, set of capability-based requirements for the S&T community to 
respond to. 
(2) The S&T community has seen the FNC Process as a major 
disruption to their mission of researching and developing technology options to the DoN.  
The restructuring of the traditional S&T (BA1 + BA2 + BA3) account to a split-
portfolio–D&I (Discovery & Invention) + E&D (Exploitation & Deployment)–approach.  
This fundamental redistribution of the S&T portfolio has caused a major shift in the focus 
and emphasis of the S&T activities towards much shorter-term development concerns at 
the expense of the traditional technology development planning approach.  This 
restructuring has resulted in a void in the Applied Research (BA2) category which can be 
expected to greatly hinder future transition efforts if left unchanged. 
(3) The Acquisition community, the community which quickly 
embraced the process and was the most satisfied with the process (according to survey 
responses), has also expressed significant concerns with the process.  Of primary concern 
to the acquisition community has been with regard to budget instability issues as well as a 
lack of awareness regarding how to introduce new programs into the FNC Process.  
Because of the emphasis on the need for transition agreements there has been criticism 
that the FNC Process has actually inhibited naval innovation by directing scarce S&T 
resources to current acquisition programs – using S&T resources to essentially ‘plus-up’ 
acquisition programs.  Similar criticisms were that the FNC Process, through its transition 
agreements, has essentially ‘locked-up’ innovations throughout the FYDP even though 
many of those agreements might never be fulfilled. 
(4) Without a doubt the Fleet/Force community has been 
provided a much greater visibility, and indeed in some cases demonstrated a sense of 
ownership, into new technology projects being developed to address fleet needs.  The 
remoteness of the operational forces complicates the dynamics of the IPT approach, 
however.  Although the distances involved do not rule out their effective IPT 
participation it certainly creates a much greater need on having the IPT operate 
effectively.  The frustration conveyed through the survey responses indicates this 
community feels frustrated in their general inability to easily engage the IPT at a 
 250
meaningful (working) level.  This community, the end-user and ultimate customer of the 
capabilities developed and delivered, expressed opinions that the FNC Process appears to 
be mostly lip-service and is not yet functioning effectively.  Possibly in response to these 
frustrations there have been other, post-FNC Process, attempts to connect the S&T 
community to the needs of the operational forces249. 
Many of the problems discussed here are due to the ineffectiveness of the 
management (i.e., by IPT) approach embraced by the FNC Process.  The IPT’s 
consensus-based management-by-committee structure was not found to be used within 
the commercial sector.  There was no evidence found to support the successful use of 
such a management structure outside of the government acquisition community.  The 
wide variety of management and business references consulted for the literature review of 
this thesis provide no examples of such an approach being used by successful commercial 
operations. 
Furthermore, the IPT concept implemented by the FNCs was not an 
accurate implementation of the concept as originally conceived by DoD and the 
acquisition community.  There was no evidence of formal Working Group IPTs found 
anywhere in the implementation documentation or in any of the records examined.  
Through discussions with personnel informal working groups are known to have been 
formed for some of the IPTs.  These discussions provide some evidence that indicates the 
more successful FNC’s were those that appear to more closely align with the IPT 
approach as originally conceived250.  Additionally, IPT membership behavior appears to 
have tracked well with many of the predictions of group dynamics from the fields of 
Collective Action and Game Theories found in the research literature.   
d. Group Behavior and Collective Action 
The experiences and feedback provided by the stakeholder community 
correlates strongly to the behavior predicted by researchers of group dynamics, collective 
action and game theories uncovered by the literature search.  Theories of collective action 
                                                 
249 A closer examination of other such processes -- for example, ONR’s “Tech Solutions” and 
ASN(RDA)’s “Rapid Technology Transition” programs – are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
250 From data provided during personnel interviews and returned surveys there is some reason to 
believe the OMCM and KSA IPTs operated more in line with original IPT guidelines than other FNC IPTs. 
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support the effectiveness of small decision groups over larger decision-making groups. 
The IPT construct, central to the FNC decision-making process, is consistent with this 
aspect of collective action theory.  FNC Process participant experience, however, 
indicates the group behavior and decision dynamics were found to be highly complex and 
there was a high level of dissatisfaction expressed regarding the effectiveness and 
leadership of the individual IPTs and FNC decision-making process as a whole.  This 
level of dissatisfaction indicates there is a need to analyze the construction of the IPTs 
more closely.  Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Without careful 
analysis, however, the experiences revealed by the literature search show there is little 
chance of success.  The lackluster results of the FNC Process to date are fully consistent 
with the previous research performed. 
e. Customer Focus 
The participant survey and interview data collected reveal the lack of a 
clear and strong customer focus.  Although “the fleet” was generally considered to be the 
customer this was not the case universally nor, when it was the case, was there a clear 
understanding as to who, exactly, was “the fleet.”  Most respondents struggled with a 
firm grasp as to who, specifically, the customer was.   
The shift from a demonstration-centric process (very early in the FNC 
Process) to delivery-centric mandated the negotiation of very specific technology 
transition agreements.  This shift changed the emphasis of the FNCs from developing 
new and innovative future naval capabilities to delivering evolutionary incremental 
upgrades to current acquisition programs of record.  Stakeholder input from personnel 
interviews and survey responses reveal a low confidence level in the utility, accuracy and 
reliability of the TTAs and that some of these agreements are being generated mostly to 
appease the process.  
f. Customer Satisfaction 
Data collected from personnel interviews and survey responses clearly 
indicate that stakeholders of the FNC technology transition process remain dissatisfied 
with the performance and results demonstrated to date.  Much of the ineffectiveness 
might be attributed to the absence of an effective customer-focused “business model” 
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such as is more commonly used within the commercial sector.  The lack of such a 
“business model” appears to be a consequence of the fact that the DoN S&T account 
needs to service the entire DoN community.  This scope requires the DoN S&T account 
to respond to a very large number of potential naval customers–each with different needs, 
requirements and risks.  The S&T community receives more requirements guidance than 
they can support and manage programs with widely varying levels of maturity and risk.  
As a result they are regularly forced to make internal tradeoffs in order to provide the best 
value while complying with DoN fiscal constraints. 
g. Reporting and Accountability 
Senior leadership interviews and stakeholder survey data substantiated a 
clear perception that the S&T Program does not deliver and there is little accountability 
of the investments being made.  This perception stems from a lack of reporting that is 
surprising from the research community and would probably not be tolerated in a 
competitive commercial environment.  ONR does not typically publish technical reports 
on the progress or accomplishments of the projects they fund nor do they release annual 
reports or other information to the defense community.  This void of defense community 
communication exchange contributes greatly to the perception that ONR investments are 
not important or produce significant results.  ONR needs to be more open in their 
reporting and investments.  In light of focus on the corporate accounting an increased 
emphasis on full and open disclosure of the FNC program investments, and technical 
progress can be expected to increase. 
h. Project Entrance-Exit Strategy 
In spite of best intentions the FNC Process remains limited in scope 
having neither a widely recognized entrance strategy (program initiation) nor a well-
understood exit strategy (program termination or transition).  The process has not been 
supportive of the most obvious exit strategy–the demonstration of a future naval 
capability as a part of a larger technology development process such as the OSD ACTD 
process.   
i. DoN Integration of the FNC Process 
The MC approach to the FNC Process was a clear success.  Of all the 
Naval Systems Commands, the Marine Corps System Command clearly stands out as 
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being the most strongly integrated with ONR’s S&T planning processes.  As a result of 
such a strong organizational integration emphasis, the MC appears to have benefited 
significantly, possibly even disproportionately, from participating in the FNC Process.  
Numerous stakeholder survey comments lament what appears to them to be a 
disproportionate clout by the MC community.  The strong MC involvement is the result 
of a direct and concerted effort to involve the MC community in DoN S&T planning 
activities, however, and is the related to a number of ONR-MC technology planning and 
investment agreements which were established prior to the FNC Process.  These 
agreements resulted in the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) being 
designated as the VCNR and the unprecedented movement of MC billets to ONR from 
MC facilities at Quantico, VA.  Although there is a liaison function no equivalent highly-
integrated working relationships were found to exist with other naval Systems 
Commands (NAVAIR, NAVSEA, SPAWAR, etc).  To their credit the MC have been 
highly effective in leveraging “blue dollars” across the spectrum of FNCs while also 
resisting the allocation of “green dollars” from being used for DoN objectives which do 
not specifically address MC priorities.  The MC success in influencing IPT investments is 
emphasized by the comparative demonstrated lack of priority and emphasis placed on the 
FNC Process by the military component of the OPNAV community.  The observed MC 
community behavior, incidentally, appears to be consistent with the behavior predicted 
by group behavior and game theories found in the literature search.   
j. Joint Technology Development 
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The FNC Process has not been supportive of OSD joint service technology 
planning and development processes; specifically the ACTD process.  With the 
increasing joint emphasis this DoN S&T linkage to joint operations is becoming a more 
visible liability and illustrates a discord regarding the governance of technology 
development authority within the DoD.  Current wartime operations have raised the 
general awareness that the U.S. does not deploy individual services to conduct major 
operations–it deploy’s a joint force.  DoD senior level leadership has repeatedly 
articulated their belief that the power of a joint force greatly exceeds the sum of the 
separate service capabilities.  As such providing technology options which will enhance 
our joint warfighting capabilities through a more effective use of our Naval forces is 
becoming increasingly essential.  Ironically, of all the Defense Services and Agencies the 
DoN is organizationally in a position to develop and demonstrate joint interoperability 
more easily than others due to the diverse nature of its constituent components251.  The 
DoN cannot hope to contribute meaningfully to joint operations if its own technology 
development processes do not emphasize those same objectives.   
The drive towards joint operations is so strong, and so important, that it 
should not be ignored.  If the DoN fails to address the interoperability and joint 
operational issues in a meaningful way there is a risk of the DoN's S&T organization 
being restructured due to lack of fleet impact and perceived technological irrelevance.  
Such an action would simply be a “business decision” based on the demonstrated low 
return on investment.  One possible action might be to merge the DoN S&T technology 
development process model with that of another Service as a first step in achieving joint 
operations.  Such an action becomes a real possibility due to the fact that the DoN 
organizational leadership is appointed at the joint level and military leadership provides 
little stability due to the frequency of military and civilian rotational assignments.  This 
DoN senior military organizational rotation process, coupled with the fact that the DoN 
S&T senior civilian leadership has completely turned over the past few years, means that 
there would be very little resistance to such additional restructuring of the DoN S&T 
process by DoD, Congress or both.  In my view such a Defense-level organizational 
change would be detrimental to the DoN mission and would adversely impact our future 
Naval operational readiness.  Such an action would not appreciably benefit our Naval 
warfighter or, I believe, our national defense infrastructure. 
k. Outside Oversight 
Dissatisfaction with the output of the S&T Program over the years has 
resulted in increased outside oversight and this trend can be expected to continue.  The 
FNC Process itself, as detailed in Chapter IV, was a compromise to the investment 
process brought on by an increase in high-level oversight of the S&T Program.  This 
                                                 
251 The diverse spectrum of naval components would include SPAWAR (satellites, IT, 
communications), NAVAIR (aviation), NAVSEA (submarines, surface ships) and the Marine Corps 
(ground forces).  These components, spanning warfighter operations from space to the ocean bottom and 
everything in between, contain the essential interfaces required for successful Joint force operations at the 
current time. 
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increased oversight was the result of dissatisfaction in the perceived S&T Program 
output.  There are other indicators, such as the greatly increased number and amount of 
congressional ‘plus-ups’ to the S&T account, that provide additional independence 
evidence in support of an increasing amount of outside influence and oversight.  In fact a 
very high percentage – fully one third – of the DoN S&T Program now comes from these 
congressional actions.  This outside influence greatly limits the flexibility of the S&T 
managers by reducing the level of discretionary funding.  Such constraints have the 
potential effect of producing a much more disjointed investment portfolio due to the 
limiting (for example, “stove piped”) nature of the resulting project selections.  This 
outside influence can be viewed as a consequence of a lack of confidence in S&T 
Program Managers to execute S&T resources in a reliable manner. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Business Operations 
Every effort should be made to continue to improve the accountability and 
execution of general good business and research practices.  Examples of typical business 
practices would include the preparation of annual portfolio investment reports, the 
recruitment of a more professionally diverse workforce and a much greater outreach to 
other defense and commercial communities to encourage a greater awareness of 
technology opportunities and to facilitate increased personnel technical networking.  
Examples of typical research practices would include the reporting of technical results, 
providing feedback to appropriate communities and greatly increasing–rather than 
decreasing–communication and coordination activities within the stakeholder 
communities.  In many cases ONR’s execution and follow-through on these types of 
activities was considered to be poor which contributes to programmatic uncertainty, 
causes confusion and generates an atmosphere of mistrust which, in turn, ultimately 




 2. S&T Program 
It is recommended that a comprehensive S&T “business model” be rigorously 
discussed, an agreeable model be developed and then articulated throughout the 
Congress/DoD/DoN communities in order to win stakeholder support.  Included as a 
component of such a business model would be appropriate economic indicators and 
useful performance metrics.  One of the components of such a business model would be a 
DoN S&T Strategic Plan that would clarify appropriate usage of DoN S&T resources, 
and support senior level goals and objectives.  In accordance to a typical business 
perspective, the entire S&T investment portfolio will need to focus on the Navy's vision, 
concepts and problems in a more highly coordinated and tightly integrated manner.   
The S&T account should be resourced at the full 3% levels established by OSD.  
It is suggested these resources be distributed equally among the BA1/2/3 S&T portfolio 
budget activity accounts.  As part of its S&T Strategy ONR shift their emphasis to 
perform a DoN S&T Assessment and Advisory role for the entire DoN and use its 
account to support such an advisory role. 
As a fundamental change to the way the DoN conducts our S&T business the 
following investment approach is offered for consideration: 
a. Basic Research 
The DoN Basic Research (BA1) investment portfolio would investigate 
those concepts embraced by the CNO and supported by high-level organizations such as 
the Naval War College, Naval Studies Board, Strategic Studies Group, Naval Warfare 
Development Command, Naval Postgraduate School, etc.  The BA1 account should 
initiate academic research programs that support a large number of fundamental concepts 
at appropriate resource levels.  There needs to be a direct linkage between DoN Basic 
Research programs and DoN long range operational guidance, vision, concepts and 
missions.  There should also be an appropriate level of support for advanced concepts of 
a possible joint service nature.  This component of the overall DoN S&T investment 
portfolio would represent the Basic Research component of the DoN S&T budget and 
would best be administered and executed by the Office of Naval Research in 
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collaboration with the most appropriate external naval “think tank” organizations 
mentioned.  Such an arrangement would foster a more integrated coupling among our 
national civilian academic infrastructure, our military schools, and the NRE community 
laboratory and research centers. 
b. Applied Research 
The DoN Applied Research (BA2) investment portfolio should focus on 
developing a large number of advanced technology 'options' based on review of the 
maturity and usefulness of relevant BA1 investigations and as applicable to overarching 
DoN future concepts and visions developed by the NWC, NWDC as well as the 
CONOPS developed by the various Naval and Joint Forces Commands.  This component 
of the DoN S&T investment portfolio should take full advantage of the NRE personnel 
and expertise within the various Systems Commands, Navy laboratories and Warfare 
Centers, Logistics Support Activities, Depots, etc., regarding the development and 
operational integration of these future technology concept options.  This component of 
the S&T portfolio would represent the Applied Research component of the DoN S&T 
investment portfolio and would best be administered and executed by the Office of Naval 
Research in close collaboration with the NRE Community (SYSCOMs, Warfare Centers, 
FFRDCs, etc.).  In order to promote the development of the large number of advanced 
technology options required for a robust S&T program the NRE community should be 
entrusted with the authority and flexibility to administer the BA2 funds with wide 
discretion.   
c. Advanced Development 
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The DoN Advanced Development (BA3) investment portfolio should 
focus on selecting a few of the applied technology “options” developed within the BA2 
portfolio and implement the most desirable technology options on weapon system 
platforms for capability demonstration, evaluation, and performance verification.  These 
technology options would be selected in accordance with the overarching DoN future 
naval capability concepts and visions embraced by the DoN.  There are two exit strategy 
paths envisioned for BA3 projects; projects which target existing navy platforms would 
be developed as specified through a transition agreement under the management of an 
appropriate FNC IPT.  Other more innovative and less traditional projects and concepts 
that do not align with current DoN platforms or programs would be developed in parallel 
but under a different management structure.  It is reasonable to expect a number of these 
projects would be focused on joint high-priority operational issues.  Both types of BA3 
projects would culminate in advanced technology demonstrations of system components 
that comply with operational requirements and CONOPS developed by the appropriate 
centers and Commands.  This component of the S&T portfolio should take full advantage 
of the facilities and personnel expertise across the NRE “supply chain” for the systems 
engineering, operational integration, and logistics support of these future technology 
weapon system concepts.  This component of the S&T investment portfolio would 
represent the Advanced Development component of the DoN S&T portfolio and would 
best be administered and executed by the Office of Naval Research in collaboration with 
the DoN Acquisition PEO's and industry partners. 
d. Technology Demonstrations 
A small number of high-priority BA3 programs should be selected for 
joint warfighting capability demonstration by operational fleet forces as Advanced 
Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) candidates.  These programs would 
represent the DoN contribution to joint warfighting capability demonstrations for the 
DoD.  These advanced concept demonstrations would provide the (multi-service) fleet 
forces an opportunity to apply a variety of well thought out and fully coordinated naval 
technology advancements integrated with capability demonstration systems from other 
services and Defense Agencies as viable options to the Joint Forces highest priority 
problems.  This approach would provide the warfighter a wide selection from which to 
choose the most appropriate solutions to the highest priority warfighting problems and 
new concepts desired.  Upon successful completion of objectives a select number of these 
advanced technology solutions would then fully transition into operational use by the 
Joint Forces through the appropriate Services and normal acquisition channels.  This 
component of the technology transition process currently extends beyond the direct 
control of the DoN and would best be administered and executed jointly by the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense and the appropriate service(s) and Defense Agencies (the Office 
of Naval Research for the DoN component, etc.). 
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e. Discretionary Authority 
In order for the DoN to respond to unanticipated contingencies more 
effectively a small but reasonable portion of the entire DoN S&T account (BA1/2/3) 
should be reserved for ONR discretionary use as deemed most appropriate.  Such 
discretionary flexibility would be useful in emergency situations and would function as a 
very useful “buffer” for the remaining portion of the S&T portfolio.  Such a buffer would 
be very beneficial from a program management aspect and should help to stabilize the 
DoN’s technology development process.  In accordance with other similar 
recommendations a complete and accurate accounting of the actual uses of the resources 
should be made on an annual basis. 
 
3. Organizational Changes 
Two of the primary problem areas with the S&T Program have been the inability 
of the military to establish quantifiable requirements and the dual-reporting chain for the 
CNR.  The difficulties in defining program requirements was found to be a long-running, 
historical problem for the Navy that defies easy solution and continues to plague the DoN 
today. 
In an attempt to address these two problems a new reporting relationship structure 
is proposed.  The new organization would separate the military and civilian 
responsibilities to clarify roles and responsibilities more distinctly and assign 
responsibilities more appropriately.   
a. Military Relationships 
For the military, the senior flag officers’ role would change from Chief of 
Naval Research to Chief of Naval Requirements with the responsibility to coordinate the 
generation and quantification of priority naval requirements across the spectrum of the 
DoN.  The OPNAV requirements role is central to the FNC Process but the inability of 
OPNAV to execute its duties has been a major hindrance to the success of the FNC 
Process.  In this new role the CNR would be responsible to define the appropriate 
technology demonstrations for the technologies under development and would have the 
responsibility to coordinate warfighting requirements definition and priorities across the 
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DoN but limited fiduciary responsibility.  In such a capacity the CNR should, by 
whatever means deemed most appropriate, establish much closer collaboration 
agreements with other Navy stakeholder organizations in a manner similar to the 
arrangements that have been demonstrated so successfully with the Marine Corps.  As a 
suggestion, it is envisioned the CNR would maintain a collaboration military staff 
consisting of the following suggested membership: 
VCNR (MC) – Marine Corps.  Responsible to coordinate naval 
requirements from the Marine Corps community.  This position already 
exists and is a dual-hatted flag officer from the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command (MCCDC).  This position would also coordinate 










VCNR (Space) – Responsible to coordinate naval requirements from the 
SPAWAR community (IT, communications, etc).  This position would be 
a dual-hatted flag officer representative from the Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
VCNR (Air) – Responsible to coordinate naval requirements from the 
aviation community.  This position would be a dual-hatted flag officer 
representative from the Naval Air Systems Command or the CNO (N78) 
on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
VCNR (Surface) – Responsible to coordinate naval requirements from the 
surface community.  This would be a dual-hatted flag officer 
representative from the Naval Sea Systems Command or the CNO (N76) 
on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
VCNR (Subs) – Responsible to coordinate naval requirements from the 
submarine community.  This position would be a dual-hatted flag officer 
representative from the Naval Sea Systems Command or the CNO (N77) 
on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
VCNR (Intelligence) – Responsible to coordinate naval intelligence 
technology requirements across the DoN community.  This position would 
be a dual-hatted flag officer representative from the Office of Naval 
Intelligence on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
VCNR (Personnel) – Responsible to coordinate naval personnel 
requirements across the DoN community.  This position would be a dual-
hatted flag officer representative from the Bureau of Naval Personnel on a 
(2-3) year rotational basis. 
VCNR (Logistics) – Responsible to coordinate naval logistics 
requirements across the DoN community.  This position would be a dual-
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hatted flag officer representative from the Naval Supply Systems 
Command or on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
VCNR (Medical) – Responsible to coordinate naval medical technology 
requirements across the DoN community.  This position would be a dual-
hatted flag officer representative from the Bureau of Medicine and 





VCNR (Joint Ops) – Responsible to coordinate joint program 
requirements for the DoN community.  This position would be a dual-
hatted flag officer representative from the Joint Forces Command on a (2-
3) year rotational basis. 
VCNR (Special Ops) – Responsible to coordinate Special Operations 
program requirements for the DoN community.  This position would be a 
dual-hatted flag officer representative from the Special Operations 
community on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
 
Certainly there are issues with the recommended approach suggested here.  
Such an oversight body, for example, may prove to be difficult to manage as a result of 
the relatively large size of the group, as the research in group theory and collective action 
predicts.  This drawback is somewhat countered by our experience with the positive 
results achieved by the Marine Corps as they integrated their S&T workforce with ONR: 
a highly integrated workforce has been demonstrated to be very effective for the Marine 
Corps. 
b. Civilian Relationships 
On the civilian side a Director of Naval Research and Development 
(DNRD) would be responsible for developing programs to address the military 
requirements developed by the CNR.  The DNRD would be responsible to interface with 
the Congress regarding resourcing the technical component of the DoN S&T portfolio.  
The DNRD should, by whatever means deemed most appropriate, establish closer 
collaboration agreements with other national stakeholder organizations.  As a suggestion, 
it is envisioned the DNRD would maintain a collaboration staff consisting of the 
following suggested membership: 
Chief Scientist – Ensures technical quality of all work being funded.  This 
would be a senior technologist or administrator serving on a rotational 
basis (5 year max). 
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Director of Research – Responsible for the BA1 portfolio.  This would be 
a senior administrator selected from the US University system on a (2-3) 







Director of Applied Research – Responsible for the BA2 portfolio.  This 
would be a senior technology development manager taken from one of the 
NRE organizations on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
Director of Advanced Development – Responsible for the BA3 portfolio.  
This would be a Senior Manager from Industry performing a civic service 
on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
Director of Acquisition Relations – Responsible to coordinate transitions 
into DoN acquisition programs.  This would be a senior member from a 
PEO on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
Director for Joint Operations – Responsible to coordinate naval 
development programs into a joint service demonstration.  This would be a 
senior representative selected from another Service on a (2-3) year 
rotational basis. 
Director for Legislative Operations – Responsible to coordinate naval 
development programs with the legislative branch of Congress.  This 
would be a senior representative selected from the legislative community 
on a (2-3) year rotational basis. 
 
Such a staff would provide a much higher degree of awareness, 
communication and coordination of the DoN S&T portfolio among the major stakeholder 
constituents.  In this organizational architecture the DNRD would have technical and 
fiduciary responsibilities. 
c. Congressional Interface 
In response to the increasing influence of congressional actions on the 
DoN S&T account a more proactive management interface should be established in order 
to interface more effectively and instill increased confidence in ONR’s ability to execute 
programs and resources more reliably.   
 
4. FNC Process Changes 
The use of S&T resources to “plus-up” current acquisition programs, used as the 
primary technology transition mechanism for the FNC Process, is an inappropriate use of 
scarce naval S&T resources and should not continue at current levels.  As the FNC 
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Process continues to be reviewed and evaluated within the DoN, consideration should be 
given to additional process changes that would take more of a “business” approach–one 
that provides a more direct and tangible link to the warfighting customer–to the 
technology transition process.  In response to guidance by OSD to address 
interoperability and joint service warfighting operational needs it is recommended that as 
new FNC investment areas are considered an entirely new approach be considered on a 
test case basis.  Such a test case would allocate an appropriate level of FNC resources 
($50M/year over the FYDP) to establish a single joint FNC intending to focus on joint 
operational needs.   
This joint FNC would remove OPNAV from the Requirements-establishment 
position (i.e., Chair of the IPT) but leave them with their (financial) Resources 
responsibility.  Establishment of the joint FNC capability program requirements would be 
the responsibility of the customer, a designated Combatant Commander (CoCOM) or 
Joint Task Force Commander who would take ownership of the joint FNC Process, 
program development and capability demonstration.  Such a process change is desired 
since it is the CoCOM, or Joint Task Force Commander, who has the responsibility to 
integrate service capabilities into a coherent joint force.   
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) supports the 
capabilities-based technology transition process, from a Joint Forces level.  JCIDS 
appears to be a customer-focused, top-down process that would generate Joint Forces 
Enabling Capabilities (ECs) that support the Functional Capability Boards (FCBs).  A 
joint FNC would be aligned with the ECs and resource programs to respond to the EC’s 
and the applicable FCBs. 
This approach would help to focus a number of current S&T investments on a 
specific, identifiable customer.  For example, DoN S&T Science Advisors, already 
stationed at several Joint Force Commands would provide local S&T connectivity and 
help facilitate dialog between Command personnel and the applicable components of the 
NRE. 
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Changing the FNC Process in such a way should help to focus all joint FNC 
efforts to respond to an identifiable customer’s joint warfighting capability needs.  A 
significant level of investment would be dedicated to transitioning new capabilities to an 
operational joint force in a much more organized, coordinated, efficient and effective 
manner.  Doing so would demonstrate the DoN’s ability to participate fully and 
contribute meaningful naval-focused technology solutions to our joint forces in a much 
more rapid manner. 
 
5. Budget Stability 
The entire S&T Program, certainly the FNC component of the S&T Program at a 
minimum, should be funded at an appropriate resource level and, once this has been 
done, isolated to the maximum extent possible from serious funding instabilities over a 
designated performance time frame (i.e., the FYDP). 
 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Workforce Composition Analysis 
There is a wealth of literature available that researches successful organizations 
and what it takes to be successful.  Even with this abundance of resource material the 
ability to overcome organizational obstacles remains elusive.  Although there were very 
clear indications found in a variety of resources that the people are the determining factor 
in successful organizations there was very little literature found on an analysis of the 
composition of successful organizations (corporate or government) from a human 
resources perspective.  It is quite possible that many of our organizations falter because 
of poor workforce utilization practices and an inability to move personnel to more 
appropriate positions and responsibility or eventual termination, if necessary.  A 
comparative detailed study of the workforce compositions of (successful and 
unsuccessful) select commercial, non-profit, military and civilian organizations would be 




2. IPT Decision Dynamics 
The literature search provided only a glimpse at some of the past research 
conducted on group behavior, game theory, and collective action issues.  The experience 
of participants in the FNC Process suggest that additional research is needed to architect 
an IPT which will be able to accomplish the group decision-making objectives desired.  
An examination of previous thesis’ and other relevant research material revealed not 
much was known about the group dynamics, process governance and decision making in 
the acquisition communities IPT construct as was being implemented by the Navy for the 
FNC Process.  Although the field is rich with research of a general nature, the 
requirements for core group effectiveness and the dynamics of the relationships among 
group members, non-core group members and non-members are not fully understood by 
those within the DoN for the IPT group decision-making model.  A greater understanding 
of these aspects of group theory is essential and would be a valuable contribution for the 
formation and management of future IPTs. 
 
3. FNC Transitions 
In spite of the enormous effort in restructuring the DoN S&T portfolio to apply 
resources to meet the near-term needs of our operational forces, there is a clear 
perception that these changes made have had little to no actual impact on the warfighter 
or the advancement of any future naval warfighting capabilities.  Arguably, the FNC 
Process was too new to accurately assess the results of its initial implementation phase 
(POM02 project selections) but these projects should be tracked and an analysis of the 
IPT transition track record should be undertaken. 
 
4. Supply Chain Utilization Cost-Benefit Analysis 
There was sufficient evidence found in the literature that proper utilization of a 
sector’s “supply chain” is essential for effective and efficient operations for the 
commercial sector.  The laboratory, military research center, and university components 
of the Navy’s technical resource enterprise – the Naval Resource Enterprise – continues 
to be underutilized by the DoN.  This trend to underutilize our laboratories has not been 
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limited to the Navy but is occurring nationwide and is severely limiting the utility and 
effectiveness of the affected laboratories and research centers at a time when there are a 
number of national security and science and engineering educational shortfalls starting to 
attract national attention.  An accurate cost-benefit analysis of the utilization of the DoN 
NRE components would be very valuable. 
 
5. FNC Participation Costs 
A more complete cost-benefit analysis regarding the costs of participation in the 
FNC Process is another area for study.  What is the full cost of IPT membership?  What 
affect would the assessment of annual fees have on FNC program participation?  What 
are the R&D “extraction” costs? What are the R&D implementation costs?  How can 
these costs be measured?  How can the value of member benefits be quantified?  How do 
R&D costs vary across an IPT portfolio and across the NRE community?  At what point 
would the cost of serving member needs exceed their fees?  Although the precise 
measurement of these metrics would be difficult to accomplish a greater understanding of 
the critical variables would prove very useful. 
 
6. Cost Analysis Model 
The primary assumption of this thesis was that continuously rising development, 
acquisition and life cycle costs have contributed greatly to the push by DoD to require the 
Navy to operate more “like a business” in the hope of recapitalizing any cost savings 
realized.  It is not clear, however, that the Navy has a sufficient grasp of the various 
contributing components to a total cost equation for a weapon system or even a clear 
description of the individual components that contribute to such a cost equation.  It would 
be useful to develop an accurate DoN cost analysis model for weapon systems 
(submarines, satellites, aircraft, etc).  Such a model(s) would prove beneficial for the 




 7. Time-To-Market 
The desire to transition new technical capabilities to the warfighter in a much 
more rapid timeframe was a major impetus behind DoD’s many acquisition reform 
initiatives over the past twenty years.  This emphasis was also a contributing factor in the 
restructuring of the DoN S&T account and the implementation of the FNC technology 
transition process.  Such reform policies included the mandated use of commercial 
business practices and the devolution of civilian-military technical design authority to the 
commercial sector as being necessary to deliver products of lower cost and higher quality 
in a much more accelerated manner (because of superior commercial business practices 
and market efficiencies).  In spite of the substantial measures undertaken there is 
evidence that DoN continues to fail to realize the benefits desired.  Military weapons 
systems still take many more years to achieve IOC than initial plans called for at 
development costs which continue to climb and are measured in the billions of dollars.  A 
study of the issues, experiences and relevant factors involved in accelerating the time-to-
market (TTM) for DoN weapons systems would be very worthwhile. 
 
8. ROI Assessment 
A credible assessment of the return on investment (ROI) for Navy S&T 
investments is an area of significant interest.  The technology development process is 
fractured such that an accurate traceability of the technology investments (financial 
levels, funding sources, technical objectives, project durations and timeframes) is 
extremely difficult at best. 
 
9. Technology Readiness Levels 
This research indicates the usefulness of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) is 
less than desirable.  The usefulness is greatly limited by a number of significant concerns 
that have to do with the quality of the technical expertise, quality, rigor, independence of 
the assessor.  The resulting TR levels are considered to be approximations and there is 
some variability possible due to differences in the specific application of the technology 
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being assessed.  Because TRLs are being viewed within DoD (and elsewhere, such as 
NASA) as an important metric of technical maturity and readiness these assessments 
warrant further study. 
 
10. Joint Technology Transition Process 
This thesis suggests the DoN FNC portfolio support programs that would provide 
future naval capability demonstrations to joint service commands but does not explore the 
details of such a process in any depth.  Gaining an understanding of the various interfaces 
and technology transition process between the joint warfighting environment and the 
Naval warfighting environments would be invaluable to the development of such a 
change to the FNC technology transition process. 
 
E. AFTERWORD 
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) has undergone a number of significant 
changes over the last several years.  In fact, ONR has undergone major personnel and 
organizational changes during the period this thesis was written and being edited.  The 
FNC Process, in particular, has also experienced significant process changes during the 
period this thesis was being written and completed.  I have chosen to exclude those 
organizational and planning process changes that were implemented beyond the period of 
relevance for this thesis.   
The omission of recent process changes raises some concern over the possibility 
that the results of this thesis might be obsolete by the time it is released.  The issues 
examined by this thesis, however, are so important, complex and difficult to address – let 
alone resolve – that the results of this thesis are likely to remain relevant for some time 
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APPENDIX A: FNC SURVEY RESPONSES 
Surveys were electronically mailed to personnel within the DoN community who 
participated in the FNC Process.  This section of the appendix provides the individual 
survey responses from each of the four major stakeholder communities for the FNC 
Process; OPNAV, Science & Technology, Acquisition and the Fleet/Forces (military 
warfighter) communities.  The responses, underlined in the text that follows, are unedited 
except in such cases where information provided might have identified the respondent.  
In those few cases the response was edited only to the extent needed to help maintain 
confidentiality.   
The survey responses were grouped according to how the respondents categorized 
themselves (i.e., S&T community, Working Group support, etc).  In those cases where 
responders provided multiple support categories a determination was made as to which 
stakeholder community was most appropriate for that individual (to avoid double-
counting responses across different stakeholder communities).  Within a stakeholder 
group the survey order (first, second, etc.) is random. 
For this appendix the survey responses are sequentially arranged in the following 
order: OPNAV community responses, S&T community responses, Acquisition 
community responses and Warfighter (Fleet/Force) community responses.  This order 
was taken to reflect the general transition pipeline of requirements definition, technology 
development, acquisition program and deployment to the user, the warfighter. 
The following statement accompanied each survey sent out: 
This survey is being used as a part of a study of the DoN’s technology 
transition processes.  The Future Naval Capability (FNC) process is being 
used is an example of a newly established technology transition process.  
Completion of the survey is completely voluntary.  Thank you in advance 
for any time and effort you can provide in support of this study.  
ALL SURVEY RESPONSES WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL! 
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A. OPNAV COMMUNITY RESPONSES 
 
1. Response OP-1 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process? - OPNAV 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community? - Yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community? – Minimal 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process? - Minimally 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations? – Not very 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned? - No 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to? – Those programs that already had the 
funds 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs? – Beats the S**t out of me 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned? – Zero growth 
budgets 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule? - No 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs? – Don’t know 
• Are any of the IPT products funded jointly (other service or agency?) – Don’t know 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective? - No 
• How are decisions  made in your IPT? – The one with the most stars wins 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT? – Every 6 months 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected? – Existing ONR projects 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs? - No 




• Are you informed of IPT meetings? - No 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings? – Not since I left N7X 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)? - ? 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings? - ? 
If No, which communities regularly participate? - ? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information? - Sometimes 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information? – From Deputy PM 
• Is there any info you need but do not have? – Not sure, don’t know what I don’t know 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) – Almost never 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website? - Minimal 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives? – every 6 months 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process? - No 
• What has worked? – S&T program was defended against OPNAV attack 
• What has not worked? – Redirecting ONR funding toward needs 




2. Response OP-2 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Principally, the acquisition community 
is the immediate customer.  They are the folks who must take the result of the S&T 
and “engineer” or design the technology into a system or component so that 
technology can benefit the warfighter.  In that sense, the warfighter becomes the 
“ultimate” customer, but the acquisition community is the immediate customer. 
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• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  I personally think that I’m well aware of the original goals and 
objectives of the FNCs. However, the current FNC goals and objectives are somewhat 
confusing and those goals, objectives, processes and overall FNC background are 
very poorly understood within my community of warfare requirements. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  The impact so far is 
that we are expending a large amount of effort which appears to have little return on 
investment.  We participate in a unending chain of reviews and nothing ever seems to 
change except for a reduction to the FNC funding and their associated program cuts.  
However, we’ve got to remember that the FNCs only started in FY-02.  So it’s 
unreasonable to judge the output of a process which has not had sufficient time to 
generate an output. 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  This community engages the 
FNCs generally through the SUBTECH process and through participation in the 
N706 and pillar assessments. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  The FNC Process 
is critical to maintaining our technological edge.  Unfortunately, in its 
implementation, the FNCs have not focused effectively on meeting our needs.  So, the 




• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  No, I don’t think that we 
predict transitions very well.  However, I think that most of the work will transition 
… just not as planned. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Programs transition to 6.4 and 6.5 
R&D. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  It varies by IPT. Some (such as TOC) do a 
“return on investment” analysis so their metric is dollars.  Others rely on warfighter 
assessment of greatest need.  Still other IPTs accept the ONR program manager input 
without much questioning.  
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Inability to 
maintain stability in personnel (at OPNAV principally) and budget processes that 
don’t allow for the introduction of new things easily (sorry … that’s probably two 
things). 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  No. The TRLs for 
transition have a fairly wide spread.  Different communities have different standards 
that they are used to in accepting transitions. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  There are only two cases of 
any significance where a product relies on contributions from two FNCs.  ATT has 
the weapon and the sensor in two different FNCs and turbine engine technology is 
funded in two places.  However, there are a large number of dependencies in the 
sense that, for example, time critical strike relies on developments in KSA for there to 
be an overall improvement in strike capability.  In fact, KSA provides the comms for 
many other developments to be utilized effectively. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded jointly (other service or agency?)  Yes, there are 




• Some have; others are not (I’ve been on 5 IPTs).  Some 
used to be effective but have become ineffective over time. It all seems to depend on 
the willingness of the Chair to spend the time to listen and exercise judgment to 
actively manage the program.  The good IPTs have chairs that invest the effort and 
strive to get a balanced OPNAV input.  The bad ones rubber stamp the ONR 
execution manager program without even bothering to synthesize the overall OPNAV 
input. 
Has the IPT been effective?  
• Varies … consensus in some while its directed 
in others.  The charter for IPTs specifies that they act through consensus but it would 
appear that most chairs don’t understand that concept. 
How are decisions made in your IPT?  
• On average, I’d say 
that there is a change to each IPT every six months.  Certainly, it’s rare today to find 
anyone who can remember why or how the program was initially formulated in any 
FNC. The most stable element (the N911 rep) has now officially disappeared so there 
is absolutely no corporate memory on any of the IPTs. 
How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  . Varies
• There was a process that N911 
was going to implement but now that there is no N911 there isn’t anyone who knows 
what we intended to do. But, in a nutshell, there were funds set aside beginning in 
FY-06 to begin new FNCs. Selection of new FNCs was scheduled to support the 
POM-06 process.  This was also necessary to let the FNCs startup and see where the 
problems were before committing any additional funds.  This could have been a 
hedge against any sever execution problems in the existing FNCs.  By the way, most 
people would reply that there was not a process … They are wrong.  There most 
definitely was and there was a funding set-aside.  But there was absolutely no reason 
to advertise a process which wasn’t going to be implemented until the POM-06.  I’ll 
never understand why people assume that something doesn’t exist just because THEY 
are not made aware of it!  But all of that planning is in the trash heap.  Short answer is 
that there was a process but there doesn’t seem to be one today. 
Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  4
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  No longer sit on any IPTs. 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes; many many many! 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  N/A 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  NO! And they shouldn’t. 
IPT members attend IPT meetings.  If the members are doing their jobs, they are 
getting community input BEFORE they sit down at an IPT meeting. 
If No, which communities regularly participate?  IPT members participate in IPT 




• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  No 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  ONR execution managers 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Yes 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) NEVER. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  USELESS 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Monthly 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  NO, but it is an improvement 
over the pre-FNC ways of doing business. 
• What has worked?  OPNAV leadership is correct but the IPTs are at too high a level 
to devote the time necessary.  There is far more visibility into the S&T program today 
than there was 5 years ago. 
• What has not worked?  Funding of FNCs has been a dismal failure from the 
beginning.  Too many FNCs were funded so they have inadequate resources. This 
was a basic failure to downselect at the start.  OPNAV leadership is the right thing 
but it’s at too high a level to spend the time required to make intelligent oversight 
decisions.  IPTs don’t hold ONR responsible for their execution.  ONR spends too 
much on an inflated and unnecessary FNC bureaucracy.  Too many people now have 
to do separate reviews because there is no single S&T oversight organization in 
OPNAV to coordinate reviews.  Too many people try to apply their parochial 
standards to the FNCs and don’t ever bother to concern themselves with the scope of 
the S&T that Navy has to pursue to fulfill it’s widely varying missions. 




These surveys always make me exceedingly nervous because you are bound to accept the 
answers of the uninformed and the ignorant along with the knowledgeable and you 
probably can’t distinguish between them.  So, a “correct” response can be buried 
(statistically) by a whole rash of people who have an emotional reaction based on 
rumor and innuendo but no real knowledge.  So, I really prefer an interview format to 
these surveys because you can explore the basis of the subject’s responses.  I suspect 
that most of your respondents have no knowledge of the objectives and goals nor any 
knowledge of the initial charge by VADM Pilling to N091 to initiate the process.  In 
fact, most folks in ONR were completely unaware of what N911 was up to with 
respect to FNCs for roughly the first six to eight months of effort.  Only Saalfeld and 
Gaffney were knowledgeable of everything that was being done.  This void has been 
filled by urban legends which are not even remotely accurate. 
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3. Response OP-3 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  / Requirements  / Acquisition  / Resources   / Fleet Rep  / Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  / Working Group  / Project level  / Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  The acquisition community.  The 
acquisition community owns the process to deliver capability to the Fleet.  The Fleet 
is the end user. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Yes (resources).  ONR has not followed through on the execution and 
delivery of the S&T product.  Hence all of the questions by OPNAV and associated 
reductions. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Delayed the 
reduction of S&T dollars in the budget cycle.  The concept of maintaining a level-
funding stream to reduce the burden on managers of efforts was one of the pillars of 
the FNCs.  Yet, ONR has routinely reduced dollars available to the FNCs to execute.  
Why is that – OPNAV has not reduced the dollars available to FNCs.  Where are 
those funds being diverted and how are they being better used to support the 
customer? 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Overall FNC resource sponsor 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  A means to 




• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  No.  Unfortunately the 
ONR taxing schedule and fees have delayed or eliminated a significant number of the 
original transitions.  The taxes have caused the FNCs to cancel, rescope or alter the 
program plans under false fiscal requirements. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Pet projects or politically inspired.  
The “ranking” process has been explained away with arm waving; not sound analysis. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?   
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  ONR siphoning 
off funds to pay “taxes”.  The funding reductions have required the IPTs to change 
scope, cancel project and delayed delivery and timeframes. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Project maturity.  ONR 
has allowed the efforts to be turned over at TRLs greater than prescribed by the BA 
level.  This was done in most cases to persuade the acquisition community that the 
technology solution will meet their requirements. 
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• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Not any more.  As soon as 
the taxes were levied those were the first efforts to be dropped. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency?)  A couple that 
are politically or pet projects (IHPTET, AAAV, UCAV-N, ….). 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  Yes.  It has brought the 3 communities together 
(Acquisition, OPNAV, S&T).  I did not include the “Fleet” as I believe their 
investment horizon is based in the acquisition community and not in the FNCs.  The 
FNCs are a 2-10 year delivery window to the Fleet after technology transition to the 
acquisition community. 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  Consensus.  Much discussion on the 
ramifications of the decisions.  Lately though, since Dec 02, it has been done 
somewhat unilaterally by ONR.  The remaining IPT members have been lead along 
with the “short” fuse responses. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  The TOC chair, S&T 
Lead and Resource Sponsor has remained the same since the inception of the IPT.  
The acquisition rep has changed three times (averaging about 13 months).  LASW has 
rotated quite a bit.  AO has rotated quite a bit. 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected? 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  No.  The cut list from the 
original submitted program is an excellent starting point. 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  None.  It’s 
been a fight to keep what was in the program in 00, 01, 02, and 03. 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Yes 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes. 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  Started out weekly, then monthly, 
then every two months.  Now it’s about 3-6 months. 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Yes.  Either in person or 
VTC. 




• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  What is the definition of 
relevant?  Many of the S&T initiatives to address the capability shortfalls were ONR 
efforts to begin with.  I am not aware of any executed effort that was not funded by 
ONR in 2001.  The acquisition community representatives are not involved in the 
issuant of BAAs or evaluating the proposals.  So the short answer would be no. 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information? 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  A complete disclosure of the accounting.  
For an example:  Why are BA01,02 & 03 funds (FNC) being used to pay for 
contractors, IPAs, etc in the management of the FNCs?   
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  NO!  The important 
information is/was removed by ONR comptroller (hardly an open book) since it was 
considered not in the best interest of ONR to have an audit trail (funds, decisions, 
history and free thought). 




• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  The vision has been tainted and 
it’s back to business as usual. 
• What has worked?  The establishment of the communication channels amongst the 
communities.  The strength of the Acquisition & Resources communities to remain 
engaged throughout the process despite the fictitious fiscal environment they have 
been exposed to.   
• What has not worked?  Having one and two star admirals justify their decisions (IPT 
programs) to 0-6s; Any and all taxes levied.  These were allocated in the plan; Navy 
dollars funding USMC programs at expense of Navy programs; FNC funding 
accounted for less than 30% of Navy S&T account (BA 01/02/03).  So what is the 
other 70% being spent on?; Stovepiping of product lines within the IPT selection 
process; Inability of the principals to look outside of their respective domains (ships 




ONR Management Costs: ONR receives roughly $50M per year outside of the S&T 
budget to pay for the management of assigned S&T programs; including personnel 
salaries.  The establishment of the FNCs did not result in any change to the total 
amount of funds that ONR presently manages.  The FNCs efforts presently account 
for less than 30% of the entire N091 funds managed by ONR.  There was a 
significant reduction in terms of the number of individual efforts performed with the 
FNC allocated dollars.  It is therefore reasonable to expect that ONR could manage 
the FNC allocated funds with roughly the same number of personnel; which was 
possible prior to the FNC establishment.  Nevertheless, they have seen fit to increase 
staffing by setting up a fairly robust additional management structure for the FNCs.  
Rather than reassigning current ONR personnel to fill these positions, they have 
elected to bring in a substantial number of IPAs, contractors and detailees.  These 
people are then charges to the dollars allocated for the various FNC projects for 
which they are to manage.  A quick perusal of the ONR phonebook indicates a large 
number of personnel in the organization who are listed as detailees, NRL employees 
or IPAs; all of whom are funded from S&T funds regardless of their function within t 
he organization. 
 
In an environment where S&T dollars and their associated buying power has been on the 
decline, ONR is exacerbating the problem by diverting S&T execution funds to an 
increasing amount S&T management funds.  This management initiative results in 
fewer research dollars leaving Ballston Tower.  Further, it is almost impossible to 
track the amount of dollars involved since the detailee and IPA funds can look just 
like project funds sent to a Warfare Center or UARC.  This is a significant drawdown 
of critical funding which the resource sponsor expected to be available for the actual 
conduct of S&T efforts versus salaries.  Only now are the FNC IPTs beginning to 
ascertain the reduction in FNC transitions that can be supported due to this whittling 
away of the dollars.  When coupled with the expenses for the new unfounded FNCs 
and the “other” withholds, there is a significant reduction in FNC productivity and 
capabilities lost. 
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4. Response OP-4 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  / Requirements  / Acquisition  / Resources   / Fleet Rep  / Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  / Working Group  / Project level  / Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Warfighter 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community? Yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community? 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process? 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations? 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned? No 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to? 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs? 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Industry NIH, 
schedule slips & better tech alternatives. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule? 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs? Not in TCS 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)? Not in TCS 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  Good dialog but execution objective still weak. 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  Collectively? 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Quarterly 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected? 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  Not during my stay. 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)? 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings? yes 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings? yes 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)? every 6 weeks 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings? yes 




• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information? yes 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information? To IPT reps 
• Is there any info you need but do not have? A true prioritization of requirements. 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) monthly 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website? wrt FNC – not 
updated. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives? weekly 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process? Initially – sort of, later – no. 
• What has worked? Getting the stakeholders together. 
• What has not worked? ONR appears to do what it wants. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?   
Getting visibility into ONR decision-making/results. 
 
Additional Comments 
Answers reflect July 99 to July 00 timeframe.  Respondent not actually involved in 
FNC’s since then. 
There still remains an element of “game playing” which appears to be motivated to 
secure the most $$ vs. what’s right for the fleet. 
Over-emphasis on transition – transition argument is disingenuous.  Needs to be revisited 
& redefined.  Evidence of S&T product in Acq community POM submittal 
unrealistic.  Few current important capabilities were 1st driven by a requirement. 
Last thought on transition – it has been said that there is insufficient resources in Navy 
Acquisition TOA to truly transition the number of products pursued by the FNC 
program. 
If ONR wants to transition it should look at its current set of 6.3 products and begin 
packaging these to solve acquisition community needs. 
 282
5. Response OP-5 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
Exposure and participation in the FNC Process was related to a 2 year assignment 
(2000 to 2002) as a Technology Advisor to an OPNAV Warfare Directorate. 
 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
Actively engaged with the Time Critical Strike FNC, with some collateral support to 
the Knowledge Superiority & Assurance, Autonomous Operations, and Littoral 
Combat & Power Projection FNC’s. 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  The operational forces are the ultimate 
customer and there was reasonable effort by the FNC managers to “connect” with the 
operational forces.  However, the response and participation back from that customer 
community did not meet the needs of the FNC programs.  OPNAV (N7 
Requirements) were expected to plan and facilitate the transition of FNC products for 
the operational forces. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  The FNC managers made a reasonable effort to educate the OPNAV 
staffs and operational force representative on the FNC program.  Site visits and 
program planning review opportunities were planned and coordinated. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Limited.  FNC 
transition planning should have been a primary item of interest and would require 
action officers to develop detail for the outyears in the FYDP.  OPNAV Staff were 
primarily interested in the current budget year and the next POM/PR cycle (2 yrs).  
Getting OPNAV requirement officers to look beyond this period is very difficult and 
outyear plans could be classified as placeholders with limited detail.  A number of 
factors contributed to this – The constant budget churn “why bother with detailed 
long range plans when the current plan changes weekly”, requirement officer (aka 
action officers) training where most of them rotate in from a fleet assignment and get 
little or no training on the PPBS process, and the constant rotation of officers where 
they arrive with 3 yr orders but typically get slated for the next assignment and are 
either physically transferred or are engaged in the training pipeline for their next 
assignment within 18mos. 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  From my experience, the 
requirement officers did not engage  the FNC Process unless they were prompted by 
leadership.  Engagement is defined as “Attend the meeting, File the brief, and resume 
normal activity”.  Follow on activity was very limited until prompted by leadership to 
attend the next meeting/brief or to provide an update on activity. 
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• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Very important, 
however, based on the level of transition requirement planning activity the FNC 
Process was not taken very seriously. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  No. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Limited attempts to fit them into the 
outyear budget plan for existing product lines.  Significant resistance in establishing 
new program element lines within the budget to service the needs related to FNC 
product transition. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Direct language for FNC product transition 
in the R2 budget displays was the primary desired metric. 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  See discussion 
on outyear planning and requirement officer training & rotation.  In addition,  there 
was competition between product improvement plans for existing system being 
promoted by the acquisition community (PEO’s and Defense Contractors) and the 
transition of FNC products.  Risk avoidance and requirement officer reliance on the 
PEO’s to provide the detail to respond to budget drills typically resulted in the FNC 
transition being pushed aside. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Yes, in the form of 
MOU’s, transition sponsorship letters, etc.  However, most of the agreements 
contained language that served as an escape clause should a later decision be made 
not to support the transition. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Yes. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)?  Do not recall. 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  To some degree.  The IPTs provided the forum to sort 
out the detail on enabling capabilities which gave some guidance to the technical 
community on what needed to be developed and demonstrated.  The IPT did little to 
engage the budget and program plans required to ensure transition of successful 
technology products. 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  Meetings coordinated by ONR IPT reps, 
where if the organization (N76, N77, N78, etc) the had primary responsibility over a 
specific task within the FNC was present then a productive session was held.  Quite 
often the actual member of the IPT was not available do to calendar conflicts and 
either did not show or a representative was sent without decision authority.  This 
required ONR reps to follow up and work the issue one-on-one outside the IPT. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Some members were in 
place for extended periods (ONR and Acquisition Reps), while others turned over 
often (CFFC, OPNAV, MCCDC). 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  Not sure what this means. 
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• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  There was an extensive process 
that established the initial FNC programs and the elements within.  However, the 
result could be viewed as a reshuffle of the existing 6.2 & 6.3 programs and the 
addition of a few new submissions. 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  None 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Email & Phone Call. 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings? Yes 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  2 or 3 times per year. 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  No 
• If No, which communities regularly participate?  See note on IPT Decision question. 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  In general yes, depended on the 
ONR program manager methods and communication skill.  Some did very well, 
others did not. 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  To the specific program 
manager that is responsible.  Some kept websites up with key information while 
others had no website or let the info on the website lapse. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  If you knew the FNC organizational 
structure and proper POC information, you could always get the needed info. 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  See note on Where do you go to get FNC Info. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  See note on Where do 
you go to get FNC Info.  For those sites that were kept up with current info it was an 
excellent method and source for information. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  At the time, I 
made contact on a weekly basis. 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  I felt that the process was a 
significant improvement over the previous methods used to execute 6.2 and 6.3 
programs. 
• What has worked?  The implementation of the process in general.  Provides the 
opportunity to the various communities to participate in the identification and review 
process of establishing FNC projects, to track project performance, and to plan for 
transition.  Improved the alignment of ONR programs. 
• What has not worked?  The active and meaningful participation from the OPNAV 
requirements community and operational force representatives.  The opportunity was 
presented, however I do not feel that they engaged at the level required. 
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• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  Aligned the 6.2 & 6.3 efforts 
with warfighter capability needs and attempted to place emphasis on transition of 
products and technology. 
 
Additional Comments 
Please note that these are personal observations based upon my awareness of activities 
around me.  
 
The lack of well defined roadmaps that provide a detailed plan from Discovery to De-Mil 
(birth to death) hinders the FNC Process.  Resources were not being applied to 
develop the level of detail required to perform proper analysis and complete trade off 
studies need for a defendable investment plan.  Many of the individuals assigned to 
these tasks work them as collateral duty assignments where the needs of their primary 
assignments quite often push the off on the back burner where they are only 
addressed when an “interrupt” goes off.  In this mode the “path of least resistance” 
with the lowest risk is applied as the primary decision tool.  Result – roadmaps full of 
holes and limited transition activity.  Hopefully, the Mission Capability Package 
approach that was standing up as I was finishing my tour has evolved and might 
provide a fix. 
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B. S&T COMMUNITY RESPONSES 
 
1. Response ST-1 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the “customer” for the FNC Process?  Excellent question.  From the Lab 
perspective, the “customer,” unmistakably, is ONR. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  I think there has been some attempt at explanation, but the “goals and 
objectives” often seem to be overshadowed by the process (which, again from a Navy 
Lab perspective, seems to have been organized to benefit certain key favored 
industries, consulting firms, or business organizations). 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Quite a dampening 
effect.  In theory, the FNC Process should “focus” efforts on identified requirements; 
in practice, the focus of resources (i.e., money) on key favored industrial partners 
seems to have frozen or eliminated a significant portion of Navy Lab S&T work. 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  My community responded to 
the FNC Call for Proposals, but despite high-level, organized engagement, was not 
particularly successful at cornering a significant share of the work.  This has resulted 
in the perspective alluded to, two questions above. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?   Insofar as a large 
fraction of S&T funding now seems tied to the FNCs, I guess the answer has to be 
that it is very important.  No doubt, many in the S&T community right now would 
like to see a reduction of emphasis on the FNCs and a broadening of opportunities. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  I could only speculate on 
this.  I have no doubt that the PIs of the respective projects are confident, as they 
should be – but as to whether the programs will, realistically speaking, transfer on-
time, within budget, etc., I really cannot say. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  In theory, the programs should be 
transitioned to the Fleet/Force.  In practice, I have not seen an adequate explanation 
off the planned transitions. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Have not seen any published metrics. 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Are you 
referring to the FNCs, or technology transition in general?  If the latter, I would guess 
 287
the biggest obstacle is that, by the time the technology is ready to transfer, it is 
already seriously out of date.  At the same time, as delivered, it is often poorly 
designed and executed (from a Human Factors perspective). 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  (This question, and many 
that follow, are not relevant to me) 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs? 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)? 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective? 
• How are decisions made in your IPT? 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT? 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected? 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs? 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)? 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Generally, no. 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes – but infrequently. 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)? 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings? 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  This is a significant challenge 
in the S&T area.  My lab is continually working to identify means of improving 
information flow.  We are not, in my opinion, at a point where we can rest 
comfortably and say that we have achieved optimal communication. 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  Often, directly (personally) 
from ONR. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Interesting question.  Here’s another, in 
like vein:  What do you need to know that you do not currently know that you need to 
know? 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  Occasionally. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Moderate to good. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Occasionally. 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  As indicated above, from my 
perspective within the Navy Lab system, the FNC system has not been an unalloyed 
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success.  Personally speaking, I can certainly understand and applaud the goals of the 
FNC Process – to focus resources on identified requirements.  From a practical 
perspective, I am less than confident that it is working as well as it should. 
• What has worked?  The concept is a good one. 
• What has not worked?  The people I know in the labs are not sanguine that the 
process has been clearly articulated or properly executed.  Furthermore, a non-trivial 
portion of the labs’ work has been shut out due to lack of funding.  Although I cannot 
speak for everyone, the entire FNC Process seemed to materialize virtually overnight 
and to starve many competing programs.  This perception is, no doubt, at least in part 
a byproduct of a less-than-successful program of communication. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  The notion that the Navy is 
willing to focus its resources on its most important Fleet/Force requirements.  At the 
same time, it is essential that all stakeholders in the Naval Research Enterprise clearly 
understand the importance of this undertaking and are onboard with the process as 




2. Response ST-2 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  My experience is limited, but I feel that 
the purpose of the FNCs is to demonstrate the maturity (and mature if necessary) of a 
particular technology or set of technologies to support their introduction into a SDD 
program either in total or in part. As such, the customer would be a PMA or PMS 
ultimately. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community? Yes. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  I think that the 
process has had little impact as yet. The primary reason for this comment is that it is 
too early in the FNC’s life to determine if it will successfully transition technology to 
programs. I’m also concerned that there lacks continuity between the 6.1 and 6.2 
world such that new concepts would flow from research up.  
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  We are currently helping to 
execute several projects. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  If their promise is 
kept, they could be an extremely important source of technology to feed new concept 
improvement and development. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  No. Almost the opposite 
although I’m doubtful that there is much the FNC Process can do about this. 
However, I’m am equally as confident that there exists opportunities for the 
technology demonstrated to find transitions outside of their plan. If the only metric 
used is the metric of meeting the planned transition, then there is a significant risk 
that the majority of the FNC’s contributions to systems will not be accounted for 
when measuring their value. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  I’ve yet to see one of the projects 
sponsored by an FNC transition directly to another project or program. I have a very 
limited perspective and experience base, so the above is not meant to be a strong 
statement. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  It appears to me that the only metric being 
used to date is the metric of direct transition as documented in the program execution 
plan. 
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• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  The system is 
not put together to easily accept technology generically demonstrated under the FNC 
program. Frankly, I feel that the system dis-incentivizes the transition. To try and 
quickly summarize, it is my opinion that the contractors working military systems are 
incentivized to fail as they continue to be paid for failure while success completes a 
program. As such, new technology that will improve things not specifically 
developed by the contractor is not easily inserted into a program being executed by a 
contractor. There are examples of this. If you wanted to significantly increase the 
percentage of transitions from the FNC to a program, choose only projects that are 
executed by contractors and that are a significant enhancement to an existing system 
such that they have it locked up and there is a large tail to bring it to fruition. This 
way they are incentivized to transition. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Yes and ideally it is 
documented in the program execution plan. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  I don’t know. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)?  I don’t know. 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  My limited experience with the IPTs indicate that they 
are adding a measure of what they were intended to although I’m not a big fan of the 
IPT process. 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  I’m not really in the know on this. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Again, I really don’t 
know. 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  I’ve seen several different ways this has 
happened. Ideally, there is a call for proposals with direction as to what is being 
looked for. Those proposals are evaluated and voted on by the IPT. I’ve seen this 
work fairly well, but I’ve also seen this process done in appearance only (in my 
opinion). 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  Not an official one that I am 
aware of. I think this is a really large problem with the FNCs as they have been 
locked up since the first programs were selected and thus do not have a viable way of 
introducing new concepts as need and execution changes. 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  A couple. 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  No. 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  No…I don’t think I’m invited. 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  I’m not a part of an IPT. 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Dunno. 




• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  N/A 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?   
I call the program manager or one of his/ her designees. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Yes. 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  Not often, but I have used it. Information seems 
old. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Too generic and old. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Often. 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  No. Without a viable way to 
insert new concepts, the process seems broken. Also, the level of taxation is too high. 
• What has worked?  Too early to tell. 
• What has not worked?  Too early to tell, but certainly the introduction of new 
programs is necessary if the FNC Process is to remain viable. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  Demonstration and 




3. Response ST-3 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  PEOS/SYSCOMS 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Explained from an ONR viewpoint. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Some positive as far 
as PORs go.  Not much in where we go beyond PORs.  
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Yes, via TTAs. 




• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Partially.  
Budget/Schedule fluctuations impact the best intentions. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  PORs 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Real “Metric” seems to be: does it have a 
TTA? 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Acquisition 
Managers lack of real interest. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Yes. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  I know of one: REDS. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency?)  None known. 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  No,  too many changes in “Leadership”. 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  OPNAV member decides with rest of IPT 
concurring. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Far too often. 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  S&T member brings in recommended list, IPT 
concurs. 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  Yes,  working level IPT ranks 
proposed new starts. 




• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Yes 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  Several times per year. 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Yes, in person or by VTC. 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  Not completely.  Have to find 
some of this myself. 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  Multiple sources. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Not sure. 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  Rarely. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Marginal. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Almost daily. 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  No. 
• What has worked?  Better linkage between S&T and Acquisition. 
• What has not worked?  Recognition of the interdependencies between FNCs and 
between multiple FNCs and PORs and how to address these. 




FNCs are, in effect, 12 new stovepipes. 
No real system view, emphasis is just on FNC EC to one aspect of a single POR. 
No planning beyond PORs and what FNC should look like for this. 
FNCs are not in step with Sea Power 21. 
FNCs don’t really look at joint world. 
No ONR IPT above the IPTs at the 12 FNC level. 
Lack of real OPNAV/SYSCOM/PEO interest in the FNC program. 
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4. Response ST-4 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Multiple: Requirements / Acquisition / 
Resources / Fleet 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community? 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process? 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations? 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Not confident wrt 
transitions 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Multiple SYSCOM programs 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Do not know 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  The 
transitioning technology competes with or threatens an on-going activity that has an 
entrenched constituency 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule? 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs? 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)? 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective? 
• How are decisions made in your IPT? 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT? 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected? 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs? 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)? 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings? 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings? 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)? 
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• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings? 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information? 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information? 
• Is there any info you need but do not have? 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website? 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives? 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process? 
• What has worked? 
• What has not worked? 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process? 
 
Additional Comments 
Have any of the FNC’s been judged to have failed and been terminated or had their 
“Board of Directors” replaced? 
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5. Response ST-5 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other--None 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Primary customer is the PMO to which 
technology will transition 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  S&T proposals to 
ONR now focus on identified FNC thrust areas; e.g., AO.   
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  As an outsider, my sense is 
that NAVAIR's S&T community, as a whole, does not seem to constructively engage 
with ONR in the FNC Process.  Engagement seems limited to those specific 
NAVAIR S&T practitioners who are funded by an FNC. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  FNCs fund a 
portion of NAVAIR's S&T base (I have no figures).  The FNC Process itself forces 




• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Discussions with some 
PMAs and S&T practitioners suggest that the general sense is that transition rates 
won't be noticeably better than before the FNC Process.  
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Don’t know 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Don’t know 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Two obstacles 
are (1) the difficulty in constructing a technology transition roadmap (i.e., identifying 
technology insertion opportunities for a platform or system), and (2) NIH; i.e., the 
difficulty in getting a contractor to transition a 'Navy' solution once matured.  
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Don’t know 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Don’t know 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)?  Don’t know 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  N/A 
• How are decisions  made in your IPT?  N/A 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  N/A 
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• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  N/A 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  N/A 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  N/A 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  N/A 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  N/A 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  N/A 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  N/A 
• If No, which communities regularly participate?  N/A 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  Yes 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  Website or ONR. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  No 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  2 -3 times a year 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Very limited; top-
level info. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  N/A 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  Can't comment. 
• What has worked?  Can't comment. 
• What has not worked?  Can't comment. 




6. Response ST-6 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  OPNAV, BUPERS, NETC, Fleet 
Training, SYSCOM PMA/PMS Offices 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  MPT Stakeholders 
are closer 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  EIPT 




• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Mostly 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  BUPERS, NETC, OSD ADL-CO-
LAB, L-M, ARC-I, SMMTT 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Focus has continually been on how to take 
cuts to the program. 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Stable S&T 
funding. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Yes, via TTAs. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Yes, also by KSA. 




• Has the IPT been effective?  Yes. 
• How are decisions  made in your IPT?  Voting of primary members. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  As military officers 
roll. 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  Via working groups. 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  Yes – sort of. 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  37.  Easily 




• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Yes. 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes. 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  6 months and e-mails constantly. 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Yes. 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  Yes. 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  ONR FNC support staff. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Yes, FY05 – FY09 ONR TOA $$ 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  Never 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  ?? 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Monthly. 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  Yes. 
• What has worked?  No. 
• What has not worked?  Rules keep changing, ONR does not really support all FNCs. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  The formation of the EIPT. 
 
Additional Comments 
• If you read the FNC documentation, the process is a good one.  In reality, though, 
ONR, N-091, TOG, etc., etc., keep pulling up the tree to check the roots. 
• ONR leadership has failed the FNC Process.  Witness the turnover in S&T leads.  
Instead of being held in high esteem by ONR, FNCs appear to be an obstacle to 
CNR’s plans. 
• Funding instability AND requirements for signed TTAs has left a bad taste in the 
mouths of our customers.  We’ve had to reneg on TTAs we’ve signed. 
• Stabilize the funding & stop reviewing us all the time.  Give us time to do some of the 
work! 
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7. Response ST-7 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Warfighter 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  YES 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Funding for tech 
transition 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Via ONR FNC managers 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Highly important 
to continue Technology advancement/demonstration 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  No 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Weapon Programs 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Transition Planning 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  NAVAIR 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  No 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Unknown 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency?)  No 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  Unknown 
• How are decisions made in your IPT? 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT? 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected? 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  No 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  2 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  No 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  No 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)? 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings? 
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If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  Yes 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  FNC ONR manager 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  No 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website?  Never 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website? 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives? 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  No 
• What has worked?  Yes, technology demos are still funded 
• What has not worked?  Program Dynamics 





C. ACQUISITION COMMUNITY RESPONSES 
 
1. Response ACQ-1 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the “customer” for the FNC Process?  The eventual user of the technology is 
the Sailor and Marine.  However, the most immediate customers are the PARMs [sic] 
and the Major Acquisition Program Managers. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Yes, but the explanation has not been consistent either over time or by 
presenter. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Little to no impact. 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  There are acquisition 
representatives as members of some of the FNCs and periodically Major Acquisition 
Program team members meet with FNC membership. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  On a day to day 
basis not very important.  However, on a long term basis it is one of the few places 
where new technology is being developed to an acceptable level of risk for insertion 
into acquisition programs. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  NO ! 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Many of the FNC programs are being 
transitioned to major ship programs. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs? 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  The state of the 
technology is not at the maturity level desired to sufficiently reduce risk and the DoD 
budgeting process does not allow major programs to budget for emergent technology 
insertion into programs.  Additionally prime systems integrators have little incentive 
to use new technology that does not increase their profits.  
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Sometimes but frequently 
not. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  YES 





• Has the IPT been effective?  N/A 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  N/A 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  N/A 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  N/A 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  N/A 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  N/A 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Seldom 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  N/A 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  N/A 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  New information is not pushed 
out very aggressively.  
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  FNC websites. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have? 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) At least once a week. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  The latency of the 
information does not make it very useful. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives? 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  NO 
• What has worked?  It has focused the Navy's applied research managed by ONR to 
some extent. 
• What has not worked?  Funding has not been stable nor of the amount originally 
planned when the FNC Process was started. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  Having points of contact for 




Technology transition is not an easy business and frankly does not appeal to the 
personality of many outstanding research scientists.  I believe it would enhance each 
of the FNCs if they had a transition advocate to help facilitate the "marketing" and 
identification of potential applications for the various technologies in development by 
the FNCs. 
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2. Response ACQ-2 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? Across most all FNCs 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project Level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Customers for FNC products are the 
PMs (in support of the warfighters) 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Early on (98) the theory was described.  Questions such as “how do new 
projects begin?” were deferred 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Some initial modest 
improvement in OPNAV participation (in FNC Chair role).  Some increased 
communication between PMAs and ONR FNC PMs.  In both cases, improvement has 
seemed to fade as people have turned over 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Engagement from competency 
technologists is mostly a “self help” approach.  Processes such as the ATRB attempts 
to match up future PMA needs and technology solutions and make this known to the 
FNCs. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Importance lies in 
the flow of money to conduct S&T.  For whatever reason, S&T funds are in decline 
and no where more than at the warfare centers.  FNC managers seem to be directing 
funding away from NAWC. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  In the case of signed 
TTAs, confidence is higher.  Lack of regular and ongoing comm[unication]s puts 
even these agreements at risk. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  PMAs 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  This has never been well explained (or 
consistent across all FNCs).  TTAs should not be the only measure. 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  As before, lack 
of comms with transition sponsor 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  My view is that some of 
this exists but on a case by case basis 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  There seemed to be some 
initial cases of this but the recurring budget cuts seems to have forced them into one 
FNC or another  
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency?)  Do not know 
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IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  Short answer is NOT VERY.  But must be considered 
against what the alternative would have been.  Pre-FNC approach would have 
suffered even more from the continuing reduction of budgets.   
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  My perspective is that each FNC is different. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  My observation is all 
too often 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  From the outside, each FNC has a different, 
subjective method 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  If there is, I have not heard of it 
other than the prospect of replacing a terminated project—which possibility seems to 
have been overtaken by budget cuts before a new project could be started.  
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  N/A 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Not formally—word of mouth at best. 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes, occasionally. 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  N/A 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Not the ones I attended. 
If No, which communities regularly participate?  Lots of support contractors and 
other than “air.” 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  No 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  My own POC network within 
the FNCs 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Latest FNC memberships, recent briefs, 
current POR 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) Never, anymore.  After numerous initial attempts, 
found there was almost no info posted 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Somewhat useful at 
the beginning, but that info has never been updated 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  NTTO 




• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  No. 
• What has worked?  Consolidation of focus areas to allow meaningful 
accomplishments 
• What has not worked?  Fencing the FNC accounts from cuts (even discretionary 
ones) 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  A formal process to examine 
and plan for future technology needs.  Without this, S&T investment would be chaos. 
 
Additional Comments 
Recent DoN directives seem to promote “industry” models for conducting our business.  
Do not fully agree as motives are different, but even if we must, DoN fails to stick to 
the model of industry that places significant  and faithful investment in R&D (~2% 
off the top line) and does not allow that level to be cut.  S&T cannot be allowed to be 
an afterthought.  While we complain about a lack of money for current military 
budgets (and “war” bills), S&T is not successful when viewed as a totally COTS 
approach.  Technology must be worked sufficiently ahead of the insertion point to 
allow for successfully and affordably integrating the solution into the targeted 
“system”—both the platform and its network-centric operational scenario.  
Remember successful S&T means “leading the target” and involves anticipating both 
needs and solutions—up to 20 years in the future. 
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3. Response ACQ-3 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Ultimately, fleet.  Directly, program 
and program sponsor.   
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Numerous times, but I’m not sure everyone was ever contacted.  
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Better continuity, 
less of a “food fight” for ATDs that didn’t necessarily connect to programs.  
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Target programs for FNC 
R&D. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Critical to some, 
barely understood or appreciated by others – still others regard FNC funding as 
money that should be theirs, but they can’t direct it… that’s not necessarily a bad 
thing.   
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Many will.   
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Primarily programs of record.  In 
some cases, the R&D being conducted is more properly 6.2, so transition is too far in 
the future to be tied directly to the POR, but still likely.   
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Primarily warfighting value and likelihood 
of transition.   
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Underestimating 
the expense and scope of development required to reach program office expectations 
combined with overestimation by program offices of maturity of what will be 
delivered.   
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Generally, though that 
agreement is frequently based upon “success oriented” projections.   
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Yes, for instance anti 
torpedo torpedo relies on a weapon and passive sensor being developed by F/FP and 
an active sensor being developed by LASW. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency?)  Not aware, 
though some products, like an improved ALE 50 towed decoy, will likely be used by 




• Has the IPT been effective?  Largely.  My perception is that it varies.  Some seem to 
play very even handedly, while others seem to have been hijacked by the community 
to which the chairman belongs. 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  Generally worked out at a senior manager 
level, then ratified by the IPT.  
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Chair alone has 
changed 6 times in 3 years.   
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  A relative ranking based on warfighting 
contributions, technical likelihood of success, and fiscal restraints. 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  Yes, but that has largely 
developed since I have become distanced from the process. 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  Me, none, 
the IPT, many. 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  I was.  
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  I attended all.  
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  About quarterly, at least biannually 
(each leadership change). 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings? 
If No, which communities regularly participate?  Frequently missing fleet 
representation.   
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  I was.  
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  FNC Director. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  None that I can’t get.  
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) Never.  
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Unknown.  It was 
always so badly out of date that I stopped using it. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Used to meet at 




• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  Far better than what existed 
before. 
• What has worked?  The process, when followed. 
• What has not worked?  Constant cutting of FNC budget. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  Enforced planning and 
collaboration between FNC, acquisition program offices and acquisition sponsors. 
 
Additional Comments 
If every IPT followed the proscribed process, the FNCs would be much more highly 
considered than they are now.  Unfortunately, some FNCs persist in pursuing the 
desires of individuals or of communities that feel ownership regardless of the 
likelihood of actual transition. 
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4. Response ACQ-4 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other – Actually support all levels 
but working group would be best guess for a single category 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Good Question.  I could speculate as to 
who it is but it is not clear from my involvement as to who the process framers 
believe is the customer. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  I think so. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Two main impacts.  
One increased hope in that more funding has filtered to items or people that normally 
have not benefited from ONR investments.  Second extreme frustration at the 
continued reviews, changes in scope, budget cuts, taxes and other issues that take all 
of the efforts and through it away before resulting in a product.  This impact is 
amplified when most of the efforts put forward in the early stages were completed 
without funding based on the future benefit that in many cases will not materialize. 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  It has varied throughout the 
process.  At times – especially in the beginning – we were very organized with a 
centralized representative for our community within our FNC.  As the process 
evolved and people changed, it has ping-ponged back and forth and sometimes both 
at the same time between project level direct engagement and formalized centralized 
organization engagement.  More specifically – often there is direct engagement from 
the ONR program management with the acquisition representatives on an individual 
effort and other times the ONR-NAVAIR contact is brokered through a single 
individual who coordinates a NAVAIR response.  The problem has been assessing 
when which method is correct and lead to either issues of mistrust (centralized 
communications) or misunderstanding of command priorities (direct project level 
communications). 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  To my 
community the FNCs is extremely important since there is no other source of S&T 
investment for my community.  The specific question of how important is the process 
is somewhat different in that the process does not appear to be clearly defined and 
articulate and as such is not understood.  The result is the process is something that 
we endure to ensure that we can continue to maintain even the smallest of S&T 




• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  I am confident that most 
if not all projects that I am involved with will transition successfully provided the 
S&T produces the intended results.  I am so confident that I have budgeted most 
transition efforts directly into my RDT&E line. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  In the FNC that I am involved with, 
most efforts transition to multiple programs in a leader follower type of manner 
where we identify a lead platform and others that will come next.  However, only a 
portion actually require funding beyond the FNC investment.  Some projects result in 
a final product that can be implemented by spec or manual change.  Others require 
integration into the weapons system and will be done using either program funding or 
more general RDT&E funding. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Return on investment and successful 
transitions.  ROI is for project prioritization and performed by NCCA.  Transition is a 
measure of success of the projects themselves. 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  1.  Funding 2. 
funding, 3. funding.  More specifically:  1. ensuring transition funding is in place.  2.  
preserving FNC funding in light of all of the cuts and taxes to produce the technology 
sound product on the timeline promised.  3.  Convincing the powers that be that a 
spec or manual change is a viable transition path that does not require a funded 
budget line and that the project should not be canceled due to weak transition 
agreement. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Depends upon the project 
and the transition path.  Items to transition into V-22 have different requirements than 
items that result in a new approved paint system for legacy aircraft. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Not that I am aware of 
although we did attempt to get a project funded via multiple IPTs the other IPTs did 
not either care to pursue this route or have the funding to spare to do so. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency?)  In our FNC we 
have at least one project that is receiving funding from both the AF and the FAA. 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  It depends.  At times yes and at time no. 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  By the chair after considering all points. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Chair and S&T 
members have not changed.  Acquisition is on the 3rd member.   
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  If this means projects, initial selection was a 
process that I was a part of but would rather not discuss.  Cuts are implemented from 
the bottom of the prioritized project list based on return on investment. 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  One is currently in development 
but none exist today. 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  One or two.  




• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Yes 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  Every 8-10 weeks 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Yes 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  Relevant is the key word and in 
the eye of the sender.  They believe I am, I do not believe I am. 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  Network of trusted agents.  
No centralized place for repository of information 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Would love to have a current program of 
record.  Financial data is always hard to get and expect it will be near impossible now 
that N911 is no longer part of the IPT. 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  what is this?  Don’t think I have ever used it. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Don’t know. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  When they want 
something that they can only get from me.  When I want something I can only get 
from them.  Otherwise we avoid each other. 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  On a scale of 1 to 10 it is a 5. 
• What has worked?  It has given a forum for our concerns and needs and over time our 
S&T reps have taken ownership of our capability area. 
• What has not worked?  Teamwork and communication.  We continue to function with 
an “us and them” mentality.  Believe that the IPT is viewed as an impediment that is 
only there to dilute ONR authority. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  It should be that all 
communities have a voice so that we can ensure that the S&T investment is focused 
in areas that will best benefit the Sailors and ensure that the transition follows the S$T 
investment in a timely manner.  It should also be that it allows for more secure 
budgets of both the S&T investment and also the transition funding but I have yet to 
see that happen. 
 
Additional Comments 
I have noted repeatedly in my comments that communication and single focus should be 
the benefit of the FNC Process but I do not believe that all parties have bought into 
that idea and if they have not done so by now they never will.  In my FNC, I continue 
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to see patterns repeat themselves which tells me that nothing is really changing.  I had 
hoped that the FNCs would be a good first step in planning of projects from S&T 
through fielding and allow for better investment of resources but now I think it is just 
another flag officer good idea that has gone bad. 
 315
5. Response ACQ-5 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  fleet 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Introduced new tech 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Budget for transition to 
platforms 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  minimal 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Some will 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  FA-18, E-2, others 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Transition or not 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Today’s 
requirement/budget process 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Pretty much 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Not that I am aware of 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency?)  ditto 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  yes 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  Group discussion 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  annually 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  Don’t know 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  Group discussion 




• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  yes 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Every one 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  quarterly – semi annually 
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• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Yes, or their reps 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  yes 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  ONR FNC DPM 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Not that I know of 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  rarely 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Don’t know 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  weekly 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  satisfied 
• What has worked?  Group is unified  
• What has not worked?  Hard to ensure transition 





6. Response ACQ-6 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other:  via SURFTECH 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Navy – Fleet, Acquisition Pgms. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community? 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Through the IPTs, CNR & 
N70 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Fairly important 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  no 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Acquisition programs 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Signed TTAs 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  FNC funding 
cuts 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  In general, except 
AMRFS 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  yes 




• Has the IPT been effective?  In the beginning 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?   
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  3 times 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  ONR proposes changes to flags & executes 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  In KSA there is. 




• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  NO 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  twice a year 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  No 
If No, which communities regularly participate?  OPNAV 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  No 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  Website, N70 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Yes, TTAs, etc. 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  Very often 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  It’s OK.  Often all we 
can get 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Depends on the 
FNC.  KSA: once every 3 months; FFP: once a month (more frequently with POM06 
process); ACES: once to twice a month 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  yes 
• What has worked?  Getting stakeholders together 
• What has not worked?  Overall funding cuts 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  OPNAV & Acquisition 




7. Response ACQ-7 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Hard to say.  It seems like OPNAV is 
who is being appeased through the IPT.  But it’s the Acq[uition] PM’s who deliver 
the capability to the fleet and it’s the fleet who are the end-item users. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  Yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Very little. 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Through ONR PMs, but with 
much difficulty. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Not very much. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Some will transition, 
probably not as planned (schedule-wise).  Many will never transition due to repeated 
funding cuts by ONR. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Varies.  All to current PORs. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  A 6.4 PE (actually any non-S&T PE).  
TTA’s and TRL levels are also used. 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Seemingly 
constant funding level changes.  There is little stability. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  For the approved 
programs, yes. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Don’t think so. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)?  No program 
that I know about.  Some programs have joint funds but only because its mandated.  
Nothing’s joint by choice (look at the Navy interest in ACTD’s -- nil). 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  No 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  Flag-level tradeoffs.  The Chair makes the IPT 
decision. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Lots.  There’s always 
someone new. 
 320
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  ONR submits a program and the IPT approves the 
program.  As long as there’s something there for everyone its usually ok’d. 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  None that I have ever heard 
about. 




• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  In the beginning but no longer.  As I see it the 
meeting frequency has tapered off dramatically. 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  Yes 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  Not sure any longer.  Possibly every 6 
months. 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Most. 
• If No, which communities regularly participate?  I have never seen a fleet rep show 
up.  Most meetings were dialogs between OPNAV & S&T. 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  no 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  ONR rep’s. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Yes, the current listing of approved 
programs for the FNCs; new IPT EC’s; new desired program directions; etc. 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  Never 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Useless.  Info is old 
and unreliable.  I have to double-check anything there that matters. 




• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process? No. 
• What has worked?  For a while there was more visibility in the Navy program and a 
lot of good dialog.  Since the S&T program has now been defined across the FYDP the 
books are pretty much closed again.  That level of dialog has stopped. 
• What has not worked?  It’s still a ‘good old boy’ network with the old stovepipes.  
Not much has changed wrt getting things out the door faster.  The case for the usefulness 
of S&T to the warfighter has not been effectively made. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  Probably opening the books 




It seems like the Navy tried to make some fundamental and needed changes but they 
seemed to mismanage it.  I think they let the process get completely out of hand and it 
became a huge political funding food-fight within the Pentagon.  Not sure why but it 
seems like the Navy is doing all they can to avoid using the existing SYSCOM 
infrastructure.  It’s ironic as that’s probably where their biggest successes have/will 
come from.  It’s the SYSCOM ranges, labs and warfare centers that have the in-depth 
Systems Engineering expertise to implement solutions quickly.  Disappointing. 
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D. FLEET/FORCE RESPONSES 
 
1. Response FF-1 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other :  
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Current Acquisition Programs of 
Record (PORs). 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  YES 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  LITTLE – limited to 
extent Acquisition Community eventually responds to Fleet mission needs 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  POORLY.  Fleet input to FNC 
Process limited to IPT Fleet rep, often passive rep from CFFC lacking time, 
TADTAR and technical background to effectively represent fleet interests.  FNCs 
rarely solicit fleet input additional fleet input.  ONR management and much FNC 
management does not appear to welcome any external input into FNC decisions. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  In principle, very 
important, since it controls half of 6.2 and most 6.3 funding.  FNC Process is not 
having near the fleet impact it should have.  Sea Trial process appears to be at least in 
part a reaction to 6.3 failure to serve fleet needs. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  NO.  Apportionment of 
ONR budget reductions to FNCs seems to have little correlation to needs of either 
acquisition community or Fleet. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Existing acquisition PORs. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  None that affect FNC funding decisions. 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Continual cuts 
in FNC funding, apparently disproportional to cuts in Navy S&T funding, and 
allocation of those cuts with little apparent regard for fleet priorities. 
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• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  If there is, it isn’t visible 
to Tycom N8s. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Yes.  Not necessarily bad if 
efforts are coordinated and complementary (e.g. REDS).  An impediment to useful 
technology development when efforts are uncoordinated and competing for available 
funding (e.g. KSA and FFP phased array antenna efforts). 




• Has the IPT been effective?  Generally, no.  IPTs seem to have mere figurehead role 
in FNC decision reviews driven by ONR FNC managers and ONR management.  
Fleet representation does not appear effective in most IPTs. 
• How are decisions  made in your IPT?  Mostly by the FNC ONR staff, with no more 
than pro forma review by IPTs. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT? 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  Mostly by the FNC ONR staff, with no more than 
pro forma review by IPTs. 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs? 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  Two 
invited.  Several others uninvited and unwanted. 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  NO.  Never.  Any information I get on FNC 
meetings comes from SURFTECH staff or CFFC NRSA.  I have repeated asked to 
have a consolidated calendar of FNC events maintained on the ONR web site, without 
effect. 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  NO.  Generally invitation only. 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  They all seem to meet too 
infrequently to exercise effective control of FNC.   
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Apparently not. 
If No, which communities regularly participate?  ONR and acquisition POC PMO. 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  Not very well.  Some FNCs are 
better than others. 
 324
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  The DoN S&T web site.  
With some exceptions, the FNCs do not distribute information to me, and apparently 
don’t distribute information effectively beyond the ONR staff and IPT reps.  KSA, 
LASW and OMCM are better in this respect, but none of the FNCs consistently keep 
stakeholders beyond the acquisition POR PMO and the IPT informed.  
• Is there any info you need but do not have? 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/) Whenever I need information about the FNCs.  With 
all its deficiencies it is the only source of FNC information readily available from 
ONR.  I rely on SURFTECH, the CFFC NRSA and direct contact with ONR FNC 
staff for more timely/useful information. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Content is highly 
variable between FNCs.  A lot of the information is obsolete.  Navigation is an 
impediment to finding useful information even when there. 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Whenever I need 
current and evaluated information; averages several times a month but highly variable 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  No. 
• What has worked?  Focusing critical mass of funding in certain areas. 
• What has not worked?  Responsiveness to fleet needs.  Transformation.  Synergy with 
DoD ACTD process.  IPT process – decisions still too often driven by ONR and POR 
staff  priorities vice big-Navy need priorities. 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  Transitioning technology to 




For what it is worth, the rare comments I hear about ONR at flag level are to the effect 
that too much S&T funding still being directed to what the scientists want to work on 
versus what the Navy needs.  I can’t honestly dispute that is still happening, but feel it 
is unfair to blame the scientists doing the work; a fair share of the blame should be 
given to the managers at ONR and the acquisition PORs. 
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2. Response FF-2 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other (Science Advisor) 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  From our perspective, it’s the fleet 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community? Yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Gives a voice to the 
fleet to provide guidance to the technical community 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Through the N8 Office  at CSF 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Provides 
opportunity to see which technologies are likely to be available beyond the FYDP. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  No 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  They should be transitioned to the 
R&D offices (ex. ASTO) who plans for acquisition (backfit or forward fit) 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Metrics are based on the MCP assessment 
studies 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Projects take 
longer to develop and cost more than expected 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  NO 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Yes 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)?  NO – if an 
FNC product is also an ACTD then YES 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  YES 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  Proposed FNC projects are discussed in the 
working groups, recommendations made to the executive panel and approved by the 
Flag Panel 
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• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Don’t know 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  Execution of FNC portfolio decided by IPT 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  New programs are presented at 
SUBTECH 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  Too many 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings? Yes 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings? Yes 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)? At least quarterly 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings? NO 




• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information? Yes 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information? ONR POCs 
• Is there any info you need but do not have? No 
• How frequently do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  Rarely 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Used as technology 
resource 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives? Often 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process? NO 
• What has worked? Yes sometimes 
• What has not worked? Technology has not transitioned or not been accepted into 
acquisition 





3. Response FF-3 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other: Looking for FNC products 
to serve the needs of the fleet. 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  The Fleet. 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  No – we are not well tied into the FNCs; not aware of the potential 
payoff. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Negligible 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  We don’t – years ago the CCIs 
influenced the FNCs, but no real engagement since. 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Not significant 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Somewhat 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Multiple acquisition programs 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Don’t really know 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  End user 
acceptance 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Don’t know 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Don’t know 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)?  Don’t know 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  Apparently some are more effective than others 
• How are decisions made in your IPT?  Not involved 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Not involved 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  Originally, through the CCIs 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  This seems to be a difficulty 




• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  No 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  No 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  Potential interest in multiple IPTs 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Don’t know 
If No, which communities regularly participate?  Don’t know 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  No – I have to hunt for it. 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  To the PMs, although I 
haven’t 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Don’t know 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  I have not used it since I reported for duty at CSP 3 
months ago (with the exception of Tech Solutions) 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Useful, but not 
pertinent 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Haven’t yet 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  Don’t know, but it no longer 
seems as responsive to the fleet as it should be 
• What has worked?  Initial program prioritization based on CCIs seems to have 
worked 
• What has not worked?  Program no longer agile to meet changing fleet needs 
• What is should be the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  Ongoing fleet 
input 
 
h. Additional Comments 
The fleet’s time horizon is almost immediate.  The FNCs look much further into the 
future.  It seems that much up-and-coming technology is entering theater through at-
sea tests and demos, but not much of this technology seems to have a tie to the FNCs.  
A notable example is the Assured Access experiment, which is about two-thirds 
Littoral ASW and one-third MCM.  Thus, one would think that the two corresponding 
FNCs would be engaged, but I have not seen any such connection.  Much state-of-
the-art technology is being fielded for fleet evaluation during this and similar 
experiments, yet this technology does not seem tied to the FNCs, or at least the link is 
not apparent.  There seems to be a general lack of awareness here as to what the 
FNCs are and how they can be of benefit to the fleet.  Other technology venues seem 
to be making a much bigger impact.  Bottom line: The FNCs no longer seem closely 
tied to the fleet, but in order to succeed, they should be. 
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4. Response FF-4 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other:  S&T Advocate 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  SYSCOMs for transition, Warfighter 
for validation 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  For the most part 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Little impact, since 
no fleet demos in the past two years and no new capability was delivered, especially 
in the area of antisubmarine warfare.  Capabilities for ASW were very expensive 
resulting in acquisition problems. 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Operators involvement is too 
late in the development process 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Quite important 
to submarine community, especially related to littoral warfare 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  If funding is maintained 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  SYSCOMs 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Not sure 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Funding 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Operators need to see 
capability and weight in on maturity 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Not sure 




• Has the IPT been effective?  No contact was made with the submarine force (pacific 
region) 
• How are decisions  made in your IPT?  Not sure 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Not sure 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  Not sure 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  Yes, some FNCs due a RFP and 
complete evaluation 
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• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  Only one, 
but it was difficult to participate while in the field 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  No 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  No 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  Not sure 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  No 
If No, which communities regularly participate?  Not sure 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  No 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  ONR/NRL internal website 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Not sure 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)   A lot 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  Yes 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Best POC, 
contacted as needed 
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  No, totally inflexible 
• What has worked?  Not sure. 
• What has not worked?  Poor communications with operators and Science Advisors 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?   
 
Additional Comments 
Need to get products to the fleet and force for evaluation and input.  Stop hiding in labs 
and get connected & get real!  
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5. Response FF-5 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  F/F 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  yes 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  Transition: some 
Process: more 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Before: CCIs/NRSA.  Now: 
NRSA 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  Depends who you 
ask- Overall, Scale of 1-10, 6. 
 
Transitions 
• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  no 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  F/F 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Several I hope 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  Acquisition 
process 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  assumed 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  should 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency)?  should 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective? 
• How are decisions  made in your IPT? 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT? 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected? 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs? 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)? 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings? 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings? 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)? 
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• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings? 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  Yes, believe so 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  PMs, labs (performers), web 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  Not that I know of 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  not often enough 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  some 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  ~Monthly  
 
Satisfaction 
• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  yes 
• What has worked?  Attention to F/F needs (CCIs basis of FNC) 
• What has not worked?  No stability and Budget drills 




6. Response FF-6 
About You 
• What community do you represent? 
S&T  /  Requirements  /  Acquisition  /  Resources   /  Fleet Rep  /  Other 
• In what capacity do you (or did you) support an FNC? 
Principal IPT  /  Working Group  /  Project level  /  Other: NONE – NO ROLE WAS 
EVER DEFINED FOR JFCOM WITHIN FNC PROCESS 
 
FNC General 
• Who is the "customer" for the FNC Process?  Unknown; Not enough data to evaluate 
• Have the goals and objectives of the FNC program been explained to your 
community?  They were explained to me as a Science Advisor and member of the 
NFFTIO community.  They were never, to my knowledge explained to JFCOM, be it 
the staff officers or the leadership team. 
• What impact has the FNC Process had within your community?  From what I can tell, 
little to none. 
• How does your community engage the FNC Process?  Although I asked early on 
(2000) and made suggestions on this, none were ever implemented.  Early on, the 
Missile Defense FNC made contact with JFCOM to ensure that their work would be 
“borne joint” but that relationship, to my knowledge and despite my attempts to 
facilitate,  was “stillborn.” 
• How important is the FNC Process to your community/operations?  The process is 
not very important as it is currently defined.  The products and what the FNCs are 
purporting to do should be very important to the joint Community – particularly in 




• Are you confident that programs will transition as planned?  Unknown, no data. 
• Where are the programs being transitioned to?  Unknown, no data. 
• What metrics are being used by the IPTs?  Unknown, no data. 
• What is the biggest obstacle to transitioning technology as planned?  I do not know if 
it is the “biggest obstacle” but the fact that JFCOM was never engaged in this process 
could hamper implementation at a later date considering that current DoD leadership 
is very focused on reducing redundant service programs in favor of joint solutions 
(ref: MID-912, rewrites of 5000, institution of new requirements process, etc.)  
Perhaps it is the “biggest obstacle” after all. 
• Is there agreement on project maturity, cost and schedule?  Unknown, no data. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded from multiple IPTs?  Unknown, no data. 
• Are any of the IPT products funded Jointly (other service or agency?)  Unknown, no 
data.  Be careful how you define “jointly” though.  There’s Multi-Service and there’s 
Joint.  Some things are best transitioned and funded by a single service (ASW, for 
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instance), others may have only multi-service application (fixed wing aircraft) while 
others such as C4ISR, Missile Defense, Fires, etc. have jointness inherent.  Then 
there’s “Inter-agency” which is increasingly becoming as important to the DoD and 
joint Community as “Joint”… 
 
IPT Process 
• Has the IPT been effective?  Unknown, no data. 
• How are decisions  made in your IPT?  Unknown, no data. 
• How frequent has the membership changed within your IPT?  Unknown, no data. 
• How is the IPT portfolio selected?  I attended one review of an FNC (sorry, I forget 
the name) but was not asked for my opinion on the IPT portfolio.  I did come armed 
with a fleet capability need but could not get anyone to listen to me. 
• Is there a process for the selection of new programs?  Unknown, no data. 
• How many data calls have you responded in over the past year (approx)?  At JFCOM, 
I received no data calls related to FNCs that I can remember. 
 
IPT Meetings 
• Are you informed of IPT meetings?  Not applicable 
• Have you ever attended IPT meetings?  No 
• How frequently does your IPT meet (approx)?  Not Applicable 
• Do all community representatives attend IPT meetings?  Unknown, not applicable 
If No, which communities regularly participate? 
 
Communication 
• Are you kept informed of relevant S&T information?  No 
• Where do you go to get any needed FNC information?  I tried to keep up with the 
various websites – a lot of time there is very little in these websites except old 
briefings used to justify the original FNC. 
• Is there any info you need but do not have?  I can always ferret information (speaking 
as a JFCOM S&T Advisor here) and use contacts at ONR to ask questions. But after 
being rebuffed, I instead would go to OSD for my technology needs via ACTDs, 
JT&Es, DARPA.  If I went to ONR, I would go in with a Naval partner (CLF, CMFL, 
CNSW) who shared a joint issue with me – and never did I engage an FNC to fulfill 
that need but instead went to NFFTIO money (Fleet/Force Innovation Program) 
• How frequent do you use the DoN S&T website? (URL = 
https://donst.nrl.navy.mil/donst/)  I perused it a few times but found it hard to 
navigate and a lot of the information dated. 
• What is the usefulness of the information at the S&T website?  When I perused it, 
little to none) 
• How frequently do you interact with the S&T FNC representatives?  Once over the 




• In general, are you satisfied with the FNC Process?  Speaking as an S&T Advisor, no. 
• What has worked?  Unknown 
• What has not worked?  Unknown 
• What is the most important aspect of the FNC Process?  The lack of engagement with 
the joint Community 
 
Additional Comments 
If this administration stays in power for another four years, I anticipate some very large 
changes within the service S&T communities.  I heard ADM (ret) Cebrowski speak 
recently (at the Naval Industry Conference) and he stated that “Science and 
Technology that helps the joint Warfighter tends to be without a constituent” and said 
while he had no answers on how to fix this that either we should change the way the 
current system is incentivized or create a new organization to handle this.  I suspect 
that this was not an idle comment and that very smart people in the administration 
and Pentagon are addressing how to solve this issue.  I left behind a 5 year S&T 
Strategy which if implemented would go a long way to solving this.  The question is 
whether JFCOM is really the right organization to take on this burden. 
 
The way in which ONR has chosen to “play” in the ACTD program is also indicative of a 
“head in the sand” organization unwilling to accept the new rules that are forming.  I 
would suggest that ONR consider changing the focus of some of the FNCs to Future 
joint Capabilities – become a leader in joint S&T by inviting the other services in 
(perhaps by using the TARA and associated committees) and expand their IPTs to 




APPENDIX B: BUSINESS MODELS 
This appendix provides additional information on classifications of business 
models found in the business literature.  This listing is not exhaustive as there may be 
numerous innovative variations on the standard models presented here.  In some cases 
sub-categories have been listed to illustrate revenue generation variations within a 
business model category. 
• Advertising.  This is the traditional business model used by newspapers, magazines, 
radio and TV.  The media provides content and services mixed with advertising 
messages.  The advertisements may be the major source of revenue for the media 
content provider.  The media broadcaster may be a content creator or a distributor of 
content created elsewhere.  The advertising model typically works when the volume 
of viewer traffic is large or highly specialized.  Advertising models include: 
• Classifieds.  Users list items for sale or wanted for purchase. Listing fees 
are common, but there also may be a membership fee. 
• User Registration.  Content-based sites that are free to access but require 
users to register and provide demographic data. The user registration 
information provides useful information that can be sold to others for 
targeted direct advertising campaigns.  Supermarket "club" membership 
cards are an example. 
• Affiliate.  This model provides convenient purchase opportunities wherever people 
may be shopping.  The approach is to offer financial incentives (such as a percentage 
of revenue or commissions) to the affiliates.  This model is also referred to as a “pay-
for-performance” model because if an affiliate does not generate sales, it represents 
no cost to the merchant.  Print media such as bookstores and newspaper use this 
model for the sales and distribution of their books and newspapers.  
• Brokerage.  Brokers bring buyers and sellers together and facilitate transactions (as 
in real estate transactions).  The broker usually charges a fee or receives a 
commission for each transaction it enables.  Broker models are appearing more 
frequently in business-to-business (B2B), business-to-consumer (B2C), and 
consumer-to-consumer (C2C) markets. Brokerage model revenue streams can 
include:  
• Marketplace Exchange.  Offers services that cover the entire transaction 
process, from market assessment to price negotiation and order fulfillment. 
Exchanges can operate independently or be backed by an industry 
consortium. 
 337
• Auction Broker.  Conducts auctions for sellers.  The Broker charges the 
seller a listing fee and commission scaled with the value of the transaction.  
Auctions vary widely in terms of the offering and bidding rules and are 
being conducted on an experimental basis by the Navy in a number of 
different areas. 
• Distributor.  A catalog operation that connects a large number of product 
manufacturers with volume and retail buyers. 
• Virtual Marketplace.  A service for online merchants that charges setup, 
monthly listing, and/or transaction fees.  May also provide automated 
transaction and marketing services. 
• Community.  This model is based on user loyalty. Users have a pre-determined level 
of investment in both time and emotion.  Revenue stream is based on the sale of 
ancillary products and services or voluntary contributions. 
• Open Source.  This model applies to software developed voluntarily by a 
global community of programmers who share code openly.  Instead of 
licensing the software code for a fee, the open source model generates 
revenue from the sale of related services (consulting, systems integration, 
product support, tutorials, documentation, etc.). 
• Public Broadcasting.  The common user contributor model used by not-for-
profit radio and television broadcasting.  The model receives revenue from a 
community of users who will support the organization through voluntary 
donations. 
• Direct (Manufacturer).  This model is based on a manufacturer interfacing with its 
customers directly and bypassing, or greatly compressing, the normal distribution 
channel.  This model generates revenue through increased product sales at 
significantly lower price margins.  The revenue stream for this model depends on 
highly efficient operations, excellent customer service, and an intimate understanding 
of customer preferences. 
• Purchase.  The outright sale of a product to a consumer.  Recently this 
definition has been expanded to clarify the right of ownership is transferred 
to the buyer (music industry). 
• Lease.  The buyer receives the right to use the product under a “terms of 
use” agreement and a rental fee.  The product is returned to the seller upon 
expiration or default of the lease agreement.  One type of agreement may 
include a right of purchase upon expiration of the lease.  This business 
model is common in the automotive and housing markets. 
• License.  The sale of the product involves only the transfer of usage rights 
to the buyer and is done in accordance with a “terms of use” agreement.  
Ownership rights usually remain with the manufacturer.  This model is 
common in the computer software industry. 
• Infomediary.  This model is based on revenue generated from the collection, analysis 
and sale of data about consumers’ consumption habits. 
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• Incentive Marketing.  Provides incentives to customers such as redeemable 
points or coupons for making purchases from associated retailers.  Revenue 
is generated by selling the data collected for targeted advertising. 
• Merchant. Wholesalers and retailers of goods and services.  Sales may be made 
based on list prices or through auction.   
• Catalog Merchant.  Typically a mail-order business which combines mail, 
telephone and online ordering. 
• Brick and Mortar.  This is a retail establishment with a traditional 
storefront that a customer visits. 
• Subscription.  Users are charged a periodic fee to subscribe to a service and the fees 
are incurred irrespective of actual usage rates. 
• Utility.  This model is also referred to as an "on-demand" model because it is based 
on delivering a product based on metering usage (“pay as you go”).  Metered services 
differ from subscriber services because the revenue generated is a function of actual 
product usage rates.  Utility models have been traditionally used for essential public 
services such as gas, electricity and water. 
• Metered Usage.  Bills users based on actual usage of a service. 
• Metered Subscriptions.  Allows subscribers to purchase access to content 
in metered incremental portions. 
 
Businesses may incorporate a mixture of the above models to differentiate 
themselves from competitors within their industry and to optimize the potential revenue 
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APPENDIX C: ACQUISITION TRANSITION ISSUES 
This appendix discusses problems and obstacles encountered when a DoN S&T 
project, after having successfully completed all technical and programmatic objectives, 
attempted to transition the demonstrated naval capability to its target acquisition program, 
as originally planned.  This example is included as an appendix to this thesis because it 
illustrates the very real issues encountered within the military “business environment” 
when attempting to transition advanced warfighting capabilities to operational status in 
our current environment. 
The information presented here was compiled from a number of sources and 
through discussions with personnel directly involved in the technology development and 
transition processes.  The details presented are believed to be accurate although others 
may have different opinions regarding my interpretation of events described. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Direct Attack Munition Affordable Seeker (DAMASK) project was a DoN 
S&T product improvement program (PIP) technology demonstration option for the (Joint 
Direct Attack Munition) JDAM program.  The DAMASK project completed all of its 
technology development and demonstration objectives successfully yet, at the time of this 
writing, has failed to transition to operational capability as planned.  As this example 
illustrates, even in cases when the (higher-risk) technology development objectives are 
successful, significant obstacles to achieving a “transition” remain due to inconsistencies 
in the interpretation of the acquisition reform guidelines established through the changes 
directed by SECDEF William Perry.  The manner in which these acquisition guidelines 
are being implemented by the acquisition community, in this case, has the adverse affect 
of limiting the technology options.  The net effect is higher weapon system costs, longer 
development times.  In “business” terms these adverse affects would translate to a lower 
return on investment (ROI) and a longer time-to-market (TTM)–precisely the opposite 
effect of the intended goals of the acquisition reform changes.  This disconnect is, of 
course, unintentional but is the result of an abdication of technical authority–and, 
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ultimately, the financial responsibility – on the part of DoN leadership in an overzealous 
attempt to realize costs savings without the full recognition of the consequences.   
 
B. ISSUES 
JDAM is a joint Air Force (AF) and Navy program to develop an affordable, 
accurate, all-weather guidance kit for current inventory 1,000 and 2,000 pound munitions 
(bombs).  The guidance kit includes an inertial navigation system augmented by Global 
Positioning System (GPS) updates.  The guidance kit attaches to the bomb and, through 
controlled tail fin movements, directs the bomb to the target.  The system is an 
autonomous direct-attack weapon being integrated across the full spectrum of Navy and 
Air Force aircraft.  The Mission Need Statement (MNS) is TAF/SAC 401-91 and the 
Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) are CAF 401-91-II-A, Joint Adverse 
Weather Precision Strike Capability (13 Nov 91) and CAF/USN ORD for JDAM (30 
Aug 95).  JDAM was selected as an acquisition reform model program and accelerated in 
FY95 as a result of a congressional study which recommended the military services 
develop an adverse weather, accurate, air-to-ground targeting capability as soon as 
possible. 
 
1. The Acquisition Approach 
JDAM was one of seven pilot programs selected by the DoD to test new and 
innovative methods for streamlining the acquisition process.  Some of the primary goals 
were to incorporate, as much as possible, the use of best commercial practices and off-
the-shelf components to significantly reduce the weapon system’s cost and development 
time.   
As a model DoD program, the AF established an aggressive acquisition strategy 
from the start.  Their plans were to complete only an "acceptable" amount of 
Development Test & Evaluation (DT&E) and some Initial Operational Test & Evaluation 
(IOT&E) before the low-rate initial production (LRIP) decision would be made.  The 
program would then complete DT&E and IOT&E prior to the Milestone III full-rate 
production decision.  AF leadership felt this approach would provide the greatest 
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flexibility and allow them to accelerate program development while reducing cost, 
schedule and performance risks, and help ensure a smooth transition to production. 
After program acceleration in 1995 the program executed its aggressive 
acquisition strategy in an impressive and highly successful manner.  The first (JDAM) 
guided flight tests were conducted in October of 1996 and quickly followed by LRIP 
approval on 30 April 1997.  This milestone accomplishment put the program into the 
Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase of the acquisition cycle.  
Just over one year later, on 24 June 1998, the first production JDAM guidance kit was 
delivered and, on 25 February 2000, the fourth LRIP contract was awarded.  “Adequate” 
system performance test results and procurements costs for the JDAM tail kits which 
dropped from an initial (pre-acceleration program estimate) cost of $40K/each to just 
under $20K/each clearly showed the acquisition strategy was a success.  JDAM's 
Milestone III decision by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) was made in early April 
2001 and immediately followed by a full-rate production award for more than 11,000 
JDAM guidance kits.252 
 
2. Requirements Issue 
Although performance was considered adequate the JDAM weapon system was 
not meeting the weapon system requirement which called for a 3-meter targeting 
accuracy.  Performance was considered adequate since the baseline JDAM contract 
allowed for a reduced (13-meter) performance figure.  In recognition of the 3-meter 
precision targeting shortfall discrepancy the Air Force (AF) requested the JROC253 
eliminate the "precision" requirement.  The Navy, however, argued strongly for the 
validity of the original 3-meter requirement since this performance requirement was a 
critical parameter in their weapons neck-down strategy.  The JROC decided in favor of 
the Navy and did not reduce or eliminate the original 3-meter accuracy requirement.  This 
(revalidated) requirement provided an opportunity for the initiation of a DoN S&T 
JDAM’s 3-meter precision capability requirement. project to specifically address                                                  
252 The unit cost for the tail kits were just over $21K/each. 
253 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has the responsibility to validate and approve 
the mission need. 
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3. S&T Risk Reduction Program 
The contribution of the DoN’s Science & Technology (S&T) Program to 
acquisition reform objectives is not well defined but is generally understood to include 
the development of advanced technology options for insertion into acquisition programs.  
With a validated naval requirement in hand OPNAV N78 approached the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) and requested that S&T resources (budget authority categories BA1 
through BA3) be used to initiate a development program which would address this high-
priority (naval) weapon performance shortfall.  OPNAV N78 provided transition funding 
and supported the development program throughout the Planning, Programming and 
Budgeting System (PPBS).  Significant resources were POM'd over the Future Years 
Development Plan (FYDP) from FY99 through FY03 to pay for the development of a 
Precision JDAM PIP program to fill the precision requirements hole.  There was 
agreement that the S&T program would, as a parallel effort, develop and demonstrate the 
3-meter precision targeting capability to an appropriate technology readiness level (TRL) 
in a risk-reduction role for the JDAM program.  The Direct Attack Munition Affordable 
Seeker (DAMASK) project was initiated as a DoN Advanced Technology Demonstration 
(ATD)254 program to develop a 3-meter targeting capability for JDAM PIP.  The 
DAMASK project successfully completed all of the ATD project objectives and 
demonstrated the targeting capability during operational flight tests.255  The next step was 
to transition the S&T project “to the fleet” via a pre-planned Precision JDAM PIP 
insertion “window of opportunity.”  Figure 7 shows the relevant significant milestones of 
the baseline JDAM program as well as the DAMASK PIP candidate S&T project and the 
Precision JDAM PIP acquisition schedule. 
 
                                                 
254 While the DAMASK project was in development, the DoN ATD process was replaced by the FNC 
process.  Had the DAMASK weapon system capabilities been able to successfully transition from 
development to the acquisition community, the DAMASK would have served as a model test case for 
justification of the FNC process. 
255 Four live flight tests were conducted; Programmed Rounds 1 and 2 (PR1, PR2) and Guided 




























Figure 7.   
                                                
JDAM, Precision JDAM PIP Development Schedules 
 
4. Transition Issues 
There were no problems or concerns expressed by the any of the stakeholder 
communities throughout the three years the DAMASK ATD program was under 
development.  Once the program successfully completed its ATD performance objectives 
– meaning it was now ready for transition to the JDAM acquisition program – a number 
of programmatic issues quickly surfaced.   
One issue which surfaced was that the JDAM weapon was manufactured by a 
contractor which did not show support for transitioning the concept into the acquisition 
program.  Although supportive during the ATD program, the contractor was not 
supportive of the seeker design once it became a serious candidate for Precision JDAM 
PIP256.  Complicating matters was the fact that the Navy’s acquisition program office 
expressed an opinion that, as they interpret the acquisition reform guidelines, they did not 
have the authority to direct a contractor to incorporate one design over any other 
technical approach which might be under consideration.  OPNAV and ONR strongly felt 
that since the government had already incurred a significant investment of development 
 
256 It is presumed the lack of prime contractor support was a direct reflection of the low profit margin 
for a low-cost seeker, even in production quantities. 
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and demonstration resources, and had demonstrated a system that successfully met the 
JDAM performance and cost objectives, that the DAMSK design could be directed.  It 
was also felt that the ‘new rules’ of acquisition reform clearly were intended to allow the 
insertion of such a cost-effective warfighting capability into the JDAM program. 
There was also disagreement over specific requirements which appear to have 
revolved around differences in the interpretation of what was “adequate” by acquisition 
reform standards.  System performance analysis provided evidence that the DAMASK 
solution did not fully meet the Launch Acceptability Requirements (LAR) envelope.  
Accordingly, the DAMASK design was considered unacceptable by the prime contractor.  
To resolve the LAR requirement issue the contractor conducted a requirements study and 
prepared an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) that recommended different seeker design 
that would meet the full performance requirements.  The recommended solution was a 
contractor in-house design which would be considered proprietary, more expensive to 
produce and would take longer to develop.  A final decision on these matters was never 
made throughout FY01.257 
 
5. Current Status 
The precision targeting requirement has not gone away nor has a candidate seeker 
been embraced for JDAM.  In FY02 the funding resources were transferred from the 
control of a weapons acquisition program office to an aircraft acquisition program office 
in order to allow the Precision JDAM PIP program to continue from a different 
development perspective.  It is now possible the JDAM precision targeting improvements 
will be obtained as a result of the development of an organic targeting capability for a 
future naval aircraft. 
 
C. SUMMARY 
As this case illustrates, serious acquisition reform issues remain and their 
resolution remain complex and difficult yet their resolution have far-reaching 
                                                 
257 Personnel involved expressed the opinion that it appeared the program office never believed the 3-
meter precision targeting requirement was necessary. 
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implications regarding our ability to transition our applied research and development 
capabilities to the operational community and achieve the acquisition reform objectives 
envisioned by the DoD, the DoN, and the Congress.  Failure to resolve these issues has 
the net resultant affect of higher weapon system costs and longer development times 
which translate to a lower return on investment (ROI) and a longer time-to-market 
(TTM).  In this regard the S&T resources have been, effectively, wasted and the DoN has 
experienced a “lost opportunity cost” equivalent to their S&T investment.  These results 
are the antithesis of technology development and precisely the opposite of the intended 
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APPENDIX D: MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
This appendix presents a sampling of the metrics for organizational effectiveness 
uncovered during the literature search phase of the research for this thesis.   
 
A. INPUT MEASURES 
• Mission, Vision – clear, substantive, unique. 
• Types and percentages of funding and applied work-years – appropriate for 
laboratory. 
• Workload – demonstrated need for products. 
 
1. DECISION AUTHORITY 
• Technical Director/Commander tenure. 
• Flexibility/freedom in decision making to operate the lab. 
• Authority/control over supporting procurement, personnel, supply and 
maintenance organizations. 
• Extent of laboratory contracting authority and reduction of mandatory 
reviews. 
• Specific tasking/responsibilities –appropriate for laboratory. 
 
2. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
• Retention rates of high grade scientist and engineers. 
• Recruitment of highly-qualified scientist and engineers, both young and 
experienced. 
• GPA at entry. 
• Time to hire. 
• Time to classify positions. 
• Ratio of new hires from highly-rated “Top” universities. 
• Ability to maintain an effective level of advanced-degree employees. 
• Ratio of accepted to rejected offers. 
• Number with advanced degrees. 
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• Number of joint efforts with academia. 
• Number of recognized authorities hired. 
• Number of senior S&Es hired. 
• Number hired from prestigious universities. 
• Number working in the Techbase. 
• Number of PhDs working in the Techbase. 
• Number given awards/prizes. 
• Number receiving grants. 
• Employee credentials – degrees, GPA, training. 
• Retention rate. 
 
3. FACILITIES MODERNIZATION 
• Quality of facilities. 
• Average time to effect major repairs and/or construction of new facilities. 
• Ability to achieve a rate of facility replacement consistent with private-sector 
laboratory management practices (replacement-rate goal of 50 year cycle). 
 
4. R&D CONTRACTING 
• Improved average time to execute a contract, small purchase, or cooperative 
agreement while maintaining quality (Procurement Action Lead Time). 
• Development of technical personnel to be more effective as contract-support 
coordinators. 
• Reduction in required reviews, clearances, and documentation. 
• Procurement acquisition lead time. 
• Cost of contracting. 
 
B. OUTPUT MEASURES 
• Number of transitions to warfare systems. 
• Reports/presentations – external/internal. 
• New system concepts – proposed/successful. 
• Proposals of all kinds – proposed/successful. 
• System specifications developed. 
 350
• Systems analysis. 
• Invention disclosures, patents. 
• Peer review – qualitative. 
• External awards (number, quality). 
• Reputation among users – commendations, surveys. 
• Audits – types of problems, resolved vs. unresolved. 
 
1. LABORATORY PRODUCTIVITY 
• Applications by industry for licenses of patented technologies. 
• Average time to renew/acquire research equipment. 
• Laboratory discretionary research and development funds (the Packard Report 
recommended a goal of 5% to 10% of all laboratory funding). 
• Technical publications recognized by peer review. 
• Operational/user interface. 
 
2. PRODUCTS (TECHBASE)  
• Number transitioned to development. 
• Number transitioned to industry 
• Number of patents and invention disclosures. 
• Number of advanced technology demonstrations. 
• Rate of growth of the number of advanced technology demonstrations. 
• Number of refereed publications. 
• Number of conferences and symposium presentations. 
 
3. PRODUCTS (SYSTEMS/SUBSYSTEMS) 
• Number reaching Initial Operational Capability (IOC). 
• Time to reach IOC. 
• Number of new starts. 
• Quality judged by: 
• Peer review. 
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APPENDIX E: CONGRESS 
This appendix provides a very brief summary of the role and operation of the 
Congress.  Congress plays an important role in the study of government operations due to 
their role as representatives of the American people, the taxpayers who pay for – through 
taxes levied – and are therefore the “customers” for the government programs. 
This brief overview is included as an appendix to this thesis because it illustrates 
the complexity through which the revenue flows to the organizations that produce and 
deliver the services requested.  The information presented here was compiled from a 
number of sources.258 
 
Congress plays an important role in government business operations.  
Congressional treatment of R&D is characterized by fragmentation and diffusion of 
power.  R&D programs are considered at two main levels in Congress, that of 
authorizations and that of appropriations.  Authorizing committees (such as the House 
Science Committee and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions) develop special expertise in the programs they oversee and review the 
substance of these programs.  However, the legislation they prepare does not directly 
result in spending but only provides guidance and sets appropriations ceilings. 
For discretionary programs, including R&D, the power to write the legislation 
that provides actual spending authority resides in the Appropriations Committees of the 
House and Senate.  These committees are each divided into 13 subcommittees, each of 
which is responsible for a bill that controls one portion of the budget.  Each 
subcommittee produces its appropriations bill separately from the others, and each bill is 
usually signed into law separately.  In March 2003, Congress reorganized its 
appropriations structure to accommodate the new Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) by creating a new subcommittee for DHS appropriations and consolidating the 
                                                 
258 AAAS Report XXVIII, An Introduction to R&D in the FY 2004 Budget, AAAS website URL = 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/04pch1.htm, accessed June 2003. 
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Treasury/Postal and Transportation subcommittees into a single one, to keep the total 
number of subcommittees at 13.  
R&D is contained in 10 of the 13 annual appropriations bills.  Four 
subcommittees (Defense, VA/HUD, Labor/HHS, and Energy/Water) fund 94 percent of 
the total federal R&D portfolio; in each of these subcommittees, R&D funding makes up 
more than 15 percent of discretionary spending.  
The division of the budget into 13 appropriations bills limits the extent to which it 
is possible to coordinate or trade off increases and decreases in agency R&D budgets in 
the congressional process.  For example, three R&D agencies – NSF, NASA, and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-come under the jurisdiction of the 
Subcommittee on Veterans' Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Independent 
Agencies.  NIH appropriations are decided by the Labor, Health and Human Services, 
and Education subcommittee.  This means, for example, that money used for the large 
increase in NIH's budget in FY 2003 did not come from the same pot of money that funds 
NSF and NASA.  What this means is that R&D programs will compete with those non-
R&D programs contained in the same appropriations bill for the limited funds available. 
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